房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子外文翻譯

1、英文翻譯題 目 buying a house and decision to use a real estate broker 決定通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子 原文： buying a house and the decision to use a real estate brokerintroductionwhat is it that residential real estate brokers do and why would a home buyer engage their services? as is often the case, answering this question

2、is not a simple task. home buyers who acquire their house through a broker do not purchase just a house-they also obtain the services of the broker. in other words, these buyers are consuming a bundled good. one dimension of this good is lower search time, and thus lower search costs, associated wit

3、h buying through a broker. recent research (baryla and zumpano, 1995) suggests that choosing a broker improves the marginal efficiency of search, making it more likely that a buyer will find a satisfactory match earlier in the search process. buying through a broker also increases the supply of hous

4、es available to buyers, and provides buyers with information on the quality of different houses and the neighborhoods in which they are located. brokers frequently help buyers identify sources of mortgage financing and property insurance, as well as assist buyers in recording the title.all of these

5、services suggest that brokers provide value added to buyers (in addition to providing a service to sellers), something that these buyers would be willing to pay for. thus this bundle of services and the house that is purchased would, intuitively, be priced higher than homes purchased without the ass

6、istance of a broker. several studies (janssen and jobson 1980; jud and frew, 1986) observe that buyers pay more for homes listed with brokers. it is not possible, however, to determine whether this applies to the entire residential housing market since research to this point has relied on local data

7、. higher prices indicate willingness by buyers to pay more for broker-listed houses than those sold directly by owners. alternatively, competition from for-sale-by-owner properties may prevent sellers from passing on commission costs to buyers in the form of higher prices. therefore, at issue is whe

8、ther broker-assisted sales result in higher prices.if search duration is affected by broker assistance what about price? this study attempts to answer these questions by developing an empirically testable model of broker choice. in the process, this study should provide important insights into the e

9、fficiency of the residential housing market as well as the effectiveness of brokers as market intermediaries. specifically, this study examines the effects of a real estate broker by hypothesizing a two-stage process. in the first step a buyer decides whether to engage the services of a broker to as

10、sist with the search. empirically, this decision is modeled as a probity equation where the choice to use a broker is a function of such variables as the cause of the move (i.e. changes in the household, or work-related moves), the income, age, experience, and market knowledge of the buyer, and othe

11、r buyer characteristics.the second step is the purchase. here selling prices are modeled as a function of house characteristics, buyer characteristics, and whether the sale was broker-assisted. this approach should provide information about the determinants of housing prices. in particular，this mode

12、l should allow us to determine whether the broker-assisted buyers and buyers for-sale-by-owner properties constitute segmented markets which would permit the maintenance of housing price differentials. this study uses cross-section data from a nationwide survey of recent homebuyers and sellers condu

13、cted by the research division of the national association of realtors. this database includes both broker-assisted sales and sales by owners, allowing an assessment of the impact of the real estate broker on selling price, and by implication, the value of the marketing services which brokers provide

14、 to sellers. our results indicate that indeed buyers who use brokers do pay more for their homes than those who do not buy through a broker. but our results also imply that it is not because these buyers have used a broker. rather, this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of th

15、e means by which the purchase was consummated. these buyers have higher incomes, are more likely to be from out of town, are more likely to have employer assistance in the purchase-all factors that lead them to pay more for a house, but also to make them more likely to use a broker in purchasing the

16、ir home. when the decision to use a broker is accounted for, these buyers do not wind up paying more for their homes, and there is some evidence that they actually pay less than a comparable buyer who buys without an agents assistance. the layout of this study is as follows. the relevant literature

17、is reviewed in section 2.in section 3 the data, variable selection, and model are described. section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section contains the conclusions of the study. literature review a broad range of research has focused on the determinants of housing prices. these incl

18、ude traditional estimates of housing demand hedonic modeling of housing prices, the determinants of the tradeoff between price and time on the market, and models of the search process. other literature has examined the role of real estate brokers and has focused on the impact of brokers on buyer sea

19、rch, or has examined the welfare and/or moral-hazard implications of broker intermediation. few studies have tried to measure the direct effects of real estate brokers on the housing market, and fewer still on home selling prices. the work that has been produced to date has often generated conflicti

20、ng results. in part, these disparate results may reflect data availability problems, as virtually all of these earlier studies have been based on local data, and samples tended to be small, making generalizations difficult. in one of the first empirical studies of broker choice, janssen and jobson （

21、1980）find that real estate agents do have an impact on price. using data from the canadian housing market, janssen and jobson results indicate that with real estate firms of comparable size, brokers who list comparable properties for higher prices than competing brokers tend to realize significantly

22、 higher selling prices. the higher selling prices tend to be associated with transactions involving executive transfers and broker-arranged secondary financing. these results may in turn indicate that brokers obtain higher prices when dealing with buyers who are both less knowledgeable about local m

23、arket conditions and less sensitive to price. yavas and colwell (1994) suggest that selling price may also be, at least to some degree, a function of the type of broker listing arrangement used by the seller. in a study of the residential market jud (1983) estimates the demand for real estate broker

24、age services. using housing transactions data from three urban areas in north carolina, jud finds that brokers do not affect the prices of the houses which they sell, although they do appear to influence the level of housing consumed by buyers. in a subsequent study jud and frew (1986), using differ

25、ent data, find that brokers do obtain higher prices for the homes they sell. evidence is also presented that broker-assisted buyers have a greater demand for houses than their non-broker-assisted counterparts. their results lead them to conclude that broker intermediation has an effect analogous to

26、that of advertising in markets with imperfect information. more recent research by turnbull and sirmans (1993) examines the extent to which differences in information and search costs are related in housing prices. using data from the baton rouge market area turnbull and sirmans compare the prices p

27、aid by first-time and out-of-town buyers to the prices paid for comparable housing by more knowledgeable local and repeat homebuyers. their results indicate that home prices are similar across buyers with different information sets and search costs. since these were all broker-assisted transactions,

28、 tarnbull and sirmans conclude that existing brokerage institutions, such as the mls, successfully eliminate the potential price effects of asymmetric information and, thereby improve the efficiency of the housing market. it is not possible, however, to determine from this study whether price differ

29、ences exist between broker-assisted and non-broker assisted transactions. although selling prices are not compared, a study by baryla and zumpano (1995), for the first time, uses a national sample of broker-assisted and non-broker sales transactions to assess the impact of intermediation by the agen

30、t on search effort. this study indicates that information asymmetries are present in the residential real estate market and that intermediation by agents does affect buyer search efforts. first-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local home buyers. equally impo

31、rtant real estate brokers are able to reduce search time for virtually all classes of consumers whether first-time experienced local or out-of-town buyers. a follow-up study by baryla, zumpano, and elder (1995) finds that the mechanism by which agents reduce buyer search duration is an increase in s

32、earch intensity. having more market access and housing information than buyers working without brokers, broker-assisted consumers are able to visit more homes during a given period of time. these results suggest that buyers with high information and search costs are more likely to seek out the servi

33、ces of real estate brokers. whether this implication is true, and what effect such a search decision has on selling price however remains to be seen. the next logical step, therefore, is to examine this choice and its consequent effect on home prices. data and methodology this study uses data from a

34、 nationwide survey of home buyers conducted by the national association of realtors in 1987. the survey, the home buying and selling process was mailed to over 30,000 households. after eliminating incomplete or faulty questionnaires the database totaled 2495 observations all of which took place in19

35、86. table 1 displays summary statistics from the survey sample, categorized by whether the transaction was agent-assisted or non-agent-assisted. table la displays agent usage based on differences in information and search costs among the buyers. evaluating the impact of the real estate broker on pri

36、ces paid by home buyers would seem initially a straightforward process: one estimates a price equation using ordinary least squares, controlling for differences in housing characteristics (as in a hedonic price model) and the impact of buyer characteristics on the price, including a dummy variable d

37、efined to indicate whether the buyer used a broker in the transaction. or one could estimate separate equations for the broker-assisted and non-broker-assisted buyers. the difficulty is that the price paid by the buyer and the choice of whether to utilize a broker may be linked. a higher price paid

38、by buyers using a broker may not imply that prices are higher for homes listed by brokers. instead it may be that this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of whether or not they used an agent. this is a classic example of self-selection: if those who use an agent are predispose

39、d to pay a higher price, the ordinary least squares estimate of the coefficient on the agent variable will overestimate the effect of the agent on the price paid by the buyer. the presence of selection bias could imply a number of possibilities. one is that the bias exists and that after taking into

40、 account the self-selection by these buyers, housing prices are still higher for the group using a broker (as indicated by the coefficient of the broker variable). this result would imply that there are two separate residential real estate markets: one for broker-assisted properties and the second f

41、or the for-sale-by-owner (fsbo) properties. this separation could permit the maintenance of housing-price differentials between the two groups of consumers. if selection bias is present and housing prices are higher for broker-listed properties the price differences observed could be attributed to t

42、he predisposition of buyers using a broker to pay more for their homes. if no selection bias is present the higher prices may represent the value added by the broker which the buyers are willing to pay for. alternatively no price differentials may exist due to the competitive impact of fsbos on the

43、prices paid for broker-assisted transactions. the choice of whether to use a broker and its subsequent effect on price is modeled using a heckman two-stage model. in the first stage, a probity equation is employed to model the decision to choose a real estate broker. the decision is modeled as a fun

44、ction of eight variables. buyer income (ainc) is employed as a measure of the opportunity cost of search. it has already been shown that buyer search duration can be reduced by working with a real estate broker. if higher income buyers have higher opportunity costs we would expect that they would ch

45、oose to buy through a real estate broker. source: leonard v. zumpano, harold w. elder, edward a.baryla.1996. journal of real estate finance and economics. academic publishers13:169-181. 6譯文： 決定通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子簡(jiǎn)介 房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人究竟是做什么的，為什么購(gòu)房者會(huì)激發(fā)他們的服務(wù)呢？在通常情況下，這是一個(gè)不容易回答的問(wèn)題。其實(shí)購(gòu)房者在通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子的過(guò)程中買(mǎi)到的不僅僅是房子，而同時(shí)是在取得經(jīng)紀(jì)人的服務(wù)。換

46、言之，這些購(gòu)買(mǎi)者通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人擁有了一個(gè)很好的的購(gòu)房途徑。通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人購(gòu)買(mǎi)房子的一個(gè)好處就是可以減少搜尋房子的時(shí)間，從而降低了買(mǎi)房過(guò)程中的成本。最近的研究認(rèn)為（巴雷拉和祖帕諾 1995），通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子，大大提高了購(gòu)房者購(gòu)房的效益，因?yàn)檫@樣這些購(gòu)房者在尋找房子的過(guò)程中更有可能找到稱(chēng)心如意的房子。通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房子增加了可供購(gòu)房者選擇的房源，購(gòu)房者還可以向經(jīng)紀(jì)人提出自己對(duì)房子的要求，如要求的房屋的質(zhì)量以及希望房屋的街道位置。經(jīng)紀(jì)人經(jīng)常會(huì)記錄買(mǎi)家的信息并協(xié)助買(mǎi)家辦理按揭融資和財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)服務(wù)。 這些服務(wù)都表明，經(jīng)紀(jì)人向買(mǎi)家提供了額外的有價(jià)值的服務(wù)（除了向賣(mài)方提供服務(wù)），有時(shí)候，那些買(mǎi)家愿意支付那些額外

47、的費(fèi)用。因此，包含這些服務(wù)的房屋的銷(xiāo)售價(jià)格會(huì)高于無(wú)經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助置業(yè)的房屋的價(jià)格。一些學(xué)者注意到買(mǎi)家對(duì)于那些業(yè)主代理上市的房子會(huì)支付更多。然而，要確定這是否適用于整個(gè)住宅市場(chǎng)是不可能的，因?yàn)檠芯窟@一點(diǎn)要依靠當(dāng)?shù)氐臄?shù)據(jù)資料。較高的價(jià)格預(yù)示著買(mǎi)家相對(duì)于那些直接出售的房子更愿意較多支付那些業(yè)主代理上市的房子。另外，來(lái)自自有產(chǎn)權(quán)出售的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能會(huì)阻止賣(mài)家以高價(jià)的形式將委托成本傳遞給買(mǎi)家。因此，問(wèn)題是業(yè)主輔助銷(xiāo)售是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致價(jià)格的提高。如果購(gòu)房者是在經(jīng)紀(jì)人的協(xié)助下搜尋房子的，那么價(jià)格會(huì)是怎么樣呢？本文嘗試從經(jīng)紀(jì)人選擇的發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｊ絹?lái)回答這些問(wèn)題。在這個(gè)過(guò)程中，本文對(duì)整個(gè)住宅市場(chǎng)的效率以及經(jīng)紀(jì)中介市場(chǎng)的有效性

48、提供了重要的見(jiàn)解。 具體來(lái)說(shuō)，本文探討的是在以?xún)呻A段進(jìn)程的假設(shè)條件下對(duì)一個(gè)房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人的影響。第一步，買(mǎi)方?jīng)Q定是否聘請(qǐng)一個(gè)協(xié)助搜尋房屋的服務(wù)經(jīng)紀(jì)人。根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，這個(gè)是由普羅比模型方程決定的，而收入，年齡，經(jīng)驗(yàn)和對(duì)買(mǎi)方市場(chǎng)的認(rèn)識(shí)，以及其他買(mǎi)主的特點(diǎn)都將作為變量引起函數(shù)的移動(dòng)（即改變?cè)诩彝セ蚬ぷ饔嘘P(guān)方面的移動(dòng)），從而影響買(mǎi)方是否選擇使用代理。第二步是購(gòu)買(mǎi)。在這里房屋的銷(xiāo)售價(jià)格是根據(jù)房屋的特色，購(gòu)買(mǎi)者的喜好，以及是否需要提供經(jīng)紀(jì)協(xié)助而確定的。這種方法需要提供相關(guān)決定因素的信息才能確定住宅的價(jià)格。尤其，這個(gè)模型可以讓我們確定買(mǎi)家是否可以接受代理協(xié)助房屋與業(yè)主自行出售房屋之間的差價(jià)。 本文參考了美國(guó)房地產(chǎn)

49、經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)會(huì)研究部對(duì)全國(guó)購(gòu)房者和銷(xiāo)售者所進(jìn)行的調(diào)查的數(shù)據(jù)。該數(shù)據(jù)包括了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人對(duì)經(jīng)紀(jì)輔助銷(xiāo)售和業(yè)主銷(xiāo)售的兩種模式在影響銷(xiāo)售價(jià)格方面的評(píng)估，并揭示了經(jīng)紀(jì)人為賣(mài)方所提供的營(yíng)銷(xiāo)服務(wù)的價(jià)值。 我們的研究結(jié)果表明，通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)房的買(mǎi)家的確要比不通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人的買(mǎi)家支付更多的費(fèi)用。但我們的結(jié)果也同樣表明，支付更多的費(fèi)用并不是單單因?yàn)槭褂昧私?jīng)紀(jì)人。相反的，這類(lèi)買(mǎi)家無(wú)論以何種方式購(gòu)買(mǎi)房子都會(huì)比其他買(mǎi)家花更多的錢(qián)。導(dǎo)致他們花更多錢(qián)的因素是：可能這些購(gòu)買(mǎi)者的收入很高，可能他們來(lái)自其他地方，也可能是受別人的雇傭而這么做，更有可能的是他們通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)自己的房子從而使自己的房子升值。當(dāng)這些賣(mài)家決定使用經(jīng)紀(jì)人來(lái)買(mǎi)房時(shí)，他們也并不打算為此而付出更多的錢(qián)，并且有一些證據(jù)表明，他們實(shí)際支付的錢(qián)比不使用經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助的賣(mài)家要來(lái)的少。本文的布局如下：第二部分的回顧有關(guān)文獻(xiàn)，第三部分對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)、變量選擇和模型進(jìn)行描述，第四部分用實(shí)例證明結(jié)果，最后一部分記載本文的結(jié)論。文獻(xiàn)綜述大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)都集中在研究房?jī)r(jià)的決定因素，包括對(duì)住房需求，