經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所-退出wto可能對的關(guān)稅意味著什么英文2018

POLICYvantageofthiscountrylikeyouwouldn’tbe18-23WhatMightaTrumpWithdrawalfromtheWorld2018,inannouncingplansfortarifimportedsteelandaluminum,hesed:“TheWTOhasbeenadisasterforthiscountry.IsbeengreatforChinaandterriblefortheUnitedSes.”3InJune2018,Axiosthadrepeatedly edhisdesiretopulltheUnited esoftheWTO.4AdviserstoteddownPOLICYvantageofthiscountrylikeyouwouldn’tbe18-23WhatMightaTrumpWithdrawalfromtheWorld2018,inannouncingplansfortarifimportedsteelandaluminum,hesed:“TheWTOhasbeenadisasterforthiscountry.IsbeengreatforChinaandterriblefortheUnitedSes.”3InJune2018,Axiosthadrepeatedly edhisdesiretopulltheUnited esoftheWTO.4AdviserstoteddownMeanforUSreport,asdid,wholatersaid,“I’mnotaboutpullingout[oftheWTO].”But,headded,beentreatedveryDespitehisdenial,t’sanunfairessentially.BownandDouglasA.histhinkinginerviewwithBloombergonAugustNovember2018.“Iftheydon’tWTO,”hesaid,up,IwouldwithdrawfromttheagreementestablishingChadP.BownistheReginaldJonesSeniorFellowatthePetersonInstituteforernationalEconomics.DouglasA.IrwinisnonresideniorfellowatthePetersonInstituteforernationalEconomics.TheyaregratefultoAudreyN.O’BrienandEvaZhangforexcellentresearchassistance.TheyalsonkfriendsattheUSernationalTradeCommisforhelpfulguidancewithdatasour.nkstoOlivierBlanchard,RachelBrewster,JérémieCohen-Setton,JenniferHillman,GaryHufbauer,SoumayaKeynes,MaryLovely,JeffreySchott,JoelTrachtman,andTedTrumanforhelpfulcommentsanddiscuss.body“wasthesingleworsttradedealeverAlthoughtherearenoindicationsofspecificplanstotakesuchastep,Axiosreportedinearly t,onordersof,theadministrationhaddraftedbill—entitledtheUnited esFairandReciprocal Wire,October27,2017.ChrisIsidore,“WhiteHouseLaudedU.S.RecordwithWTO,WhichTrumpNowCallsa‘Disaster,’” Money,March2,AstheAxiosarticleputit:“‘He’s[threatenedtowithdraw]100times.Itwouldtotally[screw]usasacountry,’saidasourcewho’sdiscussedthesubjectwithTrump.Thesource tTrumphasfrequentlytoldadvisers,‘….Idon’tknowwhywe’reinit.TheWTOisdesignedbytherestoftheworldtoscrewtheUnitedS es’”(Jona Trump’sPrivateThreattoUpendGlobalTrade,”Axios,June29,2018).DougPalmer,“Trump:U.S.NotWithdrawingfromtheWTO,”Politico,June29,2018.?PetersonInstituteernationals.theWorldanization(WTO).1InOctoberhe ed:“TheWTO,Worldanization,wasupforthebenefitofeverybodybutus.Theyhavetaken1.InerviewonNBCin2016,during6.lethwait,MargaretTalev,andJennifern,TrumptoldChuckTodd“We’regoingto“TrumpThreatenstoPullU.S.OutofWTOIfItDoesn’t Up,’”Bloomberg,August30,2018.ateorwe’regoingtopullout.Thesetradedealsareater,Chuck.World anizationisadisaster”7.Heconfirmedthiss ementonSeptember7,2018,whenhesaid,“Andthesedeals tweremade—NAFTAwasoneoftheworsttradedealseverinhistory.WorldTradeanization t’s tgoesdown—to goesdownasthenumberone”(remarksTrumpinpressgaggleaboardAirForceOne,WhiteHousePressBriefings,September7,2018,thePress,Julyt-the-meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706).ContemptfortheWTOisalsoarepeatedthemeofBobWoodward’sFear:TrumpheWhiteHouse,whichquotesTrumpassaying“We’vetalkedaboutthisadnauseam. t. t.GetofNAFTA.GetoutofKORUS[theKorea–UnitedS TradeAgreement].AndgetoutoftheWTO”(Woodward2018,264)and“TheWorldTrade anizationistheworstanizationevercreated!”(Woodward2018, gaggle-aboard-air-force--trump-1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA|+1.202.328.9000免費(fèi)獲12免費(fèi)獲12；；（增值服務(wù)掃一掃回復(fù)：加入“起點財經(jīng)群PB18-Novembertwoulddoawaywiththemost-favoredreachedundertheReciprocalTradeAgreementsAct(MFN)clause,whichrequirestheUnited estotreat1934.Congresslastsetratesofimporthe ermsoftheimportdutiesappof1930,inwhatiscommonlyknownasthetotheirgoods.8Suchastepwouldallowtariff.Button,has,throughasaresultincreasetariffrates,evenrates“bound”(fixed)intradenegotiatingPB18-Novembertwoulddoawaywiththemost-favoredreachedundertheReciprocalTradeAgreementsAct(MFN)clause,whichrequirestheUnited estotreat1934.Congresslastsetratesofimporthe ermsoftheimportdutiesappof1930,inwhatiscommonlyknownasthetotheirgoods.8Suchastepwouldallowtariff.Button,has,throughasaresultincreasetariffrates,evenrates“bound”(fixed)intradenegotiatingexecutiveorder,reducedimportreciprocaltradeagreementsreachedin1930s,thentwithdrewtheUnited theloweregotiatedatGeneralfromtheTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP)andrepeatedlythreatenedtowithdrawfromtheNorthAmericanonTariffsandTrade(GATT)meetingin1947aswellassubsequentmultilateralrounds,notablytheKennedyRound(1964–67),theTokyoRound(1973–79),andtheUruguayRound(1986–93).10AccordingtoWTO(2017),about99.9percentofUSimportdutiesareboundasaresultofthesenegotiatedagreements.IftheUnitedSesweretoTradeAgreement(NAFTA),merelyfloatingtheideatheUnitedSalarmbellsinWashingtonandaroundtheworld.Trump,aUSwithdrawalfromthedrawfromtheWTO,couldeanhadneverbeenconsideredherealmsibility.nowraisesseveralimportantThisPolicyBriefaddressestwooforderrescindingallofthesenegotiatedtariffreductions,andimportdutiescouldreverttothosesetbyCongressin1930.(SuchanorderwouldnotaffectdutiesappdtocountrieswithwhichtheUnitedSeshasfreetradeagreements.)TheUStariffschedulehastwomaincolumns.Column1consistsoftheMFNtariff;column2consistsofthe1930duties.11Figure1providesasnapshotofarepresenivepagefromthe2018HarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnitedSes.Aftertheheadingandsubheadingnumber,,wouldbethe withdrewfromtheWTO?thelegalauthoritytopulltheUnitedSganizationandimutoftheHOWWOULDAUSWITHDRAWALTARIFFIfitweretowithdrawfromtheWTO,theUniteddescription,andunitofrateofduty.Column1isgeneralandspe l.TtyarethreecolumnsforotwoeralcolumnistheMFNonimportsfromotherWTOmembers.Thetariffsappthespelcolumnusuallysays“free”andliststhecountriesorprogramseligibleforduty-freetreatment.CountriesareeligibleeitherbecausetheyhaveafreetradeagreementwiththeUnitedSesorbecausetheyarecoveredbyatot nds.IftheUnitedSeslefttheWTO,othercountrieswouldbefreetodiscriminateagainstitevenifUSdutiesremainedunchanged.Itwouldthusmakesenseto(GSP)ortheAfricanAct(AGOA).12Column2isthenon-MFNtariffrateestab-lishedin1930.13Asshowninfigure1,importsof“tinbars,onlyiftheUnitedS MFN;theyaredutyfreeforvefreeWhatcouldbethemostdramaticheagreementswiththeUnitedSesorarepartofadesig-natedtariffpreferenceprogramandtaxedat45percentfornon-MFNcountries. anaction?Oneextremescenariowouldtthe astariffs”—sincetradeagreement8.BownandIrwin(2017)discussthesizeofthetari?cutsindi?erentGATTnegotiatingrounds.TheHarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnited esUptheWTO,”Axios,July1,9.ThisisnottheTrumppublic offrustrationwiththeMFNclause.SecretaryofCommerceWilburRosspennedaMay15,2017lettertotheWallStreetJournalwiththetitle“MostFavoredNationRuleHurtsImporters,LimitsU.S.Trade,”inresponsetoanop-edwrittenbyCh .BownandAlanO.Sykes(“TheTrumpTradeTeam’sVocabularyProblem,WallStreetJournal,May14,2017).InordertogetaroundtheMFNtari indingcom-mitmentsonsteelandaluminum,theTrumpadministrationhasimplementedhighertariffsbytriggeringSection232oftheTradeExpan Actof1962.available12.Sometimesadutyislistedunderthe lcolumn, neralMFNrate,dependingontheandhowlongthephaseoutoftariffsisplannedunderthefreetradeagreement.13.Someadjustmentstothedutiesestablishedin1930havebeenmadeovertheyears,suchastheconverofsomespecificdutiestoadvaloremduties.2PB18-November1ivepagefromtheHarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnitedes,3Source: ernationalTrade,.3HarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnitedPB18-November1ivepagefromtheHarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnitedes,3Source: ernationalTrade,.3HarmonizedTariffScheduleoftheUnitedes(2018)edforesSArticleRatesof12SpeUnwroughtTin,notTinContaining,byweight,5percentorlessofContaining,byweight,more n5percentbutnot n25percentofleadContaining,byweight, n25percentofTinwasteandTinbars,rods,profilesandOtherarticlesofArticlesnosewherespecifiedorincludedofatypeusedforhousehold,tableorkitchenuse;toletandsanitarywares;alltheforegoingnotcoatedorplatedwithpreciousSuitableforfoodorbeverageTinplates,sheetsandstrip,ofathicknessexceeding0.2Tinfol(whetherornotpredorbackedwithpr,prboard,plasticsorsimilarbackingmaterials),ofathickness(excludinganybacking)notexceeding0.2dersandPbkgPbkgFree(A,AU,CA,CL,CO,D,IL,JO,KR,MX,OM,P,PA,PE,SG)Free(A,AU,CA,CL,CO,D,IL,JO,KR,MX,OM,P,PA,PE,SG)Free(A,AU,CA,CL,CO,D,IL,JO,KR,MX,OM,P,PA,PE,SG)Free(A,AU,CA,CL,CO,D,IL,JO,KR,MX,OM,P,PA,PE,SG)Free(A,AU,CA,CL,CO,D,IL,JO,KR,MX,OM,P,PA,PE,SG)PB18-NovemberColumn2dutiesareappdtoonlytwocountries,CubaandNorthKorea(USCustomsandBorderPatrol2017).OthercountriesareeitherWTOmembers,inwhichcasetheyareentitledtothecolumn1MFNtariff,orTheimport-weightedmeasureofacountry’sdutyisanyways.16Themostobvioustthemeasureisdownward-biasedbecausesubjectedtohightariffswillnotbeimportedin-easttheMFNycourtesy.vetiesandwillthereforereceivealowerhefreetradeagreementwiththePB18-NovemberColumn2dutiesareappdtoonlytwocountries,CubaandNorthKorea(USCustomsandBorderPatrol2017).OthercountriesareeitherWTOmembers,inwhichcasetheyareentitledtothecolumn1MFNtariff,orTheimport-weightedmeasureofacountry’sdutyisanyways.16Themostobvioustthemeasureisdownward-biasedbecausesubjectedtohightariffswillnotbeimportedin-easttheMFNycourtesy.vetiesandwillthereforereceivealowerhefreetradeagreementwiththeUnited es,suchasForle,ifadutyof100percentonaproductppdtomostbilateralttherewillbenoimports tcategoryknownasaprohibitivetariff),ttariffwillnotproductsundertheGSP,AGOA,orotherunilateraltariffpreferenceprograms.anytproductwiththeveryhightariffwillreceiveazeroweight—i.e.,effectivelybeingHowhigh,age,aretheimportdutiesinhetrade-weighted1andcolumn2?ThetariffoAsecondapproachisthesimpleaverageofallthetariff hetariffcode.ThesimpleaverageMFNappsectionsand99chapters,with11,621tarifflinesonspecificgoods.TherearemultiplewaysofcondensingtheseortheUnited eswas3.3percentin2017.sandsoftariffoasimplesummarymeasure.methodavoidsthetproductswithhighPolicyBriefconsiderstwocomplementarycarryalowweightbecauseoflowlevelsofimports.Butapproachistheimport-weightedaverage ionofthisapproachteverytarifflinegetsontotalordutiableimports.In2017theimport-weightedaveragetariffwas2.0percent,andtheaveragetariffonduti-ableimportswas4.7percent,accordingtodatafromtheequalweight,eventhoughtariffsmayaffectverydifferentamountsoftrade.Althoughmanylowdutiesmayaffectfewimportsandafewhigherdutiesmayaffectagreatdealoftrade,thesimpleaveragewilltakeeveryobservedduty(tariffline)asanequallyweightedobservation.Insum,noperfectwayofmeasuringacountry’saverageareeasytocalculateanddorevealusefulinformationernationalTrade(USITC2018).15tnThedistinctionndutiableandduty-freeisimportantbecause,evenbeforethereciprocaltradeagreementsofthe1930sandtheoriginalGATTin1947,theevelofacountry’simportaverageUStariffsignoretherateofdutyundercolumn2.18coffee,tea,andbananas,aswellasrawmaterialsnotproducedheUnitedS es,suchastin.Mostmanufacturedgoods,however,weresubjecttosomeimportduty,becausesometaUSwithdrawalfromtheWTOisIrwin(2010).inAndersonandNeary(2005)tion.In2017,about70percentofUSimporfree;in1930about65percentofUSimportereddutyteredIrwin(2010)examineshowbiasedvariouscalculationsoftheaveragetariffcanbe.Below,thisPolicyBriefalsopresentsadditionalestimatesoftheaveragetariffweightedbyworldimportsinsteadofUSimports.Nevertheless,eventhisadjustmentdoesnotfullyaddresstheproblem,becausetariffsincertainsectors(e.g.,agriculture,textiles,clothing,andfootwear)arehigher nothersectorsacrosscountries(BownandCrowley2016),andtheirtrade-depressingeffectwillhaveasystemicdownwardbias heoverallaverage.Someacademicresearchhaslookedatcolumn2tariffs.Broda,Lim?o,andWeinstein(2008)examineoptimaltariffs.Ossa(2014)examineshowtheycomparetothetheoreticallypredictedtariffs tmightariseinatradewar.PierceandSchott(2016)andHandleyandLim?o(2017)relyonthemasthetariffs twouldfaceChina’sexportsifChinadidnotreceiveMFNtariffs he1990s, heperiodbeforeChinaenteredtheWTO.AsidefromtheWTO,theUnitedSesalsohas14freetradeagreementswith20countries.heabsenceofUSwithdrawalfromtheseagreements,thesecountrieswouldcontinuetofacezerotariffseveniftheUnitedSeswith-drewfromtheWTO.Thesetari?calculationsdonotincludeanyofthespe tari?sim edascountervailingorantidum safeguards,orthetari?s ttheTrumpadministrationhas edunderSection232oftheTradeExpan Actof1962orSection301oftheTradeActof1974.Thelattercalculationisbasedontherevenuegeneratedfromtheimportdutiesthemselves.Theaveragetariffondutiableimportsissimplythetariffrevenuedividedbydutiableimports.Theaveragetariffontotalimportscanbeconstructed woways,eitherasthetariffrevenuecollecteddividedbythetotalvalueofimports,bothduti-ableanddutyfree;orbyusingtheproduct-leveltariffrateweightedby tproduct’simports.USITC(2018)reportsanaggregatemeasureoftheaveragetari asedonrevenueas1.3percentfor2017.Ourmeasure,basedonproduct-leveltariffrevenue,differsslightlyfromtheaggregatenumberreportedbytheUSITC.4PB18-NovemberSoif—hypothetically—theUnited esweighteddutiesarelowerasmallerweightcolumn2tarilines,theminimumis0,nthesimpleaverageoftedaverageiffdrewfromtheWTOandshiftedfromapplyingcolumn1tocolumnPB18-NovemberSoif—hypothetically—theUnited esweighteddutiesarelowerasmallerweightcolumn2tarilines,theminimumis0,nthesimpleaverageoftedaverageiffdrewfromtheWTOandshiftedfromapplyingcolumn1tocolumn2dutiesonallimports?Howhighwouldtheaveragetariffgo?Table1providestheanswerbycomparingthecolumn1andcolumn2duties.Thesimpleunweightedaveragedutyincolumn1is3.3percent;theunweightedaveragedutythestandarddeviationisTable1alsoreportstheaverageybroadcolumn2isa32.3percent.WhenweightedUSimports,theaveragedutyincolumn1is2.0percentn28.1percentin Thereasonwhytheermediateinputsandcapitalequipment,aphenomenon hetrade-weightingforcolumn2calculations,the aineda mptionis tcountrieswithwhichtheUnitedS eshadafreetradeagreementasof2018wouldcontinuetoreceivethezerotari?.21.Iftheaveragetari?figureisweightedbyworldimportsinsteadofUSimports,theaveragecolumn1dutyis3.4per-centandtheaveragecolumn2dutyis33.5percent.5Table US2017andcolumn22017 Column tariff,import-2017tariff, Column2tariff, simpleaveragesimple All BybroadeconomicConsumer ermediate Capital ByAnimalproducts,live Vegetable Animalorvegetablefats Preparedfoodstuffs,beverages,spirits,vinegar, products,edibleMineral Plasticsand Hides,skins,leather, Woodandarticlesof Pulpofwood,scrapor Textilesandtextile Footwear,headgear,umbrellas,feathers, Stone,cement,plaster,ceramics,glassware,pearls, Pearls,preciousstones, Basemetalsandarticlesofbase Machinery,mechanical ,electrical ion:vehicles,aircraft, instruments;optical,surgical, Armsand Note:BroadeconomiccategoriesaredefinedbytheUnitedNations.SectorsaredefinedinBownandCrowley(2016,appendixSource:ConstructedbytheauthorswithdatafromUSITC PB18-NovemberFigureUS2017andcolumn2tariffsbyFats, FoodstusPulpofwoodBasemetalsPrecious Stone,0tarirate2017tari,import-weightedColumn2tari,import-weightedSource:Tablewithinandacrosscountriesandsectors(Bownandpercentonwoodpulpandrelatedgoods,from8.2percentto58.1percentontextiles,from1.2to32.9percentonmachinery,andfrom1.6percentto40.3percentoninstruments(figureThesenumbersareastoundingandhavePB18-NovemberFigureUS2017andcolumn2tariffsbyFats, FoodstusPulpofwoodBasemetalsPrecious Stone,0tarirate2017tari,import-weightedColumn2tari,import-weightedSource:Tablewithinandacrosscountriesandsectors(Bownandpercentonwoodpulpandrelatedgoods,from8.2percentto58.1percentontextiles,from1.2to32.9percentonmachinery,andfrom1.6percentto40.3percentoninstruments(figureThesenumbersareastoundingandhaveseveral2016),becausecountriestendtoelowertariffsermediateinputsandcapitalequipment,inorderthemanufacturingppensiftariffsmovefromcolumn1totanteconomic,theyindicatehow2?Forincreasefrom4.6percenttoto31.0percent,andtarif.0USimportdutieshavefallenasarenegotiations.Hadtherebeennochangerates,theaveragetariffwouldbe28–32percent,not2–3Second,withdrawingfromtheWTOandabruptlyrevertingtothecolumn2dutieswouldamounttothelargesttariffincreaseinUShistory.Figure3putsapotentialaageof1.4percentto34.3percent.TheofthesetariffswouldthussignificantlyraisethecostofimportedinputstoUSfirms,reducingtheirvestochangeinusingthetrade-owertariffaverageforllimportsanddutiableimports.Table1alsoreportsinformationbysectors.Inafewcases,suchasanimalproductsandminerals,theacktolevelsnotseensincethelate1930sornthecolumn1andcolumn2tariffsisminor.But1940s—backinthetprevailedinthelatefigure2alsoostcasesthedifferenceinandearly20thcentury.Thoughtheaveragetariffisenormous.Tariffswouldrisefrom1.1percenttoUnited eswassimilarlyhelatend6PB18-NovemberFigure3UStrade-weightedaveragetariff(1820–2017)andhypotheticalcolumn2tariffin2018rateEmergencyofof1930wleyMorrillTariofHypotheticalchangeto“Column2”tari0 DutiableimportsTotalimportsSource:Historical isticsoftheUnited es,MillennialEdition(NewPB18-NovemberFigure3UStrade-weightedaveragetariff(1820–2017)andhypotheticalcolumn2tariffin2018rateEmergencyofof1930wleyMorrillTariofHypotheticalchangeto“Column2”tari0 DutiableimportsTotalimportsSource:Historical isticsoftheUnited es,MillennialEdition(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityweband2006,seriesEe424-430),updatedwithdatafromUSITCDataweb,20thcenturies,thechangesinlegislatedrateswereinputsandcapitalequipmentwouldquicklyraisethecostsofUS-basedproductionanderodethecountry’sindustrialcompetitiveness.ItwouldmaketheUnitedSesaabruptorlargenTaketheinfamouswleytariffof1930,wasamuchmoremodestnevenfigure7billionconsumerslivingoutsidethecountry.ThefacingUSproducersandresultinconsumers.Higherpriavailabilityofcertainproductsformanyreflects.AccordingtoaSenateFinanceCommitteereportin1930,hadthenew1930dutiesbeenappdto1928imports,theaveragetariffondutiableimportswouldhaverisenfrom38.75percentto41.14percent,anincreaseofjust2.4percentageposand6percent(Irwin2011,102–103).Figure3illustratesamuchlargerincreaseintheFurthermore,USwithdrawalfromtheWTOandsuchalargeincreaseofitstariffwouldsurelybemetwithforeignretaliationagainstUSexports.ThosetariffswouldmaketheUnitedSesanunattractivelocationinwhichcompanieswouldinvestandproduce.ThepracticalimportofleavingtheWTOwouldbesignificant,evenifUSimportdutiesdidnotchangeasaresult.TheUnitedSeswouldnolongerbeconstrainedintermsofitstariffpolicy,andothercountrieswouldface ofUStariffsarosedueto1929–32.Becausemosttariffrateswereduties,fallingmeanttheadvaloremequivalentwouldhaveincreasedeveniftherehadnotbeenatariffincreasearisingfromwley(IrwinWetthisisanextremescenario.A26percentageincreaseinthelimitonwhattariffstheycouldeonUSexports.tarifftodaywouldbeenormouslyproblematicfortheresponsetotheTrumpadministration’ssteelandeconomy.Thesharptariffsedundertheguiseofnationalsecurity),7PB18-Novembertradingpartnersalmostimmediayretaliatedagainstn$23billionofUSexports.ItistageneralttheexecutivecouldhavelegalauthoritytotariffincreasewouldbemetnevengreaterfromanagreementunilaterallybutnottoproclaimanewUStariffschedule.MuchofUStradelawwaspremisedonthenotion CongresswouldbemorelikelytowanttoimplementproOthercountrieswouldfeelfreetodiscriminateagainstUSSeswouldhavenorecoursetoobject.Itsonlycourseofactionwouldbecounterretaliation.ButthiswouldPB18-Novembertradingpartnersalmostimmediayretaliatedagainstn$23billionofUSexports.ItistageneralttheexecutivecouldhavelegalauthoritytotariffincreasewouldbemetnevengreaterfromanagreementunilaterallybutnottoproclaimanewUStariffschedule.MuchofUStradelawwaspremisedonthenotion CongresswouldbemorelikelytowanttoimplementproOthercountrieswouldfeelfreetodiscriminateagainstUSSeswouldhavenorecoursetoobject.Itsonlycourseofactionwouldbecounterretaliation.ButthiswouldtlimitedadditionaleffectivenessttheUnited wouldalreadyhavechokedoffimportsbyraisingitstariffs time—littleadditionalpaincouldbeinflicted.uentbranchwasmorecommittedtoUSengagetionalahowever.BecauseallmodernUStrrulesnotjustontariffsbutalsomayrequirechangestoUSdoimplementinglegislationatheHouseoftradedealshavebeenenactedbycongresEvenaWTOtmerelyeliminatedontariffpolicieswithoutactuallyraisingwouldgenerateuncerta y,whichislikelytobeharmfulforinvestmentandtrade, llyforUScompaniesworkersseekingstoforeignCANTHEUNITEDUNILATERALLYESOUTOFTHEal-ThetextsoftradeagreementsliketheWTOdonotiththeexplicitauthoritytoForexlishedwhenCle,USheWTOwasndfromsuchagreements;whetherornottheexecutivedosoislegallyshavenotntensuredementweretmanyoftheoUSlwithdrawalUruguayalapproval,sothereisnolegalprecedenttogolaw.ForthoselawstoofCongressexplicitlyrepeafromtheWTO.SectionapprovalofUSParticipationlelproviintheWTO.CongthecontingencyUnitedSLegalscholarslikeTrachtmaning)ttheconstitutionalauthoritytoregulateforeigncommerceogivenexclusivelytonderArticleI;ualvesnoTrachtman’sreasoningte-dauthoritytoterminatetradeagreementsisinconsistentexclusiveerovercommerce.owhethertheOtherhaslegalauthoritytounilaterallywithdrawfromtradeagree-mentsaremoresanguine.Hufbauer(2017)po stotherolettradedealshavehadinfurtheringUSforeignpolicy.Heably,ifwantedtodoso,hetoworkthroughAnactionbyWTOwithoTrumptowithdrawfrom justifythetrolemightbeusedasalegalargument’sauthorityundertheArticlethecourts.Avarietyof ae22.TheTrumpadministration’stari?sedonBownandKeynes2018).HowtheUScourts,includingtheSupremeCourt,wouldruleisanopenquestion.underSection301oftheTradeActof1974werealsometwithimmediatetari?retaliation.Forasummary,seeChadP.Bown,“ForTrump,ItWasaSummerofTari?sandMoreTari?s.Here’sWhereThingsStand,”Washington (MonkeyCage),September13,2018.ATrumptowithdrawthe esfromtheWTO—ifdeemedlegalunderUSlaw—coulddealadisastrousblowtoAmerica’sforeigntrade.Thecosttoconsumersandimport-reliantmanufacturersoftheraisingimporttariffssignificantlywouldbeenor-mous.AndtheresultingforeignretaliationagainstAmericanexporters—farmersandmanufacturersalike—wouldseverelydamagetheeconomy.23.Recentresearchhast yalsohas(Handley2014;HandleyandLim?o2015,2017;PierceandSchott2016;Crowley,MengandSong2018).24.OnthelegalquestionofwhetherunilaterallywithdrawfromUStradeagreements,see(2016);Hufbauer(2016,2017);andTrachtman(BownandKeynes(2018)providea8PB18-NovemberOntopoft,thettheUnitedionwouldlikelycrippleanfromtheWTOwouldbedetrimentaltoUSforeignnomicanderestsandwouldraiseeven ionofWorldWarIIquestionsastowhat,ifany,systemofuponruleswouldreplaceit. lrelationsforoversevendecades.Anderson,JamesE.,andJ.PeterNeary.2005.MeasuringtheRestrictivenessofernationalTradePolicy.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Bown,Ch.,andMeredi.Crowley.2016.TheEmpiricalLandscofTradePolicy.heHandbookofCommerlPolicy,ed.KyleBagwellandRobertW.Staiger,3–108.Am-sterdam:NorthHolland.Hufbauer,GaryClyde.2017.CanTrumpTerminateNAFTA?PIIETradeandInvestmentPolicyWatch,October10.Wash-ington:PetersonInstituteforernationalEconomics.Irwin,DouglasA.1998.ChangesinU.S.Tariffs:TheRoleofImportPriandCommerlPolicies.AmericanEconomicReview88:1015–26.Irwin,DouglasA.2011.PeddlingProtectionism:Bown,.,PB18-NovemberOntopoft,thettheUnitedionwouldlikelycrippleanfromtheWTOwouldbedetrimentaltoUSforeignnomicanderestsandwouldraiseeven ionofWorldWarIIquestionsastowhat,ifany,systemofuponruleswouldreplaceit. lrelationsforoversevendecades.Anderson,JamesE.,andJ.PeterNeary.2005.MeasuringtheRestrictivenessofernationalTradePolicy.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Bown,Ch.,andMeredi.Crowley.2016.TheEmpiricalLandscofTradePolicy.heHandbookofCommerlPolicy,ed.KyleBagwellandRobertW.Staiger,3–108.Am-sterdam:NorthHolland.Hufbauer,GaryClyde.2017.CanTrumpTerminateNAFTA?PIIETradeandInvestmentPolicyWatch,October10.Wash-ington:PetersonInstituteforernationalEconomics.Irwin,DouglasA.1998.ChangesinU.S.Tariffs:TheRoleofImportPriandCommerlPolicies.AmericanEconomicReview88:1015–26.Irwin,DouglasA.2011.PeddlingProtectionism:Bown,.,andDouglasA.Irwin.2017.TheGATT’sandtheGreatDepres .Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityingPo:TariffLevelscirca1947.InAssessingtheTradeanization:FitforPure?ed.ManfredElsig,Ber-nardHoekman,andJoostPauwelyn.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bown,ChadP.,andSoumayaKeynes.2018.CanTrumpWithdrawfromTradeDeals?TradeTalkssode54,Irwin,DouglasA.2010.TradeRestrictivenessandDead-weightLossesfromU.S.Tariffs.AmericanEconomicJournal:EconomicPolicy2:111–33.Murrill,BrandonJ.2016.U.S.WithdrawalfromFreeTradeAgreements:FrequentlyAskedLegalQuestions(September7).Washington:CongresalResearchService.Ossa,Ralph.2014.TradeWarsandTradeTalkswithAmericanEconomicReview104,no.1