國(guó)際法：第二章 國(guó)際法的基本原則（案例分析）

PAGE第二章國(guó)際法的基本原則（經(jīng)典案例）*規(guī)制武力使用的法律的演進(jìn)PeterMalanczuk,Akehurst'sModernIntroductiontoInternationalLawLawfulandunlawfulwars:developmentsbefore1945FormanycenturiesWesternEuropeanattitudestowardsthelegalityofwarweredominatedbytheteachingsoftheRomanCatholicChurch.OneofthefirsttheologianstowriteonthesubjectwasStAugustine(AD354-430),whosaid:Justwarsareusuallydefinedasthosewhichavengeinjuries,whenthenationorcityagainstwhichwarlikeactionistobedirectedhasneglectedeithertopunishwrongscommittedbyitsowncitizensortorestorewhathasbeenunjustlytakenbyit.Further,thatkindofwarisundoubtedlyjustwhichGodHimselfordains.Theseideascontinuedtobeacceptedforover1,000years.Warwasregardedasameansofobtainingreparationforapriorillegalactcommittedbytheotherside(thereparationsoughthadtobeproportionaltotheseriousnessoftheillegality).Inaddition,warsagainstunbelieversandhereticsweresometimes(butnotalways)regardedasbeingcommandedbyGod.Inthelatesixteenthcenturythedistinctionbetweenjustandunjustwarsbegantobreakdown.Theologianswereparticularlyconcernedwiththestateofman'sconscience,andadmittedthateachsidewouldbeblamelessifitgenuinelybelievedthatitwasintheright,eventhoughoneofthesidesmighthavebeenobjectivelyinthewrong(thiswasknownasthedoctrineofprobabilism).Moreover,thecategoryofjustwars(beliumjuslum)begantobedangerouslyextended.AlthoughseventeenthcenturywriterslikeHugoGrotiusmadesomeattempttore-establishtraditionaldoctrines,theeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesproducedanalmostcompleteabandonmentofthedistinctionbetweenlegalandillegalwars.Warsweresaidtobejustifiediftheywerefoughtforthedefenseofcertainvitalinterests,buteachstateremainedthesolejudgeofitsvitalinterests,whichwereneverdefinedwithanyattemptatprecision.Indeed,thewholedoctrineofvitalinterestsprobablyconstituted,notalegalcriterionofthelegalityofwar,butasourceforpoliticaljustificationsandexcuses,tobeusedforpropagandapurposes.Themostrealisticviewofthecustomarylawinthe"classical"periodofinternationallaw,asitcametostandtowardstheendofthenineteenthcentury,isthatitplacednolimitsontherightofstatestoresorttowar....[Duringthenineteenthcentury,]thebalance-of-powersystemwasfairlysuccessfulinmakingwarsrare.Theexpense,destructivenessandlongdurationofwars,andtherisksofdefeat,meantthatwarswerenotworthfightingunlessastatestoodtogainalargeamountofterritorybygoingtowar;butastatewhichseizedtoomuchterritorythreatenedthewholeofEuropebecauseitupsetthebalanceofpower,andstateswereusuallydeterredfromattemptingtoseizelargeareasofterritorybytheknowledgethatsuchanattemptwouldunitetherestofEuropeagainstthem....TheunprecedentedsufferingoftheFirstWorldWarcausedarevolutionarychangeinattitudestowardswar.Nowadayspeople(atleastinEurope)areaccustomedtoregardwarasanappallingevil.Itishardtorealizethatduringtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesmostpeople(exceptforafewpacifists)regardedwarinmuchthesamewayastheyregardedahardwinter—uncomfortable,certainly,butpartofthesettledorderofthings,andprovidingexcellentopportunitiesforexhilaratingsport;eventhewoundedsoldierdidnotregardwaraswrong,anymorethantheskierwithabrokenlegregardsskiingaswrong.Allthischangedafter1914,butthelawtooksometimetocatchupwithpublicopinion.TheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations,signedin1919,didnotprohibitwaraltogether;instead,Article12(1)provided:TheMembersoftheLeagueagreethat,ifthereshouldarisebetweenthemanydisputelikelytoleadtoarupture,theywillsubmitthemattereithertoarbitrationorjudicialsettlementortoinquirybytheCouncil,andtheyagreeinnocasetoresorttowaruntilthreemonthsaftertheawardbythearbitratorsorthejudicialdecision,orthereportbytheCouncil.(Thethree-monthperiodofdelaywasintendedtoallowtimeforpassionstodiedown;ifstateshadobservedathree-monthdelayaftertheassassinationoftheArchdukeFranzFerdinandin1914,itispossiblethattheFirstWorldWarcouldhavebeenaverted.)Inaddition,membersoftheLeagueagreednottogotowarwithmemberscomplyingwithanarbitralawardorjudicialdecision.Duringthe1920svariouseffortsweremadetofillthe'gapsintheCovenant'—thatis,totransformtheCovenant'spartialprohibitionofwarintoatotalprohibitionofwar.TheseeffortsculminatedintheGeneralTreatyfortheRenunciationofWar(otherwiseknownastheKellogg-BriandPact,orthePactofParis),signedin1928.Almostallthestatesintheworldbecamepartiestothistreaty,whichprovided:TheHighContractingPartiessolemnlydeclare...thattheycondemnrecoursetowarforthesolutionofinternationalcontroversies,andrenounceitasaninstrumentofnationalpolicyintheirrelationswithoneanother.TheHighContractingPartiesagreethatthesettlementorsolutionofalldisputesorconflictsofwhatevernatureorofwhateverorigintheymaybe,whichmayariseamongthem,shallneverbesoughtexceptbypacificmeans.TheUNChartergoesfurtherthantheKellogg-BriandPactbyoutlawingallsuesofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofastateunlessauthorizedbytheSecurityCouncilortakeninself-defense.PriortoadoptionoftheCharter,adeclarationofwartriggeredacomplexsetoflegalrulesdealingwiththerightsofbelligerentsandneutrals.Toavoidthelegalconsequencesassociatedwithatechnicalstateofwar,statesengagedinarmedconflictoftendeniedthattheywereactuallyatwar.Tosurmountthisdifficulty,Article2(4)oftheICharterreferstoallusesofforce,whethertheymightamounttowarinthetechnicalsenseornot.Butasthematerialsthatfollowmakeclear,Article2(4)andrelatedCharterprovisionsleaveabundantroomfordebateaboutwhetheraparticularuseofforceisorisnotlawful.*《聯(lián)合國(guó)憲章》與禁止使用武力原則序言：我聯(lián)合國(guó)人民同茲決心(WethepeoplesoftheUnitedNationsdetermined)欲免后世再遭今代人類兩度身歷慘不堪言之戰(zhàn)禍(tosavesucceedinggenerationsfromthescourgeofwar,whichtwiceinourlifetimehasbroughtuntoldsorrowtomankind)，……促成大自由中之社會(huì)進(jìn)步及較善之民生，并為達(dá)此目的力行容恕，彼此以善鄰之道，和睦相處，集中力量，以維持國(guó)際和平及安全，接受原則，確立力法，以保證非為公共利益，不得使用武力，……第一條聯(lián)合國(guó)之宗旨為：一、維持國(guó)際和平及安全；并為此目的：采取有效集體辦法、以防止且消除對(duì)于和平之威脅，制止侵略行為或其他和平之破壞；并以和平方法且依正義及國(guó)際法之原則，調(diào)整或解決足以破壞和平之國(guó)際爭(zhēng)端或情勢(shì)。第二條為求實(shí)現(xiàn)第一條所述各宗旨起見，本組織及其會(huì)員國(guó)應(yīng)遵行下列原則：一、本組織系基于各會(huì)員國(guó)主權(quán)平等之原則。二、各會(huì)員國(guó)應(yīng)一秉善意，履行其依本憲章所擔(dān)負(fù)之義務(wù)，以保證全體會(huì)員國(guó)由加入本組織而發(fā)生之權(quán)益。三、各會(huì)員國(guó)應(yīng)以和平方法解決其國(guó)際爭(zhēng)端，避免危及國(guó)際和平、安全、及正義。四、各會(huì)員國(guó)在其國(guó)際關(guān)系上不得使用威脅或武力，或以與聯(lián)合國(guó)宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何會(huì)員國(guó)或國(guó)家之領(lǐng)土完整或政治獨(dú)立。五、各會(huì)員國(guó)對(duì)于聯(lián)合國(guó)依本憲章規(guī)定而采取之行動(dòng)，應(yīng)盡力予以協(xié)助，聯(lián)合國(guó)對(duì)于任何國(guó)家正在采取防止或執(zhí)行行動(dòng)時(shí)，各會(huì)員國(guó)對(duì)該國(guó)不得給予協(xié)助。六、本組織在維持國(guó)際和平及安全之必要范圍內(nèi)，應(yīng)保證非聯(lián)合國(guó)會(huì)員國(guó)遵行上述原則。七、本憲章不得認(rèn)為授權(quán)聯(lián)合國(guó)干涉在本質(zhì)上屬于任何國(guó)家國(guó)內(nèi)管轄之事件，且并不要求會(huì)員國(guó)將該項(xiàng)事件依本憲章提請(qǐng)解決；但此項(xiàng)原則不妨礙第七章內(nèi)執(zhí)行辦法之適用。第二十四條一、為保證聯(lián)合國(guó)行動(dòng)迅速有效起見，各會(huì)員國(guó)將維持國(guó)際和平及安全之主要責(zé)任，授予安全理事會(huì)，并同意安全理事會(huì)于履行此項(xiàng)責(zé)任下之職務(wù)時(shí)，即系代表各會(huì)員國(guó)。二、安全理事會(huì)于履行此項(xiàng)職務(wù)時(shí)，應(yīng)遵照聯(lián)合國(guó)之宗旨及原則。第二十五條聯(lián)合國(guó)會(huì)員國(guó)同意依憲章之規(guī)定接受并履行安全理事會(huì)之決議第六章爭(zhēng)端之和平解決第三十三條一、任何爭(zhēng)端之當(dāng)事國(guó)，于爭(zhēng)端之繼續(xù)存在足以危及國(guó)際和平與安全之維持時(shí)，應(yīng)盡先以談判、調(diào)查、調(diào)停、和解、公斷、司法解決、區(qū)域機(jī)關(guān)或區(qū)域辦法之利用、或各該國(guó)自行選擇之其他和平方法，求得解決。二、安全理事會(huì)認(rèn)為必要時(shí)，應(yīng)促請(qǐng)各當(dāng)事國(guó)以此項(xiàng)方法，解決其爭(zhēng)端。第七章對(duì)于和平之威脅和平之破壞及侵略行為之應(yīng)付辦法第三十九條安全理事會(huì)應(yīng)斷定任何和平之威脅、和平之破壞、或侵略行為之是否存在，并應(yīng)作成建議或抉擇依第四十一條及第四十二條規(guī)定之辦法，以維持或恢復(fù)國(guó)際和平及安全。第四十一條安全理事會(huì)得決定所應(yīng)采武力以外之辦法，以實(shí)施其決議，并得促請(qǐng)聯(lián)合國(guó)會(huì)員國(guó)執(zhí)行此項(xiàng)辦法。此項(xiàng)辦法得包括經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系、鐵路、海運(yùn)、航空、郵、電、無線電、及其他交通工具、之局部或全部停止，以及外交關(guān)系之?dāng)嘟^。第四十二條安全理事會(huì)如認(rèn)第四十一條所規(guī)定之辦法為不足或已經(jīng)證明為不足時(shí)，得采取必要之空海陸軍行動(dòng)，以維持或恢復(fù)國(guó)際和平及安全。此項(xiàng)行動(dòng)得包括聯(lián)合國(guó)會(huì)員國(guó)之空海陸軍示威、封鎖、及其他軍事舉動(dòng)。第四十三條一、聯(lián)合國(guó)各會(huì)員國(guó)為求對(duì)于維持國(guó)際和平及安全有所貢獻(xiàn)起見，擔(dān)任于安全理事會(huì)發(fā)令時(shí)，并依特別協(xié)定，供給為維持國(guó)際和平及安全所必需之軍隊(duì)、協(xié)助、及便利，包括過境權(quán)。二、此項(xiàng)特別協(xié)定應(yīng)規(guī)定軍隊(duì)之?dāng)?shù)目及種類，其準(zhǔn)備程度及一般駐扎地點(diǎn)，以及所供便利及協(xié)助之性質(zhì)。三、此項(xiàng)特別協(xié)定應(yīng)以安全理事會(huì)之主動(dòng)，盡速議訂。此項(xiàng)協(xié)定應(yīng)由安全理事會(huì)與會(huì)員國(guó)或由安全理事會(huì)與若干會(huì)員國(guó)之集團(tuán)締結(jié)之，并由簽字國(guó)各依其憲法程序批準(zhǔn)之。第五十一條聯(lián)合國(guó)任何會(huì)員國(guó)受武力攻擊時(shí)，在安全理事會(huì)采取必要辦法，以維持國(guó)際和平及安全以前，本憲章不得認(rèn)為禁止行使單獨(dú)或集體自衛(wèi)之自然權(quán)利。會(huì)員國(guó)因行使此項(xiàng)自衛(wèi)權(quán)而采取之辦法，應(yīng)立即向安全理事會(huì)報(bào)告，此項(xiàng)辦法于任何方面不得影響該會(huì)按照本憲章隨時(shí)采取其所認(rèn)為必要行動(dòng)之權(quán)責(zé)，以維持或恢復(fù)國(guó)際和平及安全。第八章區(qū)域辦法第五十二條一、本憲章不得認(rèn)為排除區(qū)域辦法或區(qū)域機(jī)關(guān)、用以應(yīng)付關(guān)于維持國(guó)際和平及安全而宜于區(qū)域行動(dòng)之事件者；但以此項(xiàng)辦法或機(jī)關(guān)及其工作與聯(lián)合國(guó)之宗旨及原則符合者為限?！景咐?－1】海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（1990年8月至1991年2月）第一階段——伊拉克入侵科威特現(xiàn)代伊拉克(Iraq)形成于第一次世界大戰(zhàn)之后。隨著奧斯曼帝國(guó)(theOttomanEmpire)的崩潰，不列顛和法國(guó)控制了阿拉伯世界的大部分領(lǐng)土。在1922年，英國(guó)劃定了伊拉克、沙特阿拉伯和科威特的邊界。為了限制伊拉克在該地區(qū)的影響并使其依附自己，不列顛有意不讓伊拉克國(guó)土延伸至波斯灣。伊拉克從未全部接受此種安排，并定期地對(duì)科威特的部分或全部國(guó)土提出權(quán)利主張。在伊拉克看來，由于在奧斯曼時(shí)代科威特是伊拉克Basra省的一個(gè)行政分區(qū)，所以它應(yīng)當(dāng)是現(xiàn)代伊拉克的一個(gè)組成部分。在1963年，伊拉克和科威特達(dá)成了協(xié)議，接受其獨(dú)立并大體上承認(rèn)了其邊界，但沒有清楚地確定其分界線。但是在10年后，在應(yīng)阿拉伯聯(lián)盟的要求放棄領(lǐng)土主張之前，伊拉克卻突然占領(lǐng)了科威特北部的部分地區(qū)。在1979年，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因(SaddamHussein)在伊拉克上臺(tái)。其后不久，它發(fā)動(dòng)了對(duì)伊朗漫長(zhǎng)而血腥的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。在1980到1988年的兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間，伊拉克與科威特之間的關(guān)系緩和。兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后，伊拉克背負(fù)達(dá)800美元的巨額債務(wù)，其中大部分是欠科威特的。而且，由于作為伊拉克唯一經(jīng)濟(jì)支柱石油的價(jià)格下跌，伊拉克陷入了經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)之中。為了恢復(fù)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)，免除所欠科威特巨額債務(wù)，徹底解決出?？趩栴}，提高自己在中東地區(qū)的地位，薩達(dá)姆政權(quán)決定吞并科威特。伊拉克武裝進(jìn)攻科威特的另一個(gè)原因是：蘇聯(lián)已無力控制伊拉克，而伊拉克認(rèn)為美國(guó)不會(huì)干涉其侵略行動(dòng)。因此，從1990年7月中旬開始，伊拉克就指責(zé)科威特超額生產(chǎn)石油，致使世界油價(jià)下降，給自己帶來?yè)p失，并向伊科邊界集結(jié)部隊(duì)。在這種情況下，為避免兩國(guó)發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，以約旦國(guó)王侯賽因和埃及總統(tǒng)穆巴拉克為首的阿拉伯國(guó)家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在伊、科兩國(guó)之間進(jìn)行積極的斡旋，希望兩國(guó)用政治手段解決爭(zhēng)端。伊拉克表面上保證絕對(duì)不會(huì)對(duì)科威特使用武力，但仍繼續(xù)向伊、科邊界增兵。為了隱蔽侵略企圖，伊拉克還向外界宣稱，它的行動(dòng)完全是針對(duì)以色列的。1990年8月2日，伊拉克精銳的共和國(guó)衛(wèi)隊(duì)突襲科威特，并于當(dāng)日就占領(lǐng)了科威特全境。薩達(dá)姆宣稱科威特政府在一場(chǎng)政變中被取代了，而新政府請(qǐng)求伊拉克提供幫助。8月8日，伊拉克宣布科威特并入伊拉克，成為伊拉克第19個(gè)省。ByinvadingKuwait,Iraqaccomplished,albeitonlybriefly,severalmajorobjectives.First,iteffectivelycancelledtheenormousdebtitincurredasresultofKuwait’sfinancialaidduringtheIran-Iraqwar.Second,itpositioneditselftocontrolKuwait’senormousoilwealthandperhapsthemanybillionsofdollarsinKuwaitiassetsheldinforeignbanks.Third,itsignaledneighboringGulfstates,especiallySaudiArabia,thatiftheydidnotaccommodateIraq’soilpricepolicies,theycouldbenextinlinefoeattack.Finally,iteliminatedIraq’第二階段——國(guó)際社會(huì)的譴責(zé)和制裁階段伊拉克入侵科威特的行為立即引起了國(guó)際社會(huì)的密切關(guān)注的強(qiáng)烈反應(yīng)，世界各國(guó)紛紛譴責(zé)伊拉克的侵略行徑。TheUnitedStatesimmediatelydenouncedtheattackasa“blatantuseofmilitaryaggression”andcalledfor“theimmediateandunconditionalwithdrawalofallIraqforces.”在入侵的當(dāng)天，聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)就召開緊急會(huì)議。以14票贊成，0票反對(duì)（也門棄權(quán)），安理會(huì)通過了一項(xiàng)決議譴責(zé)伊拉克的入侵，并斷定它構(gòu)成對(duì)國(guó)際和平與安全的破壞，并要求“伊拉克立即并無條件地從科威特撤軍”?！猄.C.Res.660（1990）在1990年8月6日，以13票贊成，0票反對(duì)（也門和古巴棄權(quán)），安理會(huì)對(duì)伊拉克施加了廣泛的制裁?！猄ecurityCouncilResolution661(1990)在1990年8月9日，安理會(huì)立即和一致通過決議宣布伊拉克的蓄意吞并是無效的，并號(hào)召各國(guó)不要給予承認(rèn)?！猄ecurityCouncilResolution662(1990)在1990年8月19日，安理會(huì)一致通過決議要求伊拉克允許第三國(guó)國(guó)民離開并非常其斷絕與他國(guó)外交和領(lǐng)事關(guān)系的指令。——SecurityCouncilResolution664(1990)OnAugust18IraqPresidentSaddamHusseinissuedthefollowingstatementaboutthetreatmentofforeignersinIraq.StatementofIraq…[T]heUnitedStatesanditsallies…begantoblockadeanduse…militaryforce[toimposean]economicembargoincludingfoodandmedicine,whichisconsideredanactofwar[inviolationof]internationalcustomandinternationallaw.Andthisproceduredidleadtothereductionofimportedfoodswhichincludes[milkfor]newbornbabies…[I]naccordancewith…h(huán)umanitarianprincipleswedecidedto…treattheforeignnewbornbabiessimilarlywiththeIraqibabies.Andifthereweretobeanyreductioninthenecessitiesofbabiesbecauseoftheeconomicembargo,then…thesamecalamityaffectingtheIraqinewbornwillaffectsimilarlytheforeignbabies.….由于許多國(guó)家質(zhì)疑美國(guó)的觀點(diǎn)——安理會(huì)661號(hào)決議授權(quán)使用武力阻止伊拉克船舶違反聯(lián)合國(guó)的禁運(yùn)，美國(guó)請(qǐng)求安理會(huì)明確授權(quán)。在8月25日，以13票對(duì)0票（也門和古巴棄權(quán)），安理會(huì)妥協(xié)性地通過了第665號(hào)決議，whichpermittedmemberstatestouse“measurescommensuratetothespecificcircumstancesasmaybenecessaryundertheauthorityoftheSecurityCounciltohaltallinwardandoutwardmaritimeshippinginordertoinspectandverifytheircargoesanddestinations.”在9月25日，聯(lián)合國(guó)禁止來往伊拉克的空中通道，從而關(guān)閉了剩下的最后制裁漏洞?！猄ecurityCouncilResolution670(1990)一個(gè)月后，安理會(huì)強(qiáng)化了對(duì)伊拉克的壓力，在其第674號(hào)決議中指出，伊拉克將會(huì)對(duì)虐待外國(guó)人質(zhì)和因其入侵和占領(lǐng)科威特而引起的任何損失承擔(dān)責(zé)任。第三階段——聯(lián)合國(guó)最后通牒(TheUNUltimatum)與海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)爆發(fā)在經(jīng)過廣泛和復(fù)雜的磋商之后，安理會(huì)在第678號(hào)決議中發(fā)布了對(duì)伊拉克的最后警告。該決議以12票對(duì)2票表決通過，古巴和也門投了反對(duì)票，中國(guó)棄權(quán)。SecurityCouncilResolution678(1990)TheSecurityCouncil…ActingunderChapterVIIoftheCharter,1.DemandingthatIraqcomplyfullywithresolution660(1990)andallsubsequentrelevantresolutions,anddecides,whilemaintainingallitsdecisions,toallowIraqonefinalopportunity,asapauseofgoodwill,todoso;2.AuthorizesMemberStatesco-operatingwiththeGovernmentofKuwait,unlessIraqonorbefore15January1991fullyimplements,assetforthinparagraph1above,theforegoingresolutions,touseallnecessarymeanstoupholdandimplementresolution660(1990)andallsubsequentrelevantresolutionsandtorestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurityinthearea….1991年1月17日，以美國(guó)為首的多國(guó)部隊(duì)出動(dòng)了數(shù)百架飛機(jī)對(duì)伊拉克境內(nèi)的多個(gè)軍事目標(biāo)發(fā)動(dòng)了輪番轟擊，開始了“沙漠風(fēng)暴”(DesertStorm)行動(dòng)，海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)正式打響。伊拉克也曾向沙特和以色列發(fā)射“飛毛腿”導(dǎo)彈，企圖逼迫以色列卷入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，使多國(guó)部隊(duì)對(duì)伊拉克的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榘⒗澜鐚?duì)以色列和美國(guó)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。但以色列在美國(guó)的指示下沒有對(duì)伊拉克進(jìn)行還擊，避免的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的升級(jí)和變調(diào)。1月28日，伊拉克又組織了地面進(jìn)攻，企圖將多國(guó)部隊(duì)拖入地面戰(zhàn)，從而發(fā)揮自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)，但也被多國(guó)部隊(duì)擊敗。經(jīng)過1個(gè)多月的持續(xù)猛烈轟炸，多國(guó)部隊(duì)摧毀了伊拉克的主要軍工廠、軍事設(shè)施、軍事力量，使伊拉克的軍事指揮系統(tǒng)和防空系統(tǒng)限于癱瘓，沉重打擊了科威特境內(nèi)的伊軍。在這種情況下，2月中旬，蘇聯(lián)派特使訪問了巴格達(dá)，薩達(dá)姆接受了蘇聯(lián)特使的勸告，同意從科威特撤軍。多國(guó)部隊(duì)的空中打擊停止。但以美國(guó)為首的多國(guó)部隊(duì)（來自34個(gè)國(guó)家約70萬軍隊(duì)）為了消滅科威特境內(nèi)的伊拉克共和國(guó)衛(wèi)隊(duì)，于2月24日，又對(duì)伊拉克軍隊(duì)發(fā)動(dòng)了大規(guī)模的地面進(jìn)攻（DesertSaber）。多國(guó)部隊(duì)迅速解放了科威特并攻入伊拉克南部地區(qū)。2月27日，伊拉克被迫宣布無條件接受聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)的全部決議，要求?；?。2月28日，多國(guó)部隊(duì)宣布?；?。至此，海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)以多國(guó)部隊(duì)的勝利而宣告結(jié)束。海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中，伊拉克損失數(shù)千輛坦克和裝甲車，有大約10萬名戰(zhàn)士陣亡；美國(guó)只有148名士兵喪命。據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)防部估計(jì)，海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)花費(fèi)610易美元，其中360億美元由科威特、沙特和其他海灣國(guó)家埋單，而德國(guó)和日本支付160億美元。TheGulfWar[FN1]broughtintostarkrelieftheeffectofwarontheenvironment.Environmentaldestruction,previouslyregardedasincidentaltotheconductofwar,[FN2]hasbecomeafundamentalpart*406ofmilitarystrategy.[FN3]TheGulfWarwastermedan“eco-war”[FN4]andIraq'sactsas“environmentalterrorism.”TheOilSpill－TheOilFires問題與討論1．伊拉克入侵科威特違反了哪些國(guó)際法基本原則？2．美國(guó)用來確保多數(shù)安理會(huì)理事國(guó)支持第678號(hào)決議的手段是合法的嗎？它們影響了決議的政治或法律效果嗎？ThomasFriedman,HowU.SWonSupporttoUseMideastForces,TheIraqResolution:AU.S.-SovietCollaboration,N.Y.Times,Dec.2,1990,atA1,A19.MorethanAmerican-Sovietdiplomacy,ofcourse,wentintoproducingResolution678.Equallyimportanttotheeffect,officialssaid,werelessvisiblestrategies,liketheBushAdministration’sdecisiontoencourageSaudiArabiatogive＄1billioninaidtohelptheSovietthroughthewinter;itsdecisiontolettheChineseknowthatiftheydidnotvetotheresolutiontheirForeignMinisterwouldbereceivedattheWhiteHouseafter18monthsofisolation[followingChina’suseofforcetocrushpro-democracydemonstratorsinTiananmenSquarein1989];andthearguments…withsmallercoalitionmembers,inwhich[thePresidentandtheSecretary]pressedthepointthatiftheUnitedNationsfailedtodislodgeIraqfromKuwait,everysmallstatewouldbeatthemercyoflargerpredatoryneighbors.WithAmerica’splaceintheworld,nottomentionMr.Bush’spoliticalfuture,ridingontheoutcomeofthegulfcrisis,theadministrationneverhesitatedtoletothernationsknowthattheirsupportforthisresolutionwasvitaltoWashington,whichwouldrememberitsfriendsanditsfoes.MinutesaftertheYemenidelegatejoinedtheCubansinvotingagainsttheresolutionattheSecurityCouncilonThursday,aseniorAmericandiplomatwasinstructedtotellhim:“Thatwasthemostexpensivenovoteyouevercast”meaningitwouldresultinanendtoAmerica’smorethan＄70millioninforeignaidtoYemen.3．你如何評(píng)價(jià)美國(guó)與聯(lián)合國(guó)在海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中的關(guān)系？【案例2－2】“科索沃危機(jī)與北約干涉”案（1999年3月至6月）多年以來，科索沃一直是塞爾維亞共和國(guó)的一個(gè)自治省，而塞爾維亞本身又是南斯拉夫社會(huì)主義聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)的一個(gè)省份。科索沃的居民曾經(jīng)大部分是塞爾維亞人。在二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束之際，其人口大約是塞爾維亞人和阿爾巴尼亞人各占一半。不過，到了80年代，科索沃的阿爾巴尼亞人占了當(dāng)?shù)厝丝诘?0%左右，作為少數(shù)民族的科索沃塞爾維亞人常常遭受歧視。米洛塞維齊(SlobodanMilosevic)，一個(gè)新興的政客，利用科索沃塞爾維亞人的艱難處境作為宣揚(yáng)其民族主義政綱的借口，最終登上了塞爾維亞總統(tǒng)的寶座，后來又當(dāng)上了南聯(lián)盟(theFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,FRY)的總統(tǒng)，并借助民族主義使前南斯拉夫解體。在1989年，米洛塞維齊以塞爾維亞總統(tǒng)的身份廢除了科索沃的長(zhǎng)期自治地位。阿爾巴尼亞族人，由于面臨在就業(yè)、教育和一般公共生活方面的歧視，組建了平行的機(jī)構(gòu)來管理其日常生活。與此同時(shí)，許多科索沃人利用造反策略來追求獨(dú)立。事實(shí)上，美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家把科索沃解放軍(KosovoLiberationArmy,KLA)——主要的阿爾巴尼亞族人反叛力量——定性為恐怖主義組織。由于KLA不斷升級(jí)其對(duì)南斯拉夫警察和其他目標(biāo)的攻擊，貝爾格萊德加強(qiáng)了對(duì)科索沃阿爾巴尼亞人的鎮(zhèn)壓，結(jié)果導(dǎo)致成千上萬的阿爾巴尼亞人流離失所，逃到山區(qū)去避難。西方國(guó)家擔(dān)心發(fā)生在克羅地亞和波斯尼亞的血腥沖突會(huì)重演，決定在有關(guān)事件升級(jí)為一場(chǎng)可能卷入鄰近的阿爾巴尼亞和馬其頓（一個(gè)擁有更大數(shù)量阿爾巴尼亞人少數(shù)民族）的地區(qū)性沖突之前采取行動(dòng)。在1998年，貝爾格萊德在國(guó)際壓力下同意不佩帶武器的國(guó)際觀察員進(jìn)駐科索沃監(jiān)督塞爾維亞警察的行為。但是，由塞爾維亞安全部隊(duì)制造的人權(quán)侵犯事件仍在繼續(xù)發(fā)生。在1999年1月15日，幾個(gè)塞爾維亞警察分隊(duì)，顯然是為了報(bào)復(fù)剛發(fā)生不久且導(dǎo)致三名塞爾維亞警察喪生的KLA的伏擊行動(dòng)，進(jìn)入了Racak鎮(zhèn)，在那里他們虐待并殘酷殺害了大約45名居民。FRY宣稱那些在Racak鎮(zhèn)被殺死的人是恐怖分子，“先前曾用自動(dòng)武器、火箭筒和迫擊炮向警察開火”，但FRY的行動(dòng)遭到了廣泛的譴責(zé)，并促使西方加緊尋求有關(guān)沖突的政治解決辦法。在1999年2月，聯(lián)絡(luò)小組(theContactGroup)——美國(guó)、英國(guó)、法國(guó)、德國(guó)、俄羅斯和意大利促使雙方在法國(guó)的朗布衣埃(Rambouillet)就提升科索沃的自治進(jìn)行談判。在朗布衣埃，美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家堅(jiān)持要求貝爾格萊德接受廣泛的臨時(shí)性自治安排并允許北約(NATO)全面進(jìn)駐科索沃以確保有關(guān)安排得到落實(shí)。沖突雙方都拒絕接受?？扑魑职柊湍醽喨讼脍A得完全的獨(dú)立，而貝爾格萊德不希望北約武裝部隊(duì)染指其領(lǐng)土。最后，西方國(guó)家成功地使科索沃人接受了《朗布衣埃協(xié)定》，但貝爾格萊德拒絕接受，盡管其得到的明確警告是：如果會(huì)談失敗，北約可能使用武力。到了1999年3月18日，由于顯然不會(huì)達(dá)成協(xié)議，會(huì)談被擱置了。兩天后，貝爾格萊德對(duì)KLA的主力發(fā)動(dòng)了春季攻勢(shì)，同時(shí)也包圍了KLA不大活躍的地區(qū)。塞爾維亞軍隊(duì)驅(qū)逐或殺害了許多平民，并搶劫和毀掉了阿爾巴尼亞人村莊中的許多家園。在1999年3月24日，北約開始對(duì)在科索沃，甚至塞爾維亞的目標(biāo)進(jìn)行了有選擇性的轟炸。不但沒有接受北約就科索沃問題提出的建議，米洛塞維齊迅速加大了其對(duì)科索沃阿爾巴尼亞人的攻擊力度。塞爾維亞部隊(duì)和穿戴黑色面罩的準(zhǔn)軍事力量在數(shù)周內(nèi)就驅(qū)逐了超過80萬科索沃人。在此過程中，許多人受到肉體上的虐待；同時(shí)可能有1萬人被殺害。盡管北約最初希望其轟炸行動(dòng)在幾周之內(nèi)就會(huì)產(chǎn)生成效，但卻持續(xù)了幾個(gè)月。隨著一個(gè)和平協(xié)定的達(dá)成和一個(gè)敦促米洛塞維齊遵守類似于（但并不同樣嚴(yán)格的）規(guī)定在《朗布衣埃協(xié)定》條款相關(guān)安理會(huì)決議的出臺(tái)，轟炸行動(dòng)才在1999年6月初結(jié)束。到8月，大約90%被迫逃離該省而進(jìn)入阿爾巴尼亞、馬其頓和其他國(guó)家的科索沃人在北約維和部隊(duì)的保護(hù)下重新返回其家園。1.DebatingtheLegalityofNATOInterventionGovernmentofficials,humanrightsgroups,philosophers,andlegalscholarsalikehavevigorouslydebatedthecompatibilityofNATO'smilitaryinterventionwithArticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.SupportersoftheinterventionemphasizetheneedtorespondtoahumanitarianemergencyandthemultilateralcharacterofNATOdecisionmaking.Further,theypointtonumerousSecurityCouncilresolutionsinadvanceofthebombingdeterminingthatBelgrade'sattacksonKosovarAlbaniansthreatenedinternationalpeaceandsecurityanddemandinganendtoviolationsoftheKosovars’humanrights.InResolution1160,forexample,theCouncildemandedonMarch31,1998,thatBelgradewithdrawits"specialpoliceunitsandcease[]actionbythesecurityforcesaffectingthecivilianpopulation."Similarly,inResolution1199,adoptedonSeptember23,1998,theSecurityCouncildemandedthatBelgradeceasehostilitiesandnegotiateapoliticalsettlement.TheCouncilwarnedthat"shouldtheconcretemeasuresdemandedinthisresolution...notbetaken...[itwould]considerfurtheractionandadditionalmeasurestomaintainorrestorepeaceandstabilityintheregion."Butascriticsoftheinterventionpointout,theSecurityCouncilneverexpresslyauthorizedNATO'smilitarycampaign.NATO'smemberswouldhaveliked,butdidnotseek,suchauthorizationbecauseitwasclearthatRussia,withitslonghistoricaltiestoSerbia,andperhapsalsoChina,whichhaslongopposedwhatitseesasattemptsatassertingWesternhegemony,wouldvetoanyauthorizingresolution.Atthesametime,byavoteof12-3,theSecurityCouncilonMarch26rejectedadraftresolutionintroducedbyRussia,China,andNamibiacondemningthebombingcampaignasaviolationofinternationallaw.Moreover,inResolution1244,adoptedonJune10,1999,theSecurityCouncilwelcomedthepoliticalsettlementreachedattheconclusionofthebombingcampaignandthe"internationalarmedpresence"thatfollowedtheFRY’sJuneagreementwithNATO.Forsomeobservers,NATO'sactionwithoutpriorandexplicitSecurityCouncilauthorizationamountedtoaclearviolationofArticle2(4)oftheCharter.Intheirview,humanitarianconcernsofthesortthatprecipitatedNATOactiondonotandshouldnotsufficetooverridetheCharter'snormsontheuseofforce.TheyarguethattheCharter'sdesignreflectsasimplebutcrucialutilitariancalculus:theriskofescalatinginterstateconflictinherentinanyweakeningoftheconstraintsontheuseofforceoutweighsthepossiblebenefitsofcarvingoutexceptionsforcasesofgravehumanitarianneedthat,foronereasonoranother,cannotgeneratetheSecurityCouncilconsensusneededtoauthorizemilitaryintervention.Othersresistthisconclusionasinsufficientlyresponsivetohumanitarianconcernsandasincompatiblewithrecentstatepractice.Intheirview,itisimpossibletodismissanactioncarriedoutbytheworld'srichestandmostpowerfulstates,alldemocraciescommittedtotheruleoflaw,asasimplebreachofinternationallaw.Theyarguethattheinterventionwasmorallyandpoliticallyjustifiedandthatinternationallawmustbeflexibleenoughtoaccommodatesuchinterventions.Someofthesedivergentviewsarereflectedinthematerialsthatfollow.2.ScholarlyReactionstoKosovoLegalacademicsweresharplydividedintheirresponsetoNATO'sinterventioninKosovo.SomecondemneditasanopenbreachoftheUNCharterandcustomaryinternationallaw.Otherspraiseditasusheringinanewerainwhichtheprotectionofhumanrightswouldtakeprecedenceoveroutmodednotionsofstatesovereignty.Butmanyscholarsattemptedamorenuancedevaluation,asreflectedinthefollowingexcerpts.RuthWedgwood,NATO'sCampaigninYugoslaviaThelackofanysimpleprecedentfortheaircampaignisonlyastartingplaceindecidinguponlegality,fortheformalsystemofinternationallawcannotclaimnmonopolyongenerativepower.Thelackofanysinglesourceofrulesorultimatearbiterofdisputesininternationalaffairsmeansthatstatepracticeremainskeytotheshapingoflegalnorms.Whenanactionisdeemedmorallyurgentbyamajorityofstates—evenanactioninvolvingtheuseofforce—itislikelvtoshapealegaljustificationtomatch.ThewaroverKosovomaymarktheendofSecurityCouncilclassicism—thecommonbeliefthatallnecessaryandlegitimateusesofforceoutsidetheCouncil'sdecisioncannecessarilybeaccommodatedwithintheparadigmofinterstateself-defense.Itmayalsomarktheemergenceofalimitedandconditionalrightofhumanitarianintervention,permittingtheuseofforcetoprotectthelivesofathreatenedpopulationwhenthedecisionistakenbywhatmostoftheworldwouldrecognizeasaresponsiblemultilateralorganizationandtheSecurityCouncildoeslotopposetheaction....InitsexplanationoftheKosovomilitaryintervention,theUnitedStateshasemphasizedthegoalsoftheNATOaction,ratherthanthebasisininternationalawforauthorizationoftheuseofforce.PresidentClintonstatedthattheactionvasdesignedtoavertahumanitariancatastrophe,preservestabilityinakeypartofEurope,andmaintainthecredibilityofNATO.U.S.governmentlawyers,perhapsmoremindfulofprecedent,haverestedonaso-calledelementsapproach—alsostyledas“fact-basedfactors”.Elegantornot,thisisinpartapracticalprudence,mixingcircumstancesandprincipletoqualifyanyuniversalisttheoryorwiderangingrulethatmightprovelessattractiveinotherhands.Thereis,infact,noshortageoftheoriestolegitimatetheKosovocampaign.ButthelegalscholarfacesaparadoxreminiscentofJusticeCardozo'sfamouslymaddeningopinions—nosingleargumentquitecarriesthedayevenwhiletheensembleseemssufficient....Withinthekenoftreatisewriters,humanitarianinterventionhasinconstantsupport.Somenoteitsinfrequentuseandthedangerofpretextualdisguiseofnationalambitions.OthersarguethatamoredirectassignmentofthetaskofhumanitarianprotectiontotheUnitedNationsmightincreaseitslegitimacy,andhencethewillingnesstodischargethedutythroughcollectivemeans.Butmanyhavearguedagainstproceduralperfectionismintimesofemergency,whenkeynormativeprinciplesareatstake,andUnitedNationssecuritymachineryfailstowork.TheaimsoftheUNCharteraretoguaranteehumanrightsandinternationalsecurity,andwhilethedangerofincreasingthescaleofaconflictisalwaystobeconsidered,theuseofmilitaryactiontoprotectabeleagueredpopulationmayadvancehumanevalueswithoutsignificantdangertostability....RichardA.Falk,Kosovo,WorldOrder,andtheFutureofInternationalLaw 93Am.J.Intl.L.848,848-852(1999)Itisjurisprudentiallyproblematicbothtoregard“ethniccleansing”asintolerabletotheinternationalcommunityandtocondemntheformandsubstanceoftheNATOinterventionaryresponsedesignedtopreventit.Andyetjustsuchadoctrinaltensionseemstofollowfromtheperspectivesofinternationallawandworldorder.Myattempthereistodefendsuchadoublecondemnationasposingtheessentialnormativechallengeforthefuture:genocidalbehaviorcannotbeshieldedbyclaimsofsovereignty,butneithercantheseclaimsbeoverriddenbyunauthorizedusesofforcedeliveredinanexcessiveandinappropriatemanner....[ProfessorFalkthenreviewstheKosovopolicydilemma.Henotesthatintheviewofproponentsoftheintervention,theKosovarAlbanianpopulationwasin“severejeopardy,”theUNappearedincapableofeffectivelyaddressingtheproblem,anddiplomaticremedieshadbeenexhausted.Ontheotherhand,henotesthatcriticsrespondthattheSecurityCouncildidnotauthorizetheintervention,thatalessrigidandconfrontationaldiplomacymighthaveproducedasatisfactoryresolution,andthat“themassiveSerbresorttoethniccleansingbythemostbrutalmeans[mayberegarded]aslargelyaneffectofthebombingratherthanasanurgentstimulusforaplanthatwouldotherwisehavebeencarriedoutmoregradually.”]PuttingthesetwomajorlinesofinterpretationtogetherleavesonewiththedisturbingimpressionthathumanitarianinterventiononbehalfofAlbanianKoso-varswasnecessarybut,underthecircumstances,impossible.Itwasnecessarytopreventahumanitariancatastropheintheformofethniccleansing.Itwasimpossiblebecauseofthepoliticalunavailabilityofanappropriatemeans,TheselectionofsuchameanswasblockedbydeepdivisionsbetweenleadingEuropeanstales,andbytheresolvetoinsistonaNATOsolution.ItalsoreflectedthedisinclinationofthecitizenryoftheNATOcountries,especiallyGermanyandtheUnitedStates,tobeartheconsiderablehumancoststhatmighthavefollowedfromtheadoptionalegallyandmorallymoreacceptableformofintervention.Asthisphrasingsuggests,themosthelpfulformoflegalappraisalisoneofdegree,conceivingoflegalityandillegalitybyreferencetoaspectrum.Themore“reasonable”aresponse,theclosertothelegalityendofthespectrum.InrelationtoKosovo,thecontentionhereisthatplausibleoptionswereavailabletogivetheactiontakenahigherdegreeoflegality(withoutcompromisingthehumanitarianmission),andthustoimproveitsstatusasaprecedentforthefuture.III.REJECTINGLEGALISM...[R]elianceonlegalisticanalysisisparticularlyunfortunateforthefutureofinternationallaw.ItputsinternationallawyersintheuncomfortablerolethatImmanuelKantaccusedthemofinPerpetualPeace,namely,thatofbeing"miserableconsolers"....ThebasicundertakingoftheCharterwastoassignexclusivecontrolovernondefensiveusesofforcetotheSecurity.Council,andtoacceptthelimitsonresponsethatthisenta