世界銀行報(bào)告：全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退在即

SEPTEMBER2022

EFIPolicyNote4

EQUITABLEGROWTH,FINANCE,

ANDINSTITUTIONSPOLICYNOTE

IsaGlobalRecession

Imminent?

Kose,andNaotakaSugawara

JustinDamienGuénette,M.Ayhan

IsaGlobalRecessionImminent?

JustinDamienGuénette,M.AyhanKose,andNaotakaSugawara*

6995

EquitableGrowth,Finance,andInstitutionsPolicyNotes(EFIPolicyNotes)arepreparedunderthedirectionoftheVicePresidentforEquitableGrowth,Finance,andInstitutions(EFI).EFIPolicynotesanalyzetopicalissuesofimportancetopolicymakersinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

*Guénette:WorldBank,Email:jguenette@;Kose:WorldBank,BrookingsInstitution,CEPR,CAMA,Email:akose@;Sugawara:WorldBank,Email:nsugawara@.WethankAmatAdarov,CarlosArteta,KevinClinton,AntonioFatas,IndermitGill,JongrimHa,GrahamHacche,PatrickKirby,FranziskaOhnsorge,JosephRebello,JamesRowe,FranzUlrichRuch,andChristopherTowefortheirdetailedcommentsandsuggestions.LorezQehajaandKaltrinaTemajprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY1

I.INTRODUCTION3

II.GLOBALRECESSIONSSINCE19707

II.1.MAINCHARACTERISTICS7

II.2.EVENTSDURINGGLOBALRECESSIONSANDDOWNTURNS8

III.GLOBALACTIVITY10

III.1.EVOLUTIONOFGROWTHFORECASTS10

III.2.RECENTDEVELOPMENTSINHISTORICALCONTEXT12

IV.POLICYRESPONSES14

IV.1.EVOLUTIONOFPOLICIES14

IV.2.RECENTPOLICYACTIONSINHISTORICALCONTEXT17

V.GLOBALGROWTHSCENARIOS21

V.1.BASELINESCENARIO22

V.2.SHARPDOWNTURNSCENARIO24

V.3.GLOBALRECESSIONSCENARIO27

VI.CONCLUSION31

APPENDIXI.IDENTIFYINGTHETURNINGPOINTSOFTHEGLOBALBUSINESSCYCLE35

APPENDIXII.GLOBALECONOMICMODEL38

REFERENCES41

FIGURES

Figure0.Globalrecession:activity,policies,andoutcomes2

Figure1.Globalcontext4

Figure2.Globalrecessions8

Figure3.Growthforecasts11

Figure4.Recentdevelopmentsandglobalrecessions13

Figure5.Interestrates,governmentexpenditures,anddebt16

Figure6.Inflation,interestrates,andfiscalbalances17

Figure7.Policiesduringglobalrecessions20

Figure8.Globalscenarios:GDPandtradegrowth23

Figure9.Globalscenarios:inflation,interestrates,andoilprices26

Figure10.Scenariosinrelationtopastglobalrecessions28

Figure11.Vulnerabilities,crises,andgrowth33

TABLES

Table1.Globalscenarios:globalinflation,nominalandrealinterestrates25

Table2A.Globalscenarios:GDPgrowth29

Table2B.Globalscenarios:PercapitaGDPgrowth30

TableI.1.GDPgrowthduringglobalrecessions35

TableI.2.Globalrecessions:durationandamplitude(withquarterlyseries)36

TableI.3.GDPgrowthduringglobaldownturns36

TableI.4.Listoflowestandhighestgrowthrates37

TheoddsofrecessioninEurope,theUnitedStates,andChinaaresignificantandincreasing,andacollapseinoneregionwill raisetheoddsofcollapseintheothers…Therisksofaglobalrecessiontrifectaarerisingbytheday.

KennethRogoff,April26,2022

Aglobalrecessionisentirelyavoidable…EvenbylaxercriterialikeGDPgrowthbelow2.5percent,globalrecessionisveryfarfrominevitable.

JeffreyFrankel,August25,2022

Whetherthebalanceofrisksistowardinflation,recession,orasmoothlandingfromcurrentturbulencedependson unknownssuchasthedurationoftheUkrainewar…….Butaglobalrecessioniscertainlynotinevitable.

AnneO.Krueger,August25,2022

…Ifthesetwoeconomies(theUSandChina)arebothintheirrespectiveversionsofrecession,thenthatwillvirtuallyguaranteea

globaldownturn.Giventheircurrentweaknessesandchallenges,suchascenarioisquitepossible…ButIamlessconvincedofthisthanIprobablywasafewmonthsago…

JimO’Neill,August25,2022

Notwithstandingthepitfallsofforecastinganythingthesedays,mycrackedandworncrystalballseesaglobalrecessionoccurringinthenextyear….Collectively,Europe,theUS,andChinamakeupabouthalfofworldGDPonapurchasing-power-paritybasis.With noothereconomyabletofillthevoid,Iamafraidaglobalrecessiondoesindeedappearinevitable.

StephenS.Roach,August25,2022

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Context.Sincethebeginningoftheyear,arapiddeteriorationofgrowthprospects,coupledwithrisinginflationandtighteningfinancingconditions,hasignitedadebateaboutthepossibilityofaglobalrecession—acontractioninglobalpercapitaGDP

(Figure0.A).

Drawingoninsightsgainedfrompreviousglobalrecessions,thisstudypresentsasystematicanalysisoftherecentevolutionofeconomicactivityandpolicies,andamodel-basedassessmentofpossiblenear-termmacroeconomicoutcomes.

Evolutionofactivity.Consensusforecastsforglobalgrowthin2022and2023havebeendowngradedsignificantlysincethebeginningoftheyear.Althoughtheseforecastsdonotpointtoaglobalrecessionin2022–23,experiencefromearlierrecessionssuggeststhatatleasttwodevelopments—whicheitherhavealreadymaterializedinrecentmonthsormaybeunderway—heightenthelikelihoodofaglobalrecessioninthenearfuture.First,everyglobalrecessionsince1970wasprecededbyasignificantweakeningofglobalgrowthinthepreviousyear,ashashappenedrecently

(Figure0.B)

.Second,allpreviousglobalrecessionscoincidedwithsharpslowdownsoroutrightrecessionsinseveralmajoreconomies.

Evolutionofpolicies.Despitethecurrentslowdowninglobalgrowth,inflationhasrisentomulti-decadehighsinmanycountries.Tostemrisksfrompersistentlyhighinflation,andinacontextoflimitedfiscalspace,manycountriesarewithdrawingmonetaryandfiscalsupport.Asaresult,theglobaleconomyisinthemidstofoneofthemostinternationallysynchronousepisodesofmonetaryandfiscalpolicytighteningofthepastfivedecades

(Figure0.C)

.Thesepolicyactionsarenecessarytocontaininflationarypressures,buttheirmutuallycompoundingeffectscouldproducelargerimpactsthanintended,bothintighteningfinancialconditionsandinsteepeningthegrowthslowdown.Thissynchronouspolicytighteningcontrastswiththepoliciesadoptedaroundthe1975globalrecessionbutissimilartothoseimplementedaheadofthe1982recession.Amajorlessonfromthesetwoepisodesisthatmakingnecessarypolicyadjustmentsinatimelyfashionisessentialtocontaininginflationarypressuresandreducingtheoutputcostsofpolicyinterventions.

Near-termgrowthoutcomes.Threescenariosfortheglobaleconomyover2022-24areanalyzedusingalarge-scale,cross-countrymodel(

Figure0.D)

.Thefirst,baselinescenario,alignscloselywithrecentconsensusforecastsofgrowthandinflation,aswellasmarketexpectationsforpolicyinterestrates.However,itimpliesthatthedegreeofmonetarypolicytighteningcurrentlyexpectedmaynotbeenoughtorestorelowinflationinatimelyfashion.Thesecondscenario,sharpdownturn,assumesanupwarddriftininflationexpectations,whichtriggersadditionalsynchronousmonetarypolicytighteningbymajorcentralbanks.Inthisscenario,theglobaleconomywouldstillescapearecessionin2023butwouldexperienceasharpdownturnwithoutrestoringlowinflationbytheendoftheforecasthorizon.Inthethirdscenario,globalrecession,additionalincreasesinpolicyrateswouldtriggerasharpre-pricingofriskinglobalfinancialmarketsandresultinaglobalrecessionin2023

(Figure0.E)

.Iftheongoingglobalslowdownturnsintoarecession,theglobaleconomycouldendupexperiencinglargepermanentoutputlossesrelativetoitspre-pandemictrend

(Figure0.F).

Thiswouldhavesevereconsequencesforthelong-termgrowthprospectsofemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesthatwerealreadyhithardbythepandemic-inducedglobalrecessionof2020.

Policyresponses.Policymakersneedtonavigateanarrowpaththatrequiresacomprehensivesetofdemand-andsupply-sidemeasures.Onthedemandside,monetarypolicymustbeemployedconsistentlytorestore,inatimelymanner,pricestability.Fiscalpolicyneedstoprioritizemedium-termdebtsustainabilitywhileprovidingtargetedsupporttovulnerablegroups.Policymakersneedtostandreadytomanagethepotentialspilloversfromgloballysynchronouswithdrawalofpoliciessupportinggrowth.Onthesupply-side,theyneedtoputinplacemeasurestoeasetheconstraintsthatconfrontlabormarkets,

energymarkets,andtradenetworks.

1

GrowthInflation

4

3

2022-23

2

FebMarAprMayJunJulAug

C.Globalpolicyraterisesandcuts

Number

30

Figure0.Globalrecession:activity,policies,andoutcomes

B.GlobalGDPgrowthduringglobalrecessions

A.Evolutionofglobalgrowthandinflationforecasts

for2023

Percent,year-on-year

Percent

8

4

0

-4

-8

-12

5

Pastglobalrecessions

t-5t-4t-3t-2t-1tt+1t+2

D.GlobalGDPgrowthunderdifferentscenarios

Baseline

Sharpdownturn

Globalrecession

Percent

4

RisesCuts

20

10

2

0

-10

-20

0

-30

2024

2023

2022

19701983199620092022

F.EvolutionofglobalGDP

E.GlobalpercapitaGDPunderdifferentscenarios

Index,2022=100

105

Index,2019=100

115

Baseline

Sharpdownturn

Globalrecession

Pastglobalrecessions

Baseline

Sharpdownturn

Globalrecession

110

Pre-pandemicforecasts

105

100

100

95

95

2024

2022

2023

2018201920202021202220232024

Sources:BankforInternationalSettlements;ConsensusEconomics;HaverAnalytics;Kose,Sugawara,andTerrones(2020);OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment;OxfordEconomics;WorldBank.A.ConsensusforecastsofglobalgrowthareweightedbyGDPinU.S.dollarsbasedon86countries,andconsensusinflationforecastsarebasedonmedianbasedon83countries.ThelastobservationisAugust2022.B.GlobalGDPgrowtharoundthefiveglobalrecessions,aswellasinrecentperiod,basedonthequarterlydata.Pastglobalrecessionsshowtherangeforthefiveglobalrecessions(i.e.,1975,1982,1991,2009,and2020),andtime“t”denotesthebeginningofrespectiveglobal

recessions:1974Q1,1981Q4,1990Q4,2008Q3,and2020Q1,respectively.For2022-23,time“t”shows2023Q1.Dataovert-3tot-1in2022–23(i.e.,2022Q2to2022Q4)arecomputedwithconsensusforecastsofquarterlygrowthin45countries.C.Three-monthaverageofthenumberofpolicyraterisesandcutsoverthemonthfor38countriesincludingeuroarea.ThelastobservationisJuly2022.D.E.Thesescenarios(Baseline,Sharpdownturn,andGlobalrecession)areproducedusingtheOxfordEconomicsGlobalEconomicModelandexpressedasthevaluesin2022equalto100.Forpastglobalrecessions,therangeshowstheminimum-maximumrangeofpastfiveglobalrecessionsandthevaluesoneyearpriortoeachglobalrecession(forexample,1974forthe1975globalrecession,and2019forthe2020globalrecession)areequalto100.F.Dataareshownasanindex(2019=100).Thepre-pandemicforecastsarebasedongrowthforecastsintheJanuary2020long-termconsensusforecastsover2020–24.

2

I.INTRODUCTION

Justtwoyearsafterthepandemic-inducedglobalrecessionof2020,theworldeconomyisagainfacingdifficultchallenges.Asgrowthisslowingsharply,fearsofanimpendingglobalrecessionarerising

(Figure1A)

.Stagflationarypressuresarealsomountingasinflationreachesnewmulti-decadehighsinmanycountries(

Figures1Band1C)

.Geopoliticaltensionsarecastingalongshadowoverglobalgrowthprospects,withtheRussianFederation’sinvasionofUkrainemagnifyingpre-existingsupply-sidechallengesandintensifyingvolatilityincommoditymarkets.

Moreover,risingglobalborrowingcostsareheighteningtheriskoffinancialstressamongthemanyemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)thatoverthepastdecadehaveaccumulateddebtatthefastestpaceinmorethanhalfacentury(

Figure1D)

.1

Asthequotesaboveshow,therehasrecentlybeenavigorousdebateaboutthenear-termprospectsfortheglobaleconomyandthechancesofglobalrecession.2Ourstudyaimstoinformthisdebatewithasystematicanalysisofrecentdevelopmentsdrawingonlessonsfrompreviousglobalrecessionsandacarefulassessmentofpossiblenear-termgrowthscenariosbasedonawell-definedmodellingframework.Weaddressthreespecificquestions:

?Howdoestherecentevolutionofeconomicactivitycomparewiththatpriortoearlierglobalrecessions?

?Howdorecentmacroeconomicpolicyactionsdifferfromthoseprecedingearlierglobalrecessions?

?What