聯(lián)合國貿(mào)易發(fā)展委員會(huì)-貿(mào)易希望：黑海谷物倡議的影響（英）-2023.3

UNITED

NATIONS

CONFERENCE

ON

TRADE

AND

DEVELOPMENTATRADEHOPETheimpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiativeMarch2023INTRODUCTIONThe

war

in

Ukraine

sent

shock

waves

throughout

the

global

economy,

in

particularthrough

trade

disruptions

of

food

and

fertilizers

from

two

of

the

world’s

mainbreadbaskets,

Ukraine

and

the

Russian

Federation.

This

left

millions

of

people

indeveloping

and

least

developed

countries

at

the

frontline

of

a

food

and

price

crisis.In

July

2022,

two

agreements

were

signed:

one

is

the

memorandum

of

understandingbetween

the

United

Nations

and

the

Russian

Federation

to

facilitate

the

unimpededaccess

for

their

food

and

fertilizers

exports

to

global

markets.

The

second

is

theBlack

Sea

Grain

Initiative

(BSGI),

signed

by

the

Russian

Federation,

Türkiye,

Ukraine,and

witnessed

by

the

United

Nations

to

allow

the

safe

export

of

grain,

fertilizers

andotherfoodstufffromUkrainianportsintheBlackSea.These

agreements

have

helped

to

bring

down

the

cost

of

food,

stabilize

globalmarketsandkeepthemopen.However,

this

progress

is

fragile

and

price

pressures

remain.

While

food

priceshave

gone

down

from

their

all-time

high

at

the

start

of

the

war,

they

remain

highcompared

to

pre-crises

levels.

Moreover,

currency

depreciations

prevent

manydevelopingcountriesfrombene?tingfromglobalpricedecreases,and,inthemostsevere

cases,

prices

have

even

gone

up.

Additionally,

as

is

so

often

the

case,

themostvulnerablebearthebrunt,particularlywomen.The

United

Nations

remains

committed

to

both

agreements,

and

to

remove

allremaining

impediments

that

constrain

access

of

food

and

fertilizers

from

theRussianFederationandUkrainetoglobalmarkets.This

report

concentrates

on

showing

the

bene?ts

of

one

of

the

agreements,

theBlack

Sea

Grain

Initiative,

and

its

contribution

to

ease

market

pressures

and

averttheworstimpactsofthefoodcrisis.The

continuation

and

effective

implementation

of

both

agreements

are

vital

forglobalfoodsecurity.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative2CONTENTS1

2

3BlackSeaGrainInitiativeinnumbersGapsstilltobeclosedThefragilityoffoodpricesTheInitiativeisanimportantpartoftheglobalresponseA

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative31BlackSeaGrainInitiativeinNumbers1.1

Deliveringfoodtotheworld1asof5March202323,000,000+tonnesofgrainwereexportedundertheInitiativeDeveloping

countries

have

bene?tted

the

most

from

the

Initiative,

Wheat

and

corn

are

among

the

world’s

most

used

food

staples.

Undersupportingfoodsecurityamongthemostvulnerable.theInitiative,

cornandwheataccountedfor77percentofexports.Figure1:DevelopingcountriesreceivedthelargestshareoffoodexportsFigure2:CornandwheatmakeupthemajorityoffoodexportsShareoffoodexportstocountrygroupsbydevelopmentstatusAsashareoftotalcargoshipped(%)LeastDeveloped6%OtherBarley9%4.3%Sunfloweroil5%Sunflowermeal

6%OtherDevelopingCorn49%Tonnes:23,355,528DevelopedTonnes:23,355,52849%45%Wheat28%Source:UNCTAD

secretariatbasedondatafromtheJointCoordinationCentreasof5March,

2023.Note:

Cargomaybeprocessedandre-exportedfromtheprimarydestination.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative4Many

developing

and

least

developed

countries

rely

on

these

grains

to

provide

affordable

food

for

theirpopulations.

Under

the

Initiative,

exports

of

these

vital

grains

from

Ukraine

were

able

to

resume,

reachingglobal

markets.

Exports

of

corn

to

developed

and

developing

countries

have

been

almost

evenly

split,

at

51

percent

and

49

per

cent,

respectively.

Exports

of

wheat

have

gone

predominantly

to

developing

countries

and

leastdevelopedcountries,

representing65percentoftotalwheatcargo.Figure3.

CornreachesdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesalmostequallyFigure4.

Developingcountriesbene?tfromthelion’sshareofwheatexportsShareofexportsofcorntocountrygroupsbydevelopmentstatusShareofexportsofwheattocountrygroupsbydevelopmentstatusLeastDeveloped20%Developed34%DevelopedDeveloping51%Tonnes:49%Tonnes:11,438,4246,455,384Other

Developing45%Figure5.

DistributionofcornexportsbyincomeFigure6.

DistributionofwheatexportsbyincomeShareofexportsofcorntocountrygroupsbyincomelevelShareofexportsofwheattocountrygroupsbyincomelevelLowermiddleincome9%Lowincome10%Highincome37%Highincome51%LowerUppermiddleTonnes:11,438,424middleincome40%Tonnes:income6,455,38433%Upper

middleincome19%Source:

UNCTAD

secretariatbasedondatafromtheJointCoordinationCentreasof5March,

2023.Note:

Cargomaybeprocessedandre-exportedfromtheprimarydestination.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative5The

Black

Sea

Grain

Initiative

has

allowed

for

greater

consistency

and

predictability.

This

has

helped

mitigatepriceshocksintheinternationalmarketandfacilitatedasteadyfoodsupply.Figure7.

Exports?uctuatebutdonotfalterMonthlyexportsundertheBlackSeaGrainInitiative,

inmetrictonnes.4.1M4M4M3.7M3.5M2.8M3M3M2M1M1.7MAug2022SepOctNovDecJan2023FebSource:

UNCTAD

secretariat

based

on

data

from

the

Joint

Coordination

Centre

as

of5

March,

2023.

As

an

ongoing

month,data

for

March

2023

is

not

shown.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative62GapsstilltobeclosedThe

BSGI

accounted

for

60

per

cent

of

total

Ukrainian

export

volumes

of

corn,

wheat

and

barley

during

the

?rstfourmonthsofitsoperation.

However,

exportsfortheperiodJanuary-November2022were22%below2021levels.Figure8.

More

than

half

of

Ukrainian

grain

exports

were

supported

by

the

Initiative

since

its

signingMonthlyUkrainianexportsofcorn,

wheatandbarley,

withandwithouttheBSGI,

inmilliontonnesExportsoutsidetheBlackSeaGrainInitiativeExportsundertheBlackSeaGrainInitiativeWARINUKRAINE642INITIATIVE

SIGNEDJan2021AprJulOctJan2022AprJulOctSource:

UNCTAD

secretariatbasedondatafromUNComtradeandtheJointCoordinationCentreuntilNovember2022.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative72.1

Port

activityisstillbelowpre-warlevelsSince

the

signing

of

the

Initiative,

ship

departures

from

Ukrainian

ports

have

shown

a

marked

increase.However,despite

the

Initiative’s

efforts,there

is

still

more

to

be

done

to

restore

ship

departures

from

Ukraineto2021levels.Figure9.

Ship

departures

rose

with

the

Initiative,

but

remain

below

2021

levelsNumberofportcallsbyweekinUkraine20018016014012010080WAR

IN

UKRAINEINITIATIVE

SIGNED2021202260Ships

mostly

departing

from

river

portsThe

BSGI

wasextended

by120

days

on17

November40200W01W07W13W19W25W31W37W43W49Source:

UNCTAD

secretariat,

basedondataprovidedbySea/(www.sea.live)BetweentheonsetofthewarandtheimplementationoftheInitiative,

riversbecamethemainshippingroutesfor

Ukrainian

exports.Before

the

war,

more

than

90

per

cent

of

ships

had

departed

from

seaports.However,with

the

war,

this

share

abruptly

dropped

to

20

per

cent.

After

the

signing

of

the

Initiative,

the

share

almostdoubled.Trade

alongrivershasbecomemoreimportantcomparedtothepre-warperiod.

Trade

diversiontowardsriverports

–

in

particular

the

river

Danube

–

is

also

re?ected

in

trade

statistics.

For

the

period

January

to

November,Ukrainian

grain

exports

to

Romania

increased

from

less

than

one

thousand

tonnes

in

2021

to

more

than

amilliontonnesin2022.But

trade

via

inland

waterways

comes

at

a

higher

cost.

River

routes

cannot

handle

large

dry

bulk

vesselsbut

instead

employ

small

cargo

and

multipurpose

vessels

carrying

lower

volumes.Furthermore,if

the

grain’sdestination

is

overseas,

as

is

the

case

for

most

developing

and

least

developed

countries,

it

takes

more

time

toreachits?naldestinationwhenneedingtotransittheEuropeanUnion.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative82.2

Ukrainianexportsofgraintodevelopingcountriesremainbelowpre-warlevelsGrain

exports

from

Ukraine

signi?cantly

picked

up

since

the

start

of

the

Initiative.

Totalgrain

exports

during

theautumn

months

came

close

to

levels

of

the

previous

year.

However,

they

could

not

compensate

for

the

tradeslumpduringthe?rstmonthsofthewar.Notably,

foreverytonneofwheatshippedfromUkrainetodevelopingcountriesin2022,

thereisagapoftwotonnes.

The

gap

of

11.8

million

tonnes

is

equivalent

to

the

annual

wheat

food

consumption

of

175

millionpeople,

roughly

the

population

of

Bangladesh.1

For

corn

and

barley,the

export

gap

is

as

large

as

41

per

centand82percent,

respectively,

ofthepreviousyear’s

level.Figure10.

Grain

exports

todeveloping

countries

rose

with

the

Initiative,

but

gaps

are

yet

to

be

?lledUkrainianexportvolumestodevelopingcountriesinmilliontonnes,

selectedproductsExportsWheatBeforetheInitiative(Jan-Jul)Sincetheinitiative(Aug-Dec)ExportGap2021

18.22022

2.83.711.8Corn2021

15.32022

5.83.36.3Barley2021

5.120224.2Source:

UNCTAD

secretariat,

basedonUNComtrade(untilNovember2022)andtheJointCoordinationCentre(untilendofDecember)1AccordingtoFAO-AMIS,

theworldaveragepercapitafooduseofwheatforthemarketingseason2021/22was67kgperyear.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative9The

Initiative

has

signi?cantly

increased

exports

of

grains

to

LDCs

but

gaps

persist

here

as

well.

Two

outof

three

tonnes

of

Ukrainian

wheat

destined

for

LDCs

in

2022

were

delivered

through

the

Initiative.

Sincethe

Initiative

started,

Ukrainian

wheat

exports

to

LDCs

more

than

doubled

compared

to

the

start

of

the

war.Nonetheless,

therewasasubstantialgapbytheendoftheyear.

Thegapof1.6milliontonnesisequivalenttotheannualwheatfoodconsumptionof60millionpeoplelivinginLDCs,

roughlythepopulationof

Tanzania.2Figure11.

Ukrainianwheatexportstoleastdevelopedcountriesmorethandoubledcomparedtothestartofthewar,

butmoreisneededExportvolumeinthousandtonnesExportsBeforetheInitiative(Jan-Jul)SincetheInitiative(Aug-Dec)ExportGapTotalLDCs2021

2,9262022

4418531,633Bangladesh2021

8112022323488377Yemen2021

7782022

249

152Ethiopia2021

5372022

168327Djibouti2021

1942022

128Source:

UNCTAD

secretariat,

basedonUNComtrade(untilNov2022)andtheJointCoordinationCentre(untilendofDecember).2According

to

OECD-FAOAgricultural

Outlook

2022-2031

(2022),average

per

capita

food

consumption

of

wheat

in

least

developedcountrieswas27.1kgperyear.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative103Thefragilityoffoodprices3.1

FoodpriceshavecomedownfromrecordlevelsbutremainhighThe

Food

andAgriculture

Organization

(FAO)

reports

that

food

prices

are

almost

18

per

cent

lower

than

theirall-time

high

in

March

2022,

following

the

start

of

the

war

in

Ukraine.

This

downward

trend

in

prices

wassupportedbytheeffortsoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative.However,

price

levels

are

still

high

when

compared

to

pre-war

and

pre-pandemic

levels.

Food

prices

in

January2023

were

45

per

cent

above

the

average

over

the

past

two

decades.Furthermore,concerns

persist

for

thestabilityoffuturefoodprices,

whichmaybeunderminedbyclimaticfactors,

riskofmarketdisruptions,

exportrestrictions,

highenergycosts,

andweakeningglobaldemandforfood3.Figure13.

TheInitiativehashelpedtoreverserisingfoodprices,

butaffordabilityremainsachallengeFAO

FoodPriceIndex(100=January2020)160150Average

2022140130Average

2021120WARIN

UKRAINE110100Average

2020Average

2000-20209080JanAprJulOctJanAprJulOctJanAprJulOctJan2023202020212022Source:

FAO3VosRetal(2023).

Isfoodpricein?ationreallysubsiding?IFPRIBlog.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative113.2

Notallcountrieshavebene?ttedfromdecliningpricesExchange

rates

have

had

an

impact

on

the

affordability

of

goods

in

local

markets.

As

reported

by

UNCTAD4,in

2022,

as

the

US

dollar

appreciated

in

value,

currencies

in

many

developing

countries

depreciated.Thiscurrencydepreciationincreasedimportcostspaidbydevelopingcountries,

manyofwhichrelyheavilyonimportsforcrucialproductslikecereals.One

example

that

demonstrates

this

fact

is

the

case

of

wheat.

In

a

positive

development,

the

internationalreference

price

of

wheat

has

declined

since

October

2022.

Yet

in

some

cases,the

cost

of

purchasing

wheatin

local

currencies

has

increased

during

the

same

period.

As

a

result,many

of

those

living

in

poorer,

import-dependentcountriespaymoreforbasicfooditems.Figure14.

Somedevelopingcountriesarenotbene?ttingfromdecliningwheatpricesTheeffectsofexchangerate?uctuationsondomesticwheatpricesinselectedcountries(January2020=100)BangladeshiTakaEgyptianPoundGhanaianCediSriLankanRupeesWARINUKRAINE5004003002001000Reference

pricein

US$JanAprJulOctJanAprJulOctJanAprJulOctJan2020202120222023Source:Re?nitiv-Eikonand

WorldBank’s

PinkSheet(February2023)Note:

ThereferencewheatpriceusedistheUSHardRed

WinterwheatpriceinUSdollarpermetrictonne4UNCTAD

(2022).

ADoubleBurden:

Theeffectsoffoodpriceincreasesandcurrencydepreciationsonfoodimportbills.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative12While

most

developing

countries

are

paying

lower

prices

when

compared

to

the

record

highs

seen

in

May2022,

currency

depreciations

have

partly

eroded

the

bene?ts

of

declining

international

prices.

In

some

cases,depreciations

have

been

so

sharp

that

the

wheat

price

in

domestic

currency

surpasses

record

levels.

This

isthecase,

forinstance,

inEgypt,

Suriname,

SouthSudanandGhana.Figure15.

Currencydepreciationsreduceorevenoffsetbene?tsfromlowerwheatpricesChangeinwheatreferencepricesJanuary2023comparedtoMay2022peak,

bycurrencyCountriespayingmorethanlastyear?30%?20%?10%0%+10%EgyptArgentinaSurinameSouth

SudanGhanaHaitiLao

PDRSudanUkraineAngola-27%ChangePakistanBangladeshMalawiininternationalreferencepricein

US$TürkiyeColombiaGambiaMyanmarMongoliaIcelandNigeriaSource:Re?nitiv-Eikonand

WorldBank’s

PinkSheet(February2023)Note:

Countriesinboldareleastdevelopedcountries(9).

Theselectedcountriesdepictedinthegrapharethoseforwhichexchangeratemovementsoffsetmorethan25%ofthedeclineinUSdollar-denominatedwheatprices.A

TRADEHOPE:TheImpactoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative133.4

WomenbearthebruntoftheimpactThe

World

Food

Programme,

and

Food

and

Agriculture

Organization5

warn

that

acute

food

insecurity

isescalating,

affecting

as

many

as

828

million

people

worldwide.

LDCs

are

disproportionately

at

risk

of

foodinsecurity,

with

several

countries

facing

complex

and

prolonged

humanitarian

crises.

They

are

in

need

ofemergency

intervention

to

avert

the

imminent

risk

of

starvation.

Trade

in

staple

food

items

forms

a

keycomponentofthisemergencyresponse.Moreover,

the

“costoflivingcrisis”

tendstohaveaharsheffectonthepoorestandmostvulnerablesegmentsof

the

population.

It

widens

inequalities

not

only

between

countries

but

also

within.

As

poorer

householdsspend

a

relatively

larger

share

of

their

income

on

necessary

goods

like

food,they

tend

to

be

more

adverselyaffected

by

high

food

in?ation.Globally

and

regionally,the

prevalence

of

food

insecurity

has

been

historicallyhigher

among

women

than

men6,

and

the

gender

gap

has

widened

since

2019.There

is

a

serious

concern

thatwomenandchildrenmightsufferdisproportionatelyfromhighfoodprices.With

limited

resources

to

cushion

any

temporary

shock,

poorer

households

are

more

likely

to

resort

to

copingstrategies

that

create

adverse

long-term

effects

on

living

standards.

This

is

the

case,

for

example,

whenprolonged

food

insecurity

permanently

affects

the

health

or

strength