牛津能源研究所（OIES）：市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)和未來(lái)不確定的背景下的液化天然氣合同

December2023

ABraveNewWorld?

LNGContractsintheContextofMarketTurbulenceandanUncertainFuture

OIESPAPER:NG187JackSharples,SeniorResearchFellow,OIES

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Copyright?2023

OxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies

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ISBN978-1-78467-225-6

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Acknowledgements

IwouldliketothankallthosewhohelpedmeduringthewritingofthisPaper.Thisincludesthosewhoweregenerouswithboththeirtimeandtheirknowledge,toparticipateinresearchinterviewsatthestartofthisproject.TheirinsightsmadeavaluablecontributiontothecontentofthisPaper,andareincludedonananonymousbasis.

MythanksandappreciationalsogotothoserepresentativesofOIESGasProgrammesponsorcompanies,whoreadearlydraftsofthisPaper,andprovidedextremelyvaluablefeedbackandcommentary.Theirinsightsalsomadeavaluablecontributiontothispaper.

IwouldalsoliketothankthosecompanieswhoprovideOIESwithbothdataandaccesstoinformativepublicationspertainingtotheglobalgasmarket,andLNGmarketinparticular,whichhavecontributedtothedevelopmentofthispaper:S&PGlobal,Argus,Kpler,andGIIGNL.

Lastly,butbynomeansleast,IwouldliketothankmycolleaguesattheOIESfortheirongoinghelp,guidance,andencouragement.InparticularIwouldliketothankDavidLedesma,MikeFulwood,andJamesHendersonfortheirprovisionofinsightsandcommentaryonthispaperduringtheresearchandwritingprocess.ManythanksalsotoKateTeasdale,HarveyGrazebrook,andBillFarren-Pricefortheirhelpinpreparingthepaperforpublication.

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ExecutiveSummary

In2022,theglobalLNGmarketfacedexceptionallevelsofturbulence,asEuropeangasbuyerssoughttooffsetthelossofRussianpipelinesupplywithanunprecedentedincreaseinLNGimports.TheabilityofEuropeanbuyerstoaccessthoseLNGsupplieswasfacilitatedbytheflexibilityembeddedintheglobalLNGmarket,includingtheabilitytopurchasespotcargoesfromaggregatorsandtraders.

ThispaperarguesthattheLNGdemandseeninEuropein2022-23isnottemporary,butisnowstructural,andsettoremainfortherestofthedecadeandlikelybeyond.Inthiscontext,EuropeanLNGbuyersmustreconciletheneedtosecuregassupplyintheshort-termwiththelong-termimperativesofdecarbonisation,whileLNGexportprojectdeveloperswillonlycontinueaddingsupplytotheglobalmarketonthebasisoffirmofftakecommitments,underbindinglong-termcontracts.

Thekeyquestionis:howtoreconciletheshortandlong-termneedsofbuyersandprojectdevelopers,toensurethatthemarketremainssufficientlywellsuppliedtomanageanorderlyenergytransition?

Inaddressingthisquestion,thestandoutconclusionsofthispaperare:

?WhiletheglobalLNGmarketissettoremaintightuntil2025,thesecondhalfofthedecadewillseeasubstantialwaveofnewsupplybasedonprojectsthathavealreadytakenFID.However,thesupply-sideoutlookbeyond2030ishighlyuncertain.

?IfglobalLNGdemandcontinuestogrow,themarketwillneedadditionalsupplyfromprojectsthatneedtotakeFIDinthemid-2020s,inordertolauncharound2030,orelsefacetheshiftfromover-supplytounder-supplyakintothatseeninEuropebetween2019/20and2021/22.

?Thisuncertaintyraisesthepossibilityofseveralpossiblescenarios.Ina‘structuralimbalance’scenario,themarketcouldbeunder-suppliedifinsufficientsupply-sideFIDsaretakeninthemid-2020s,orover-suppliedifsupplycontinuesgrowfasterthandemandbeyond2030.

?Amorebenign,‘structuralbalance’scenariocouldseenewliquefactioncapacitytakingFIDinthemid-2020sonthebasisofofftakeagreementsmostlywithaggregators(portfolioplayers),whoassumevolumeriskinreturnforearningapremiumonre-sellingtoEuropeandAsia,andenduserswhowillonlybewillingtocommittocontractswithdestinationandre-saleflexibility.

?Aggregatorswillplayavitalroleinreconcilingtheshortandlong-termneedsofLNGproducersandconsumers.Theirwillingnesstosignnew,bindingofftakeagreementsoverthenextseveralyears,theirconfidenceintheirabilitytore-sellthosevolumes,andtheabilityofLNGprojectdeveloperstoleveragethoseofftakeagreementsandraisefinancesufficienttotakeFID,willbeindicativeofboththestateoftheLNGindustryinthemid-2020s,andhowitviewsitsownfuturepost-2030.

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Contents

Acknowledgements ii

ExecutiveSummary iii

Contents iv

TableofFigures iv

1.Introduction 1

2.Background:thehistoryofLNGmarketdevelopment 2

3.Thefundamentalscontext:LNGbenchmarksupplyandpricesince2019 6

4.Anewera?Whathaschangedsince2019? 9

5.WhatcriteriawouldallowpartiestosignnewSPAs? 13

5.1.Priceformation:indexationandpricelevel 13

5.2.Contractlength 17

5.3.Destinationrestrictions 18

5.4.Securityofsupplyandcounterpartyreliability 19

5.5.Risk-sharing,liability,andforcemajeure 20

5.6.Stableregulatoryframeworks,ESG,andcarbon-neutralLNG 21

6.Marketdevelopment:thebalancebetweentermandspotcontracts,andmarketconcentration 23

6.1.Marketdevelopmentandthebalancebetweentermandspotcontracts 23

6.2.Marketconcentration 24

7.Marketoutlookfor2025to2030 25

7.1.Thesupply-sideoutlook:TheUnitedStates,Qatar,andelsewhere 25

7.2.ContractsforUSandQatariLNG 28

8.Marketoutlookbeyond2030 31

9.Conclusion 33

TableofFigures

Figure1:WorldPriceFormation2006to2022-LNGImports 3

Figure2:Gas-On-Gas(GOG)SpotLNGImports2005to2022 4

Figure3:AnnualGlobalNetLNGImports(Bcmofnaturalgasperyear) 7

Figure4:MonthlyAverageGlobalLNGBenchmarkPrices,2019-2023(NominalUSD/MMBtu) 7

Figure5:GlobalLNGMarketBalancein2022vs2021(Bcmofnaturalgas) 8

Figure6:MonthlyAverageGlobalLNGBenchmarkPrices,2012-2018(NominalUSD/MMBtu) 10

Figure7:NominalvsInflation-AdjustedTTFPricestoOctober2023(USD/MMBtu) 11

Figure8:Inflation-AdjustedBenchmarkLNGPricestoOctober2023(USD/MMBtu) 11

Figure9:USLNGcontractsforutilities/industrialconsumersinEuropeandAsia(mtpa) 29

Figure10:ShareholdersinJVsatRasLaffan 29

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1.Introduction

ThispaperbeginsfromthepremisethattheglobalLNGmarkethasenteredanewera,inwhichtheaimofsecurityofsupplyintheshort-to-mediumtermandthelonger-termadaptationtotheconditionsoftheenergytransitionmustbemetinparallelbyEuropeanLNGbuyers.TheglobalLNGmarket,thoughtightoverthepasttwoyears,issettoreceiveawaveofnewsupplybetween2025and2028thatwillleaveitwell-suppliedoutto2030.However,theoutlookforsupplyanddemandpost-2030–inthecontextoftheenergytransition–ismuchmoreuncertain.

IfglobalLNGsupplyistogrowagainpost-2030,itwillbeonthebasisofFinalInvestmentDecisions(FIDs)takenbyprojectdevelopersinthenext2-3years.Onthedemandside,governmentstrategiesregardingdecarbonisation,asexpressedthroughpolicies,regulations,andtaxes,arelikelytohaveanunevenimpactacrosstheglobe,andarecurrentlysettobefeltmoststronglyinEurope.Therefore,Europeangasbuyersfindthemselvesinthechallengingsituationofneedingtomeetshort-termdemandinacontextofreplacingasubstantialproportionoflostRussianpipelinegassupplywithLNG,whilesimultaneouslyfacinguncertaintyoverlong-termEuropeangasdemand,especiallypost-2030.Thesequestionshavebecomemorepressingsincemid-2021,withincreasedmarketturbulenceimpactinguponthepaceofthesedevelopments.

ThispaperexaminesthekeyquestionofhowEuropeanLNGbuyerscanreconciletheshortandlong-termimperatives,andtheimplicationsoftheirstrategiesforLNGprojectdevelopers.Ineffect,thisaddressestheextenttowhichtheinterestsofEuropeanbuyersandLNGexportprojectdeveloperscanbereconciled,andhighlightsthekeyroleplayedbyaggregatorsandtradersinreconcilingthoseinterests.Iftheinterestsofbuyersandprojectdevelopersarenotsufficientlycloselyreconciled,theresultwillbeunderoroversupplyontheglobalLNGmarket,withpricesaccordinglyhigherorlower.Thosepricingsignalswillconsequentlyinfluencebothdemandandtheappetiteofdeveloperstoinvestinnewprojects,withintheboundariesofdemandelasticityandthetimeframeneededtoaddnewsupply.

Indoingso,thispaperbeginsbyprovidingahistoryofLNGmarketdevelopment,beforeexamininginmoredetailthemarketdynamicssince2019(thatis,thelastpre-COVID,supply-longyearfortheglobalLNGmarket)andthewaysinwhichthestructureofthemarkethaschanged.Section5thenunpacksthecriteriathatwouldallowpartiestosignnewtermLNGSPAsbeforesection6examinestheissuesoftermandspotcontracts,andmarketconcentration.Thelasttwosectionsthenprovidemarketoutlooksfortheperiod2025-2030andthenforthepost-2030period.Finally,thepaperdrawsthekeyconclusions,thatcontractualprovisionsandcarefulselectionofcounterpartiescannotalleviatealloftheriskpertainingtotermSPAs,andthatthebalanceofperceivedriskandrewardwillcontinuetomotivatemarketactivity,especiallybyaggregatorsandtradersastheystandbetweensuppliersandconsumers,andplayavitalroleinthefunctioningoftheglobalLNGmarketastheydoso.

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2.Background:thehistoryofLNGmarketdevelopment

TheLNGmarketdevelopedfromahandfulof‘pioneers’inthe1960sand1970s,andremaineda‘smallclub’initsearlydecades.AsSternandKoyamanote:

“In1971,sixcountrieswereimportingLNGfromthreeexportingcountries;by2000,the11importingcountrieswerefacing12exporters.Thisled,especiallyinAsia,towhathasbeentermeda‘relationshipculture’,whereverylongcontractualcommitments,togetherwithstrongsharedinterestsinahighlycapital-intensivebusiness,resultedinconsiderablecommercialrigidity”.1

Inthisperiod,thebusinessmodelwasbasedonco-operative,bespoke,point-to-point,bilateralagreements,whicharerelativelytypicalfornewsupplychainsdealingwithnewtechnologies(inthiscaseacryogenicsupplychain).Inthiscontext,LNGdeliveryroutesfrompointtopointweretoasignificantextentconceivedassomethingakinto‘pipelinesoverwater’,withcontractualrestrictionsoncargodiversions(coupledwithaverylimitednumberofalternativedestinations)renderingsuchLNGsupplyroutesrelativelyfixed.

Intheabsenceofadevelopedmarket,andmoreimportantly,anymeansofpricediscovery,priceindexationtooilandoilproductswasthestandardinlong-termLNGSaleandPurchaseAgreements(SPAs).ThiswasalsothecaseinEuropeforpipelinegasexportsfromtheNetherlandstoneighbouringcountriesfollowingthediscoveryofthegiantGroningengasfieldin1959andthesubsequentdevelopmentofDutchpipelinegasexportsinthelate1960sandearly1970s.2

Duringthisperiod,AsiaaccountedforthemajorityofglobalLNGimports,goingontoaccountforatleast70percentoftotalglobalimportsbetweenthemid-1980sand2000.3InEurope,growthinbothdomesticproductionandpipelineimportsfromregionalneighbours–Russia,Norway,Algeria,andLibya–meantthatLNGassumedalesserrolethaninAsia.

Between2000and2020(thatis,priortothepresentgasmarketturbulencethatbeganin2021),severalkeydevelopmentstookplaceinparallel,creatingnewopportunitiesfortheLNGmarket.Onthesupplyside,thenumberofexportcountriesgrew.Between1964and1989,Algeria,Australia,Brunei,Indonesia,Libya,Malaysia,UAE,andtheUnitedStates(Alaska)allbeganexportingLNG,withQatarjoiningtheirranksattheendof1996,creatingagroupofnineexportersbythelate1990s.

WithTrinidad&Tobago,Nigeria,andOmanhavingbeguntheirexportsin1999-2000,theywerethenjoinedbyEgypt,EquatorialGuinea,andNorwayin2005-07,Russia,Peru,andYemenin2009-11,AngolaandPapuaNewGuineain2013-14,theUnitedStates(ex-Alaska)in2016,andCameroonin2017.With21LNGexportingcountriesin2020,Mozambiquewouldjointheirrankstwoyearslater.45

Thenumberofimportingcountriesalsogrew:ByDecember2020,40countrieshadimportedatleast250millioncubicmetres(MMcm)ofnaturalgasintheformofLNGbetweenJanuary2008andDecember2020.Furthermore,newimportersjoinedtheclubinJanuary2021(Croatia),April2022(ElSalvador),December2022(Germany),April2023(Philippines),andMay2023(HongKong).6Asthenumberofexportersandimportersgrew,sotoodidthesizeofglobalLNGtrade:from100milliontonnes(mt)in2000to365mtin2020and400mtin2022.7

1Stern&Koyama,‘ChapterOne:LookingBackatHistory:TheEarlyDevelopmentofLNGSuppliesandMarkets’inLedesma,D.,andCorbeau,A-S.,2016.LNGMarketsinTransition:TheGreatReconfiguration.OxfordUniversityPress(page39)

2Correljé,A.,VanderLinde,C.,andWesterwoudt,T.,2003.NaturalGasintheNetherlands:FromCooperationto

Competition?Clingendael.

/inc/upload/files/Book_Natural_Gas_in_the_Netherlands.pdf

(70)

3Stern&Koyama,page38

4Corbeau&Flower,‘ChapterTwo:TheMaturingoftheLNGBusiness’inLedesma,D.,andCorbeau,A-S.,2016.LNGMarketsinTransition:TheGreatReconfiguration.OxfordUniversityPress(page44)

5KplerLNGPlatform[subscriptionrequired]

6ThislistofimportersIncludesEgypt,Indonesia,Malaysia,Norway,theUnitedArabEmirates,andtheUnitedStates,which

arenetexportersofLNG.IsraelimportedLNGin2013-2021,butnonesincethen.DatasourcedfromtheKplerLNGPlatform

7Corbeau&Flower,p.44,andKplerLNGPlatform

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Atthesametime,theEuropeangasmarketwentthroughaprocessofliberalisation,tradedvolumesatEuropeanhubsgrew,8LNGregasificationcapacityexpanded,91011andEuropebecamethebalancingelementinglobalLNGtrade.Bythe2010s,theEuropeanmarkethadacombinationofavailableregasificationcapacity,12aliquidmarketintowhichLNGcargoescouldbesold,substantialseasonalstoragecapacityequivalenttojustoverone-fifthofannualEuropeangasconsumption,131415andademand-sideflexiblemarketthatcouldabsorbmoresupplywhencompetitivelypriced(particularlyinthepowergenerationsector,wherecoal-to-gasswitchingwasanoption).Takentogether,thesedevelopmentsmeantthatEuropebecamethe‘marketoflastresort’forLNGsellerswithalongposition,andcontributedtothegrowthinLNGtradedonahub-indexed,ratherthanoil-indexed,basis.Since2016,therapidgrowthinLNGexportsfromtheUnitedStatesaddedsuppliestotheglobalmarketthatareeffectivelycost-plus,index-linkedtotheHenryHub,andthereforealsocategorisedashub-indexed.

Figure1:WorldPriceFormation2006to2022-LNGImports

Source:IGU,2023WholesalePriceReport(p.10)16

8AccordingtoGasunie,theannualvolumestradedatTTFgrewfrom1.35Bcmin2003to20Bcmin2008,46Bcmin2013,andpeakedat59Bcmin2019,beforefallingbackto52Bcmin2020and2021,and50Bcmin2022.See:Gasunie,2023.TTFDevelopment

.https://www.gasunietransportservices.nl/en/gasmarket/market-development/ttf-development

9InJanuary2004,EU-27+UKLNGregasificationcapacitytotalled87Bcma,with10regasificationterminalsinPortugal,Spain,France,Belgium,Italy,andGreece.ByJanuary2017,thenominalannualregasificationcapacityhadgrownto208Bcmain23countries,withtheUK,Netherlands,Lithuania,Poland,andMaltajoiningtheranksofEuropeanLNGimportingcountries.Morerecently,43Bcmaofnewcapacitywasaddedat7newimportterminalsinKrk,Croatia(Jan2021),Eemshaven,

Netherlands(Sept2022),Inkoo,Finland(Dec2022),WilhelmshavenandLubmin,Germany(Dec2022),Brunsbüttel,

Germany(Feb2023),Piombino,Italy(May2023),LeHavre,France(October2023)raisingtheannualregasificationcapacityto251Bcma.Thisregasificationcapacityisavailableat30regasificationterminalsin14countries.

10GasInfrastructureEurope,2022.LNGDatabase[21November]

.https://www.gie.eu/transparency/databases/lng-database/

11KplerLNGPlatform[subscriptionrequired]

12TheextentofavailableregasificationcapacityatEuropeanterminalsinmuchofthe2010sissummarisedbyKing&Spalding:

“Between2008and2014EuropeanLNGterminalsexperiencedlowutilisationrates,somebelow20%.2016sawanaverageutilisationrateof20%,withtheEUCommissionstatingthatyearthattheLNGinfrastructureintheEUwasunder-utilisedandnotoptimallydistributed.However,during2017theaverageutilisationrateincreasedto25%,reflectingmorebuoyantmarketconditionsforgas”.Source:KingandSpalding,2018.LNGinEurope2018:AnOverviewofLNGImportTerminalsin

Europe

./attachments/000/006/010/original/LNG_in_Europe_2018_-

_An_Overview_of_LNG_Import_Terminals_in_Europe.pdf?1530031152

(seepage3)

13EuropehereisdefinedastheEUplusUK

14BetweenJanuary2011andApril2016,EU-27gasstoragecapacitygrewfrom58Bcmto105Bcm.SeeGasInfrastructureEurope,2023.AggregatedGasStorageInventory-EU-27

.https://agsi.gie.eu/data-overview/graphs/eu

15In2017-2019,EU+UKgasconsumptionrangedbetween469and479Bcmperyear

16NotethatOPEreferstoOilPriceEscalation(oilindexation)andGOGrefersto‘GasonGas’(hubindexation)

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TheLNGmarketbecamebothlargerandmuchmoreflexible.OneconsequenceofthesedevelopmentswasthegrowingshareofSPAswithpricesindexedtoeithertheHenryHubintheUnitedStatesortoEuropeanhubs,andthegrowingshareofspot/short-termsalesrelativetolong-termcontractdeliveries.

AsthelatestInternationalGasUnion(IGU)wholesalegaspricesurveynotes,between2005and2022,theshareofoilindexationinglobalLNGimportsfellfromjustover85percentto53percent,whiletheshareof‘gasongas’(hubindexation)rosefromjustunder15percentto47percent.Since2016,therapidandsubstantialgrowthinUSLNGexports(indexedtotheHenryHub)hasbeenasignificantdriverofthisgrowth.171819WhileSPAsthatareatleastpartiallyindexedtooilcontinuetoprovidethebasisforasubstantialproportionoftheLNGsupplytoAsia,suchoil-indexedcontractsalsoremaininEurope(includingTurkey).InEurope,theshareofhub-indexedsuppliesrosefrom67percentin2021to76percentin2022,inlinewithasubstantialriseinLNGimportsoverall,andspotLNGimportsinparticular.2021

ThisriseinEuropeanspotLNGimportsin2022wasmadepossiblebycargodiversionsfrommarketsthateitherdidnotneed(inthecaseofChina),orcouldnotafford(inthecaseofPakistan),hub-indexedcargoesatthetime,astheIGUnoteintheir2023wholesalegaspricesurvey:

“ManyofthesespotLNGcargoesweredivertedfromChina,wheretheGOG[Gas-on-Gas]sharefellto27percentin2022from49percentin2021,andPakistan,wheretheGOGsharefellto17percentin2022from41percentin2021.”22

TheriseinEuropeanhub-indexed,spotLNGimportssince2017illustratedinFigure2(below)highlightsthesupply-ledgrowthinsuchimportsbetween2017(justunder10Bcm)and2019-20(35-40Bcm),theslightcontractionamidatightmarketin2021(justunder30Bcm),andfinallythesharprisein2022(almost65Bcm)asEuropeanbuyerssoughttooffsetthedeclineinimportsfromRussia.

Figure2:Gas-On-Gas(GOG)SpotLNGImports2005to2022

Source:IGU,2023WholesalePriceReport(p.26)23

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AccordingtotheIGU2022WholesalePriceReport,in2021,around30bcmofoil-indexedLNGwasimportedintoSpain,France,Italy,Turkey,Portugal,PolandandGreece.Inthesameyear,Europealsoimported62bcmofhub-indexedLNG.IGU,2022.WholesalePriceReport

./resources/2022-wholesale-price-report/

(p.54)

IGU,2023.WholesaleGasPriceSurvey

./resources/wholesale-gas-pricesurvey-2023-edition/

(p.11)

AccordingtotheIGU2022WholesalePriceReport,in2021,around30bcmofoil-indexedLNGwasimportedintoSpain,France,Italy,Turkey,Portugal,PolandandGreece.Inthesameyear,Europealsoimported62bcmofhub-indexedLNG.IGU,2023.WholesaleGasPriceSurvey

./resources/wholesale-gas-pricesurvey-2023-edition/

(p.10)

IGU,2023.WholesaleGasPriceSurvey

./resources/wholesale-gas-pricesurvey-2023-edition/

(p.11)NotethatOPEreferstoOilPriceEscalationandGOGrefersto‘GasonGas’(i.e.,hubindexation)

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IntermsofglobalLNGimports,theshareofspotsalesrosefromlessthan5percentin2005to35percentin2022(seeFigure1).24TheIGU2023reportalsoreferredtodatafromtheGroupofInternationalLNGImporters(GIIGNL)tohighlightthedifferencebetweentwodefinitionsof‘spot’:amoregenerousdefinitionreferstocontractsofoneyearorless,whileastricterdefinitionreferstovolumesdeliveredwithinthreemonthsofpurchase.Thelatterdefinitionaccountedfor28percentoftotalimportsin2022.

Overall,theglobalmarketisnowoneinwhichhalfofLNGimportsarehub-indexedandmorethanone-thirdarepurchasedonaspotbasis,withthedifferencebeingtermcontractsindexedtohubs.Inthecontextofthesemarketdevelopments,aggregatorsandtradershavetakenonanincreasinglyprominentrole,especiallywithregardtotakingontheriskposedbybasisdifferentials,betweenHenry

Hubandoil-indexedsupplyononehandandhubpricesintheEuropeanmarketontheother.25

AsLedesmanotedin2016:

“Undertheaggregatormodel,thesupplychainisdrivenbycostoptimisation,minimisation,andtheoptionalitytocapturepricedifferentials,ratherthanrelyingonafixedsupplyfromonepointtoaspecificmarketpoint…Underthismodel,theaggregatorusesitsowncreditratingtosourcetheLNGandtakesamarginfordoingthis(therebyaddingcoststotheendbuyerastheaggregatorwillwanttomakeamargin).ThebuyersarehappytopaythismarginasitwillgivethemaccesstoalargernumberofLNGsources,whileplacingtheriskontheaggregator.ThegrowingvolumesofLNGavailablefromaggregatorshaveenabledmorebuyerstogetintotheLNGmarket,astheydonotneedtoenterintolong-termofftakeagreementsdirectlywithLNGproducers,andtheaggregatorprovidesgreatercontractualflexibility…

Inadditiontotheaggregatorcompaniesthatbuy,sell,andtradeLNGaspartoftheirwiderenergyportfolio,the2010shaveseendifferentcompaniesgettinginvolved.Traditionaloil,andalsonon-energy,tradingcompanies,suchasVitol,Gunvor,Mercuria,Trafigura,andGlencore-XstratahavealsobeguntotradeLNG.LNGbuyers(suchasENGIE–formerlyGDFSuez,andalsoGasNaturalandIberdrola)aswellassomeAsianendusers(suchasJERA–ajointventureofTokyoElectricandChubuElectric,andalsoKOGASandPetroChina,tonamejustafew)arealsotradingasameansofoptimisingtheirportfoliosandtheyarepositioningthemselvestotakeontheroleoftrader.”26

Ifanything,thetrendidentifiedbyLedesmain2016hasintensifiedsincethen,drivenbytheemergenceoftheUnitedStatesasamajorLNGexporter.NetexportsfromtheUnitedStates(outsideAlaska)beganin2016(1.7mt),reached75.7mtin2022,andarelikelytosurpass80mtin2023.27Muchofthatcapacityiscontractedtoaggregatorsandtraders.AccordingtoKpler,ofthe63mtpaofLNGcurrentlycontractedforpurchaseunderSPAsforexportfromtheUnitedStates(thatis,undersupplycontractswhichbeganbefore1December2023andhavenotyetexpired),14.5mtpa(23percent)iscontractedtoaggregators28,3.2mtpa(5percent)totraders29,and2mtpa(3percent)contractedtoCheniereitselfforspotsale,alongwith3.7mtpa(6percent)tocompaniesthatmostlyproduceandmarketLNGandwishtoaddsupplytotheirportfolio.Thisprovidesroughly23.4mtpaofUSLNGthatisrelativelyflexible,comparedto18.0mtpa(29percent)contractedtoEuropeanutilities,20.3mtpa(33percent)contractedtoAsi