公司的核心競爭力-外文翻譯

外文翻譯原文TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporationMaterialSource:HarvardBusinessReview,May-June,1990P79-93Author:C.K.PrahaladandGaryHamelC.K.PrahaladisprofessorofcorporatestrategyandinternationalbusinessattheUniversityofMichigan.GaryHamelislecturerinbusinesspolicyandmanagementattheLondonBusinessSchool.TheirmostrecentHBRarticle"StrategicIntent"(MayJune1989),wonthe1989McKinseyAwardforexcellence.ThisarticleisbasedonresearchfundedbytheGatsbyCharitableFoundation.TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantageThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconceivedofthemselvesaportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesseswasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxiousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowoverwhelmedbythepaceatwhichJapaneserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofourwheeloffroadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Komatsudevelopedanunderwaterremotecontrolledbulldozer,whileCasio'slatestgambitisasmallscreencolorLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting.Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionalenhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebeenpioneeringfourwheelsteering,fourvalve-percylinderengines,incarnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicenginemanagementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionmachines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.Intheshortrun,acompany'scompetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcostandqualityminimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferentialadvantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagement'sabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempowerindividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequarterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagain.TheprobleminmanyWesterncompaniesisnotthattheirseniorexecutivesareanylesscapablethanthoseinJapannorthatJapanesecompaniespossessgreatertechnicalcapabilities.Instead,itistheiradherencetoaconceptofthecorporationthatunnecessarilylimitstheabilityofindividualbusinessestofullyexploitthedeepreservoiroftechnologicalcapabilitythatmanyAmericanandEuropeancompaniespossess.Thediversifiedcorporationisalargetree.Thetrunkandmajorlimbsarecoreproducts,thesmallerbranchesarebusinessunits;theleaves,flowers,andfruitareendproducts.Therootsystemthatprovidesnourishment,sustenance,andstabilityisthecorecompetence.Youcanmissthestrengthofcompetitorsbylookingonlyattheirendproducts,inthesamewayyoumissthestrengthofatreeifyoulookonlyatitsleaves.(Seethechart"Competencies:TheRootsofCompetitiveness.”)Corecompetenciesarethecollectivelearningintheorganization,especiallyhowtocoordinatediverseproductionskillsandintegratemultiplestreamsoftechnologies.ConsiderSony'scapacitytominiaturizeorPhilips'sopticalmediaexpertise.Thetheoreticalknowledgetoputaradioonachipdoesnotinitselfassureacompanytheskilltoproduceaminiatureradionobiggerthanabusinesscard.Tobringoffthisfeat,Casiomustharmonizeknowhowinminiaturization,microprocessordesign,materialscience,andultrathinprecisioncasingthesameskillsitappliesinitsminiaturecardcalculators,pocketTVs,anddigitalwatches.Ifcorecompetenceisaboutharmonizingstreamsoftechnology,itisalsoabouttheorganizationofworkandthedeliveryofvalue.AmongSony'scompetenciesisminiaturization.Tobringminiaturizationtoitsproducts,Sonymustensurethattechnologists,engineers,andmarketershaveasharedunderstandingofcustomerneedsandoftechnologicalpossibilities.Theforceofcorecompetenceisfeltasdecisivelyinservicesasinmanufacturing.Citicorpwasaheadofothersinvestinginanoperatingsystemthatallowedittoparticipateinworldmarkets24hoursaday.Itscompetenceinprovidedthecompanythemeanstodifferentiateitselffrommanyfinancialserviceinstitutions.Corecompetenceiscommunication,involvement,andadeepcommitmenttoworkingacrossorganizationalboundaries.Itinvolvesmanylevelsofpeopleandallfunctions.Worldclassresearchin,forexample,lasersorceramicscantakeplaceincorporatelaboratorieswithouthavinganimpactonanyofthebusinessesofthecompany.Theskillsthattogetherconstitutecorecompetencemustcoalescearoundindividualswhoseeffortsarenotsonarrowlyfocusedthattheycannotrecognizetheopportunitiesforblendingtheirfunctionalexpertisewiththoseofothersinnewandinterestingways.Corecompetencedoesnotdiminishwithuse.Unlikephysicalassets,whichdodeteriorateovertime,competenciesareenhancedastheyareappliedandshared.Butcompetenciesstillneedtobenurturedandprotected;knowledgefadesifitisnotused.Competenciesarethegluethatbindsexistingbusinesses.Theyarealsotheenginefornewbusinessdevelopment.Patternsofdiversificationandmarketentrymaybeguidedbythem,notjustbytheattractivenessofmarkets.Consider3M'scompetencewithstickytape.indreamingupbusinessesasdiverseas"Postit"notes,magnetictape,photographicfilm,pressuresensitivetapes,andcoatedabrasives,thecompanyhasbroughttobearwidelysharedcompetenciesinsubstrates,coatings,andadhesivesanddevisedvariouswaystocombinethem.Indeed,3Mhasinvestedconsistentlyinthem.Whatseemstobeanextremelydiversifiedportfolioofbusinessesbeliesafewsharedcorecompetencies.Incontrast,therearemajorcompaniesthathavehadthepotentialtobuildcorecompetenciesbutfailedtodosobecausetopmanagementwasunabletoconceiveofthecompanyasanythingotherthanacollectionofdiscretebusinesses.GEsoldmuchofitsconsumerelectronicsbusinesstoThomsonofFrance,arguingthatitwasbecomingincreasinglydifficulttomaintainitscompetitivenessinthissector.Thatwasundoubtedlyso,butitisironicthatitsoldseveralkeybusinessestocompetitorswhowerealreadycompetenceleadersBlack&Deckerinsmallelectricalmotors,andThomson,whichwaseagertobuilditscompetenceinmicroelectronicsandhadlearnedfromtheJapanesethatapositioninconsumerelectronicswasvitaltothischallenge.Managementtrappedinthestrategicbusinessunit(SBU)mindsetalmostinevitablyfindsitsindividualbusinessesdependentonexternalsourcesforcriticalcomponents,suchasmotorsorcompressors.Butthesearenotjustcomponents.Theyarecoreproductsthatcontributetothecompetitivenessofawiderangeofendproducts.Theyarethephysicalembodimentsofcorecompetencies.HowNottoThinkofCompetenceSincecompaniesareinaracetobuildthecompetenciesthatdeterminegloballeadership,successfulcompanieshavestoppedimaginingthemselvesasbundlesofbusinessesmakingproducts.Canon,Honda,Casio,orNECmayseemtopresideoverportfoliosofbusinessesunrelatedintermsofcustomers,distributionchannels,andmerchandisingstrategy.Indeed,theyhaveportfoliosthatmayseemidiosyncraticattimes:NECistheonlyglobalcompanytobeamongleadersincomputing,telecommunications,andsemiconductorsandtohaveathrivingconsumerelectronicsbusiness.Butlooksaredeceiving.InNEC,digitaltechnology,especiallyVLSIandsystemsintegrationskills,isfundamental.Inthecorecompetenciesunderlyingthem,disparatebusinessesbecomecoherent.ItisHonda'scorecompetenceinenginesandpowertrainsthatgivesitadistinctiveadvantageincar,motorcycle,lawnmower,andgeneratorbusinesses.Canon'scorecompetenciesinoptics,imaging,andmicroprocessorcontrolshaveenabledittoenter,evendominate,marketsasseeminglydiverseascopiers,laserprinters,cameras,andimagescanners.Philipsworkedformorethan15yearstoperfectitsopticalmedia(laserdisc)competence,asdidJVCinbuildingaleadingpositioninvideorecording.Otherexamplesofcorecompetenciesmightincludemechantronics(theabilitytomarrymechanicalandelectronicengineering),videodisplays,bioengineering,andmicroelectronics.Intheearlystagesofitscompetencebuilding,Philipscouldnothaveimaginedalltheproductsthatwouldbespawnedbyitsopticalmediacompetence,norcouldJVChaveanticipatedminiaturecamcorderswhenitfirstbeganexploringvideotapetechnologies.Unlikethebattleforglobalbranddominance,whichisvisibleintheworld'sbroadcastandprintmediaandisaimedatbuildingglobal"shareofmind,”thebattletobuildworldclasscompetenciesisinvisibletopeoplewhoaren'tdeliberatelylookingforit.Topmanagementoftentracksthecostandqualityofcompetitors'products,yethowmanymanagersuntanglethewebofalliancestheirJapanesecompetitorshaveconstructedtoacquirecompetenciesatlowcost?InhowmanyWesternboardroomsisthereanexplicit,sharedunderstandingofthecompetenciesthecompanymustbuildforworldleadership?Indeed,howmanyseniorexecutivesdiscussthecrucialdistinctionbetweencompetitivestrategyatthelevelofabusinessandcompetitivestrategyatthelevelofanentirecompany?Letusbeclear.Cultivatingcorecompetencedoesnotmeanoutspendingrivalsonresearchanddevelopment.In1983,whenCanonsurpassedXeroxinworldwideunitmarketshareinthecopierbusiness,itsR&DbudgetinreprographicswasbutasmallfractionofXerox's.Overthepast20years,NEChasspentlessonR&DasapercentageofsalesthanalmostallofitsAmericanandEuropeancompetitors.Nordoescorecompetencemeansharedcosts,aswhentwoormoreSBUsuseacommonfacilityaplant,servicefacility,orsalesforceorshareacommoncomponent.Thegainsofsharingmaybesubstantial,butthesearchforsharedcostsistypicallyaposthocefforttorationalizeproductionacrossexistingbusinesses,notapremeditatedefforttobuildthecompetenciesoutofwhichthebusinessesthemselvesgrow.Buildingcorecompetenciesismoreambitiousanddifferentthanintegratingvertically,moreover.Managersdecidingwhethertomakeorbuywillstartwithendproductsandlookupstreamtotheefficienciesofthesupplychainanddownstreamtowarddistributionandcustomers.Theydonottakeinventoryofskillsandlookforwardtoapplyingtheminnontraditionalways.(Ofcourse,decisionsaboutcompetenciesdoprovidealogicforverticalintegration.Canonisnotparticularlyintegratedinitscopierbusiness,exceptinthoseaspectsoftheverticalchainthatSupportthecompetenciesitregardsascritical.)譯文公司的核心競爭力資料來源:《哈佛商業(yè)評論》1990，5-6，P79-93作者：普拉哈拉德和哈默爾編者按：普拉哈拉德是美國密歇根大學研究公司策略和國際商務的教授。哈默爾是倫敦商學院研究企業(yè)政策和企業(yè)管理的講師。他們最近的《哈佛商業(yè)評論》文章《戰(zhàn)略意圖》（1989，,5-6），贏得了1989年的麥肯錫卓越獎。這篇文章是在比慈善基金會的資助下完成的。競爭優(yōu)勢的根源

NEC和GTE兩家公司的差別在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的組合，而后者則把自己視為一些業(yè)務的組合。這類情形在很多行業(yè)屢見不鮮。從1980年到1988年，與美國的施樂與克萊斯勒相比，日本的佳能公司增長了264％，本田公司增長了200％。如果說西方的經理們以前是為日本低價格，高質量的進口貨而擔憂，那么他們現(xiàn)在恐怕要驚嘆日本對手在創(chuàng)造新市場、發(fā)明新產品和改進提高方面的驚人速度了。佳能公司推出了個人復印機，本田把業(yè)務從摩托車擴展到了四輪越野車，索尼開發(fā)出了8毫米的攝像機，雅瑪哈推出了數(shù)字鋼琴，小松公司研制了水下遙控推土機，而卡西歐的最新產品則是一種小屏幕彩色液晶電視機。誰曾預料得到會演化出這樣一些前衛(wèi)產品市場?

在較為成熟的市場上，日本公司的挑戰(zhàn)也同樣令人不安。它們掀起了一場改進產品特點和功能的風暴，把尖端的技術引入到了人們的日用品中。比如，日本汽車制造商率先嘗試了四輪驅動、每缸四汽閥發(fā)動機，車內導航系統(tǒng)以及尖端的電子引擎管理系統(tǒng)。佳能憑借其產品的性能，在傳真機、臺式激光打印機甚至半導體生產設備等市場都謀得了一席之地。

在短期內，一個公司的競爭優(yōu)勢源于現(xiàn)有產品的性價比特性。但是在第一輪全球競爭中存活下來的企業(yè)，無論是西方公司還是日本公司，現(xiàn)在都已趨向于采用相似的嚴格的產品成本和質量標準。達到這些標準實際上已經成為繼續(xù)留在競爭隊伍中的最低要求，它們對于形成差異化優(yōu)勢的重要性已越來越小。從長期來看，競爭優(yōu)勢將取決于企業(yè)能否以比對手更低的成本和更快的速度構建核心競爭力，這些核心競爭力將為公司催生出意想不到的產品。管理層有能力把整個公司的技術和生產技能整合成核心競爭力，使各項業(yè)務能夠及時把握不斷變化的機遇，這才是優(yōu)勢的真正所在。

有些高層經理宣稱他們無法打造核心競爭力，因為業(yè)務單元的自主性是不可侵犯的，或者因為他們被緊張的季度預算束縛住了手腳。這些人應該反省。在很多西方企業(yè)中，問題并不是領導層在能力上遜于日本同行，或者企業(yè)的技術能力比日本公司差一大截，而是這些企業(yè)的管理層死抱著一個陳舊的公司概念。這個陳舊的概念，限制了業(yè)務部門的能力，使它們無法充分利用很多歐美公司所擁有的技術能力寶藏。

多元化公司就好比一棵大樹