英國(guó)海外發(fā)展研究所（ODI）：俄烏沖突對(duì)非洲的影響：對(duì)應(yīng)對(duì)沖突和構(gòu)建韌性的政策的影響

Synthesisreport

lmpactoftheRussia-UkrainewaronAfrica

Policyimplicationsfornavigatingshocks

andbuildingresilience

SherillynRaga,HeinrichBohlmann,AlbertoLemma,

DianahNgui,PhyllisPapadavid,DirkWillemteVelde

andChahirZaki

January2024

ECONOMICRESEARCHFORUM

(SS工

1g

uSLaig

pep

iipfor

DOlicy

ODISynthesisreport

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InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre

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Canada

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Howtocite:Raga,S.,Bohlmann,H.,Lemma,A.,Ngui,D.,

Papadavid,P.,teVelde,D.W.andZaki,C.(2024)'Impactofthe

Russia-UkrainewaronAfrica:policyimplicationsfornavigating

shocksandbuildingresilience'ODISynthesisReport.London:ODI

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/en/publications/impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-on

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africa-policy-implications-for-navigating-shocks-and-building-

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ODISynthesisreport

3

Acknowledgements

Aboutthispublication

ThissynthesispaperdrawsonthefollowingsixstudiesfromaprojectledbytheAfricanEconomicResearchConsortium(AERC),the

EconomicResearchForum(ERF)andthePartnershipforEconomic

Policy(PEP)andsupportedbyCanada’sInternationalDevelopment

ResearchCentre(IDRC):

1Benayad,M.(2023)‘Casdudéveloppementdeséchanges

agricolesentreleMarocetleSénégal’.Unpublisheddraftpaper

asofJune2023.

2Cororaton,C.(2023)‘TheimpactofthewarinUkraine:estimatingtheeconomicandwelfarelossesinAfricausingaglobalCGE

model’UnpublisheddraftpaperasofJune2023

Cororaton,C.,Bohlmann,H.,Bohlmann,J.andHenseler,M.

(2023)‘TheimpactoftheRussia-Ukrainewar:estimatingthe

economicandwelfarelossesinAfricausingaglobalCGEmodel’.

PolicyBrief267.PartnershipforEconomicPolicy

(

/public/project/20692

).

3Geda,A.andMusyoka,M.P.(2023)‘ImpactsoftheUkraine

crisesonfoodsecurityinKenyaandEthiopia:optionsforregionalTradecollaboration’.WorkingPaperIWU-CC-002.Nairobi:AERC.

4M’boukeS.,Gurara,D.,Ngui,D.andShimeles,A.(2023)‘The

echoesofconflict:analyzingthepotentialimpactsoftheRussia-

UkrainewaronAfrica’UnpublisheddraftpaperasofJune2023.

M’boukeS.,Gurara,D.,Ngui,D.andShimeles,A.(2023)‘The

echoesofconflict:analyzingthepotentialimpactsoftheRussia-

UkrainewaronAfrica’.PolicyBriefIWU-PB-001.Nairobi:AERC.

5Ngepah,N.(2023)‘Foodsecurityeffectsoffoodandagricultural

inputstradeshocksfromtheRussia-UkraineregioninSouth

AfricaandMozambique:exploringtherolesoftheMaputo

corridor,SADC,andcontinentalsources’.WorkingPaperIWU-

CC-003.Nairobi:AERC.

6Zaki,C.,Alhelo,A.andSuliman,K.(2023)‘Trade,foodsecurity,

andthewarinUkraine:ThecasesofEgyptandSudan’.Working

Paper1659.Giza:ERF.

TheauthorsaregratefultoSheilaPageforpeerreviewandtoArjan

deHaanandIDRCcolleaguesforvaluablecommentsandinsights

throughouttheproject.Wealsothankparticipantsatworkshopsin

MarrakechheldinOctober2023aroundtheIMF/WorldBankAnnual

Meetingsforcomments.

4

Abouttheauthors

SherillynRagaisaResearchFellowatODI.

HeinrichBohlmannisaResearchDirectoratPEPandanAssociate

ProfessorattheUniversityofPretoria.

AlbertoLemmaisaResearchFellowatODI.

DianahNguiisaResearchManageratAERC.

PhyllisPapadavidisaSeniorResearchAssociateatODI,current

DirectorofResearchatAthenaMacroeconomicsandanAssociate

FacultyMemberatColumbiaUniversity.

DirkWillemteVeldeisaDirectorofProgrammesatODIand

ProfessorofPracticeatSOASUniversityofLondon.

ChahirZakiisaChairedProfessorattheUniversityofOrléans,a

ProfessoratCairoUniversityandaLeadEconomistatERF.

5

Contents

Acknowledgements 3

Acronyms 6

Executivesummary 7

1Introduction 14

2Analyticalframework 16

Economicexposure 17

Resilience 18

Country-levelimpact 19

3SizeoftheRussia–Ukraineshock 20

4ExposuretotheRussia–Ukrainewarshock 22

DirectbilateralexposuretoRussiaandUkraine 22

Indirectexposuretoglobaleffects 28

5Resiliencetotheshock 33

Economicpolicyspace 33

Policyresponses 35

6ImpactoftheRussia–Ukraineshock 38

7Policyimplications 44

8Conclusions 47

References 48

6

Acronyms

ADB

AsianDevelopmentBank

AERC

AfricanEconomicResearchConsortium

AfCFTA

AfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea

BCEAO

CentralBankofWestAfricanStates

CGE

computablegeneralequilibrium

CDIS

CoordinatedDirectInvestmentSurvey

CPIS

CoordinatedPortfolioInvestmentSurvey

DRMK

DisasterRiskManagementKnowledgeCentre

EMBIG

EmergingMarketBondIndexGlobal

ERF

EconomicResearchForum

ESCAP

UnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaandthePacific

EU

EuropeanUnion

FAO

FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations

FDI

foreigndirectinvestment

FSIN

FoodSecurityInformationNetwork

GDP

grossdomesticproduct

GNAFC

GlobalNetworkAgainstFoodCrises

GVAR

globalvectorautoregressive

HIC

high-incomecountry

IDRC

InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre

IDS

InternationalDebtStatistics

IFS

InternationalFinancialStatistics

ILO

InternationalLabourOrganization

IMF

InternationalMonetaryFund

LIC

low-incomecountry

L&MICs

low-andmiddle-incomecountries

OECD

OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

PEP

PartnershipforEconomicPolicy

pp

percentagepoints

SVB

SiliconValleyBank

UK

UnitedKingdom

UN

UnitedNations

UNCTAD

UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment

UNDP

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNECA

UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAfrica

US

UnitedStates

WDI

WorldDevelopmentIndicators

WITS

WorldIntegratedTradeSolutions

WTO

WorldTradeOrganization

7

Executivesummary

TheglobalimpactoftheRussia–Ukrainewar,whichstartedin

February2022,hasbeenmediatedthroughtrade,commodityprices

andfinancialconditions.RussiaandUkrainearemajorglobal

suppliersofoil,wheatandfertilisers.Thewarhasdisruptedexportsfromthetwocountries,induceduncertaintiesinglobalsupplychainsandbeenusedtojustifyexportfoodbansinsomecountries.Theseconditionshavecontributedtoaspikeinglobalpricesofoil,foodandfertilisers,puttingupwardpressuresondomesticprices.Tostopthepriceshockfromtransformingintoinflation,high-incomecountries

(HICs)haveincreasedtheirinterestrates;this,inturn,hastriggeredcapitaloutflows,currencydepreciationandhigherborrowingcostsformanylow-andmiddle-incomecountries(L&MICs).

ItisnotstraightforwardtoisolatetheimpactoftheRussia–

Ukrainewarfromthoseofotherglobalshocks(e.g.COVID-19)

anddomesticdevelopments,butsomestudiesattempttodo

thisbyconstructingcounterfactualsorin-depthcasestudies.

Thispaperutilisesananalyticalframeworktounderstandthe

transmissionchanneloftheimpactoftheRussia–UkrainewaratthecountrylevelinAfrica,particularlytracingtheeconomicexposureandresilienceofAfricancountriestotheimpactofthewar(FigureES1).ThepaperthensynthesisesevidencefromeightAfricancountries

andAfricaasawholebasedonsixstudiesassessingtheimpactof

thewaranditsimplicationsforfoodsecurityinAfrica.

ThesixstudiesincludefourcasestudiescoveringEgypt,Ethiopia,

Kenya,Morocco,Mozambique,Senegal,SouthAfricaandSudan.

Mostofthecasestudieshighlightthelevelofexposureofthese

countriesthroughtradechannels,theeffectsonexchangeratesand

prices,andtheimplicationsforfoodconsumption.Theothertwo

studiesutiliseeconometricmodellingtechniques(i.e.globalvector

autoregressive–GVAR,computablegeneralequilibrium–CGE)to

simulatetheimpactofthewaronkeymacroeconomicvariables(e.g.growth,income)acrossAfricancountries.Asthestudiesused

differentmethodologicaltechniquesandhaddifferentdatacoverage,oursynthesisoftheevidencefromthesestudiesiscomplementedbysecondarydataandinsightsfromthewiderliterature.

Thestudiesareresearchoutputsfromanongoingcollaborative

projectledbytheAfricanEconomicResearchConsortium(AERC),

theEconomicResearchForum(ERF)andthePartnershipfor

EconomicPolicy(PEP)underaprojectsupportedbyCanada’s

InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre(IDRC).

ODISynthesisreport

8

FigureES1Vulnerabilitytotheeconomicandsocialimpactsof

theRussia-Ukrainewar

Vulnerabillity=exposurelessresilence

GlobalshockExposureResilienceCountry-evelimpact

Directbilateral

exposuretoRussia

andUkraine

·Exports/imports

·Foreigndirect

investment

·Financialflows

·Migration

·Economicspace

Indirectexposureto

globaleffectsofwar

·Tradeopenness

(e.g.,globaltrade)

·Financialopenness

(e.g.,capitaland

exchangerateregimes)

·Financialconditions

(e-g.,interestrates,

capitalflows)

GDPgrowth,prices,

costsofborrowing)·Social(e.g.,food

insecurity,jobs,

poverty,gender)

Long-term

·Humancapital

·Productivity

Russia-Ukrainewarimpact

·Tradedisruptions·Commodityprice

hikes

(e.g.,fiscaldeficit,publicdebt,foreignreserves)

·Institutionalquality·Socialcohesion

·SluggishfinancialandinvestmentfowS

·Globalfinancialtightening

Policycontext

·Economic(e.g.

Short-term

Source:Authors

Economicexposure

AfricancountrieshavelowdirectexposuretotheRussia-

Ukrainewarthroughoveralltrade,financialflowsandmigration

butaremoreexposedinspecificways,forexamplethrough

foodandfertiliserimportsfromRussiaandUkraine.InKenya,

importsfromRussiaandUkraineaccountforonly2.1%and5.1%,

respectively,ofimportsbutwheatmadeup85%oftheseimportsin

2018-2021.InEgypt,20%offoodimports(and67%ofwheat

imports)in2021werefromRussiaandUkraine.Meanwhile,between11%and41%offertiliserimportsinEgypt,Ethiopia,Morocco,

SenegalandSouthAfricaweresourcedfromRussiaandUkrainein

thedecadeupto2021.

Beyonddirectexposure,AfricancountrieshavebeenindirectlyexposedtotheglobaleffectsoftheRussia-Ukrainewarthroughdemandforexportsandinvestmentdecisions.Between2010and2019,amedianAfricancountry'sexportgoodscomprised28%of

grossdomesticproduct(GDP).Duringthesameperiod,foreigndirectinvestmentstockonthecontinentwasequivalentto35%ofGDP.

ThetighteningofmonetarypolicyinHICshasputpressureon

exchangeratesandacceleratedinflationinAfrica.Sinceearly

2022,theUS,theEUandtheUKhaveincreasedinterestratesto

arrestinflation.Thishasledtopronounceddollarstrengtheningand

hasinturninducedcapitaloutflows,currencydepreciationand

ODISynthesisreport

9

wideningsovereignspreadsinAfricancountries.Forexample,the

KenyanshillingandtheSouthAfricanranddepreciatedagainsttheUSdollarby25%and21%,respectively,betweenJanuary2022andAugust2023.Exchangeratedepreciationhaspass-througheffectsoninflationandpushesupthedebtburdenonforeign-denominateddebt.

Resilience

MostAfricancountrieswerestillrecoveringfromCovid-19

limitingtheireconomicpolicyspacewhentheRussia–Ukraine

warhitinearly2022.Sub-SaharanAfrica’sfiscaldeficitwidened

from3.9%ofGDPin2019to6.4%ofGDPin2020,whilepublicdebtincreasedbynearly10percentagepoints(pp)to57%ofGDPduringthesameperiod.Whilesub-SaharanAfrica’sfiscaldeficitandpublicdebtreducedin2021–2022theyremainedworsethanpre-pandemiclevelsin2019.

ForeignreservesdeclinedinfouroutoffiveselectedAfrican

countriesin2022.Intheyearbeforethewar(2021),fiveAfrican

countries(Egypt,Kenya,Morocco,MozambiqueandSouthAfrica)

hadforeignreservesworthfivetosevenmonthsofimports.On

average,sub-SaharanAfricahadforeignreservesworthfivemonthsofimportsin2021.Thisfelltofourmonthsin2022.Atthecountry

level,foreignreservesfellinfouroutoffivecasestudiesin2022,withthehighestdeclinesinEgyptandMozambique,toanequivalentof

threemonthsfromfivemonthsofimportsin2021.Toincrease

resources,Africancountrieshavesoughtaccesstomultilateral

financing.Afewcountries(Chad,Ethiopia,GhanaandZambia)haveappliedfordebttreatmentundertheG20CommonFramework.

AfricancountrieshaverespondedtotheRussia–Ukrainewarshock

invariousways.Oneoftheinitialresponsestothewarincluded

exportbansonfood,fertiliserandoilproducts.Algeria,Burkina

Faso,Cameroon,Egypt,GhanaandTunisiaimposedexportbansonselectedfoodproductsandoilswhereasMoroccoimplemented

exportlicensingfortomatoes.Mostoftheserestrictionshadbeen

liftedbytheendof2022.Ashigherpricesofimportedcommodities

putpressureondomesticprices,tradepoliciesintheformof

subsidiesandsuspendedimportdutiesonselectedstapleitems

(wheat,cattle,crudeoil)werealsoactivatedinMorocco.

Withincreasedinflationandexchangeratepressures,centralbanksinAfricatightenedpolicyinterestrates.PersistentexchangeratepressuresledtheCentralBankofEgypttoimplementdevaluationsandtocommittoashifttoaflexibleexchangerateregimeaspartofthe$3billionInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)financingsecuredinDecember2022.Othercentralbanks(Egypt,Ethiopia,Ghana,andNigeria)imposedforeignexchangecontrolsandmeasuresto

manageforeigncurrencyflows.

10

Withfiscalspacesqueezed,fiscalpolicyhasbeenlargely

limitedtoafewsocialprotectioninterventionstohelpthosemost

vulnerabletofoodinsecurityrisks.EgyptandSudanhave

implementedconditionalcashtransferprogrammeswhereas

MozambiqueandSouthAfricahavemaintainedsocialsafetynets

andschoolfeedingprogrammesinitiatedduringthepandemic.In

Senegal,thegovernmenthelpedlocalproducerscopewith

increasingfertiliserpricesbycontinuingits50%fertilisersubsidy.

TheRussia–Ukrainewarhasactivatedpolicyinitiativesto

improvelonger-termagriculturalproductionandtradein

commoditiesaffectedbythewar.Suchinitiativesincludeeffortsby

theEthiopiangovernmenttoimprovelocalwheatproduction,

Senegal’splantodevelopitsricevaluechainstostrengthenlocal

production,processingandmarketingofrice,andMorocco’s

agriculturalstrategytodoubletheareasundercultivationfor

rapeseedandsunflowerby2030.

Country-levelimpact

Twostudies(Cororaton,2023;M’boukeetal.,2023)haveattemptedtoisolatetheimpactoftheRussia–Ukrainewarbyconstructing

counterfactualsandestimatingalikelyimpact.Simulationssuggest

thata10%shockinoil,foodandfertiliserpriceslastingonequarter

willleadtodeclinesinAfrica’sGDPby0.1%,0.1%and0.04%,

respectively.ThecombinedannualimpactinAfricathrough

thesepriceshockstranslatestoroughly$7billion.Actual

impactsarelikelytobehighersinceoil,foodandfertiliserprices

increasedbylargershares,at40%,18%and55%,respectively,in

2022,andotherpricesincreasedaswell.Thismeanstheoverall

amountisprobablyanunderestimate.

Thereissignificantvariationintheimpactofthewaracross

Africancountries,dependingontheireconomicstructuresanddomesticvulnerabilities.SimulationssuggestthewarmayresultinfallsinfoodconsumptionofbetweenzeroinsomeSouthernandEastAfricancountriesand6%insomeNorthAfricancountries.Price

shocksfromspecificcommoditieshavedifferenteffectsoncountries’termsoftrade:anoilpriceshockinitiallybenefitsnetoilexporters

withopposingeffectsonnetoilimporters;foodpriceshocks

negativelyaffectthetermsoftradeof22Africancountries;and

fertiliserpriceshockshaveaninsignificanteffectonthetermsof

tradeofmostAfricancountries.Whentheimpactofwarcoincides

withdroughts,countriesintheHornofAfricaexperiencethehighestdeclinesinoutput(ofmorethan3%)thantherestofAfrica(of0.2%).Economicrecoveryisalsoexpectedtobefasteramongnon-resourcecountriesthanresource-intensiveonesbecausetheformerare

supportedbytheirmorediversifiedeconomies.

Similarly,whileitisdifficulttodisentangletheimpactofthewarfrom

multiplefactorsthatdrivegrowth,employment,foodinsecurityand

poverty,thewarmayhaveexacerbatedtheimpactofthe

11

pandemiconthedeteriorationofAfrica’smacroeconomicand

socialperformance.Between2020and2023,thecontinentlost4.2ppofGDPgrowthcomparedwiththepre-Covidforecast.Beyond

output,thenumberofunemployedAfricanswas1.8millionhigherin

2022thaninpre-Covidforecasts,partlydrivenbythelackof

productiveemploymentopportunitiesandbyemploymentnot

growingasfastaspopulationgrowth.Ahigherdebtservicelowers

resourcesfordevelopmentfinancinginAfrica,withinterestrate

paymentoutpacingeducation,healthandinvestmentspending.

Theoverlappingshockshaveslowedprogressintermsof

achievingAfrica’sdevelopmentgoals.In2022,around22%of

Africanswerefacinghighlevelsoffoodinsecurity,withincidence

between50%and75%ofthepopulationinEthiopia,Kenya,

MozambiqueandSudan.Povertyhasalsoincreased,suggestingthat18millionnewpoorpeoplewereaddedin2022tohalfoftheAfricanpopulation(546millionpeople)alreadylivinginpovertyin2021.

Theimpactsofthewarhavedisproportionateeffectsonwomen.

InKenya,forinstance,women-headedhouseholdsinbothruralandurbanareaswerefoundtobemoreaffectedthanhouseholdsheadedbymenbychangesinwheatflourpricesbetweenFebruary2022andMay2023.Priceshocksmayalsohaveaffectedwomenmorethan

menaswomenspendalargerproportionoftheirincomeonfood.

Increasedpricesmayalsohavereversedprogressonwomen’s

accesstomodernenergyandcausedareturntounhealthybiomass

forfuelforcookingandheating.

TheeconomicandsocialimpactsofCOVID-19andtheRussia–

Ukrainewarmayresultinpersistentoutputlossesor‘scarring’

effects.Simulationsofthelong-termeffectsofCOVID-19inAfrica

suggestthatGDPreductionsrelativetoano-COVID-19scenariowillstillbefeltacrosscountriesby2030and2050,aseconomiclosseswillerodegainsinhumandevelopmentinthepastdecades.The

effectsoftheRussia–UkrainewararelikelytocompoundthescarringfromCovid-19inAfrica.

Policyimplications

Thesixstudiesunderlyingthissynthesis,aswellasroundtableand

publicdiscussionsofthestudies’keyfindings,1highlightgeneral

observationsandarangeofcountry-specificpolicysuggestionsfor

governments.

1Tailoredpolicyapproachestoshocks,giventhe

heterogeneousnatureoftheeffectsofthewaronAfrican

countries.Boththesizeandthenatureoftheeffectsvary.

Evidenceshowsthatimpactsgofromzeroto6%ofthetotalvalueoffoodconsumption.Whileseveralresource-intensivecountries

1ThefindingsofthesixstudieswerediscussedduringanODI–IMFcloseddoorroundtableon12May2023,AERC–ERF–PEPmeetingsheldon27Juneand19September2023andanODIeventatthesidelinesoftheIMF–WorldBankAnnualMeetingson11October2023.

12

havebenefitedfromglobalcommoditypriceshocksintheshort

runtheywillbeaffectednegativelyinthelongrun,whilenon-

resource-intensivecountriesareexpectedtogrowfasterinthe

mediumterm.Inaddition,countrieswithhighergovernment

capacitymayexhibitstrongerrecovery.Deeperandmore

persistentoutputcontractionsareexpectedinAfricancountries

withpre-existingvulnerabilities,suchassusceptibilitytoclimate

changeeffectsandpoliticalinstability.Suchheterogeneitymeanssomecountries(e.g.importers)needmoreactionsthanothers,

andthatapproacheswillneedtobetailoredtoenableshort-term

macroeconomicstabilisationbutalsolong-termresilience-

building.Forinstance,resource-intensiveeconomiesmayneedtosupporttransformativesectorswithlarge-scaleemployment(e.g.manufacturing,services)andinvestinupskillingofhumancapitalandclimate-resilientinfrastructure.

2Safeguardingoftargetedsocialsafetynetsduringshocks.It

isnotpossibletoneutraliseshockssotherewillbeimpactsfrom

changesinpricesandeconomicactivity.Somecountrieshave

respondedtotheRussia–Ukrainewarinsocialprotectionterms,

mostlythroughcashtransfersandsubsidies,butsuch

interventionsarenotenough.Giventhedistributionalimpactsof

increasesinpricesandpovertyincidenceinducedbythewar,

thereisaneedformoreproactiveandtargetedsocialsupportforwomen,vulnerablegroupsandpoorhouseholds;theextensionofcreditfacilitiestomarginalisedsmallholderfarmers;andthe

scaling-upofsocialsecurityforworkers.

3Proactivemonetarypoliciestoarrestthefinancialspilloversofshocks.Thecasestudiesshowthat,whilesomecentralbanks(e.g.EgyptandSouthAfrica)respondedfastattheonsetoftheRussia–Ukrainewar,othersrespondedlater.Africancentral

banksmayneedtohaveproactivemeasuresinplacetocounter

inflationarypressures(andexchangeratepass-throughto

inflation)stemmingfromexternalshocks.Suchmeasuresmay

includeinterestrateadjustmentsandmacroprudentialtools.

However,centralbanksshouldalsobecautiousaboutthe

implicationsofdeployingsuchtools;forinstance,higherpolicy

ratescanleadtohigherborrowingcostsandaslowdownin

domesticinvestment.Inaddition,theremaybeaneedto

establishsustainableexchangerateregimesthatbetterabsorb

shocksandimprovethecompetitivenessofexports.

4Tradecreationanddiversificationoffood,fertilisersand

energysources.Initialtradepolicyresponsestothewarinthe

formofexportbanswerenottheoptimalinterventiontosecure

domesticfoodsupply.Instead,thestudieshighlightthe

importanceofenhancingregionalandbilateraltradetoreduce

susceptibilitytocommodityshocksandtheirimpactonfood

securityinAfrica.Thisappliestothetradingofstaplefoodsand

inputsforagriculturalproductionanddistribution(e.g.fertiliser,

fuel)necessaryforfoodsecurity.Oneapproachwouldbe

13

investingintradecorridors,toreducetradetransportationcosts

andenhanceefficiency.Thiscanbesupplementedbybilateral

strategicengagementstocovertheareasoftradeandinvestmentfacilitation,tradeinfrastructureandcapacity-building.

Strengtheningintra-AfricantradethroughtheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeAreamarketcanalsopromote,expandanddiversifyregionaltradeandinvestmentinagricultureandenergy,andhelpraiserealpercapitaincometoliftmillionsoutofextremepoverty.

5Boostingefficientdomesticagriculturalandfertiliser

production.Implementingmeasurestoimproveagricultural

productivitycanhelpreducedependencyonimportsand

susceptibilitytoglobalcommoditypriceshocks.Measurescould

involveincreasinginvestmentinagriculturalandfertiliserresearchanddevelopment,improvingaccesstomodernand

environmentallysustainablefarmingtechniquesandtechnologies,supportingsmallholderfarmersoradoptingacomprehensive

agriculturalsectordevelopmentstrategy.

Meanwhile,thereisroomtoenhancetheroleofinternational

financinginstitutionsinshockmanagementandeconomic

recovery.Fiscalresourceshavebeensqueezedbytheoverlapping

shocksofCovid-19andtheRussia–Ukrainewar.Inaddition,the

recentglobalfinancialtighteningisincreasingthecostofborrowing

anddebtservicing.AsofAugust2023,21Africancountriesareat

highriskof,oralreadyin,debtdistress,andprogressonsecuring

debttreatmenthasbeenslow.Highdebtservicinglowersresources

forspendingonsocialservicesandpublicinvestment.Thereisa

needtoconsiderhowinternationalfinancinginstitutionscanprovide

speedier,moreflexibleandhigherfinancingthatiscommensurate

withthemagnitudeoftheshocks.Butitisnotjustthelevelof

financing:thedirectionalsomatters.Anareaofpolicydebatethus

relatestohowtheIMFandWorldBank(andotherglobalfinancial

institutionsandcreditors)candomoretofinancetargetedgrowth,

throughpoliciestohelpsaveAfrica’sgrowthanddevelopment

trajectoryfromscarringeffects.

14

1Introduction

AfricawasstilldealingwiththelingeringeffectsofCOVID-19when

theoutbreakoftheRussia–Ukrainewarin2022causedglobal

economicdisruptionsthathampereditseconomicrecovery.The

tradedisruptionsfromthewarledtohigherglobalcommodityprices,especiallyinfood,fuelandfertilisers,duringthefirsthalfof2022.TheincreaseincommoditypricestriggeredinflationarypressuresinmanyAfricancountriesandglobally.Toarrestinflation,centralbanks

tightenedtheirinterestrates,whichledtocapitaloutflows,higher

borrowingcostsandcurrencydepreciationsformanyAfrican

countries.Higherdebtserviceandexpensiveborrowingcostsfurthersqueezedlimitedfiscalspace,meaningthat,asofAugust2023,21of53Africancountrieswereathighriskoforalreadyindebtdistress.

Theoverlappingglobalshocks,combinedwithdomesticmacro-fiscalimbalancesandvulnerabilities(e.g.conflictandclimatechange

effects),arederailingAfrica’sgrowthanddevelopmentprogress.

Between2020and2023,sub-SaharanAfricaisestimatedtohave

lost4.2percentagepoints(pp)ofgrowthcomparedwithitstrajectorybeforethepandemic.2In2022,thenumberofAfricansexperiencingacutefoodinsecurityincreasedby35million,toreachatotalofabout180million(WorldBank,2023a).Meanwhile,18millionnewpoor

wereaddedin2022tohalfoftheAfricanpopulation(546million)

alreadylivinginpovertyin2021(UNECA,2023a).Progressonthe

provisionofqualityeducationandpromotinggenderequalityhas

beenslow(UNECA,2023b)andmaybehalted,givenlimitedfiscalspacefordevelopmentspendingasaresultoftherisingdebtserviceburden(UNDP,2023).

This