任務(wù)制網(wǎng)課知識模塊5 goernance

Chairmanand?Ultimateleadershipoftheorganisationconsistsofnumberofstrands,Chairmanand?Ultimateleadershipoftheorganisationconsistsofnumberofstrands,mostLeadingtheboardofdirectors–the??Leadingthemanagementteamatandboardlevel–theChiefExecutiveOfficeror2007/12?Anotherdelegate,AlliyaYongvanich,saidthat2007/12?Anotherdelegate,AlliyaYongvanich,saidthatrolesofchiefexecutiveandchairmanshouldalwaysbeseparatedbecauseofwhatshecalled‘a(chǎn)ccountabilitytoExplaintherolesofthechairmanincorporategovernance.(5marks)AssessthebenefitsoftheseparationoftherolesofchiefexecutiveandchairmanthatAlliyaYongvanicharguedforandexplainherbeliefthat‘a(chǎn)ccountabilitytoshareholders’isincreasedbytheseparationoftheseroles.(12marks)???Roleof?ThechairmanistheleaderRoleof?Thechairmanistheleaderoftheboardofinaprivateorpubliccompanyalthoughotherorganisationsareoftenrunonsimilargovernancelines.Inthisrole,heorsheisresponsibleforensuringtheboard’seffectivenessasaunit,intheserviceoftheshareholders.Thismeansagreeingand,ifnecessary,settingtheboard’sagendaandensuringthatboardmeetingstakeplaceonaregularRoleof?ThechairmanrepresentsthecompanyRoleof?Thechairmanrepresentsthecompanytoandotheroutsidestakeholders.Heorsheisoftenthe‘publicface’oftheorganisation,especiallyiftheorganisationmustaccountforitselfinapublicmanner.Linkedtothis,thechairman’srolesincludecommunicationwithshareholders.Thisoccursinastatutorysenseintheannualreport(where,inmanyjurisdictions,thechairmanmustwritetoshareholderseachyearintheformofachairman’sstatement)andatannualandextraordinarygeneralRoleof?Internally,thechairmanensuresthatRoleof?Internally,thechairmanensuresthatreceiverelevantinformationinadvanceofboardmeetingssothatalldiscussionsanddecisionsaremadebydirectorsfullyapprisedofthesituationunderdiscussion.Finally,hisorherroleextendstoco-ordinatingthecontributionsofnon-executivedirectors(NEDs)andfacilitatinggoodrelationshipsbetweenexecutiveandnon-executivedirectors.?Divisionof?TheseparationofrolesoffersthebenefitthatDivisionof?Theseparationofrolesoffersthebenefitthatitupthechiefexecutivetofullyconcentrateonthemanagementoftheorganizationwithoutthenecessitytoreporttoshareholdersorotherwisebecomedistractedfromhisorherexecutiveresponsibilities.Thearrangementprovidesaposition(thatofchairman)thatisexpectedtorepresentshareholders’interestsandthatisthepointofcontactintothecompanyfor?Divisionof?HavingtwopeopleratherthanoneatDivisionof?Havingtwopeopleratherthanoneattheheadoflargeorganisationremovestherisksof‘unfetteredpowers’beingconcentratedinasingleindividualandthisisanimportantsafeguardforinvestorsconcernedwithexcessivesecrecyorlackoftransparencyandThecaseofRobertMaxwellisagoodillustrationofasingledominatingexecutivechairmanoperatingunchallengedand,insodoing,actingillegally.?Divisionof?HavingthetworolesseparatedreducesDivisionof?Havingthetworolesseparatedreducestheriskofconflictofinterestinasinglepersonbeingresponsibleforcompanyperformancewhilstalsoreportingonthatperformancetomarkets.Finally,thechairmanprovidesachannelfortheconcernsofnon-executivedirectorswho,inturn,provideanimportantexternalrepresentationofexternalconcernsonboardsofdirectors.?Accountabilityandseparationof?IntermsoftheAccountabilityandseparationof?Intermsoftheseparationofrolesassistinginaccountabilitytoshareholders,fourpointscanbeThechairmanscrutinisesthechiefexecutive’smanagementperformanceonbehalfoftheshareholdersandwillbeinvolvedinapprovingthedesignofthechiefexecutive’srewardpackage.Itistheresponsibilityofthechairmantoholdthechiefexecutivetoaccountonshareholders’behalfs.Shareholdershaveanidentifiedperson(chairman)toholdaccountablefortheperformanceoftheirinvestment.Whilstday-to-daycontactwillnormallybewiththeinvestorrelationsdepartment(oritsequivalent)theycanultimatelyholdthechairmantoaccount.??Accountabilityandseparationof?ThepresenceofaseparateAccountabilityandseparationof?ThepresenceofaseparatechairmanensuresthatsystemisinplacetoensureNEDshaveapersontoreporttooutsidetheexecutivestructure.ThisencouragesthefreedomofexpressionofNEDstothechairmanandthis,inturn,enablesissuestoberaisedandacteduponwhennecessary.Thechairmanislegallyaccountableand,inmostcases,anexperiencedperson.He/shecanbeindependentandmoredispassionatebecauseheorsheisnotintimatelyinvolvedwithday-to-daymanagement?June2011Q1(d)PrepareastatementforMrJune2011Q1(d)PrepareastatementforMrTsakos,thechiefexecutive,toreadattheEGMtoaddressthefollowingareas.(i)AnexplanationoftherolesofthechiefexecutiveinmanagingtheissuesdescribedinthecaseatBoboCompany;(8marks)Roleof?leadthecompanyandtoprotectshareholderRoleof?leadthecompanyandtoprotectshareholderabovealldevelopandimplementpoliciesandstrategiescapableofdeliveringsuperiorshareholdervaluemanagethefinancialandphysicalresourcesofthecompany,monitorresults,andensurethateffectiveoperationalandriskcontrolsareinplaceoverseethemanagementteam,co-ordinatetheinterfacebetweentheboardandtheotheremployeesinthecompany???You’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhaveYou’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhavefinishedthisChairmanandCEOChairmanandCEOJune2009?TQCompany,alistedcompany,June2009?TQCompany,alistedcompany,recentlywentadministration(ithadbecomeinsolventandwasbeingmanagedbyafirmofinsolvencypractitioners).Agroupofshareholdersexpressedthebeliefthatitwasthechairman,MissHeikeHoiku,whowasprimarilytoblame.Althoughthecompany’smanagementhadmadeanumberofstrategicerrorsthatbroughtaboutthecompanyfailure,theshareholdersblamedthechairmanforfailingtoholdseniormanagementtoaccount.Inparticular,theywereangrythatMissHoikuhadnotchallengedchiefexecutiveRupertSmithwhowasregardedbysomeasarrogantanddomineering.June2009(b)Assess,inthecontextoftheJune2009(b)Assess,inthecontextofthecase,theimportanceofthechairman’sstatementtoshareholdersinTQCompany’sannualreport.(5marks)(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’sperformanceaschairmanofTQCompany.(8marks)(b)Importanceofthechairman’s?Ingeneralterms,it(b)Importanceofthechairman’s?Ingeneralterms,itisintendedtoconveymessagestoshareholdersingeneral,strategicAsaseparatesectionfromothernarrativereportingsectionsofanannualreport,itoffersthechairmantheopportunitytoinformshareholdersaboutissuesthatheorshefeelsitwouldbebeneficialforthemtobeawareThisindependentcommunicationisanimportantpartoftheseparationoftherolesofCEOandchairman.??(b)Importanceofthechairman’s?Inthecaseof(b)Importanceofthechairman’s?InthecaseofTQCompany,theroleofthechairmanisparticularimportancebecauseofthedominanceofMrMissHoikuhadaparticularresponsibilitytousehermostrecentstatementtoinformshareholdersaboutgoingconcernissuesnotwithstandingthedifficultiesthatmightcauseinherrelationshipwithMrSmith.MissHoikuhasanethicalaswellasanagencyresponsibilitytoexpressherindependenceinthechairman’sstatementandconveyissuesrelevanttocompanyvaluetothecompany’sshareholders.Shecanuseherchairman’sstatementforthispurpose.??(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ?Thecasedescribesaparticularlypoorperformancebycompanychairman.Itisakeyfunctionofthechairmantorepresenttheshareholders’interestsinthecompanyandMissHoikuhasclearlyfailedinthisduty.AkeyreasonforherpoorperformancewasherreportedinabilityorunwillingnesstofaceuptoMrSmithwhowasclearlyadomineeringpersonality.Akeyqualityofacompanychairmanishisorherabilityandwillingnesstopersonallychallengethechiefexecutiveifnecessary.?(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ?Shefailedtoensurethatacommitteestructurewasplace,allowingasshedid,theremunerationscommitteetoatrophywhentwomembersleftthecompany.Linkedtothis,itappearsfromthecasethatthetwonon-executivedirectorsthatleftwerenotreplacedandagain,itisapartofthechairman’sresponsibilitytoensurethatanadequatenumberofnon-executivesareinplaceontheboard.?(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ?SheinexplicablyallowedMrSmithtodesignhisrewardspackageandpresidedoverhimreducingtheperformancerelatedelementofhispackagewhichwasclearlymisalignedwiththeshareholders’interests.WhenMrSmithfailedtoco-ordinatetheotherdirectorsbecauseofhisunspecifiedbusinesstravel,shefailedtoholdhimtoaccounttherebyallowingthecompany’sstrategytofail.?(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ(d)CriticiseMissHoiku’saschairmanofTQ?Thereseemstohavebeensomeunder-reportingpotentialstrategicproblemsinthemostrecentannualreport.A‘futureprospects’or‘continuingbusiness’statementisoftenarequireddisclosureinanannualreport(inmanycountries)andthereisevidencethatthisstatementmayhavebeenmissingormisleadinginthemostrecentannualreport.You’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhaveYou’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhavefinishedthisNon-executiveNon-executiveBoard??ThemainboardcommitteesAuditcommittee–arguablythemostimportantcommittee,responsibleforliaisingwithexternalaudit,supervisinginternalauditandreviewingtheannualaccountsandinternalcontrols.Nominationcommittee–Board??ThemainboardcommitteesAuditcommittee–arguablythemostimportantcommittee,responsibleforliaisingwithexternalaudit,supervisinginternalauditandreviewingtheannualaccountsandinternalcontrols.Nominationcommittee–responsibleforrecommendingtheappointmentsofnewdirectorstotheboard.Remunerationcommittee–responsibleforadvisingonexecutivedirectorremunerationpolicyandthespecificpackageforeachdirectorRiskcommittee–responsibleforoverseeingtheorganisation'sriskresponseandmanagementstrategies???Non-executivedirectors?Non-executivedirectorshaveno(managerial)Non-executivedirectors?Non-executivedirectorshaveno(managerial)Non-executivedirectorsshouldprovideabalancinginfluence,andplayakeyroleinreducingconflictsofinterestbetweenmanagement(includingexecutivedirectors)andshareholders.Theyshouldprovidereassurancetoshareholders,particularlyinstitutionalshareholders,thatmanagementisactingintheinterestsoftheorganisation.?2013/06(c)Brieflyexplainthegeneralrolesofnon-executivedirectorsinalistedcompanysuchasBoomCo,anddiscusswhynon-executivedirectorsshouldnotreceiveperformance-relatedelementsintheirrewardsasSamSouthenquired.(10marks)2013/06(c)Brieflyexplainthegeneralrolesofnon-executivedirectorsinalistedcompanysuchasBoomCo,anddiscusswhynon-executivedirectorsshouldnotreceiveperformance-relatedelementsintheirrewardsasSamSouthenquired.(10marks)Roleofnon-executive?ThefourgeneralrolesofRoleofnon-executive?ThefourgeneralrolesofNEDsare:thestrategyscrutinisingrole,riskroleandthepeopleInthestrategyrole,NEDsmaychallengeanyaspectofstrategytheyseefitandofferadviceorinputtohelptodevelopsuccessfulstrategy.ThescrutinisingorperformanceroleiswheretheNEDs’independenceisperhapsthemostimportant.NEDsarerequiredtoholdexecutivecolleaguestoaccountfordecisionstakenandcompanyperformance.Inthisrespect,theyarerequiredtorepresenttheshareholders’interestsagainstanyvestedinterestsorshort-termexecutivepressures.??Roleofnon-executive?TheriskroleinvolvesNEDsRoleofnon-executive?TheriskroleinvolvesNEDsensuringthecompanyhasadequatesystemofinternalcontrolsandsystemsofriskmanagementinplace.Finally,inthepeoplerole,NEDsoverseearangeofresponsibilitieswithregardtothemanagementoftheexecutivemembersoftheboard.Thistypicallyinvolvesissuesconcerningappointmentsandremuneration,butmightalsoinvolvecontractualordisciplinaryissues,andsuccessionplanning.?Numberofnon–executive?'Theboardshouldincludenon-executiveNumberofnon–executive?'Theboardshouldincludenon-executivedirectorssufficientcharacterandnumberfortheirviewstocarrysignificantweight.'NewYorkStockExchangerulesnowrequirelistedcompaniestohaveamajorityofnon-executivedirectors(iemorethanhalftheboard).Othercodes,suchastheSingaporecode,suggestatleastathirdoftheboardshouldbeindependent(non-executive)??Cross-ThisiswhereanexecutivedirectorofCompanyAisanon-executivedirectorofCompanyB,andanexecutivedirectorofCompanyBisanon-executivedirectorofCompanyA.Cross-ThisiswhereanexecutivedirectorofCompanyAisanon-executivedirectorofCompanyB,andanexecutivedirectorofCompanyBisanon-executivedirectorofCompanyA.Dec2008Q2?(c)RiskcommitteememberscanDec2008Q2?(c)Riskcommitteememberscanbeeitherexecutivenon-Distinguishbetweenexecutiveandnon-executivedirectors.(2marks)EvaluatetherelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofChen’sriskmanagementcommitteebeingnon-executiveratherthanexecutiveinnature.(7marks)???Advantagesofnon-executive?SeparationfromthecontentbeingdiscussedAdvantagesofnon-executive?SeparationfromthecontentbeingdiscussedislikelytobringindependentNon-executivedirectorsoftenbringspecificexpertisethatwillbemorerelevanttoariskproblemthanmoreoperationally-mindedexecutivedirectorswillhave.Chen’sfourmembers,beingfromdifferentbackgrounds,arelikelytobringarangeofperspectivesandsuggestedstrategieswhichmayenrichtheoptionsopentothecommitteewhenconsideringspecificrisks??Disadvantagesofnon-executive(advantagesofexecutive?DirectinputDisadvantagesofnon-executive(advantagesofexecutive?Directinputandrelevantinformationwouldbefromexecutivesworkingdirectlywiththeproducts,systemsandproceduresbeingdiscussediftheywereonthecommittee.Non-executivesarelesslikelytohavespecialistknowledgeofproducts,systemsandproceduresbeingdiscussedandwillthereforebelesslikelytobeabletocommentintelligentlyduringmeetings.?Disadvantagesofnon-executive(advantagesofexecutive?Themembership,Disadvantagesofnon-executive(advantagesofexecutive?Themembership,offourpeople,noneofwhomdirectexperienceofChen’sindustryorproducts’couldproducedecisionstakenwithoutrelevantinformationthatanexecutivemembercouldprovide.(p1就是要習(xí)慣性的結(jié)合背景）Non-executivedirectorswillneedtoreporttheirfindingstotheexecutiveboard.Thisreportingstageslowsdowntheprocess,thusrequiringmoretimebeforeactionscanbeimplemented,andintroducingthepossibilityofsomemisunderstanding.(該點是比較特殊的因為不同于其他三個委員會風(fēng)險管理委員會對風(fēng)險管理的結(jié)果最后還是往往還是需要執(zhí)行董事去執(zhí)行性）?You’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhaveYou’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhavefinishedthisNon-executivedirectorsNon-executivedirectors2012/06?Define‘independence’inthecontextofgovernanceandcriticallyevaluateMr2012/06?Define‘independence’inthecontextofgovernanceandcriticallyevaluateMrLouse’scommentthatgreaterindependenceofnon-executivedirectorsisimportantinincreasingtheeffectivenessofboardcommittees.(8marks)DescribetherolesofariskcommitteeandcriticiseMrLouse’sunderstandingoftheriskcommitteeinZogsCompany.(9marks)?DefineIndependenceisaqualitypossessedbyindividualsandreferstotheavoidanceDefineIndependenceisaqualitypossessedbyindividualsandreferstotheavoidanceofbeingundulyinfluencedbyavestedinterest.Thisfreedomenablesamoreobjectivepositiontobetakenonissuescomparedtothosewhoconsidervestedinterestsorotherloyalties.Define?Independencecanbethreatenedbyover-familiaritytheexecutiveboard,whichiswhymanycorporategovernancecodesDefine?Independencecanbethreatenedbyover-familiaritytheexecutiveboard,whichiswhymanycorporategovernancecodeshavemeasuresinplacetopreventthis.TheseincluderestrictionsonshareoptionschemesforNEDs,time-limitedappointmentsandbansoncross-Otherrestrictions,dependingonjurisdictionandcode,includesalariesbeingsetatanappropriatelevelforNEDs,acompulsorynumberofyearsafterretirementfromacompanybeforebeingeligibleforaNEDrole(ifever),andnoclosepersonalrelationshipsbetweenexecutivesand??Benefitsofgreater?InthecaseoftheBenefitsofgreater?Inthecaseoftheindependenceofnon-directors,MrLouseisarguingthatthosewithnopreviouscontactwiththeothermembersoftheboardandwhocomefromoutsidetheindustrythatZogsisin,willbemoreindependentthanthosewhomayhavesomeformofvestedinterest.Inthisheisonlypartlyaccurate:whilstsuccessiontoaNEDrolefromanexecutivepositioninthesamecompanyislikelytothreatenindependence,appointmentstoNEDpositionsfromothercompanieswithinthesamesectorarequitecommonandstillprovideindustryknowledgetoa?BenefitsofgreaterThefirstbenefitofgreaterindependenceisthatindependentpeoplebroughtinasNEDsarelesslikelytohavepriorvestedinterestsintermsofmaterialbusinessrelationshipsthatmightinfluencejudgmentsoropinions.BenefitsofgreaterThefirstbenefitofgreaterindependenceisthatindependentpeoplebroughtinasNEDsarelesslikelytohavepriorvestedinterestsintermsofmaterialbusinessrelationshipsthatmightinfluencejudgmentsoropinions.Suchvestedinterestsmayinvolvefriendshipswithotherboardmembersorpastprofessionalrelationships.Benefitsofgreater?Second,theyarelikelyBenefitsofgreater?Second,theyarelikelytohavefewerprejudicesforagainstcertainpoliciesorindividualsasworkingrelationshipswillnothavebeenbuiltupoveranumberofAccordingly,theyarelikelytostartfromthe‘groundup’inseekingclarificationsandexplanationsforeachareaofdiscussion.Previousrivalries,alliancesorembeddedideaswouldnotfrustratediscussionsandthismayallowformoreobjectivediscussions.?BenefitsofgreaterThird,independentnon-executivedirectorsaremorelikelytochallengetheestablishedbeliefsoflessindependentpeople(suchasexecutivedirectors).BenefitsofgreaterThird,independentnon-executivedirectorsaremorelikelytochallengetheestablishedbeliefsoflessindependentpeople(suchasexecutivedirectors).Thisisamoreeffectivewayofscrutinisingtheworkofboardcommitteesandofincreasingtheireffectiveness.DisadvantagesofgreaterSomeNEDsareappointedbecauseoftheirconnectionswiththeexistingboard,eitherthroughpriorindustryinvolvement,priorexecutivemembershiporpriorserviceonanotherboardwithoneormoreDisadvantagesofgreaterSomeNEDsareappointedbecauseoftheirconnectionswiththeexistingboard,eitherthroughpriorindustryinvolvement,priorexecutivemembershiporpriorserviceonanotherboardwithoneormoreotherdirectors.TheseareconsideredbyMrLousetobelessindependent.Disadvantagesofgreater?Thereare,however,anumberDisadvantagesofgreater?Thereare,however,anumberofadvantageswhenhavesomefamiliaritywithacompanyandboardtheyarejoining.Akeynon-executiverole,includinginboardcommittees,isprovidingstrategicadvice.Thiscanoftenarisefromathoroughknowledgeofthestrategicissuesinacompanyorindustry.Retiredexecutivedirectors,likeMrLouse,sometimesserveasNEDsinthesamecompanyandarethusabletobringtheirexperienceofthatindustryandcompanytobearoncommitteediscussions?Disadvantagesofgreater?SomelevelofpriorconnectionisDisadvantagesofgreater?Somelevelofpriorconnectionisadvantageouswhenleveloftechnicalknowledgeisrequired.Therefore,MrLouse’scommentsaboutindependencedependinguponNEDs’needingtobefromadifferentindustrybackgroundorsectorisnotquiteappropriate.Whenservingonanappointmentscommittee,forexample,knowledgeoftheindustryandthetechnicalaspectsofacompany’soperationswillincreaseeffectiveness.Thismightapplyinelectronics,chemicals,accountingservicesandfinancialservices,forexample.Whenservingonariskcommitteein,forexample,abank,atechnicalknowledgeofkeyrisksspecifictothatparticularindustrycanbeveryimportant.?You’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhaveYou’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhavefinishedthisUnitary&Multi-Unitary&Multi-2012/06?(a)Comparethetypicalgovernancebetweenafamilybusinessandalistedcompany,andassessCrispin’sviewthattheLumfamilywill‘losethefreedom2012/06?(a)Comparethetypicalgovernancebetweenafamilybusinessandalistedcompany,andassessCrispin’sviewthattheLumfamilywill‘losethefreedomtomanagethecompanyastheywish’aftertheflotation.(10marks)(c)Distinguishbetweenunitaryandtwo-tierboards,anddiscussthedifficultiesthattheLumfamilymightencounterwhenintroducingaunitaryboard.(7marks)?DistinguishbetweenUnitaryandtwo-?InaunitaryDistinguishbetweenUnitaryandtwo-?Inaunitaryboard,alldirectors,includingexecutiveandnon-executivedirectors,aremembers.Alldirectorsareofequal‘rank’intermsoftheirabilitytoinfluencestrategyandtheyalsoallsharethecollectiveresponsibilityintermsoflegalandregulatoryliability.ThereisnodistinctioninconstitutionorlawbetweenstrategicoversightandoperationalDistinguishbetweenUnitaryandtwo-?Inatwo-tierDistinguishbetweenUnitaryandtwo-?Inatwo-tierboard,responsibilitiesaresplitbetweensupervisoryoroversightboard(chairedbythecompanychairman),andanoperationalboard(usuallychairedbythechiefexecutive).Thesupervisoryboarddecidesonstrategicissuesandtheoperationalboardbecomesresponsibleforexecutingthestrategydeterminedbythesupervisoryboard.Responsibilitiesbetweentheboardsareclearlydemarcatedwiththesupervisoryboardresponsibleformanylegalandregulatorycomplianceissues(suchasfinancialreporting).Directorsonthelowertier(operationalboard)donothavethesamelevelsofresponsibilityorpowerasthoseonthesupervisory?DifficultiesfortheLum?ThefirstdifficultyfortheLumDifficultiesfortheLum?ThefirstdifficultyfortheLumfamilyisthelossoftightcontroltheyenjoyedpriortotheInaunitaryboard,allstrategicdecisionsneedtobetakenbyafullboardincludingtheNEDs.Itispreciselytopreventsmallgroupsofpowerfulexecutivesfrommakingdecisionsontheirownthatthecounterweightofthenon-executiveboardwasintroduced.ThismayleadtofrustrationintheLumfamilymembers,whichmayaffecttheobjectivityofsomedecisions.??DifficultiesfortheLum?ThecompanywillloseDifficultiesfortheLum?Thecompanywilllosethecapacityforfastmakinginthefamilysupervisoryboardbecauseoftheneedtoinvolveeverybody.Largeboardsgenerallymeetregularlybutonfixeddates.NEDsandotherexecutivedirectorsarelikelytoseekexplanationsfordecisionstakenoutsidethemainboarddiscussionsandcanactagainstanymembers,includingfamilymembersastheLumfamilyonlycontrols20%oftheDifficultiesfortheLum?ThechangeincultureDifficultiesfortheLum?Thechangeinculturebroughtaboutbythechangesaredifficultforthefamilytomanageandthemovementtoaunitaryboardislikelytoaddtothedifficultyofthisadjustment.Theneedtoconsultwidely(onalargerboard)andtoseekconsensusarelikelytobesignificantchangesfortheLumfamily.Forthoseusedtothefamilywayofmanagingthecompany,thesechangesarelikelytobedifficulttodealwith.Multi-tier??(a)SupervisoryAsupervisoryboardhasworkers'representativesandstakeholders'managementrepresentativesincludingbanks'representatives.TheboardhasnoexecutiveMulti-tier??(a)SupervisoryAsupervisoryboardhasworkers'representativesandstakeholders'managementrepresentativesincludingbanks'representatives.Theboardhasnoexecutivefunction,althoughitdoesreviewthecompany'sdirectionandstrategyandisresponsibleforsafeguardingstakeholders'interests.Itmustreceiveformalreportsofthestateofthecompany‘saffairsandfinance.Itapprovestheaccountsandmayappointcommitteesandundertakeinvestigations.?Multi-tier??(b)ManagementAmanagementorexecutiveboard,composedentirelyofmanagers,willberesponsiblefortheday-to-dayrunningMulti-tier??(b)ManagementAmanagementorexecutiveboard,composedentirelyofmanagers,willberesponsiblefortheday-to-dayrunningofthebusiness.Thesupervisoryboardappointsthemanagementboard.Membershipofthetwoboardsisentirelyseparate.You’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhaveYou’reaThanksforstayingwithus.YouhavefinishedthisDirectors'Directors'Purposesofdirectors'?ClearlyadequateremunerationhastoPurposesofdirectors'?Clearlyadequateremunerationhastobepaiddirectorsinordertoattractandretainindividualsofsufficientcalibre.Remunerationpackagesshouldbestructuredtoensurethatindividualsaremotivatedtoachieveperformancelevelsthatareinthecompanyandshareholders'bestinterestsaswellastheirownpersonalinterests.?Remuneration?TheGreenburycommitteeintheUKsetoutRemuneration?TheGreenburycommitteeintheUKsetoutwhichareagoodsummaryofwhatremunerationpolicyshouldinvolve.Directors'remunerationshouldbesetindependentmembersoftheAnyformofbonusshouldberelatedtoperformanceorenhancedshareholdervalueThereshouldbefulltransparencyofdirectors'remuneration,includingpensionrights,inthe???Remuneration?IssuesconnectedwithremunerationpolicyincludetheRemuneration?IssuesconnectedwithremunerationpolicyincludetheThepayscalesappliedtoeachdirector'spackageTheproportionofthedifferenttypesofrewardwithineachTheperiodwithinwhichperformancerelatedelementsbecomepayable???Elementsofremuneration-Basic?BasicsalarywillElementsofremuneration-Basic?Basicsalarywillbeinaccordancewiththetermsthedirectors'contractofemployment,andisnotrelatedtotheperformanceofthecompanyortheInsteaditisdeterminedbytheexperience,performanceandresponsibilitiesofthedirector,andalsowhatothercompaniesmightbepreparedtopay(themarketrate).?ElementsofPerformancerelated?DirectorsmaybepaidElementsofPerformancerelated?Directorsmaybepaidacashbonus