高盛-中美貿(mào)易的真相 Facts about US tariffs on China 20241208

8December2024|7:16PMHKT

AsiainFocus

FactsaboutUStariffsonChina

■AftertheUSelectioninearlyNovember,potentialUStariffincreasesonChinesegoodsbecametopofmindforinvestors.Inourclientconversationsafter

publishingthe2025ChinaEconomicoutlook,wereceivedmanyquestionsonUStariffs.Inthisnote,wedelveintodetailedtradedataandprovidesome

usefulfactsonexistingUStariffsonChina.

■Thetariffincreasesduringthe2018-19US-Chinatradewarhavesignificantly

shiftedUSimportsawayfromChinatoothertradingpartners.China'sshareofUSimportsdroppedfromover20%in2017to13.5%inQ32024,alevellast

seenin2004.Therewasalsoanotableproductmix-shiftinUSimportsfrom

China:tariffedgoodsexperiencedlostshareswhereasnon-tariffedgoodsgainedshares,leadingtoadecreaseintheeffectivetariffrate.

■Productexclusionshelpedfurtherreducetheeffectivetariffrate.Afterseveralroundsofextensionsandsubsequentadjustments,theremaining164

exclusionscovered15%oftariffedgoods.Incorporatingbothproductmix-shiftaftertheimpositionoftariffsandexclusions,wecalculatetheeffectivetariffrateonUSimportsfromChinahasstabilizedataround10%inrecentyears.

■ThePhaseOnetradeagreementsignedinJanuary2020includedacommitmentbyChinatobuyanadditional$200bnofUSgoodsandservices.Ultimately

ChinesepurchasesofUSgoodsfellshortofthePhaseOnetradeagreement,partlyduetotheonsetoftheCovidpandemicasChineseimportsofUSenergyproductsandtransportationequipmentmissedthetargetsbythelargest

margins.

YutingYang

+852-2978-7283|yuting.yyang@GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

XinquanChen

+852-2978-2418|xinquan.chen@GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

ChelseaSong

+852-2978-0106|chelsea.song@GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

8u2-7a8n-6634|hui.shan@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

LishengWang

+852-3966-4004

lisheng.wang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

AndrewTilton

+852-2978-1802|andrew.tilton@GoldmanSachs(Asia)LL.C.

■TheBidenadministrationrecentlyannounceditsintentiontotightenregulationsaroundthedeminimisexemptionsandtocurbimportsfromlow-costChinesee-commerceplatforms.WeestimatethattheremovalofdeminimisexemptionswouldincreasetheUSeffectivetariffrateonChinesegoodsbyslightlylessthan1pp.

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegAC

certificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.

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FactsaboutUStariffsonChina

AftertheUSelectioninearlyNovember,potentialUStariffincreasesonChinesegoodsbecametopofmindforinvestors.Inourclientconversationsafterpublishingthe2025

ChinaEconomicoutlook,wereceivedmanyquestionsregardingourbaseline

assumptionthattheincomingTrumpadministrationwillraisetheeffectivetariffrateonChinaby20pp.Inthisnote,wedelveintotheexperienceofthe2018-19US-ChinatradewarandprovidesomeusefulfactsonexistingUStariffsondifferentChineseproducts,US-ChinaPhaseOnetradeagreement,andotherissuespertainingtoUS-Chinatradesuchas"deminimis"tariffexemptions.

Abriefrecapofthe2018-19US-Chinatradewar

ThefirstTrumpadministration'stariffincreasesbeganinearly2018,targetinganarrowsetofimportssuchaswashingmachines,solarpanels,steel,andaluminum,thoughthesewerenotexclusivetoChina.TheUSsubsequentlyincreasedtariffsonalarge

shareofimportedproductsfromChinain2018-2019(Exhibit1).Aftermanyroundsoftariffhikesandretaliations,theUS-ChinaPhaseOnetradeaareementwassignedonJanuary15,2020.Altogether,theUSaddedtariffsonapproximately$350billionworthofimportsfromChina,withtariffratesrangingfrom7.5%to25%.Chinaretaliatedwithtariffincreasesonabout$100billionworthofUSexports.Ourpreviousresearch

showedthatthenegativegrowthimpactofthe2018-19US-ChinatradewarwasmoresignificantforChinathanfortheUS,withthetotalcumulativehittothelevelofGDPis0.7-0.8%forChinaand0.5-0.6%fortheUS.

Exhibit1:Atimelineofthe2018-19US-Chinatradewar

2018-2020:TRUMP-ERATRADEWARS

TrumpAdministrationenactsChinesetariffs,kickingoffatit-for-tattradewarthateventuallyendswithaPhase1tradedeal.

Mar2018:Trumporders25%tariffsonsteelimportsand10%onaluminumimports

fromallsuppliersincluding

China.

2018

Aug2018:USimposes25%tariffsonS16bnworthofChinesegoods(List2).Chinaretaliateswithitsowntariffson$16bnworthofUSgoods.

2019

May/Jun2019:USraisestariffsfrom10%to25%onS200bnworthof

Chinesegoods.Chinahikesrateson$36bnoutofthe$60bntariffedUSgoods.

Jan2020:USandChinasignPhase1tradedealthatindudesa

ChinesepledgetobuymoreUSgoods.The15%tariffsonList4Awerehalvedto7.5%.

2020

Jan2018:USimposes

"safeguard"tariffsonallimportedwashing

machinesandsolarpanels,indudingfromChina.

Jul2018:USimposes25%tariffon$34bnworthofChinese

goods(List1).Chinaretaliateswithitsowntariffson$34bnworthofUSgoods.

Sep2018:USimposes10%

tariffsonS200bnworthof

Chinesegoods(uist3).ChinaimposestariffsonS60bnofUSgoods.

Sep2019:USimposes15%tariffsonoverS100bnworthofChinesegoods(List4A).ChinaretaliateswithtariffsonS7Sbn

worthofUSgoods.

Source:PIE,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

TheincreasedtariffshavesignificantlyshiftedUSimportsawayfromChinatoother

tradingpartners,withthedeclineprimarilyconcentratedintariffedgoods.AsExhibit2shows,Chinaaccountedforaround10%oftotalUSgoodsimportsintheearly2000s.FollowingChina'sentryintotheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),itsmarketsharegrewrapidly,exceeding20%by2015.However,thisupwardtrendstartedtoreversein2018.ApartfromabriefreboundduringtheCovidpandemicperiod(2020-21)whenex-China

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supplychainswereseverelydisrupted,China'sshareofUSgoodsimportsdeclined

steadily.AsofQ32024,China'ssharehadfallento13.5%,alevellastseenin2004.Thedeclinewaslargelyattributabletothe2018-19tariffhikes.AsshowninExhibit3,US

importsoftariffedgoodsfromChinahaveremainedbelowpre-tradewarlevels.In

contrast,USimportsofnon-tariffedgoodshavestayednotablyabove2017levels.As

such,goodsfacingtariff(Lists1-4A,explainedbelow)currentlycoveraround40%ofUSimportsfromChina(vs.70%in2017).

Exhibit2:China'sshareofUSgoodsimportshasdeclinedsignificantlysincetheonsetofthe2018-19tradewar

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Exhibit3:Thedeclinewasconcentratedintariffedgoods

OthersincludetotalimportsminusLists1-3and4A,whicharemostlyList4B.

Source:USITC.DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Effectivetariffrateloweredbyproductmix-shiftandexclusions

Forbackground,therewerefourtranchesoftariffsimposedonChineseimportedgoodsduring2018-19underSection301oftheTradeActof1974(Exhibit4).Thefirsttwo

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tranches(List1andList2),totaling$50bnworthofUSimportsfromChina,targeted

almostexclusivelyintermediategoodsandcapitalgoods(e.g.,industrialmachineryandelectricalequipment).Thethirdtranche(List3),$200bnimportsintotal,comprisedofmostlyintermediate/capitalgoodsbutsomeconsumergoods(e.g.,furnitureand

electronics).Thefourthtranchehadtwosub-lists(List4A,around$100bn,andList4B,around$150bn),containingmostlyconsumergoods,wereeithertariffedata

significantlylowerrate(7.5%forList4Avs.25%forLists1-3)ornottariffedatall(List

4B).Thispatternoftariffimpositionduring2018-19isthereasonbehindourbaseline

assumptionthatnewtariffsinTrump'ssecondtermwillalsolargelyfallonList1-3items,resultingina20ppincreaseintheeffectivetariffrate.

Exhibit4:Lists1-3weremainlyintermediateandcapitalgoods,whileList4containsmoreconsumergoods

Percent

Source:GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch,USITC

Astaticcalculationwouldyieldaneffectivetariffrateof14%basedon2017tradedata(e.g.,(50*25%+200*25%+100*75%+150*0%)/500=14%).However,theactual

effectivetariffrateislowerduetoproductmix-shift:ChinesegoodsintariffedcategoriesexperiencedmeaningfuldeclineswhereasthosenotfacingtariffsgainedshareinUS

imports.Forexample,ChineseexportsofelectricequipmentandmechanicalmachinerytotheUS,whichaccountfornearlyhalfofChineseexportstotheUS,contractedby

morethan20percentfrom2017to2024(Exhibit5).1

1OurpreviousresearchsuggestedsignificantshiftsinUStechimportsawayfromChinatotherestofAsia,notablyVietnam.

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Exhibit5:ChineseexportsofelectricequipmentandmechanicalmachinerytotheUScontractedby20%from2017to2024

TariflistsByIndustryBilion,USDBilion,USD

100100

TheUSITChasreleasedUSimportsfromthreequarterstogetthefullyeardatain

Chinaforthefrstine2024.

months,and

we

assumethattheimports

oflastquarterequaltothe

average

ofthefirst

Source:USITC,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Productexclusionsalsohelpedreducetheeffectivetariffrate.TheUSTrade

Representative(USTR)introducedtheSection301exclusionprocessin2019,allowingcompaniestoapplyforexemptionsfromtariffsbasedoncertaincriteria(e.g.,whethertheproductisonlyavailablefromChinaandwhetherthetariffswouldresultinsevereeconomicharm).Theseexclusions,initially549intotal,graduallyexpiredby2021afterseveralextensions.Ofthe549expiredexclusions,352werethenretroactively

reinstatedonOctober12.2021.Afterthat.someofthese352extensionswere

extendedmultipletimesduring2021-2024.SeparatelyandinlightoftheCovid

pandemic,theUSTRgrantedtariffexclusionsto99healthcareandCovid-related

productsonDecember29,2020.Afterseveralsubsequentadjustments,inMay2023,theUSTRreducedthenumberofextendedCovid-relatedexclusionsto77.

OnMay24,2024,theUSTRannouncedafurtherreductionintariffexclusions.Ofthe

429remainingexclusions(i.e.,352previouslyreinstatedexclusionsaswellas77

Covid-relatedexclusions),only164wereextendedthroughMay31,2025.TheremainingexclusionsexpiredonJune14,2024,witha14-daytransitionperiod(Exhibit6).Taken

together,the549initialexclusionsaccountedfor35%oftotaltariffrevenuefromLists1-4A.Withthereductionto164exclusionsinJune2024,thesharefelltoaround15%(Exhibit7).

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Exhibit6:TimelineofUSproductexclusions

Originally549exclusions(Jul2018-Oct2021)

Current164exclusions(May2024-May2025)

99Covidexclusions

(March2020-Feb2023)

Reinstatementof352

exclusions

(Oct2021-May2024)

77Covidexclusions

(May2023-May2024)

Source:USTR,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Exhibit7:Current164exclusionsaccountedfor15%oftotalUStariffrevenueonChinesegoods

exclusions352exclusionsexclusions

Source:USTR,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Thecurrentexclusions,indollarvalueterms,areprimarilyconcentratedinthe

mechanicalmachineryandelectricalequipmentcategories,amountingto$21bn(vs.

totalexclusionsof$39bn).Theexclusionshavenearlyhalvedinvaluetermscomparedtotheoriginal549exclusions.Inthetransportationsector,almostallexclusionsgrantedin2019havebeenallowedtoexpire(Exhibit8).

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Exhibit8:Indollarvalueterms,thecurrentexclusionshavenearlyhalvedcomparedtotheoriginal549exclusions

Source:USTR,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Incorporatingbothproductmix-shiftaftertheimpositionoftariffsandevolvementof

productexclusions,wecalculatetheeffectivetariffrateonUSimportsfromChinaovertime(Exhibit9).Specifically,welookatthetariffrateandexclusionstatusofeach

ten-digitUSHarmonizedTariffedSchedule(HTS)productcodebythevalueofUS

importsfromChina.TheaverageeffectivetariffrateonimportsfromChinaincreased

substantiallyfrom3.5%in2017to12%inearly2020.ThePhaseOnetradeagreementloweredtheeffectiveratebyaround3percentagepointsafterthetariffrateonList4Aproductswascutfrom15%to7.5%.Theoveralleffectivetariffratehasbeenrelativelystableataround10%inrecentyears.Tocross-checkourestimates,wealsolookatdutydatareleasedbytheUSCensusBureau.2AsshowninExhibit9,itfollowedasimilar

trendtoourestimatesforthemostpart.

2AccordingtotheUSCensusBureau,theinclusioninthefiguresofsomeUSproductsreturnedafter

processingandassemblyabroad,forwhichaportionofthevalueiseligiblefordutyfreeconsideration,maycausethesedutyfigurestobesomewhatoverstated.Incaseswherearticlesaredutiableatvariousspecialrates,adutiablevalueisshownbutnodutyiscalculated,leadingtoanunderestimateofeffectivetariffrate.

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Exhibit9:EffectivetariffrateonUSimportsfromChinahasstabilizedataround10%

Percent

Percent

Source:GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch,USTR,USITC

AreviewoftheUS-ChinaPhaseOnetradeagreement

OnJanuary15,2020,theUSandChinasignedthePhaseOnetradeagreementwhichincludedacommitmentbyChinatobuyanadditional$200bnofUSgoodsandservicescumulativelyovertwoyearsin2020-21comparedtothe2017ChineseimportsfromtheUS.Ultimately,ChinesepurchasesofUSgoodsfellshortofthePhaseOnetrade

agreement,fulfillingonlv60%ofthepledgedpurchases(Exhibit10andExhibit11).

AccordingtothePetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics(PIIE)data,Chinese

purchasesofautoandaircraftonlyreached40%and18%ofthetarget,respectively.

However,purchasesofsemiconductorsandsemiconductorequipmentexceededthe

targetpartiallyduetoChinesebuyersstockpilingbeforetheUSimposedexport

restrictionsonsuchproducts.Agriculturalproductsaccountedforonethirdofthegoodscoveredbytheagreement,andChinesepurchasesofagriculturalproductsreached82%ofthetarget.Purchasesofenergyproductsreachedonly40%ofthePhaseOnedeal

commitment,partlyduetotheonsetoftheCovidpandemic,reducedmobilityonCovidlockdownsandsignificantlyloweroilpricesin2020.

MediaarticleshavereportedthatChinamayincreasepurchasesofUSgoodsnextyeartofulfilltheUS-ChinaPhaseOnetradeagreementsignedin2020.WethinktheimpactonChina'stotalimportsmaybesmallasChinamayreduceimportsfromother

countries,especiallyforhomogeneousproductslikecommodities.

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Exhibit10:Chinesepurchasesonlyreached60%ofthetargetspecifiedinPhaseOnetradeagreement

Billion,USDUS-ChinaPhaseOnePurchaseDealPercent

Source:PIE

Exhibit11:ChinamissedPhaseOnetradeagreementtargetsacrossdifferentproducts

BillionUSD

BillionUSD

*Thehollowbarforuncoveredproductsrefersto2017exportvalue(takentwice).

Source:PIE

Thedebateonthedeminimisexemption

Underthe"deminimis"exemption,aUSimportercangenerallyimportoneormore

shipmentsofmerchandiseeachday,withoutpayingtariffsordutiesforimportation

valuedatorbelowaspecificthreshold.Priorto2016,theUSdeminimisthresholdwas$200,anditwasraisedto$800undertheTradeFacilitationandTradeEnforcementAct(TFTEA)tofacilitatethegrowinge-commercemarket.UShasahigherdeminimis

thresholdcomparedtoothercountriesaccordingtotheGlobalExpressAssociationdata(Exhibit12).Thisthresholdchange,alongwithrapide-commercegrowthandbusinessmodelchangesafter2016,ledtoasignificantincreaseinsmall-packagelow-value

shipmentsintoUS.

AccordingtoUSCustomsandBorderProtection's(CBP)statistics,itprocessed1billiondeminimisshipmentsin2023,a46%increasefrom2022.Additionally,CBPalready

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processedanestimatedonebilliondeminimisshipmentsinthefirstthreequartersof2024,suggestingcontinuedincreases.TotalUSdeminimisimportsjumpedfromjust$1.6bnin2015to$54.5bnin2023,peakingat$67bnin2020duetotheonlinegoodsdemandboomduringpandemiclockdowns(Exhibit13).Theaveragevalueofade

minimisshipmentinFY2023was$54(vs.$12in2015).

Thesignificantincreasesinlow-valueshipmentshaveposedchallengesforCBP's

screeningcapabilities.CBPexpressedconcernsoncompaniesexploitingthedeminimissystemtoavoidtariffs.InSeptemberthisvear,theBidenadministrationannounceditsintentiontotightenregulationsaroundthedeminimisexemption.Forexample,the

proposedruleswouldrequiremoredatadisclosurefordeminimisshipmentsanddenyexemptionsforChinesegoodsthataresubjecttoUStariffs

AsshowninExhibit14,Chinaaccountedfor60%ofallpackagesshippedtotheUSdailyunderthedeminimisprovisionduring2018to2021(latestdataavailable).IfweassumethattheUSimported$40bngoodsfromChinaviathedeminimischannelin2024,andtheremovalofdeminimisexemptionswouldraiseeffectivetariffratesontheseproductsfrom0%to10%,thenitwouldincreaseUStariffratesonChinese

goodsbyslightlylessthan1pp.

Exhibit12:UShasahigherdeminimisthresholdcomparedtoothercountries

USD

Source:GlobalExpressAssociation,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

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Exhibit13:ThenumberandvalueofdeminimisshipmentstoUSsurgedoverthepastfewyears

TheCBP'sfiscalyearrunsfromOct1toSep30.

Source:USCBP,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

Exhibit14:MorethanhalfofalldeminimisshipmentstotheUSoriginatedfromChina

Deminimisvolumebyregionduring2018-2021

Otherregions

Mexico

UKGermany

Canada

China

HongKong

Source:USCBP,GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch

YutingYangandXinquanChen

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DisclosureAppendix

RegAC

We,YutingYang,XinquanChen,ChelseaSong,HuiShan,LishengWangandAndrewTiton,herebycertifythatalloftheviewsexpressedinthisreportaccuratelyreflectourpersonalviews,whichhavenotbeeninfluencedbyconsiderationsofthefim'sbusinessorclientrelationships.

Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedonthecoverpageofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs'GloballnvestmentResearchdivision.

Disclosures

Regulatorydisclosures

DisclosuresrequiredbyUnitedStateslawsandregulations

Seecompany-specificregulatorydisclosuresaboveforanyofthefollowingdisclosuresrequiredastocompaniesreferedtointhisreport:managerorco-managerinapendingtransaction;1%orotherownership;compensationforcertainservices;typesofclientrelationships;managed/comanagedpubicofferingsinpriorperiods;directorships;forequitysecurities,marketmakingand/orspecilistrole.GoldmanSachstradesormaytradeasa

principalindebtsecurities(orinrelatedderivatives)ofissuersdiscussedinthisreport

Thefllowingareadditionalrequireddisclosures:Ownershipandmaterialconflictsofinterest:GoldmanSachspolicyprohibitsitsanalysts,

professionalsreportingtoanalystsandmembersoftheirhouseholdsfromowningsecuritiesofanycompanyintheanalyst'sareaofcoverage

Analystcompensation:AnalystsarepaidinpartbasedontheprofitabilityofGoldmanSachs,whichincludesinvestmentbankingrevenues.Analystasofficerordirector:GoldmanSachspolicygenerllyprohibitsitsanalysts,personsreportingtoanalystsormembersoftheirhouseholdsfrom

servingasanoffice,directororadvisorofanycompanyintheanalystsareaofcoverage.Non-U.S.Analysts:Non-U.S.analystsmaynotbeassociatedpersonsofGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCandthereforemaynotbesubjecttoFINRARule2241orFINRARule2242restrictionsoncommunicationswithsubjectcompany,publicappearancesandtradingsecuritiesheldbytheanalysts.

AdditionaldisclosuresrequiredunderthelawsandregulationsofjurisdictionsotherthantheUnitedStates

Thefollowingdisclosuresarethoserequredbythejurisdictionindicated,excepttotheextentareadymadeabovepursuanttoUnitedStateslawsandreguations.Australia:GoldmanSachsAustraliaPtyLtdanditsafitesarenotauthoriseddeposittakinginstitutionslasthattemisdefinedinthe

BankingAct1959/Cth)inAustraliaanddonotprovidebankingservices,norcarryonabankingbusiness,inAustralia.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstot,isintendedonlyfor"wholesaleclients"withinthemeaningoftheAustralianCorporationsAct,unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.In

producingresearchreports,membersofGlobalvestmentResearchofGoldmanSachsAustraliamayattendsitevisitsandothermeetingshostedbythecompaniesandotherentitieswhicharethesubjectoftsesearchreports.InsomeinstancesthecostsofsuchsitevisitsormeetingsmaybemetinpartorinwholebytheissuersconcernedifGoldmanSachsAustraliaconsidersitisappropriateandreasonableinthespecificcicumstancesrelating

tothesitevisitormeeting.Totheextentthatthecontentsofthisdocumentcontainsanyinancialproductadvice,itisgeneraladviceonlyandhas

beenpreparedbyGoldmanSachswithouttakingintoaccountaclient'sobjectives,financialsituationorneeds.Acientshould,beforeactingonany

suchadvice,considertheappropriatenessoftheadvicehavingregardtotheclientsownobjectives,financialsituationandneeds.Acopyofcertain

GoldmanSachsAustraliaandNewZealanddisclosureofinterestsandacopyofGoldmanSachs'AustralianSelSideResearchIndependencePolicy

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