會計財務管理類中英文翻譯@外文翻譯@外文文獻翻譯

外文翻譯 譯文 1 并購的收益來源 資本市場領域研究的另一個課題是收入的一般來源。當收入只是別人非盈利成果時，資本市場領域的研究人員還不能確認資產(chǎn)已被重新分配，使之創(chuàng)造財富的盈利回升。雖然金融經(jīng)濟學家不能合理解釋為什么并購是別人的非盈利目標的成果，但是，研究人員推斷，這些合乎邏輯的假設值的目標收益不僅是重新通過并購得到的，也是分配產(chǎn)生的結果。一些研究者認為，股東的利益是從債券持有人處得來的。丹尼斯和麥康奈爾（ 1986）不支持這個意見。另外一個觀點是，利潤是從目標公司的資源稅操作衍生而來的。從學術上講這個證據(jù)是 存在的，但不明確。奧爾巴赫和雷蘇斯（ 1987）推測，在可能情況下稅款這個因素占好處的20%，說明是足夠重要的，它將影響并購的決策。吉爾森（ 1988）等人卻發(fā)現(xiàn)，眾多有關稅收優(yōu)惠的定義問題，交易成本和信息費復雜化的說法，以及稅前利潤方面肯定是并購活動產(chǎn)生的原因，或者說并購是公司實現(xiàn)稅收優(yōu)惠的最合適方法。在一個幾項研究中，賈雷爾（ 1988）等人發(fā)現(xiàn)，大部分的并購活動也不能歸因于稅收方面的原因。施萊弗和薩默斯（ 1988）聲稱，利潤從并購產(chǎn)生，因為新的董事會違反嵌入。施萊弗和薩默斯（ 1988）聲稱，利潤從并購產(chǎn)生， 原因是新的董事會，違反了公司與利益相關者群體的嵌入式就業(yè)條件。 鏈接并購目標公司管理不佳的表現(xiàn)研究是由施萊佛和維什尼（ 1988）審查的。他們的研究表明公司還沒有建立完善的管理機制來制止執(zhí)行者開展的活動，這個活動是不會為股東創(chuàng)造價值的。此外，莫克（ 1988）等分析這種敵意收購時聲稱，收購發(fā)生的過快，或者下屬企業(yè)和管理當局不能盡快地減少相關程序或其他相匹配模型。結果驗證了這一事實有代理成本，新股東們認為，這一成本將能夠被減少。 收購公司的負面影響提出為什么并購活動能夠開始進行的問題。魯巴特肯（ 1983）提供了對這 種有明顯難度問題的一個可能解釋。他認為與并購有關的行政上的困難會消除潛在的利潤。他還斷言，在使用該方法可能不足以發(fā)現(xiàn)利潤，這與詹森（ 1986）并購投標人利潤公司量化復雜性的觀點一致。其結論解釋了在投標人利潤匱乏的情況下并購活動仍然活躍的原因。魯巴特肯（ 1983）認為，只有特定類型的并購戰(zhàn)略才可能對購買公司的股東有好處。 除了這些論點，羅爾（ 1986）在同意有效率的市場假說的同時，聲稱在經(jīng)驗性地評估工作的目標和招標公司的集體價值后，并購是不能令人信服。他們沒有辦法估計投標人的假設。因此，他制定了“傲慢自大假說 ”的規(guī)定，即并購的總利潤是確定的（羅爾 1986）。換句話說，管理層繼續(xù)對目標公司超值估價。這些結果顯示金融界的研究人員是如何結合自由現(xiàn)金流假設，代理理論以及效率市場的事件研究方法，來解釋并購活動的合理化的。然而，金融研究人員駁斥了金融經(jīng)濟學家中央假說以及一個市場公司控制權假設是約束經(jīng)理的一個重要手段，這一事件的研究是創(chuàng)造價值的量化的有效方法，而股票市場則能夠恰當?shù)毓纼r公司。學者們使用現(xiàn)有的數(shù)據(jù)事件研究方法之外的其他方法，提出有關并購的利潤的特定減免。索羅弗斯克萊福特和謝勒（ 1987 年（二），例如，他們聲稱 ，長期的結果通常顯示，相比國內(nèi)市場標準，并購目標執(zhí)行一般高于行業(yè)平均水平的 8左右。此外，它們的財政收入表現(xiàn)既不增加也不減少，與并購后相當。這些研究人員不相信股市場總是有效 -一個基本假設 -提出對并購相比于金融學者提供的不同表現(xiàn)的解釋。謝勒（ 1988）推測，由于股市并不總是能夠正確估計股票價值，一些企業(yè)將在任何特定時間被高估了，這使他們能夠購買其他公司，但有些公司將被低估，這是他們感興趣的目標。被高估的公司，會研究可能的的目標公司，了解他們是否有被低估，導致其股價上升。這個發(fā)現(xiàn)被低估的公司將被購買，他們的新股 票價格只是表達了一種市場調(diào)整。企業(yè)在審查后沒有低估的將不會被購買，在被并購的目標中它們的股票價格可能回歸到以前的水平。 作者：托馬斯 施特勞布 國籍：德國 出處： 并購頻繁失敗的原因 原文 1 The Origins of earnings through M&As Another of the capital market schools field of study is the origins of earnings in general. When earnings are just the outcome of somebody elses disprofit, the capital market schools researchers cannot confirm that assets have been redistributed so as to create wealth by picking up profitability. However, although financial economists cannot reasonably explain the gains in M&A targets as somebody elses disprofits,researchers deduce that it is logical to suppose that value is not just re-allocated through M&As, but is produced.Some researchers believe that shareholder profits come from bondholders losses.Dennis and McConnel (1986) do not uphold this opinion. An additional perspective is that profits are derived from tax manipulations of the target firms resources. In the literature, the evidence for this is, however, ambiguous. Auerbach and Reishus (1987) surmised that in possibly 20% of cases tax benefits are sufficiently important to affect the M&A decision. Gilson et al. (1988) nevertheless found that a multitude of problems concerning definitions of tax benefits, transaction costs, and information costs complicate the claim that tax profits are definitely the reason for M&A activities,or that M&As are the most suitable method for companies to realize tax benefits. In an evaluation of several studies, Jarrell et al. (1988) found that much of the M&A activity could not be attributed to tax reasons.Shleifer and Summers (1988) claim that profits are derived from M&As because a new board breaches the embedded employment conditions between the company and the stakeholder groups. Studies that link M&As to poor target company management performance were examined by Shleifer and Vishny (1988c). Their study shows that firms have not succeeded in establishing controls to prevent managers from carrying out activities that do not increase the stockholder value.Moreover, Morck et al.s (1988) analysis of hostile takeovers claims that such takeovers take place in swiftly changing or declining businesses and in firms wherethe management is not able to minimize procedures fast enough, or model other adaptations. The results verify the fact that there are agency costs that the new hareholders think they will be able to decrease. The negative consequences of M&As for the buying companies raise the question why M&A activities are undertaken at all. A number of potential explanations for this apparent puzzle are offered by Lubatkin (1983), who suggests that the administrative difficulties associated with M&As could erase potential profits. His further assertion that the methods in use have possibly not been sufficient to uncover profits is consistent with Jensens (1986) argument of the complexity of quantifying profits for M&A bidder companies. As a concluding explanation for M&As permanence despite the lack of profits for the bidders, Lubatkin (1983) suggests that just specific types of M&A strategies might profit the buying companys shareholders. Besides these arguments, Roll (1986), while agreeing with the efficient market hypothesis, claims that the empiric work that evaluates the target and bidding companies collective value after an M&A is unconvincing. no way related to the bidders supposition that their estimations are He consequently formulated the “hubris hypothesis” which states that M&As aggregate profits are in correct (Roll1986). In other words: managements continue to over valuate target firms.These results demonstrate how the financial schools researchers combine the ypotheses of free cash flow, a market for corporate control, the agency theory and efficient markets with the event studies method to improve the rationalization in respect of M&A activity. However, a number of financial researchers refute the financial economists central hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that a market for corporate control is a key instrument for disciplining managers, that event studies are a valid method of quantifying value creation, and that the share market is capable of precisely valuing firms.Scholars who use other methods than event studies of existing data make specific deductions with regard to M&A profits. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987(b), for example, claim that long-term-based results usually reveal that M&A targets perform above the industry average - at around 8% - compared to their home market standards. Furthermore, their financial income performances neither increased nor declined considerably after the M&A.Those researchers who do not believe that the share market is always efficient a basic assumption - suggest different explanations for M&A performance than the ones offered by financial scholars. Scherer (1988) hypothesizes that because the stock market does not always properly value stock, some firms will be overvalued at any given point in time, enabling them to purchase other firms, but some firms will be undervalued, which renders them interesting targets. Companies that are overvalued, will examine possible target companies to find out if they have been underestimated,causing their share price to increase.Firms that are discovered to be underestimated are purchased and their new share price simply expresses a market correction. Firms that are not purchased after being examined were not underestimated, and their share prices return to the level prior to their being possible M&A targets. Author:Prof. Dr. oec. Thomas Straub Nationality:Germany Originate from: Reasons for Frequent failure in Mergers and Acquisitions 譯文 2 評價成功的客觀標準 客觀的措施是建立在公開信息之上的。容易獲得信息是因為利用了外部信息的優(yōu)點。由于外部信息不受到答辯人的偏見，基于外部數(shù)據(jù)就可以比較不同的研究成果。同時，外部信息也苦于缺乏差異。如外部經(jīng)濟波動的影響，工業(yè)企業(yè)的具體因素，以及其他收購等具體因素，或各種因素對結果影響很大，從而限制了外部信息的解釋力。運用客觀成功措施，研究人員研究了使并購 成功的兩個方面：戰(zhàn)略上的成功和財務上的成功。 并購財務上的成功已經(jīng)在不同的研究中被標準化。最后，創(chuàng)造價值是公司的核心目標。因此，在財務上價值創(chuàng)造的成功是并購成功的一個標準。有兩種在財務上成功的數(shù)據(jù)源已被用于確定兼并和收購成功：股票的市場數(shù)據(jù)和公司的會計數(shù)據(jù)。股市會響應公司合并和收購的公告。這意味著股東估計將收購公司的創(chuàng)造價值，或評估已收購公司的銷毀價值。如果他們希望收購能夠增加收購公司的的價值創(chuàng)造，股票價格將上漲。如果他們希望收購能夠摧毀收購公司的價值，股票價格將下跌。當然，這只有與股票價格的發(fā)展無關的行業(yè) 或特定的股票市場的發(fā)展可以考慮。這些不相關的影響即所謂不正常的股市反應。不同時期使用了前后公告。例如，阿格拉瓦爾（ 1992）等調(diào)查股市的影響公布在前，其結果直到 5年后才宣布。其他的，如哈布利安，芬克爾斯坦（ 1999）測量 5 天的異常收益率在合并后的前 5 天。然而，這種假設是建立在能夠正常地反應公布及預計并購的所有可能產(chǎn)生的影響之上的。雖然長期收購具有捕捉長期發(fā)展的優(yōu)勢，但是它們會受到合并后發(fā)生事件的影響。阿格拉瓦爾（ 1992）等在 765 項收購研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，與去年同期研究相比，收購的累積異常收益率在 5% 10之間 ，芬克爾斯坦（ 1999）則發(fā)現(xiàn)沒有任何影響。同樣，魯巴特肯（ 1987）在 439 項有關公司收購的研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，沒有重大的股票在不同的市場有時間效應（ 18-64 個月后的兼并與收購）。魯巴特肯，斯里尼瓦桑，曼切爾特（ 1997 年）也發(fā)現(xiàn)并購后的第 2天，第 16 天以及第 56 天無異常收益。布赫納（ 1990）調(diào)查的 90 個公司的股票的市場表現(xiàn)，也認為是無相關聯(lián)系的。其結果表明，收購沒有使抽樣公司的市場價值增加（ 1990a ：自己的譯本）。在另一項研究中，布赫納（ 1990）發(fā)現(xiàn)封閉后 12 個月的平均異常收益率恢復到 -10%（布赫納 1990c： 300）。在對波士頓咨詢集團（ 2004）的研究中，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)，在收購平均創(chuàng)造價值表現(xiàn)上，大多數(shù)并購是失敗的。因為高風險活動，所以這是異常現(xiàn)象。但是，如果一家公司從事很多兼并和收購，就平均而言，實際上是可能創(chuàng)造價值的。根據(jù)有關財務執(zhí)行情況的調(diào)查結果，魯巴特肯，奧尼爾（ 1987）發(fā)現(xiàn)，并購交易顯著增加公司的非系統(tǒng)風險，而減少系統(tǒng)性風險。該系統(tǒng)風險下降，是因為兼并和收購遵循一種產(chǎn)品或市場推廣的目標，這降低了系統(tǒng)行業(yè)在大多數(shù)情況下的市場風險。但是，非系統(tǒng)性風險，取決于公司大力增加的特性，一些公司在并購后 表現(xiàn)得非常好，但另外一些現(xiàn)象是并購后變得松散。然后，這大大增加了非系統(tǒng)性風險。對股市信息使用相應的金融理論，假設市場能夠正確地估計公司的價值與戰(zhàn)略。根據(jù)這個假設，收購將正確地評估股市，從而代表其有潛在的價值。 衡量并購成功的與否在建立在合并前的會計數(shù)據(jù)和合并后的會計數(shù)據(jù)的基礎之上的。常用的尺度是資產(chǎn)回報，股本，息稅前利潤，銷售或收購公司的利潤回報。庫斯維特（ 1985）在 3500 項大規(guī)模收購的研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，一年后公司獲得了5.33%的平均增長居留權。庫斯維特（ 1985）還認為，一年后，收購企業(yè)將增加 3.40%的市場回報。同樣，布赫納（ 1990）探討了 110 項德國并購事件，發(fā)現(xiàn)在并購交易 3 年后才能得到資本回報以及股本回報。他發(fā)現(xiàn)，平均而言，收購公司會惡化財務性能。 作者：弗洛里 弗倫施 國籍：美國 出處：從社會角度看并購 原文 2 Objective success measures Objective measures are based on publicly available information. The advantage of using external information is that the information is readily available. As external information does not suffer from respondents biases, it is possible to compare results from different studies based on external data. At the same, external information suffers from a lack of differentiation. External effects such as economic fluctuations, industry specific factors as well as firm specific factors such as other acquisitions, or divestures strongly affect the result and thus limit the explanatory power of external information.Using objective success measures, researchers have studied the success of mergers and acquisitions in two different dimensions: strategic success and financial success. Financial success of mergers and acquisitions has been measured in many different studies.Ultimately, value creation is the core objective of firms. Hence value creation respectively financial success is a useful success measure for mergers and acquisitions. There are two different sources of data for financial success that have been used to identify success of mergers and acquisitions: Stock market data and accounting data of firms.Stock markets react to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions. That means that stockholders evaluate the expected value creation or value destruction of acquisitions for acquiring firms and acquired firms. If they expect that an acquisition creates value for the acquiring firm, stock prices go up. If they expect that an acquisition destroys value for the acquiring firm, stock prices go down. Of course, only stock price developments that are unrelated to industry specific developments or stock market developments can be considered.These unrelated effects are called abnormal stock market reactions. Different time periods have been used before and after the announcement. For example, Agrawal et al. (1992) investigate the stock market effect before the announcement until five years after the announcement. Others such as Haleblian, & Finkelstein (1999) measure abnormal returns from 5 days prior to the merger until 5 days after the merger. This, however, assumes that stock markets react correctly to an announcement and anticipate all possible effects of an M&A. While long periods have the advantage of capturing long-term developments of an acquisition, they suffer from events happening after the merger.While Agrawal et al. (1992) find in a study on 765 acquisitions that cumulative abnormal returns of acquisitions are -10% over a 5-year period, Haleblian, & Finkelstein (1999) find no effect. Similarly, Lubatkin (1987) finds in a study on 439 acquiring firms that there is no significant stock market effect at different points in time (18 64 months) after the M&Atransaction.Lubatkin, Srinivasan, & Merchant (1997) also find over periods of 2, 16, 56 days after an M&A-announcement no abnormal returns.Bhner (1990a) investigates the stock market performance of 90 firms and finds that ummarized, the results indicate that acquisitions do not yield increase of market value of the firms in the sample“ ( 1990a: 45, own translation). In another study, Bhner (1990c) finds an average abnormal rate of return of -10% twelve months after the closing (Bhner 1990c:300).In a study of The Boston Consulting Group (2004), the authors find that while the majority of mergers fail, acquirers on the average create value. This is curious insofar, as the risk is seemingly high. But if a firm engages in many mergers and acquisitions, on the average, it might actually create money.Consistent with the findings about financial performance, Lubatkin, & ONeill (1987) find that M&A-transactions significantly increase the unsystematic risk of firms, while the systematic risks decrease. The systematic risk decreases, because mergers and acquisitions that follow a product or market extension objective reduce the systematic industry, resp