外文翻譯小企業(yè)金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：在財(cái)政增長(zhǎng)周期私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)的角色

1、寧波大紅鷹學(xué)院 畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯所在學(xué)院： 經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院 專 業(yè)： 財(cái)務(wù)管理 班 級(jí)： 08財(cái)管7班 學(xué) 號(hào)： 姓 名： 指導(dǎo)教師： 2011 年 11 月 19 日譯文：小企業(yè)金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：在財(cái)政增長(zhǎng)周期，私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)的角色 創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)的作用已經(jīng)獲得了相當(dāng)大的公眾的關(guān)注在20世紀(jì)90年代。這個(gè)重點(diǎn)，大部分源于創(chuàng)新 - 尤其是在高科技，信息和生物技術(shù)領(lǐng)域 - 從信仰是非常依賴一個(gè)蓬勃發(fā)展的企業(yè)部門。令人矚目的成就，如微軟，基因泰克和聯(lián)邦快遞公司的故事，體現(xiàn)的意義，創(chuàng)造新的合資公司是未來(lái)生產(chǎn)率的必要條件。其他最近的“現(xiàn)象有進(jìn)一步集中公眾的關(guān)注和對(duì)小企業(yè)的認(rèn)識(shí)，包括創(chuàng)業(yè)中

2、心的作用，東歐，金融危機(jī)，在亞洲和其他地區(qū)的威脅小企業(yè)的信貸可用性，和使用越來(lái)越多的創(chuàng)業(yè)的出現(xiàn)，替代那些已經(jīng)在美國(guó)企業(yè)重組流離失所。伴隨著這個(gè)高度在一般地區(qū)的小企業(yè)的興趣，已經(jīng)在金融市場(chǎng)，小企業(yè)基金的性質(zhì)和行為的決策者，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和學(xué)者的興趣增加。在這個(gè)問(wèn)題的核心是對(duì)成長(zhǎng)型企業(yè)融資的需要和接收在其成長(zhǎng)的各個(gè)階段，私人股本和債務(wù)融資與此相關(guān)的合同的性質(zhì)類型的問(wèn)題，這些資金的替代來(lái)源之間的連接和可替代性。除了這個(gè)小企業(yè)融資的微觀基礎(chǔ)的利益，是在小企業(yè)融資的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)影響越來(lái)越大的興趣。例如，20世紀(jì)90年代初的美國(guó)“信貸緊縮”和鞏固銀行業(yè)的影響，對(duì)小企業(yè)信貸的可用性的影響也已經(jīng)在過(guò)去幾年許多研究的主題

3、。同樣，貨幣政策“信貸渠道” - 機(jī)制，通過(guò)貨幣政策的沖擊可能對(duì)小企業(yè)的資金不成比例的巨大影響 - 產(chǎn)生了大量的分析和辯論。其他關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題，如“首次公開發(fā)行之間的聯(lián)系（ipo）的市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本流動(dòng)，創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)投資的謹(jǐn)慎人規(guī)則，和小企業(yè)融資的金融體系結(jié)構(gòu)中的作用，才剛剛開始吸引研究的關(guān)注。小企業(yè)融資的私人市場(chǎng)，特別有趣，因?yàn)樗麄兪侨绱瞬煌?，從該基金的大型企業(yè)的公眾街市。私人股權(quán)和債券市場(chǎng)提供了高度結(jié)構(gòu)化的，復(fù)雜的合同，往往敏銳地信息不透明的小企業(yè)。這是公眾的股票和債券市場(chǎng)基金相對(duì)信息透明的大型企業(yè)，往往比較通用的合同下。發(fā)揮金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)可以評(píng)估通過(guò)篩選的活動(dòng)小的業(yè)務(wù)素質(zhì)和地址信息的問(wèn)題作為信息生產(chǎn)者的

4、私人市場(chǎng)的關(guān)鍵作用，承包，和監(jiān)控。中介人屏幕上的潛在客戶進(jìn)行盡職調(diào)查，包括收集有關(guān)的業(yè)務(wù)，在其運(yùn)作的市場(chǎng)，任何可以質(zhì)押的抵押品信息，以及企業(yè)家或創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)。這可能涉及到從現(xiàn)有的關(guān)系，與企業(yè)，企業(yè)的所有者，或其他有關(guān)各方中介獲取信息的使用。中介的小企業(yè)設(shè)置首創(chuàng)的合同條款的初始質(zhì)量（價(jià)格，分?jǐn)?shù)的所有權(quán)，抵押，限制性條款，成熟度等）使用此信息的合約設(shè)計(jì)和收益結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上選擇公司的財(cái)務(wù)特征和企業(yè)家以及公司的前景和相關(guān)信息的問(wèn)題。高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高成長(zhǎng)型企業(yè)，其資產(chǎn)大多是無(wú)形的更頻繁地獲得外部股權(quán)的，而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相對(duì)較低，低增長(zhǎng)的公司，其資產(chǎn)大多是有形的探討下面的原因，更經(jīng)常收到外債。最后，以保持該公司從事剝削活動(dòng)或策略

5、，中介顯示器比的關(guān)系，以評(píng)估合規(guī)性和財(cái)務(wù)狀況的過(guò)程中堅(jiān)定的，并通過(guò)直接參與管理決策等手段施加控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家或重新談判商業(yè)銀行貸款契約的豁免。首先是要提供完整的圖片中，小企業(yè)的資金，目前現(xiàn)有的研究和數(shù)據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上的私人股本和債務(wù)市場(chǎng)的性質(zhì)可能。二是吸取各股的理論和實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)，在過(guò)去側(cè)重于小企業(yè)融資的具體方面，但往往還沒(méi)有抓獲的小企業(yè)融資和向這些企業(yè)提供的資金的替代來(lái)源的復(fù)雜性之間的連接。第三個(gè)目標(biāo)是在相關(guān)的市場(chǎng)，合同，以及與小企業(yè)融資相關(guān)的機(jī)構(gòu)，要突出相對(duì)較新的數(shù)據(jù)源，可用來(lái)解決這些問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域的研究建議擴(kuò)展。公眾的焦點(diǎn)對(duì)小企業(yè)的金融衍生無(wú)論是從最近的一些創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)的令人矚目的成就，并從關(guān)注，正的

6、凈現(xiàn)值項(xiàng)目的許多小企業(yè)可能無(wú)法獲得足夠的外部融資。關(guān)注的原因包括，除其他外，在亞洲和美國(guó)最近的信貸緊縮，缺乏發(fā)達(dá)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)，在歐洲大陸和其他地方，金融機(jī)構(gòu)合并的潛在影響，各地的小企業(yè)提供信貸。本文探討了一些小企業(yè)融資方面，投資者和中介機(jī)構(gòu)提供的，和私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)中，它們的功能。我們看到通過(guò)一個(gè)增長(zhǎng)周期的范式，在不同的資本結(jié)構(gòu)是在周期的不同點(diǎn)的最佳小企業(yè)融資的多，雖然我們強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，這一范式并不適合所有的小型企業(yè)。周圍的小企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)的問(wèn)題，一般都是比那些大型企業(yè)最重要的不同，往往涉及與該公司的財(cái)政狀況的企業(yè)家和其他知情人的個(gè)人財(cái)務(wù)的相互交織。小企業(yè)與大企業(yè)不同的是，通常有其資金的大量業(yè)

7、內(nèi)人士提供的 - 企業(yè)家，創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)，家庭和朋友的其他成員。此外，小企業(yè)普遍接受私人“股權(quán)和債務(wù)市場(chǎng)的外部資金，而不是公眾街市。部分小企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定是否和何時(shí)進(jìn)入公共資本市場(chǎng)通過(guò)首次公開招股，雖然絕大多數(shù)的企業(yè)永遠(yuǎn)也達(dá)不到這一點(diǎn)，在金融成長(zhǎng)周期。即使在小企業(yè)之間的內(nèi)部融資和外部融資的區(qū)別并不總是徹底清除，因?yàn)闃I(yè)內(nèi)人士往往對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供的外債提供個(gè)人擔(dān)?；虺兄Z個(gè)人抵押品。在私人市場(chǎng)的中介機(jī)構(gòu)也評(píng)估內(nèi)業(yè)主的個(gè)人財(cái)務(wù)狀況 - 包括未在該公司投資資產(chǎn) - ，使這些個(gè)人資產(chǎn)也有一個(gè)關(guān)系到公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。最后，絕大多數(shù)是小企業(yè)所有者管理，減輕影響的大型企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的所有者和管理者之間的代理沖突。然

8、而，業(yè)主管理可能引進(jìn)到小公司，如在規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的所有者/經(jīng)理的水平，或他/她的激勵(lì)，以問(wèn)題的外債，而不是外部股權(quán)保持所有權(quán)和該公司的控制權(quán)，資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定的其他因素。雖然大量的研究已經(jīng)開始對(duì)小企業(yè)融資的話題，更有待完成。我們的金融成長(zhǎng)周期和小企業(yè)融資的相互聯(lián)系的分析表明，為今后的研究中最令人興奮的領(lǐng)域，一些可能涉及調(diào)查小企業(yè)融資的來(lái)源可能會(huì)改變整個(gè)商業(yè)周期，政府政策變化的反應(yīng)，在在私人或公共市場(chǎng)的危難時(shí)期，信息處理技術(shù)的不斷提高。此外，重要的是要確定的可用性和形成新的企業(yè)的小企業(yè)融資成本的影響，他們有能力從事高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或不透明的活動(dòng)，并在就業(yè)，實(shí)際產(chǎn)出和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響。在追求這些和其他小企業(yè)融資研究議程

9、，應(yīng)該證明是非常有用的描述和這里的新的數(shù)據(jù)資源的可用性。引自：.小企業(yè)金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)在財(cái)政增長(zhǎng)周期中的作用j。銀行和金融,1998,22:613- 673。原文：the economics of small business finance:the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cyclethe role of the entrepreneurial enterprise as an engine of economic growth has garnered considera

10、ble public attention in the 1990s. much of this focus stems from the belief that innovation - particularly in the high tech, information, and bio-technology areas - is vitally dependent on a flourishing entrepreneurial sector. the spectacular success stories of companies such as microsoft, genentech

11、, and federal express embody the sense that new venture creation is the sine qua non of future productivity gains. other recent “phenomena have further focused public concern and awareness on small business, including the central role of entrepreneurship to the emergence of eastern europe, financial

12、 crises that have threatened credit availability to small business in asia and elsewhere, and the growing use of the entrepreneurial alternative for those who have been displaced by corporate restructuring in the u.s.accompanying this heightened popular interest in the general area of small business

13、 has been an increased interest by policy makers, regulators, and academics in the nature and behavior of the financial markets that fund small businesses. at the core of this issue are questions about the type of financing growing companies need and receive at various stages of their growth, the na

14、ture of the private equity and debt contracts associated with this financing, and the connections and substitutability among these alternative sources of finance. beyond this interest in the micro-foundations of small business finance is a growing interest in the macroeconomic implications of small

15、business finance. for example, the impact of the u.s.“credit crunch” of the early 1990s and the effect of the consolidation of the banking industry on the availability of credit to small business have also been the subject of much research over the past several years. similarly, the “credit channels

16、” of monetary policy - mechanisms through which monetary policy shocks may have disproportionately large effects on small business funding - has generated considerable analysis and debate. other key issues, such as the link between the initial public offering (ipo) market and venture capital flows,

17、prudent man rules regarding institutional investing in venture capital, and the role of small firm finance in financial system architecture are just beginning to attract research attention.the private markets that finance small businesses are particularly interesting because they are so different fr

18、om the public markets that fund large businesses. the private equity and debt markets offer highly structured, complex contracts to small businesses that are often acutely informationally opaque. this is in contrast to the public stock and bond markets that fund relatively informationally transparen

19、t large businesses under contracts that are more often relatively generic.financial intermediaries play a critical role in the private markets as information producers who can assess small business quality and address information problems through the activities of screening, contracting , and monito

20、ring. intermediaries screen potential customers by conducting due diligence, including the collection of information about the business, the market in which it operates, any collateral that may be pledged, and the entrepreneur or start-up team. this may involve the use of information garnered from e

21、xisting relationships of the intermediary with the business, the business owner, or other involved parties. the intermediary then uses this information about the initial quality of the small business to set contract terms at origination (price, fraction of ownership, collateral, restrictive covenant

22、s, maturity, etc.).a contract design and payoff structure is chosen on the basis of the financial characteristics of the firm and the entrepreneur as well as the firms prospects and the associated information problems. high risk-high growth enterprises whose assets are mostly intangible more often o

23、btain external equity, whereas relatively low risk-low growth firms whose assets are mostly tangible more often receive external debt for reasons explored below. finally, in order to keep the firm from engaging in exploitive activities or strategies, the intermediary monitors the firm over the cours

24、e of the relationship to assess compliance and financial condition, and exerts control through such means as directly participating in managerial decision making by venture capitalists or renegotiating waivers on loan covenants by commercial banks.this paper has several motivations. the first is to

25、provide as complete a picture as possible of the nature of the private equity and debt markets in which small businesses are financed based on currently available research and data. the second is to draw connections between various strands of the theoretical and empirical literature that have in the

26、 past focused on specific aspects of small firm finance but often have not captured the complexity of small business finance and the alternative sources of funding available to these firms. the third goal is to suggest extensions to the research in key areas related to the markets, contracts, and in

27、stitutions associated with small firm finance and to highlight the relatively new data sources available to address these issues.public focus on small business finance derives both from the spectacular success of some recent entrepreneurial firms and from concern that many small businesses with posi

28、tive net present value projects may not be able to obtain sufficient external finance. causes for concern include, among others, the recent credit crunches in asia and the u. s., the lack of well-developed venture capital markets in continental europe and elsewhere, and the potential impact of finan

29、cial institution consolidation on the availability of credit to small business everywhere. this paper explores a number of facets of small firm finance, the investors and intermediaries that provide it, and the private equity and debt markets in which they function. we see much of small business fin

30、ance through a growth cycle paradigm, in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle, although we emphasize that this paradigm does not fit all small businesses.the issues surrounding capital structure for small businesses are generally different than those that a

31、re most important for large corporations, and often involve the intertwining of the personal finances of the entrepreneur and other insiders with the finances of the firm. unlike large firms, small firms typically have a substantial amount of their funding provided by insiders - the entrepreneur, ot

32、her members of the start-up team, family, and friends. in addition, small businesses generally receive their external funding in private “ equity and debt markets, rather than public markets. part of the capital structure decision for small firms is whether and when to enter public capital markets v

33、ia an ipo, although the vast majority of firms never reach this point in the financial growth cycle. even the distinction between insider finance and external finance in small business is not always completely clear, since insiders often give personal guarantees or pledge personal collateral against

34、 external debt provided by financial institutions. the intermediaries in private markets also evaluate the personal finances of the inside owners - including assets that are not invested in the firm - so these personal assets also have a bearing on the capital structure of the firm. finally, the vas

35、t majority of small businesses are owner-managed, which alleviates agency conflicts between owners and managers that affect capital structure choices in large corporations. however, owner management may introduce other factors into capital structure decisions of small firms, such as the owner/managers level of risk aversion, or his/her incentive to issue external debt rather than external equ