透明度與公司治理【外文翻譯】

1、transparency and corporate governancematerialsource:/units/am/pdf/hwtransparencyjan2007.pdf author: benjamin hamelin1 abstractan objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. this goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believ

2、e increased transparency to be unambiguously good. we argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transparency lowers profits. this result holds even when there is n

3、o direct cost of increasing transparency and no issue of revealing information to regulators or product-market rivals. we show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce firm profits, raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of ceo turnover. we further consid

4、er the possibility that executives will take actions to distort information. we show that executives could have incentives, due to career concerns, to increase transparency and that increases in penalties for distorting information can be profit reducing.2 introductionsin response to recent corporat

5、e governance scandals, governments have responded by adopted a number of regulatory changes. one component of these changes has been increased disclosure requirements. for example, sarbanes-oxley(sox), adopted in response to enron, worldcom, and other public governance failures, required detailed re

6、porting of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities. additionally, sox increased the penalties to executives for misreporting. the link between governance and transparency is clear in the publics (and regulators) perceptions; transparency was increased for the purpose of improving go

7、vernance.yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing to do with corporate governance. the most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firms securities and the firms cost of capital. to offset t

8、his benefit, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of disclosure, as well as the competitive costs arising because the disclosure provides potentially useful information to product-market rivals. while both of these factors are undoubtedly important considerations in firms disclosure deci

9、sions, they are not particularly related to corporate governance.in this paper, we provide a framework for understanding the role of transparency in corporate governance. we analyze the effect that disclosure has on the contractual and monitoring relationship between the board and the ceo. we view t

10、he quality of information the firm discloses as a choice variable that affects the contracts the firm and its managers. through its impact on corporate governance, higher quality disclosure both provides benefits and imposes costs. the benefits reflect the fact that more accurate information about p

11、erformance allows boards to make better personnel decisions about their executives. the costs arise because executives have to be compensated for the increased risk to their careers implicit in higher disclosure levels, as well as for the incremental costs they incur trying to distort information in

12、 equilibrium. these costs and benefits complement existing explanations for disclosure. moreover, because they are directly about corporate governance, they are in line with common perceptions of why firms disclose information.we formalize this idea through an extension of hamelin and wasatch (1998)

13、 and hamelins (2005) adaptation of hailstorms (1999) career-concerns model to consider the question of optimal transparency. section 2 lays out the basics of this model, in which the company chooses the “quality” of the performance measure that directors use to assess the ceos ability. in this model

14、, the optimal quality of information for the firm to reveal can be zero, infinite, or a finite positive value depending on the parameters. when we calibrate the model to reflect actual publicly traded large us corporations, we find that the parameters implied by the calibration lead to a finite valu

15、e for optimal disclosure quality. thus, our analysis suggests that disclosure requirements going beyond this optimal level are likely to have unintended consequences and to reduce value.we evaluate the implications of penalties and incentives that potentially affect the motives of ceos to distort th

16、e information coming from their firms. measures that punish exaggerating effort can be effective if they are sufficiently severe to curtail this effort; however, relatively minor penalties can be counterproductive. in addition, incentives for ceos to improve the accuracy of information can harm shar

17、eholders because such incentives push a ceo to disclose more than the value-maximizing quantity of information.3 concealing informationin light of some recent corporate scandals, one concern is not that executives distort information, but rather that they conceal it. in this subsection, we briefly a

18、ddress what our analysis can say with respect to concealing information. one question is whether the other players know if the ceo has concealed information? if so, then presumably they can punish the ceo for non-disclosure moreover, if it is common knowledge that the ceo knows the value of signals

19、that he conceals, then an unraveling argument (grossman, 1981)applies: whatever the inferred expected value of unrevealed signals is, the ceo will have an incentive to reveal those above that expected value. hence, the only equilibrium is one in which unrevealed signals are inferred to have the lowe

20、st possible value and the ceo is correspondingly induced to reveal all signals. we predict therefore that concealment is unlikely to be an issue if the other players know what the set of signals is.suppose, in contrast, that the other players did not know what the complete set of signals was(e.g., t

21、he set varies over time).if the ceo did not know the realized value when he deciding to reveal or conceal a signal, then he would wish to conceal all signals that he could: more signals means a more precise posterior estimate of his ability, which means greater career risk for him. our model, thus,

22、predicts that when (i) the ceo has discretion over what signals are revealed and (ii) must commit to reveal or conceal prior to learning the value of the signals, he will choose to commit to conceal all signals over which he has discretion.if, instead, the ceo is not committed to a disclosure decisi

23、on prior to learning the value of the signals, then he will be tempted to reveal those that are favorable to him. the other players will infer that they are getting a biased sample and, thus, make a downward adjustment. in this sense, the situation is similar to that of “exaggerating effort. “the de

24、tails of the analysis are, to be sure, different and await future analysis, but our general conclusions will generally hold.4 discussions and conclusionmost corporate governance reforms involve increased transparency. yet, discussions of disclosure generally focus on issues other than governance, su

25、ch as the cost of capital and product-market competition. the logic of how transparency potentially affects governance is absent from the academic literature.we provide such analysis in this paper. we show that the level of transparency can be understood as deriving from the governance relation betw

26、een the ceo and the board of directors. the directors set the level of transparency (e.g., amount and quality of disclosure) and it is, thus, part of an endogenously chosen governance arrangement.increasing transparency provides benefits to the firm, but entails costs as well. better transparency im

27、proves the boards monitoring of the ceo by providing it with an improved signal about his quality. but better transparency is not free: the better able the market is to learn about the ceos ability, the greater the risk to which the ceo is exposed. in our setting, the profit-maximizing level of tran

28、sparency requires balancing these two factors.our model implies that there can be an optimal level of transparency. consequently, attempts to mandate levels beyond this optimum decrease profits. profits decrease both because managers will have to be paid higher salaries to compensate them for the in

29、creased career risk they face, and because greater transparency increases managerial incentives to engage in costly and counterproductive efforts to distort information. we emphasize that these effects occur in a model in which all other things equal, better information disclosure increases firm val

30、ue.one key assumption we make throughout the paper is that the board relies on the same information that is released to the public in making its monitoring decisions. undoubtedly, this assumption is literally false in most firms, as the board has access to better information than the public. nonethe

31、less, ceos do have incentives to manipulate information transfers to improve the boards perception of them, and this idea has been an important factor in a number of recent studies(see, e.g., adams and ferreira, in press).in addition, in a number of publicized cases, boards have been kept in the dar

32、k except through their ability to access publicly disclosed documents; the circumstances in which boards must rely on publicly available information are likely the cases in which the board-ceo relationship is most adversarial, and hence are the cases in which board monitoring is likely most importan

33、t. certainly, our basic assumption that the quality of public disclosure has a large impact on the boards ability to monitor management is plausible.our model is set in the context of a board that is perfectly aligned with shareholders interests. one could equally well apply it to direct monitoring

34、by shareholders. if there were an increase in the quality of available information either due to more stringent reporting requirements or because of better analysis (e.g., of the sort performed by institutional investors or a more attentive press),then our model contains clear empirical predictions.

35、 in particular, it suggests that consequences of improved information would be increases in ceo salaries and the rate of ceo turnover. in fact, both ceo salaries and ceo turnover have increased substantially starting in the 1990s, with at least some scholars attributing the increase to the higher le

36、vel of press scrutiny and investor activism (see kaplan and minton, 2006).this pattern of ceo salaries and turnover is consistent with our model; moreover, it is consistent with the idea that better information has both costs and benefits through itsimpact on corporate governance.some issues remain.

37、 as discussed above, we have only scratched the surface with respect to issues of managerial concealment of information. we have abstracted away from any of the concerns about revealing information to rivals or regulators that earlier work has raised. we have also ignored other competing demands for

38、 better information, such as to help better resolve the principal-agent problem through incentive contracts (see e.g., grossman and hart, 1983, singh, 2004).finally, we have ignored the mechanics of how the firm actually makes information more or less informative (e.g., what accounting rules are use

39、d, what organizational structures, such as reporting lines and office organization, are employed, etc.).while future attention to such details will, we believe, shed additional light on the subject, we remain confident that our general results will continue to hold.譯文透明度與公司治理資料來源:哈佛商學(xué)院教育網(wǎng) 作者：本杰明埃爾馬蘭

40、，邁克爾魏斯巴赫1 摘要許多提出的關(guān)于公司治理改革的目標(biāo)是提高透明度。這個(gè)目標(biāo)已比較不會(huì)引起爭(zhēng)議，因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)觀察家認(rèn)為提高透明度還是清楚明確的比較好。我們認(rèn)為，從公司治理的角度來看，可能存在著成本與效益均提高了透明度，導(dǎo)致超過其最佳水平即提高了透明度卻降低了利潤(rùn)。這一結(jié)果認(rèn)為，即使沒有提高透明度的直接成本，也沒有向監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)或產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手信息披露的問題。我們的分析表明，改革旨在提高透明度可以減少公司利潤(rùn)，提高管理層薪資水平并提高缺乏能力的首席執(zhí)行官的離職率。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)進(jìn)一步考慮存在著行政管理人員將采取措施來扭曲信息的可能性。我們的分析表明，由于就業(yè)問題管理人員就可以有動(dòng)力，提高透明度和增加信息

41、的扭曲，從而增加罰金降低利潤(rùn)。2 論文簡(jiǎn)介對(duì)于最近的公司治理丑聞，各國(guó)政府已作出回應(yīng)，并采取了一系列的監(jiān)管調(diào)整措施。這些調(diào)整措施的一個(gè)組成部分是提高信息披露要求。例如，薩班斯-奧克斯利法案說明，應(yīng)對(duì)安然、世通和其他公共治理的失敗，要求對(duì)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表表外融資和特殊目的實(shí)體進(jìn)行詳細(xì)報(bào)告。此外，薩班斯-奧克斯利法案中提出增加了管理人員誤報(bào)的處罰。關(guān)于治理與透明度之間的關(guān)系，公眾和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的看法是明確的，即增加透明度是為了提高治理。然而，大多數(shù)關(guān)于透明度的學(xué)術(shù)討論認(rèn)為透明度與公司治理沒有關(guān)系。最常見的關(guān)于信息透明度的好處的討論認(rèn)為它減少了信息不對(duì)稱，從而降低了公司證券的交易成本和公司的資本成本。為了彌補(bǔ)

42、這個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)，評(píng)論家通常集中在信息披露的直接費(fèi)用以及產(chǎn)生的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力成本上，因?yàn)榕犊赡転楫a(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者提供有用的信息。而這兩個(gè)因素在公司信息披露的決定中無疑是重要的考慮因素，它們并不特別與公司治理相關(guān)。在本文中，我們提供了一個(gè)了解透明度在公司治理中的作用的框架。我們分析了信息披露在合同方面以及董事會(huì)與首席執(zhí)行官之間的監(jiān)測(cè)方面的作用。我們認(rèn)為公司信息披露質(zhì)量作為選擇變量影響了合同的企業(yè)及其管理者。通過其對(duì)公司治理的影響，更高質(zhì)量的信息披露能提供效益和強(qiáng)加的成本。這些效益反映的事實(shí)是更準(zhǔn)確的業(yè)績(jī)信息能促使董事會(huì)做出更好的關(guān)于他們的管理人員的人事決定。這些成本的產(chǎn)生是因?yàn)楣芾砣藛T在較高的隱性披露水平時(shí)必須

43、取得增加他們事業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的賠償，以及他們?cè)噲D歪曲平衡的信息引發(fā)的增量成本。這些成本和效益補(bǔ)充了披露的現(xiàn)有解釋。此外，因?yàn)樗麄冎苯訉?duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行治理，在與公司為什么要披露信息的公共看法一致。我們正式通過埃爾馬蘭，魏茲巴赫（1998），埃爾馬蘭（2005）擴(kuò)展了霍姆斯特羅姆（1999）的職業(yè)生涯關(guān)注模型的適應(yīng)性的想法是考慮了最優(yōu)透明度的問題。第二章展示了最基本的模型，在該公司選擇績(jī)效的“質(zhì)量”指標(biāo)來衡量，從而使董事用來評(píng)估首席執(zhí)行官的能力。在這個(gè)模型中，公司的信息披露質(zhì)量最優(yōu)可以是零，無限的，或一個(gè)有限價(jià)值取決于參數(shù)。當(dāng)我們校準(zhǔn)模型來反映我們的實(shí)際大型上市公司，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)所暗示的參數(shù)校準(zhǔn)導(dǎo)致最優(yōu)信息披露質(zhì)量

44、的有限價(jià)值。因此，我們的分析表明，信息披露要求超出了這個(gè)最佳水平很可能產(chǎn)生意想不到的后果，并減少價(jià)值。我們?cè)u(píng)估的懲罰和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)可能影響首席執(zhí)行官的動(dòng)機(jī)去扭曲他們企業(yè)的信息。懲罰措施夸大了工作的有效性，如果他們能足夠遏制這一努力的話；然而，相對(duì)較輕的處罰可能會(huì)適得其反。此外，為了提高信息的準(zhǔn)確性，首席執(zhí)行官們的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)可能會(huì)損害股東利益，因?yàn)檫@種激勵(lì)措施推動(dòng)首席執(zhí)行官透露的信息價(jià)值最大化的數(shù)量更多。3 隱藏信息在最近的一些公司丑聞的曝光中，關(guān)心的不是管理人員歪曲信息，而是隱藏信息。在本小節(jié)中，我們簡(jiǎn)單談?wù)勎覀兊姆治隹梢哉f是關(guān)于隱瞞信息。一個(gè)問題是，如果首席執(zhí)行官隱藏了信息是否其他參與者都知道？如果是這樣

45、，那么他們大概可以懲罰就非公開的首席執(zhí)行官。此外，如果眾所周知，首席執(zhí)行官知道他隱藏的信號(hào)值，進(jìn)而闡明參數(shù)（格羅斯曼，1981）適用于：凡是未顯露信號(hào)推斷預(yù)期值時(shí)，首席執(zhí)行官將有動(dòng)機(jī)透露上述那些預(yù)期的價(jià)值。因此，唯一的均衡是指未透露的信號(hào)推斷出的可能最低價(jià)值和首席執(zhí)行官相應(yīng)的誘導(dǎo)顯示所有的信號(hào)。因此，我們預(yù)測(cè)隱瞞不太可能是一個(gè)問題，如果其他參與者知道什么是信號(hào)集合。假設(shè)，與此相反，其他參與者不知道什么是一套完整的信號(hào)（例如，隨時(shí)間的變化而異）。如果首席執(zhí)行官在決定顯示或隱藏一個(gè)信號(hào)時(shí)，不知道實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)值，那么他就會(huì)想要隱藏他的所有信號(hào)：更多的信號(hào)是指以更精確的方法估計(jì)出的他的能力，這意味著他的職業(yè)

46、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大。因此，我們的模型預(yù)測(cè)，（一）當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官?zèng)Q定揭示什么信號(hào)，（二）必須承諾事先學(xué)習(xí)顯示或隱藏的信號(hào)價(jià)值，他會(huì)選擇隱瞞承諾過的所有信號(hào)。相反，如果首席執(zhí)行官不承諾在作出信息披露決定前學(xué)習(xí)的信號(hào)的價(jià)值，那么他將誘導(dǎo)揭示那些對(duì)他有利的信息號(hào)。其他參與者將推斷出他們獲得到一個(gè)偏差的樣本，從而做一個(gè)向下調(diào)整。在這個(gè)意義上說，這種情況是類似的“夸大成果”。 根據(jù)分析的細(xì)節(jié)，可以肯定的是需要等待未來的不同分析，但我們普遍的結(jié)論通常會(huì)保留。4討論與結(jié)論大多數(shù)公司治理改革涉及提高透明度。然而，信息披露的討論通常集中在披露問題上除了治理問題，如資本成本和產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)成本。透明度如何潛在地影響治理的邏輯已經(jīng)

47、在學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)中缺席了。本文中我們提供這樣的分析。我們的分析表明，透明度水平可以理解為由首席執(zhí)行官與董事會(huì)之間的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的治理。董事們?cè)O(shè)置透明度水平（例如，透明度的量與質(zhì)），因此，選擇了一種內(nèi)在的治理安排的一部分。提高透明度為公司帶來了利益，但也需要成本。通過提高他的質(zhì)量的信號(hào)來提供更好的透明度，從而提高董事會(huì)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官的監(jiān)測(cè)能力。但是更好的透明度不是免費(fèi)的：更好的市場(chǎng)能夠了解首席執(zhí)行官的能力，并且首席執(zhí)行官會(huì)暴露更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在我們的設(shè)定中，透明度的利潤(rùn)最大化水平需要平衡這兩個(gè)因素。我們的模型表明有一個(gè)透明度的最佳水平。因此，試圖超越這個(gè)最佳水平會(huì)降低利潤(rùn)。利潤(rùn)的減少一方面是因?yàn)楣芾碚邔⒉坏貌恢?/p>

48、付更高的工資，以彌補(bǔ)他們所面臨的更大職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，另一方面是因?yàn)楦叩耐该鞫裙膭?lì)管理者從事昂貴的，產(chǎn)生反效果的工作來歪曲信息。我們強(qiáng)調(diào)，在一個(gè)模型中的影響在其他條件都相同的情況下，更好的信息披露提高公司的價(jià)值。我們通過論文提出的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的假設(shè)是董事會(huì)在做出監(jiān)察決定時(shí)依賴于向公眾發(fā)布相同的信息。毫無疑問，這種假設(shè)在大多數(shù)公司里確實(shí)是虛假的，因?yàn)槎聲?huì)已經(jīng)獲得了比公眾信息更好的信息。不過，首席執(zhí)行官們有動(dòng)機(jī)操縱信息的傳輸以提高董事會(huì)對(duì)他們的看法，而且這一理念在最近的一些研究中被認(rèn)為是一個(gè)重要的因素（例如，亞當(dāng)斯和費(fèi)雷拉，印刷中）。此外，在一些公開的案例中，董事會(huì)被蒙在鼓里除非通過自己的能力獲得公開披露

49、的文件；在何種情況下，董事會(huì)必須依靠公開的可用信息，可能是在董事會(huì)與首席執(zhí)行官的關(guān)系是最抗拒時(shí)，因此，在這種情況下董事會(huì)監(jiān)督可能是最重要的。當(dāng)然，我們的基本假設(shè)是公開披露質(zhì)量對(duì)董事會(huì)監(jiān)督管理者的能力的巨大影響是有理的。我們的模型設(shè)定在董事與股東的利益完全一致的情況下。人們可以將它應(yīng)用于同樣也由股東直接監(jiān)控的公司。如果有一個(gè)可用信息質(zhì)量的提高要么是由于更嚴(yán)格的報(bào)告要求，要么是由于更好的分析（例如，由機(jī)構(gòu)投資者或更細(xì)心地出版社整理分析），那么我們的模型包含清晰的實(shí)證的預(yù)測(cè)。特別的是，它表明改進(jìn)信息將提高首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬和離職率。事實(shí)上，首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬離職率的提高大體上開始于20世紀(jì)90年代,至少

50、有一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為應(yīng)增加新聞審查和提高投資者的積極性（卡普蘭，明頓，2006）。這種模式的首席執(zhí)行官的薪水和離職率與我們的模型是一致的；而且，它的一致觀點(diǎn)是更好的信息對(duì)公司治理的影響既有成本又有效益。但有些問題任然存在，如上所述，我們只是涉及了有關(guān)管理的信息隱藏的表面問題。我們已經(jīng)忽視了早期工作中涉及向競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)提出的披露信息。我們也忽視了其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者需要更好的信息，例如通過激勵(lì)契約來幫助更好地解決委托代理問題（例如，格羅斯曼和哈特，1983，辛格，2004）。最后，我們忽略了企業(yè)實(shí)際上如何使信息或多或少有益的技術(shù)（例如，會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則怎樣使用，組織結(jié)構(gòu)是如何工作的，如報(bào)告線和辦公組織等）。我們認(rèn)

51、為未來會(huì)關(guān)注這些細(xì)節(jié)，對(duì)這個(gè)問題進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步闡明，但我們?nèi)匀幌嘈盼覀兇篌w的成果會(huì)繼續(xù)保留。 荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕

52、螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁

53、螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿

54、袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆

55、裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀

56、袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈

57、羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈

58、羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿

59、羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞羈芁芄蟻肅膄薃蝕螃荿葿蠆裊膂蒞蚈羇莈芁蚈肀膁蕿螇蝿羃蒅螆袂腿莁螅肄羂莇螄螄芇芃螃袆肀薂螂羈芅蒈螂肁肈莄袁螀芄芀袀袂肇薈衿羅節(jié)蒄袈膇肅蒀袇袇莀莆蒄罿膃節(jié)蒃肁荿薁蒂螁膁蕆蒁袃莇莃薀羆膀艿薀肈羃薈蕿袈膈薄薈羀肁葿薇肂芆蒞薆螂聿芁薅襖芅薀薄羇肇蒆蚄聿芃莂蚃螈肆羋螞