農業(yè)保險的再思考[外文翻譯]

1、本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目： crop insurance reconsidered 出 處： amer. j. agr. econ. 作 者： joseph w. glauber crop insurance reconsideredjoseph w. glauberduring the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was much debate over how to fix what were perceived as the “failures” of the federal crop insurance program. the federa

2、l crop insurance improvement act of 1980 made crop insurance the primary form of disaster protection for agricultural producers, replacing a standing disaster assistance program with subsidized crop insurance. to encourage sales, private companies were enlisted to deliver the product and significant

3、ly share in the underwriting risks. almost overnight, the crop insurance program was converted from a pilot program offering limited coverage to a limited number of crops nationwide, to a nationwide program covering most major field crops in most major growing regions.the perceived failures of crop

4、insurance were many. at the time of passage of the 1980 act, congress envisioned a participation rate approaching 50% of eligible acres by the end of the decade. despite premium subsidies and expanded coverage, crop insurance participation grew very slowly. when a major drought struck the midwest in

5、 1988, only 25% of eligible acreage was enrolled in the program nationwide and participation was even less in states such as illinois and indiana (chite).widespread crop losses and poor participation in the insurance program prompted congress to pass supplemental disaster legislation throughout the

6、decade including almost $5 billion in disaster assistance to cover crop losses in 1988 and 1989 alone (glauber and collins). in addition to its failure to replace disaster assistance, the actuarial performance of the crop insurance program was dismal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. the aggrega

7、te loss ratio, that is, total indemnities divided by total premiums (including premium subsidies), exceeded 150% over 198193. poor actuarial performance was blamed on expansion of coverage into new areas without having adequate data to rate risks which contributed to adverse selection problems and t

8、he difficulty in monitoring producer behavior which contributed to moral hazard issues (u.s. general accounting office 1993).finally, despite large actuarial losses, companies shared little of the underwriting risks. over 198190, total indemnities exceeded total premiums (including premium subsidies

9、) by $2.3 billion. over the same period, companies recorded net underwritings “gains” of $102 million (glauber and collins). this prompted repeated criticism from the u.s. general accounting office (1981, 1987, 1992) that companies were not adequately sharing in risks.within ten years of the 1980 ac

10、t, poor performance of the crop insurance program prompted the bush administration to propose eliminating the crop insurance program and replacing it with a standing disaster program (gardner 1994). the proposal received little interest in congress, but the criticism of the crop insurance program re

11、mained unabated. widespread crop losses due to the 1993 floods in the midwest prompted yet another disaster bill. this time, however, congress and the clinton administration agreed on the crop insurance reform act of 1994, which authorized additional premium subsidies to increase participation. yet,

12、 despite increases in participation, congress passed ad hoc disaster legislation covering losses in 1998, 1999, and 2000. in 2000, congress passed the agricultural risk protection act, which provided further subsidies to encourage crop insurance purchases.now, fifteen years and two reform bills late

13、r, the crop insurance program boasts an 80% participation rate with over 215 million acres enrolled and a total liability estimated in excess of $46 billion for 2004 (davidson). over amer. j. agr. econ. 86 (number 5, 2004): 11791195 copyright 2004 american agricultural economics association 1180 num

14、ber 5, 2004 amer. j. agr. econ. 57% of participating acres are enrolled at coverage levels in excess of 65%. the loss performance of the crop insurance program has improved as well. over 19942003, the aggregate loss ratio for the program was 98%, which prompted the secretary of agriculture to conclu

15、de, “the program on a national scale is financially sound, properly rated, and effectively managed” (glickman). and, new reinsurance agreements negotiated between the private companies and the government have resulted in companies retaining more risk and facing larger possible underwriting losses in

16、 event of widespread crop losses.yet, have the program reforms since 1994 really addressed the fundamental failures raised fifteen years ago? despite large gains in participation, congress continues to pass ad hoc disaster legislation; two years after passage of the agricultural risk protection act,

17、 congress passed supplemental disaster assistance to cover 2002 crop losses. the costs of the program have risen dramatically as well. expected annual costs of the program are over $3 billioncompared with less than one-third of that cost fifteen years ago. increased subsidies have, in turn, raised c

18、oncerns about the distorting effects of crop insurance on production. while the aggregate actuarial performance has improved, large regional disparities exist. finally, as private companies have taken on more risks, they have come under increasing criticism for the large underwriting gains they earn

19、 from the program.in the following sections, the paper reconsiders the crop insurance program and the problems of agricultural insurance more generally. it draws on the large literature that has emerged on crop insurance, particularly over the past ten years. economic research on crop insurance can

20、be traced at least as far back as valgrens 1922 study of private insurance markets.2 however, the amount of research on crop insurance has increased dramatically over the past ten years, paralleling the growth n the program itself. for example, over 1981 93, ten journal articles were published in th

21、e american journal of agricultural economics. since 1994, fifty-one articles have been published, including over twenty in 2003 and 2004 alone.the paper is organized as follows. the next section examines the demand for crop insurance and why participation in the crop insur-ance program has depended

22、on large subsidies. the following section examines the problems of rating agricultural production risks and how subsidies mask actuarial performance. the unintended effects of subsidized crop insurance on production are considered in section “effects of crop insurance on production.” the section “al

23、ternative crop insurance plans” examines alternatives means to manage production risks, including area yield options and weather derivatives. summary and conclusions are offered in the final section.the demand for crop insurancetable 1 shows the growth of the crop insurance program since 1981. parti

24、cipation in the program grew slowly in the 1980s, reaching only 55.6 million acres in 1988, about 25% of eligible acreage. participation reached 40% in 1989 and 1990, largely because of disaster legislation that required recipients of disaster payment in 1988 and 1989 to buy crop insurance in the su

25、bsequent crop year. by 1993, participation hadfallen to 32% of eligible area (glauber and collins).over the period 198193, participating producers received, on average, about $2 in indemnity payments for every $1 of premium paid. why then did participation rates in the program remain so low througho

26、ut the 1980s and early 1990s? the most often cited reason is adverse selection (see, e.g., miranda). adverse selection problems arise when risks vary across insurance buyers and buyers know more about the risks they face than does the insurer who sets the rates (hirshleifer and riley). thus, produce

27、rs whose expected indemnities exceed the premiums costs are more likely to purchase insurance; those whose costs exceed their expected indemnities are less likely to purchase. second, studies show that farmers and ranchers use a variety of risk-management strategies to mitigate the risks that they f

28、ace (harwood et al., u.s. gao 1999). empirical studies of crop insurance participation during this period confirmed that many of these practices had negative effects on participation (see knight and coble 1997).by the end of the 1980s, it was clear to policy makers that the subsidy levels provided u

29、nder the 1980 act were not sufficient to achieve50% participation without either making insurance purchases compulsory or increasing the level of the subsidy. in their analysis of theu.s. crop insurance program, gardner and kramer concludedthat premiums would have to be subsidized as much as 50% to

30、achieve 50% participation. similar conclusions were reached by wright and hewitt and goodwin and smith (1995).congress responded by both making insurance compulsory and increasing remium subsidies. under the crop insurance reform act of 1994, producers of insurable crops were eligible to receive a b

31、asic level of coverage, catastrophic risk protection (cat), which initially covered 50% of a producers approved yield at 60% of the expected market price.3 cat coverage was required for producers who participated in the commodity price support and production adjustment programs, farm credit, or othe

32、r farm programs.while the premium cost of cat coverage was fully subsidized by the government, producers were required to pay a sign-up fee equal to $50 per crop per county. in addition, the 1994 act provided additional subsidies for coverage levels greater than 50% (buy-up levels). over 220 million

33、 acres were enrolled in the program in 1995, over 80% of eligible acres (excluding hay), with over half of these at the cat level. responding to producer criticism, congress eliminated the compulsory provisions for cat coverage in 1996 causing enrollment in cat to decline. however, enrollment in buy

34、-up coverage continued to increase, reaching 120 million acres in 1998 (glauber and collins).to encourage further enrollment in higher coverage levels, congress provided supplemental premium subsidies in the 1999 and 2000 crop years and in 2000 passed the agricultural risk protection act, which incr

35、eased subsidy levels for most buy-up levels (table 2). enrollment in the crop insurance program rose from 182 million acres insured in 1998 to over 217 million in 2003, almost a 20% increase. where less than 8% of insured acres were enrolled at coverage levels greater than 65% in 1998, over 53% were

36、 enrolled in 2003. because of increased enrollment and enrollment at higher coverage levels, total liability was $40.6 billion in 2003, a 46% increase over 1998 levels.the experience of the past twenty-five years suggests that with adequate subsidies, producers will buy crop insurance, but the margi

37、nalcosts are large. because the demand for crop insurance is generally inelastic with respect to premium (goodwin, coble and knight), the marginal per acre costs of enrolling additional acres into the program are high. figure 1 shows premium subsidies plotted against buyupacres over 19812003. it sho

38、ws how the marginal costs of enrolling additional buy-up acres have increased as subsidy levels have increasedunder successive crop insurance reform legislation. because subsidies are applied to all participating acres, it becomes more and more expensive to coax in acreage at the margin. estimated a

39、t the mean buy-up acreage over the period, the marginal cost per acre (in $2000) during 198194 was $3.31 per acre, compared to an average per acre subsidy of $2.73. during 199598, the marginal subsidy cost per acre was $10.51 compared with an average per acre subsidy of $4.99. from 1999 to 2003, the

40、 marginal subsidy costs are estimated at $25.99, compared with an average per acre subsidy of $7.76. these costs include premium subsidy costs only. delivery costs would bring per acre marginal subsidy costs to as high as $30 per acreabout twice the average per acre premium cost.譯 文：（注：外文題目、出處、作者的英文

41、為times new roman字體；譯文題目字體為黑體小二號，一級標題以三號黑體居中打?。幌驴找恍校ㄐ虚g距22磅）為二級標題,以四號黑體左起空兩行打印,三級標題以小四號黑體左起空兩行打印，換行后以小四號宋體空兩行打印正文。）農業(yè)保險的再思考在20世紀80年代末和90年代初，人們對于如何解決被認為“失敗”的聯(lián)邦農業(yè)保險計劃有很多的爭論。1980年頒布的聯(lián)邦農業(yè)保險改進法把農業(yè)保險作為農業(yè)生產者災難保護的主要形式，用農業(yè)保險補助來替代一個長期的災難援助計劃。為了鼓勵銷售，私營企業(yè)被贊許交付產品，這樣很大程度上分擔了保險的風險。幾乎一夜之間，農業(yè)保險計劃從一項只提供國家有限范圍內，有限數量的農業(yè)物

42、的試點計劃轉變?yōu)橐豁椇w最主要的農業(yè)生產地區(qū)的最主要的農作物的全國性計劃。被認為失敗的農業(yè)保險有很多。在1980年通過的法案里，國會預想十年后有將近50%農保參與率的合格農田數。不管額外的保險補貼和擴充的保險范圍，農業(yè)保險發(fā)展的非常的緩慢。1988年的一場干旱，嚴重影響了美國的中西部，當時只有25%的合格的土地面積，像伊利諾州和印第安那等地方的農業(yè)保險參與率則更加少(chite)。廣泛的農作物損失和低的農業(yè)保險參與率使得國會通過補充災難援助的法條，在十年內花了近50億美元在災難援助上，包括1988年和1989年的農作物損失(格勞伯和柯林斯)。除了替代災害援助的失敗之外，在整個80年代和90年代

43、初，農業(yè)保險計劃的保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績也是相當糟糕的。合計的損失率，即總的賠償金比上總保險金額（包括保險補貼），在1981到1993年這段時間超過了150%。低的保險統(tǒng)計業(yè)績被歸咎于在擴大新的區(qū)域的覆蓋范圍時，沒有適當的數據來評估導致逆向選擇的問題，也就是在監(jiān)控農業(yè)工人行為上的困難，即由于道德危機（投保人可能不可靠）而形成的風險（美國審計院，1993）。最終，雖然大量的保險損失，但公司只承擔了少量的保險風險。在1981-90年間，總的賠償金超過總的保險金額達23億，在相當的時期，公司記載的凈保險收益為一億兩百萬，這個被美國審計院反復提出批評（1981,1987,1992）說公司并沒有分擔足夠的風險。

44、在1980年法案后的十年內，農業(yè)保險的差的效果致使布什政府建議廢除農業(yè)保險計劃，用長期的災難計劃來代替（加德納 1994）。這項提議雖然并沒引起國會的重大興趣，但是對農業(yè)保險計劃的批評并沒有減弱。1993年美國中西部的洪災所引發(fā)的廣泛的農作物損失引起了另外一種災難法案。這次，然而，國會和克林頓政府贊成1994年的農業(yè)保險改良法，提供進一步附加保險費補貼來增加參與。然而，盡管參與的增加，國會通過了特設災難立法來替代損失在1998年，1999年和2000年。在2000年，國會通過的農業(yè)風險保護法，提供了進一步的補貼來鼓勵農業(yè)保險購買。現(xiàn)在，15年來的兩個改革法案后，農業(yè)保險計劃已經很成功了，在20

45、04年已經有百分之八十的參與率，登記的合格用地面積超過兩億一千五百萬英畝，總負債達到460億(davidson)。在2004年農業(yè)經濟協(xié)會出版的“美國農業(yè)經濟”中的1180頁中提出57%的多人參與英畝被登記在超過65%的覆蓋水平上。農業(yè)保險的壞的業(yè)績也有所提升。在1994-2003年中，農業(yè)保險計劃總計的損失率為98%，農業(yè)部秘書的結論是：“這個全國規(guī)模的計劃在有健全的財政，適當的評估，和有效的管理” (克曼)。政府和私營企業(yè)之間的新的再保險金額協(xié)議規(guī)定在遇到大范圍的農作物損失時，企業(yè)要保留更大的風險和承擔更多的保險損失。然而15年前1994年提出的這個計劃的改革真的解決了根本的問題了嗎？盡管

46、在參與率上有很大的提高，但國會仍繼續(xù)通過特設的災難法規(guī)；在通過農業(yè)風險保護法的兩年后，國會通過了許多附加的災難援助，包括2002年代的災難損失。這個計劃的花費也同樣的劇烈的上升。該計劃預期的年度花費超過了30億美元，不少于15年前的三分之一的成本。增加的補貼反過來使使人們對于產品的農業(yè)保險的扭曲效果產生了憂慮。雖然總計的保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績提高了，但大的地區(qū)差異也形成了。最后，雖然私營企業(yè)承擔了更多的風險，但是他們因為從這個計劃中賺得的巨大的保險收益也使得企業(yè)遭受越來越多的批評。在接下來的段落里，這篇論文重新考慮了農業(yè)保險和一般農業(yè)保險所出現(xiàn)的問題。它運用了大量的關于農業(yè)保險的文獻，特別是這十年里的

47、。關于農業(yè)保險的經濟研究最早要追溯到1992年valgren的私人保險市場的研究中。然而，在過去十年內，隨著這個計劃本身的增長，相應的關于農業(yè)保險的文獻研究也劇烈的增加。例如，在1981年到1993年間，在美國農業(yè)經濟日報上發(fā)表了10篇農業(yè)保險的文章，而從1994年開始，已經已經有51篇文章發(fā)表了，在2003年和2004年間就發(fā)表了20多篇。這篇文章的組織如下所示。下一章調查了農業(yè)保險的要求和農業(yè)保險計劃的參與量取決于龐大的補貼。再接著一段分析了評定農業(yè)產品風險的問題和補貼如何掩蓋了保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績?！八綘I公司和風險共享”這章說了私營部門在計劃交付和風險分享中扮演了什么角色?！稗r業(yè)保險對生產的影響”這章說了在生產上補助的農業(yè)保險的非計劃中的影響。替代農業(yè)保險計劃說了替代選擇對經營生產風險的重要性，包括區(qū)域產量期權和露天的衍生產品。摘要和總結構成了最好一章。農業(yè)保險的要求表1顯示了從1981年以來農業(yè)保險計劃的增長。該計劃的參與量在20世紀80年代增長是十分緩慢的，在1988年只達到了5660萬英畝，合格土地面積大約在25