國際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易專業(yè)外文翻譯

1、 本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)(論文)外文翻譯譯文：俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的銀行體系和貨幣政策（節(jié)選）作者：保羅.繆林 moct-most5：53-701992年1月，俄羅斯開始實(shí)施所謂“大爆炸”（休克療法）模式的激進(jìn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型。該模式的理論基礎(chǔ)主要建立在三個(gè)力量的快速和同時(shí)活化作用上，即自由化、穩(wěn)定化和私有化。這個(gè)合并策略的預(yù)期效果是在一個(gè)合理的價(jià)格體系、工業(yè)調(diào)整和國外競(jìng)爭的刺激下，積極地反映總供給。主要會(huì)從三個(gè)方面控制緩解過度的直接的通貨膨脹壓力：從供給與需求的關(guān)系作用來影響市場(chǎng)價(jià)格；通過開放的匯率制度的經(jīng)常性往來帳戶的名義錨效應(yīng)影響；而最重要的方式是通過財(cái)政政策來對(duì)貨幣供應(yīng)量和預(yù)算支出額進(jìn)行制約。在俄羅斯，由

2、于產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整的直接后果，在轉(zhuǎn)型的初期階段，產(chǎn)量下降和通貨膨脹的情況并沒有排除。同時(shí)，這個(gè)階段預(yù)期又是健康的，因?yàn)樗鼤?huì)關(guān)注那些生產(chǎn)不需要產(chǎn)品的過時(shí)的商品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)，而短期內(nèi)，市場(chǎng)力量又會(huì)快速地促使解放的資源用于新私有化和高效率的部門?！按蟊ā蹦Ｊ降恼卫碚摶A(chǔ)是1991年底的一個(gè)事實(shí)，即蘇聯(lián)的解體為俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型創(chuàng)造了必要和獨(dú)特的條件，時(shí)間對(duì)于改革者來說是一種缺乏而珍貴的資源。這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)的窗口有可能隨時(shí)關(guān)閉，為了保證經(jīng)濟(jì)變革過程的不可逆性，俄羅斯認(rèn)為只有“大爆炸”模式能夠引進(jìn)一開始所需要的變化。表面上，政治理論基礎(chǔ)強(qiáng)于經(jīng)濟(jì)理論基礎(chǔ)，但是后來的事實(shí)證明，那些走施加了政治考慮的路線和步調(diào)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革

3、，很少產(chǎn)生預(yù)定的效果。事實(shí)上，對(duì)于俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型三年多過程的觀察，我們無法避免地感到深深的不安。從1992年到1994年，國民生產(chǎn)總值以年均12%的速度下降，物價(jià)水平幾乎上漲到了1992年水平的40倍，預(yù)算赤字從國民生產(chǎn)總值的4%飆升到了15%。家庭和企業(yè)的金融性資產(chǎn)實(shí)質(zhì)上都被粉碎了，盧布的匯率貶值超過了10倍，并且境外帳戶和外債大大惡化到了危險(xiǎn)的程度。在這樣的一個(gè)戲劇性的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)情況下，公開失業(yè)率的增加少于本來的預(yù)期，然而，這完全不是一個(gè)好消息，這確實(shí)地翻印了繼續(xù)生存體系中直接援助的某個(gè)組成部分，通過保持高的隱蔽性失業(yè)率來變相地體現(xiàn)自己。這種情況的存在主要?dú)w結(jié)于俄羅斯當(dāng)局沒有能力及時(shí)地建立一

4、個(gè)社會(huì)安全網(wǎng)，來解放零邊際生產(chǎn)率的工人，和允許工人建立的工業(yè)體系，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)更有效率的勞動(dòng)力比率。實(shí)際上，這意味著，俄羅斯還沒有進(jìn)行真正的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整。而且私有化迄今為止尚未對(duì)資源的有效率的重新分配作出重大的貢獻(xiàn)。一些分析師給了這些消極負(fù)面的事態(tài)發(fā)展一個(gè)直截了當(dāng)?shù)慕忉?，他們認(rèn)為，自由化、私有化正確的提出和發(fā)揮了他們的作用，但是穩(wěn)定化的部分應(yīng)該阻止或減弱前兩股力量運(yùn)作時(shí)的不平穩(wěn)，而不是一貫的被追求。貨幣政策仍然保持寬松。這反過來又使通貨膨脹偏差在經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁時(shí)期，減少了對(duì)公共事業(yè)改組的刺激，責(zé)成國家通過資助中央銀行信貸和虛弱的財(cái)政執(zhí)法來干預(yù)對(duì)他們的支持。因此，國家被迫進(jìn)行敢于來增加人民的收入。如通過增

5、加轉(zhuǎn)移支付款項(xiàng)和對(duì)糧食、能源等一些基本商品的價(jià)格進(jìn)行持續(xù)的補(bǔ)貼。這破壞了預(yù)算紀(jì)律的任何可能性，并在經(jīng)歷了一系列的惡性循環(huán)后，把國家?guī)У搅藧盒酝ㄘ浥蛎浀倪吘?。分析師們?cè)\斷得出的治療建議是一致的，包括在本質(zhì)上大幅度地降低貨幣供應(yīng)量和實(shí)行嚴(yán)格的控制預(yù)算支出。為了配合這些操作，盧布的匯率變化應(yīng)該盯住美元?！盀榱私o穩(wěn)定化進(jìn)程提供一個(gè)重要的名義錨，不僅僅通過它來影響商品的市場(chǎng)價(jià)格，而且還通過其規(guī)律來影響政府和央行的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策”。面對(duì)在過去三年里俄羅斯產(chǎn)品輸出和人民生活水平的前所未有的下降，一些經(jīng)濟(jì)分析師現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)開始研究替代方法去解釋這些事件的原因。而通過這種想法：產(chǎn)生惡性通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條衰退的同時(shí)因素

6、的范圍必須擴(kuò)大到包括成本因素和累計(jì)實(shí)際需求波動(dòng)的影響。應(yīng)該對(duì)于在以下區(qū)域的重要的結(jié)構(gòu)性節(jié)機(jī)構(gòu)，如管理能力和金融機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)施，松散效率的后果給予充分的重視。因此，對(duì)于限制性貨幣和財(cái)政政策的治療應(yīng)更為嚴(yán)格，并要求主管當(dāng)局對(duì)這些結(jié)構(gòu)性節(jié)采取果斷的行動(dòng)。本文中，我們將會(huì)根據(jù)另一種替代性解釋，尤其是側(cè)重于那些與常規(guī)分析員共同提到的不同的某些貨幣政策失誤，重新考慮俄羅斯將來的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。這個(gè)回顧也表明僅靠市場(chǎng)力量無法生成新的工業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)，這仍然是要經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型成功的必要條件。要想取得這一結(jié)果有必要采取幾項(xiàng)具體行動(dòng)，其中包括建立高效的銀行體系和金融部門看來是必不可少的。文章分析了在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型進(jìn)程中令人不滿意的情況和目前事態(tài)

7、的發(fā)展。提出了恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)的幾條建議。過去的教訓(xùn)和將來的議程迄今為止的事實(shí)告訴我們，總體戰(zhàn)略失敗的原因是期望光靠市場(chǎng)力量和政策措施就可以促使結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整。在一個(gè)體制和管理都尚未完善的體系中，貿(mào)易自由化進(jìn)程并不能啟動(dòng)宏偉的新古典主義的彈性，而且缺乏一個(gè)有效的金融體系的支持，不能給予任何經(jīng)濟(jì)內(nèi)容的私有化進(jìn)程。創(chuàng)造性破壞的壓力使得在幾個(gè)世紀(jì)里形成的現(xiàn)代西方經(jīng)濟(jì)的結(jié)構(gòu)不會(huì)在短短幾年內(nèi)由于刺激而產(chǎn)生積極的效果，因此，如今的俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)正徘徊在一個(gè)不穩(wěn)定的平衡點(diǎn)上，因?yàn)樗奶攸c(diǎn)正是一個(gè)分配非常不當(dāng)和資源無法有效利用，所以必須立即放棄這個(gè)戰(zhàn)略。在1988-1990年間，俄羅斯銀行系統(tǒng)參與了按蘇聯(lián)的水平進(jìn)行的機(jī)構(gòu)改革的

8、整個(gè)過程，在1990年年底俄羅斯通過的本國的銀行法，是建立在自主開發(fā)的銀行系統(tǒng)的基礎(chǔ)上，根據(jù)法律形成的機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置是一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的兩層體系，中央銀行主要是負(fù)責(zé)發(fā)行貨幣，財(cái)務(wù)和資金，監(jiān)督以及再融資的銀行部門。商業(yè)銀行貸款給企業(yè)的任務(wù)是越來越多，尤其是設(shè)立聯(lián)合股份公司。業(yè)務(wù)上，所有這些銀行都是常規(guī)普通的銀行，也就是說，他們都可以提供短期，中期和長期的的借貸業(yè)務(wù)。這種結(jié)構(gòu)從制度上來說是正確的，有著許多功能性的特點(diǎn)。由于缺乏這方面的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，主體規(guī)則和條例還都不完善，尤其是缺少關(guān)于這方面的最低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的銀行會(huì)計(jì)，這使得俄羅斯中央銀行不能有效的實(shí)施對(duì)銀行的監(jiān)管。中央銀行對(duì)商業(yè)銀行的再融資過程，因?yàn)槿狈鹑谫Y產(chǎn)而受到阻礙

9、，通常會(huì)構(gòu)成這些抵押品：商業(yè)票據(jù)和政府證券。特別是如果沒有后者，會(huì)使融資國庫發(fā)生系統(tǒng)性的通貨膨脹。此外，也還沒有真正的支付和結(jié)算系統(tǒng)，這使得該系統(tǒng)高度分割，還會(huì)阻礙出現(xiàn)一個(gè)高效率的銀行市場(chǎng)。商業(yè)銀行也遭受到了一系列的相互關(guān)聯(lián)的結(jié)構(gòu)和功能的問題。這在很大程度上是俄羅斯系統(tǒng)出現(xiàn)的特點(diǎn)這一原罪所引發(fā)的后果。1989-1991年在cbr登記的幾乎所有的銀行，公共機(jī)構(gòu)或者公共機(jī)構(gòu)式的，要建立一個(gè)自己的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，這將能夠使他們收集他們所產(chǎn)生的存款，并延伸到他們所需要的部分，這產(chǎn)生了獨(dú)特的情況，即成了數(shù)量有限的法人為主要股東、存款人和借款人的銀行。在這些領(lǐng)域有效地進(jìn)行干預(yù)并不是一件容易的任務(wù)，因?yàn)樗馕吨?/p>

10、準(zhǔn)混合行動(dòng)的政策和機(jī)構(gòu)。如果俄羅斯當(dāng)局最終能夠認(rèn)識(shí)到工業(yè)的結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整是一個(gè)能夠成功轉(zhuǎn)型的關(guān)鍵變量，執(zhí)行這項(xiàng)任務(wù)就可能會(huì)變得更加容易，而且為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，光靠自由化和私有化，甚至是在框架內(nèi)的限制性的貨幣政策都是不夠的。而必要的條件是建立能夠執(zhí)行革命原則的體系、方法和政策，如貨幣和信貸，作為索賠的真正資源是稀缺的資產(chǎn)，它的使用比例不足時(shí)就必須支付價(jià)格。反過來，建立這樣的機(jī)構(gòu)、方法和政策，將極大地推動(dòng)一個(gè)適當(dāng)?shù)暮鸵恢碌牧髁考夹g(shù)來援助西部，特別是國際金融機(jī)構(gòu)。不幸的是，目前這些機(jī)構(gòu)所追求的業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略主要是基于資本轉(zhuǎn)移，引進(jìn)外資可以可以彌補(bǔ)像俄羅斯這樣一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型的大國的財(cái)政缺口這件事是值得人們懷疑的。資

11、金流量應(yīng)伴隨著有技術(shù)援助的倡議能夠產(chǎn)生的內(nèi)在力量所需要掌握的整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的進(jìn)程。這將加強(qiáng)資金轉(zhuǎn)移的邊際生產(chǎn)率，并逐步將財(cái)政壓力的規(guī)?？刂苹匚鞣缴鐣?huì)負(fù)擔(dān)得起的比例。原文：the banking system,monetary policy and economic transformation in russia:1992-1994paolo miurin moct-most 5:53-70radical economic transformation began in russia in january 1992 with the diligent application of the so-ca

12、lled big bang model. the economic rationale of this model is based on swift and simultaneous activation of three main forces: liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation. the combined expected outcome of this manoeuvre is a positive response of aggregate supply under the stimuli of a rational pr

13、ice system, industrial restructuring and foreign competition. excessive immediate inflational pressures would be prevented in three ways: by the rationing effect on demand of new prices; by the nominal anchor effect of the liberalised exchange rate in a regime of current account convertibility; and

14、most importantly, by the introduction of financial discipline through restrictions on money supply and on budgetary outlays. in russia, due to the immediate consequences of industrial restructuring, an initial phase of output decline and inflation was not excluded. at the same time, however, this ph

15、ase was expected to be healthy, since it would concern obsolete enterprises producing unwanted goods; and of short duration, since the market forces would rapidly channel the liberated resources towards the newly privatised and efficient sectors.the political rationale of the big bang approach was b

16、ased on the fact that at the end of 1991, when the dissolution of the soviet union created the essential and unique condition for economic transformation of russia, time was a scarce and precious resource for the reformers. there were risks that this window of opportunity would be closed suddenly; o

17、nly an immediate big bang was considered capable of introducing from the outset the genetic changes needed in order to guarantee the irreversibility of the transformation process. the political rationale appears stronger than the economic one, but events that followed proved that economic reforms wh

18、ich follow paths and paces imposed by political considerations rarely generate the intended results. in fact, observing the effects of transformation in russia nearly three years after the inception of the process, we cannot avoid feeling a deep sense of dismay. between 1992 and 1994 gnp fell at an

19、average yearly rate of 12%; prices increased to nearly forty times their 1992 levels; the budget deficit soared from 4% to 15% of gnp; financial assets of households and enterprises were crushed in real terms; the exchange rate of the ruble depreciated more than tenfold; and external accounts and fo

20、reign indebtedness deteriorated substantially reaching dangerous proportions. open unemployment increased less than what could have been expected during such a dramatic macroeconomic scenario. however, far from being good news, this rather reflects the continued survival in the system of a component

21、 of direct assistance which manifests itself by keeping levels of disguised unemployment high. this survival is largely due to the inability of russian authorities to create a social safety net in time to liberate enterprises from zero marginal productivity workers and permit the establishment in th

22、e industrial system of more efficient labour/output ratios. in effect, this means that real industrial restructuring in russia has not yet started and that privatisation to date has not yet contributed significantly to an efficient reallocation of resources.some analysts have a straightforward expla

23、nation for these negative developments: liberalisation and privatisation, they say, were correctly introduced and played their role, but the stabilisation component of the package, the one that should have prevented or attenuated the imbalances implicit in the operation of the first two forces, was

24、not consistently pursued. monetary policy remained lax. this in turn kept the inflationary bias in the economy strong, reduced the stimuli to restructure public enterprises and obliged the state to intervene in their support through subsidised central bank credits and weak fiscal enforcement. the st

25、ate was therefore forced to intervene in support of the incomes of the population, through increased transfer payments and continued subsidies to prices of some basic commodities, like grain and energy. this destroyed any possibility of budgetary discipline and, in a series of vicious circles, broug

26、ht the country to the brink of hyperinflation. the therapy proposed by these analysts is coherent with their diagnosis, and consists in essence of drastically reducing the money supply and introducing strict controls on budgetary expenditure. in conjunction with these actions, the exchange rate of t

27、he ruble should be pegged to the dollar in order to provide a crucial nominal anchor to the stabilisation process, not only through its direct effects on the goods market prices, but also through its disciplinary effect on the governments and central banks macroeconomic policies. 3faced with the unp

28、recedented fall in output and living standards which has occurred in russia in the last three years, some economists are now developing an alternative way of interpreting the causes of these events. by this way of thinking:- the spectrum of simultaneous factors involved in generating hyperinflation

29、and the slump must be widened to include cost factors and aggregate real demand fluctuations;- more attention should be paid to the consequences of leaving unwound important structural knots in the areas of institutional efficiency, managerial capabilities and banking infrastructures.accordingly, th

30、e therapy goes beyond the implementation of more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and demands decisive action from the responsible authorities with respect to these structural knots.in this article we will reconsider recent economic developments in russia according to this alternative inter

31、pretation, focusing particularly on certain monetary policy mistakes which differ from those commonly referred to by conventional analysts (section 2). this review will also indicate that market forces alone cannot generate industrial redeployment, which remains the foremost condition in order for e

32、conomic transformation to be successful. to obtain this result several specific actions are needed, among which the creation of an efficient banking and financial sector appears to be essential. the unsatisfactory conditions and developments of this sector during the transformation process will be a

33、nalysed (section 3.1) and a minimal agenda for its rehabilitation will be suggested (section 3.2).lessons from the past and a minimal agenda for the futurethe story told so far indicates the failure of the overall strategy based on the expectation that market forces and short-term policy measures al

34、one could prompt structural adjustment. in a system which was institutionally and managerially unprepared, liberalisation did not activate the magnificent neo-classical elasticities and, lacking the support of an efficient banking/financial sector, failed to give economic content to the privatisatio

35、n process. the shumpeterian forces of creative destruction, which took centuries to forge the structure of modern western economies, could not be stimulated to produce positive results in just a few years. as a consequence, the russian economy is now hovering around a precarious point of equilibrium

36、, which must be abandoned urgently because it is characterised by a large misallocation and under-utilisation of resources.lessons from the past and a minimal agenda for the futurethe story told so far indicates the failure of the overall strategy based on the expectation that market forces and shor

37、t-term policy measures alone could prompt structural adjustment. in a system which was institutionally and managerially unprepared, liberalisation did not activate the magnificent neo-classical elasticities and, lacking the support of an efficient banking/financial sector, failed to give economic co

38、ntent to the privatisation process. the shumpeterian forces of creative destruction, which took centuries to forge the structure of modern western economies, could not be stimulated to produce positive results in just a few years. as a consequence, the russian economy is now hovering around a precar

39、ious point of equilibrium, which must be abandoned urgently because it is characterised by a large misallocation and under-utilisation of resources.banking and financial structuresin the years 1988-90 the russian banking system participated in the overall process of institutional reforms conducted a

40、t the soviet union level. at the end of 1990, russia approved its own banking laws, which established the foundations for the autonomous development of the banking system. the institutional setting organised by these laws was that of a classical two-tier system, with the central bank essentially in

41、charge of issuing the currency, financing the treasury and supervising and refinancing the banking sector. lending to enterprises was the task of a growing number of commercial banks, established as joint stock companies. operationally, all these banks were universal banks, in the sense that they co

42、uld lend and borrow at short-, medium- and long-term.this structure, institutionally correct, was characterised by many functional shortcomings. the central bank of russia (cbr) could not effectively implement banking supervision because of a lack of expertise in this area and an inadequate corpus o

43、f rules and regulations, especially those concerning minimum standards for bank accounting (which, in turn, made external auditing practically impossible). central bank refinancing of commercial banks was hampered by the absence of the financial assets that typically constitute the collateral for th

44、ese operations: commercial paper and government securities. the absence of the latter, in particular, made the financing of the treasury systematically inflationary. furthermore, there was no real payment and settlement system, which left the system highly segmented and prevented the emergence of an

45、 efficient inter-bank market. the minimal agendacommercial banks were also afflicted by a series of intertwined structural and functional problems. these are largely the consequence of the original sin that characterised the emergence of the russian banking system: practically all banks registered w

46、ith the cbr between 1989 and 1991 were created by public or semipublic institutions wanting to build a financial arm of their own, which would be capable of collecting the deposits generated by them and extending to them the needed credits. this produced the unique situation in which a restricted number of juridical persons (state-owned enterprises, their controlling ministries, local authorities) were the main shareholders, depositors and borrowers of the bank. intervening