潘堅打印稿－－附錄二：外文文獻

1、附錄二：外文文獻譯文1反傾銷行為的流行為討論傾銷政策創(chuàng)造條件會幫助我們調(diào)查全球流行的傾銷活動。反傾銷政策的重要性做為一個論點與反傾銷活動在全球流行成比列的增長。此外，怎樣為美國制定合適的政策的概念從某種程度上依賴于別的國家現(xiàn)在的做法。打個比方，假如別的國家精力旺盛的制定反傾銷政策但是美國卻很少花精力在這上面，沒有為多邊協(xié)議跟別的國家談判。很多觀察員將會看到結(jié)果對美國公司不利，同時將會反對這些新政策。美國反傾銷政策的反對者宣稱相反的事物是正確的跟其他國家比起來，美國已經(jīng)在運用反傾銷政策上過于激進。在美國的帶領(lǐng)下一些國家只是最近開始使用反傾銷政策。一些國家開始對這種激進的反傾銷政策感到不滿，希望能

2、在wto協(xié)議里對這些政策加入一些限制。哪些國家在使用反傾銷法律只有一些國家很嚴(yán)重地在使用反傾銷法律，在這些國家中美國是最活躍地使用者。通過估計，到目前為止至少是。沒有別地國家可以和它相提并論。在對美國進口市場合理地設(shè)想下，美國巨大的進口量和巨大的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值不能夠解釋這么高水平的針對別的國家的反傾銷活動。從1991年到1995年美國發(fā)起的反傾銷案件每年平均超過49起。據(jù)報道，這占世界每年278起反傾銷案件的18%,遠遠大于其他國家。在這五年期間，超過四分之三的美國出口貨物出口到反傾銷不到美國一半的國家去，只有5個國家的平均水平達到每年20起，10個國家只有每年8起反傾銷案件。包括美國，總共有2

3、5個國家在這5年內(nèi)發(fā)起反傾銷案件。三個國家澳大利亞、芬蘭、瑞典在1995年1月1號加入了歐共體。因此現(xiàn)在發(fā)起的都是歐共體市場的反傾銷案件，而不是他們自己獨自發(fā)起了。19911995年各個國家平均發(fā)起的反傾銷案件當(dāng)我們看看美國常用的反傾銷措施就會感到更震驚，美國有294款反傾銷措施在1995年12月31號實施。占世界全部的35。沒有哪個國家能比的上它的一半。下一個很積極反傾銷的就是歐共體。它有133起反傾銷措施，再下面就是加拿大（98）、墨西哥（81）。1991年到1995年期間，四分之三的美國出口貨物出口到反傾銷沒有美國三分之一的國家去。這么高的反傾銷案件和措施不一定指出美國的行為是特別激進的

4、。美國是一個有很大進口數(shù)量的大國，所以我們可以想到，比起小進口量的國家它會更頻繁的遭到傾銷。反傾銷不應(yīng)該隨進口數(shù)量的增長而增長。相反，因為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值反傾銷措施的征稅應(yīng)該降低，原因就是一定數(shù)量的傾銷對一個有這么大gdp的國家的傷害應(yīng)該是很小的。使這種可能變小的方法是讓任何強加的反傾銷案件都通過具體傷害標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在把大數(shù)量的進口貨物考慮進去的同時也應(yīng)該同時考慮美國自己巨大的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值。反傾銷案件的精確功能是否會隨著進口數(shù)量和gdp的改變而改變?nèi)Q于怎樣去假設(shè)市場和出口公司的行為。在一個合理的假設(shè)下。反傾銷案件的數(shù)量和措施應(yīng)該大致上和進口在gdp中的比率成比列。這些假定和相應(yīng)解釋性的論點如下所述。假

5、定一個出口商希望出口的數(shù)量跟這個國家的規(guī)模成比列，依次大致上和gdp成比例。外國出口商的數(shù)量大致上跟全部進口量除以國內(nèi)的各公司的平均進口量成比列。假設(shè)從事傾銷公司的數(shù)量和出口商的數(shù)量成比列，那反傾銷案件和措施也應(yīng)該大致上跟全部進口量除以這個國家的gdp成比列。有人可以提出其他合理的功能方式勿庸置疑的改變這個假定。然而，在全部的方式中的案件和措施應(yīng)該有增加進口的功能和減少gdp的功能。為了說明進口數(shù)量和經(jīng)濟之間的相互影響，中央預(yù)算辦公室已經(jīng)建立了一個跟前面描述的假定一致的有開始指數(shù)和活動措施索引的案件。創(chuàng)造者根據(jù)一個國家從1991年到1995年每年平均的反傾銷案件除以這個國家每年平均的進口占國內(nèi)

6、生產(chǎn)總值比率的值得出。同樣，后者等于在1995年12月31日反傾銷措施的數(shù)量除以這個國家每年平均的進口占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值比率。按照這些指數(shù)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，美國的反傾銷活動比現(xiàn)在發(fā)布的更多，美國的反傾銷指數(shù)大于任何國家，他幾乎是歐洲共同體的一半，也是使用反傾銷措施最多的國家。同樣的，美國反傾銷措施指數(shù)也是大于任何國家，他是歐洲共同體的一倍。歐洲共同體排在第二名。美國對別的國家實施的反傾銷跟別的國家對美國的反傾銷比較是怎么樣的前面的統(tǒng)計表指出美國的反傾銷活動遠遠高于其他的國家。美國對別的國家實施的反傾銷跟別的國家對美國的反傾銷比較是怎么樣的更可能引起政策制定者的關(guān)心。比起別的國家對美國實施的反傾銷措施，美國有

7、更多更充分的措施來對付這些國家。（雖然令人驚訝，事實不能必然的說明美國是這些反傾銷措施最積極的使用者，因為別的國家可能對美國執(zhí)行不成比例的反傾銷。）總之。在1995年12月31日美國對別的國家實施了294起反傾銷，但是別的國家對美國的反傾銷卻只有87起，在國家跟國家的基礎(chǔ)上。美國對這47個國家的反傾銷都比這47個國家對美國的多（除了東德，他被包括在各國之內(nèi)）。只有11個國家對美國采取了更多的措施。這11個國家包括加拿大、墨西哥。跟他們比起來美國有更多的貿(mào)易量。然而，這些里面也有歐共體的成員國(澳大利亞，丹麥，芬蘭，希臘，愛爾蘭，盧森堡公國，葡萄牙)。像全部的歐共體國家一樣。他們沒有自己的反傾銷

8、政策，但是他們統(tǒng)一使用歐共體的反傾銷政策。表1中各歐共體國家對美國實施的反傾銷措施就是歐共體的主張的政策。然而根據(jù)那樣來計算反傾銷措施，可能不是最好的反映歐共體反傾銷政策障礙美國出口貨物到每個歐共體國家的指標(biāo)。美國有57項針對各個歐共體的措施，但是歐盟只有2項針對美國的措施。即使乘以15（歐共體國家的數(shù)量）只會給歐共體帶來30項針對美國的措施，只有美國針對歐盟措施的一半。像以前，有人可能會企圖用這些數(shù)量的措施來解釋潛在的交易量。美國處于貿(mào)易赤字，進口大于出口。因此，假如有人希望一個國家針對別的國家的反傾銷措施應(yīng)該大致上跟這個國家進口的量成比例，那比起別的國家針對美國的反傾銷措施，美國應(yīng)該要有更

9、多的反傾銷措施來針對別的國家。然而美國的貿(mào)易赤字不足以解釋反傾銷措施的不同。在1995年12月31日，美國對別的國家每100億出口到美國的貨物幾乎有5項反傾銷措施。但是別的國家對美國每100億的出口貨物只有兩項反傾銷措施（相當(dāng)于別的國家100億的進口量）。在國家跟國家的基礎(chǔ)上，區(qū)分美國針對別的國家出口到美國的貨物的反傾銷措施和區(qū)分別的國家針對美國出口到這些國家貨物的反傾銷措施幾乎不能改變這個統(tǒng)計表。美國在對48個國家每單位上的反傾銷措施大于這些國家對美國的。只有11個國家是相反的。 june e. oneill:在全球和美國流行的反傾銷行為: 一個對全球數(shù)據(jù)的分析，芝加哥大學(xué)出版社m 原文1

10、the prevalence of antidumping actionto set the stage for discussing antidumping policy, it helps to examine the prevalence of antidumping activity around the world. the significance of antidumping policy as an issue increases in proportion to the prevalence of antidumping activity. furthermore, noti

11、ons of what constitutes proper policy for the united states can depend to some extent on what the rest of the world is doing. for example, if most of the world was vigorously pursuing antidumping policy and the united states began to pursue it less vigorously without first negotiating a multilateral

12、 agreement for all countries to do so, many observers would view the result as unfair to u.s. firms and oppose the new policy on those grounds. opponents of u.s. antidumping policy claim that the opposite is true-that the united states has been more aggressive in its use of antidumping policy than m

13、ost countries; that many countries have only recently begun to make significant use of antidumping policy, following the lead of the united states and a few other countries; and that a number of countries have been unhappy with aggressive antidumping enforcement and have wanted more severe constrain

14、ts put on such policies in the wto agreement. which countries make use of antidumping laws? only a few countries make significant use of antidumping laws, and the united states is the most active user among those countries. by some measures it is by far the most active user, with no other country co

15、ming close. under a reasonable set of assumptions about the import market, the large quantities of u.s. imports and the large u.s. gross domestic product (gdp) do not explain the high levels of u.s. activity relative to those of other countries. the united states initiated an average of just over 49

16、 antidumping cases per year from 1991 through 1995 (see figure 1 and table b-1). that number was 18 percent of the reported total world average of 278 initiations per year and was more than the number reported by any other country.(10) over three-quarters of u.s. exports during the five-year period

17、went to countries that averaged fewer than half that many initiations per year. only five other countries averaged as many as 20 initiations per year, and only eight averaged as many as 10. including the united states, 25 countries reported initiating cases during the five-year period. three of them

18、-austria, finland, and sweden-joined the ec/u on january 1, 1995, and therefore now come under the ec/u antidumping policy and no longer initiate cases on their own. the picture is more striking when one looks at the stock of active antidumping measures. the united states had 294 antidumping measure

19、s in effect on december 31, 1995-35 percent of the reported world total. no other country had as many as half that number. the next most active user of antidumping laws was the ec/u, which had 133 active measures, followed by canada (98) and mexico (81). over three-quarters of u.s. exports from 1991

20、 through 1995 went to countries that had fewer than one-third the number of active measures that the united states had at the end of the period. the high numbers of u.s. cases and measures do not necessarily indicate that u.s. activity is particularly aggressive. the united states is a large country

21、 with large quantities of imports, and one would expect such a country to encounter dumping more frequently than a country with small quantities of imports. in addition to increasing with the quantity of imports, however, the number of antidumping measures imposed should decrease with the size of gr

22、oss domestic product. the reason is that the degree of injury resulting from a given quantity of dumped imports should be less for a country with a large gdp, making it less likely that any given case will pass the material-injury standard required for imposing antidumping measures. analysis that ta

23、kes the large quantity of u.s. imports into account must also take the large size of u.s. gdp into account. the precise functional form according to which the number of cases would be expected to vary as import quantities and gdp change depends on what one assumes about the markets and the behavior

24、of exporting firms. under one reasonable set of assumptions, the number of cases and measures imposed should be roughly proportional to the ratio of imports to gdp. those assumptions and the corresponding explanatory argument are as follows. assume that the quantity a foreign exporter will want to e

25、xport to a country is roughly proportional to the size of the market, which in turn is roughly proportional to gdp. the number of foreign exporters would be equal to the total quantity of the countrys imports divided by the average quantity imported from each firm. it follows that the number of fore

26、ign exporters is roughly proportional to a countrys total imports divided by its gdp. if one assumes that the number of firms engaged in dumping is proportional to the number of firms exporting to the country, then the number of antidumping cases and measures should be roughly proportional to total

27、imports of the country divided by its gdp. one could undoubtedly alter the assumptions and come up with other reasonable functional forms. however, in all reasonable forms the number of cases and measures should be an increasing function of imports and a decreasing function of gdp. to account for th

28、e effects of import quantities and the size of the economy, cbo has constructed a case initiation index and an active measure index in accordance with the assumptions just described. the former is equal to the average number of cases a country initiated per year from 1991 through 1995 divided by the

29、 countrys average annual ratio of imports to gdp over the period. similarly, the latter is equal to the number of active measures the country had on december 31, 1995, divided by the countrys average annual ratio of imports to gdp from 1991 through 1995. as measured by those indices, u.s. antidumpin

30、g activity stands out even more than by the numbers already presented. the antidumping case initiation index for the united states is larger than that for any other country, and it is almost half again as large as that for the ec/u, which is the next most active user of antidumping law by this measu

31、re. similarly, the active antidumping measure index for the united states is also larger than that for any other country, and it is over twice as large as that for the ec/u, which is the next most active user by this measure. how does u.s. antidumping activity against other countries compare with th

32、eir activity against the united states? the foregoing statistics indicate that u.s. antidumping activity is much higher than that of other countries. what may be of more concern to policymakers, however, is how u.s. activity against other countries compares with the activity of those countries again

33、st the united states. the united states has substantially more active measures against other countries than those countries have against it. (though surprising, that fact does not necessarily follow from the fact that the united states is the most active user, since other countries might aim their e

34、nforcement disproportionately at u.s. firms.) overall, the united states had 294 active antidumping measures against other countries on december 31, 1995, compared with only 87 measures against it. on a country-by-country basis, the united states has more active measures against each of 47 countries

35、 than those countries have against the united states (excluding the former east germany, which is included with germany for this tally). only 11 countries have more measures against the united states than the united states has against them. the 11 include neighbors canada and mexico, with whom the u

36、nited states has large amounts of trade. however, they also include seven members of the ec/u (austria, denmark, finland, greece, ireland, luxembourg, and portugal), which, like all ec/u members, do not have their own antidumping policies but instead are covered by the policy of the ec/u. the number

37、 of measures against the united states attributed to each ec/u member in table 1 is the number maintained by the ec/u. counting the measures in that way, however, may not be the best indicator of the degree to which ec/u antidumping policy hinders u.s. exports to each of the members individually. th

38、e united states has 57 measures against various ec/u members, whereas the ec/u has only two against the united states. even multiplying the two by 15 (the number of ec/u members) brings the ec/u up to only 30 measures against the united states, which is just over one-half as many as the united state

39、s has against the ec/u. as before, one might be tempted to explain those numbers as being the result of underlying trade volumes. the united states runs a trade deficit with the rest of the world, importing more than it exports. consequently, if one expects the number of antidumping measures that on

40、e country maintains against another to be roughly proportional to the amount that it imports from that country, the united states should have more antidumping measures against the rest of the world than the rest of the world maintains against the united states. the u.s. trade deficit, however, is no

41、t enough to explain the differences in the numbers of active measures. on december 31, 1995, the united states maintained almost five active antidumping measures against other countries for every $10 billion of u.s. imports, whereas other countries maintained fewer than two active measures against t

42、he united states for every $10 billion of u.s. exports (equivalent to $10 billion of imports by other countries from the united states).on a country-by-country basis, dividing u.s. measures against other countries by u.s. imports from those countries while at the same time dividing other countries m

43、easures against the united states by u.s. exports to those countries (equivalent to imports by those countries from the united states) does almost nothing to change the statistics. the united states maintains more measures per unit of trade against each of 48 countries than those countries maintain

44、against the united states. the reverse is true for only 11 countries. june e. oneill:antidumping action in the united states and around the world: an analysis of international data，university of chicago pressm譯文2不公平貿(mào)易的法律魔鬼在細節(jié)里brink lindsey 和 dan ikenson著摘要：因為很少有人知道美國的反傾銷法實際上是如何工作的,所以一部分這些法律在美國得到了廣泛的

45、政治支持。它令人費解的復(fù)雜性技術(shù)除了少數(shù)業(yè)內(nèi)人士和專家能了解,幾乎所有的人都不知道它所謂的“公平”和“正當(dāng)?shù)母偁帯边@些聽起來很吸引人的花言巧語下的本質(zhì)。在本研究中我們希望通過詳細審查它來洞察反傾銷法復(fù)雜盾牌下的迷霧。在這里我們提供了一個詳細的、一步步的向?qū)碚f明在目前的統(tǒng)治下傾銷是怎樣被定義和執(zhí)行的。另外，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)他們使用許多遁詞和偏見的方法把本來正常和建康的競爭誣蔑為“不公平”，然后經(jīng)常征收極其高的反傾銷稅。從這個分析得出的勿庸置疑的結(jié)論就是反傾銷法以它現(xiàn)在的立場對維持“正當(dāng)?shù)母偁帯逼鸩坏饺魏巫饔谩Ｊ聦嵣戏磧A銷政策主要的作用就是給守舊的保護主義提供美妙的借口。我們用各種不同的方法來舉例說明反

46、傾銷法嚴(yán)重的方法缺陷。首先，我們用一個簡單的例子來演示傾銷計算操作是如何的挑剔以致使人對傾銷產(chǎn)生了幻影。再次，我們用從18個不同在傾銷中記錄下來的實際案例對在特殊的和現(xiàn)實生活中被扭曲的傾銷方法的作用進行量化。最后，我們提出一個詳細的假設(shè)案例，通過對案例中傾銷計算的每個步驟的說明和如實地重現(xiàn)進行研究。在這個案例中，我們說明了一個在美國的國外生產(chǎn)者是怎樣用比自己家鄉(xiāng)市場高13.95%的網(wǎng)絡(luò)價格出售小器具的，盡管傾銷利潤高達7.37%。導(dǎo)言：許多年來，美國的反傾銷政策法得到了像共和黨人和民主黨人這樣一些人的強大的政治支持。這樣有威望的持久的兩黨連立的原因是什么呢？首先，反傾銷政策法的花言巧語是引人注

47、目的。畢竟，有哪個國會的成員喜歡堅持說他贊成違法和不公平的傾銷進口貨？誰又會反對“正當(dāng)競爭”呢？同時，花言巧語背后的事實是模糊的。反傾銷政策法的臭名是難以理解的，它內(nèi)部的工作方式僅僅是少數(shù)幾個精挑細選出來的對象、使用者、官僚主義和律師知道。單單它的專業(yè)術(shù)語像概率誤差、國概率誤差、調(diào)查階段、回顧階段、返回后付款、匹配模型、成本檢測、安全測試、設(shè)備管理控制與時間調(diào)度程序的可行性、商品差價等等就足以使一雙并不特殊的的眼睛變得呆滯了。結(jié)果，大多數(shù)反傾銷政策法的支持者就很容易地把它那吸引人的花言巧語做為表面的價值。假如聽起來很好，那肯定就是好。由這篇論文其中之一的一個執(zhí)筆者研究的一篇早期的加圖學(xué)會研究繼

48、續(xù)提出了類似的反對。那篇論文題目為“美國的反傾銷政策法與事實相違背的花言巧語”。他們聚焦在由反傾銷政策法支持者為此法提出的正當(dāng)理由上，并根據(jù)這些正當(dāng)?shù)睦碛蓪Ψ磧A銷政策的實踐進行了調(diào)查。結(jié)論是：反傾銷政策的執(zhí)行很少能成功地與反傾銷政策支持者所謂的“公平交易”相吻合。這篇論文關(guān)注的是更多的實踐和較少的理論。這里強調(diào)的是美國商業(yè)部門對傾銷所下的定義和計算的具體細節(jié)。尤其是我們要揭露反傾銷政策背后骯臟的小秘密導(dǎo)致傾銷結(jié)果的遁詞和偏見的方法，甚至當(dāng)美國進口產(chǎn)品的價格與國外廠商索取的價格相同或比國外廠商家鄉(xiāng)市場更高的價格時也依然會導(dǎo)致傾銷結(jié)果。一旦這些遁詞和偏見被了解，對當(dāng)前僅僅被限定在“公平交易”的反傾

49、銷法的幻想就破滅了。在這里我們不是企圖對反傾銷法做全面的分析或批評。由于在美國法律下要征稅的反傾銷措施，兩個主要的要求必須得以滿足，一是doc必須找出正在被傾倒的進口貨，二是國際貿(mào)易委員必須發(fā)現(xiàn)傾倒進口貨會對國內(nèi)工業(yè)造成傷害或威脅。這片論文我們并不是在演說國際貿(mào)易中心的傷害分析，也不是在演說反傾銷政策調(diào)查表面上的各種程序包括正義的要求，開始時的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，可行性的用途或所謂的伯德改善下了國內(nèi)產(chǎn)品關(guān)稅的分配。雖然反傾銷政策實踐更多的其他方面的原理接受批評的時機已經(jīng)成熟，但是我選擇對反傾銷政策方針的中心問題進行目標(biāo)導(dǎo)向追蹤，什么組成傾銷？這個問題的如何回答決定了反傾銷法的基本原理特征。假如由于方法的缺陷

50、和偏見，正常的、健康的競爭很有平常地被誣蔑為“公平”傾銷，那么法律本身就是最根本的缺陷，它并不是依照經(jīng)濟學(xué)家和政策書呆子的象牙城堡的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而正是根據(jù)反傾銷法支持者贊成的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。反傾銷政策現(xiàn)狀的擁護者爭辯反傾銷法不是保護貿(mào)易論者，它不是一般的歧視反對進口貨來支持國內(nèi)產(chǎn)品。相反地，它的目的僅僅是通過“不公平”和扭曲的市場交易為正常、健康的國際競爭開辟道路。依據(jù)它的支持者，反傾銷法在保護由國內(nèi)和國外產(chǎn)商根據(jù)誰制造最好的產(chǎn)品賣最低的價格進行公平競爭的 “公平交易”市場上產(chǎn)生了效果，以次作為反對由于政府導(dǎo)致的扭曲的本地市場導(dǎo)致一些國外廠商享受虛假優(yōu)勢的情形。事實上，如果傾銷是把如此完美無辜的進口貨競爭歸類

51、為不公平這樣一種方式定義的，那么反傾銷措施和普通的保護主義之間的區(qū)別就不存在了，反傾銷政策支持者應(yīng)該承認(rèn)有個問題需要被定位。反傾銷政策的程序在批評反傾銷政策法的方法缺陷之前，首先有必要了解，至少對反傾銷政策的步驟是如何操作的有個主要的輪廓，所以，接下來是通過對docs規(guī)則和識別與測量傾銷的程序的詳細關(guān)注，以此對目前反傾銷政策的實行做最基本的觀察。調(diào)查和回顧傾銷的定義是在一個出口市場（也就是在美國法律下）以一種比實際價值低的價格出售日用品。實際價值是根據(jù)相同或相似產(chǎn)品在相對市場（通常是國外廠商的本地市場）的價格或生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)品的花費加上一些總的利潤決定的。傾銷的范圍稱為傾銷差價，它是根據(jù)出口價格減去實

52、際價值，用它們之間的差價（假設(shè)是確定的）除以商品的出口價格來計算的。換句話說，如果一個國外廠商生產(chǎn)小器具，在本地買10，在美國買8，那么他的傾銷差價就是(10 8)/8，或者25%。傾銷存在單靠反傾銷關(guān)稅的征稅是不夠的，另外，權(quán)威人士必須確定國內(nèi)工業(yè)正受到實質(zhì)性的傷害和威脅，否則，由于傾倒進口產(chǎn)品，在本質(zhì)上阻礙了工業(yè)的發(fā)展。在美國，一種產(chǎn)業(yè)在反傾銷法下能向國際貿(mào)易中心和doc.申請救濟。加入申請的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者被稱為申請人。至少要有25%的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者自愿支持該申請，其它反對者的組成必須少于總?cè)藬?shù)的50%。申請必須包括傾銷的證據(jù)和傷害，才能進行調(diào)查。然而，必要的證據(jù)是十分謹(jǐn)慎的。一旦開始反傾銷調(diào)查，

53、國際貿(mào)易中心有45天的時間決定是否有理由讓人相信傾倒進口貨正對國內(nèi)工業(yè)進行威脅和傷害。最初遞交的肯定的決定占事例的79%。根據(jù)國際貿(mào)易中心最初肯定的決定，doc發(fā)布調(diào)查問卷給國外最知名的生產(chǎn)者和出售國內(nèi)主要貨物的出口商進行調(diào)查。如果對doc的調(diào)查沒有做出相應(yīng)的反映或沒有與這代表性的活動進行充分的合作,會導(dǎo)致對責(zé)任的不利評價與分配,它通常是根據(jù)國內(nèi)工業(yè)請求的主張。假如一個國外生產(chǎn)者有任何繼續(xù)進入美國市場的希望，都不得不對doc的大部分調(diào)查要求做出反映以獲得信息根據(jù)國際貿(mào)易中心最初肯定的決定，這個doc發(fā)布調(diào)查問卷給國外最知名的生產(chǎn)者和出售國內(nèi)主要貨物的出口商進行調(diào)查。如果對doc的調(diào)查沒有做出相

54、應(yīng)的反應(yīng)或沒有與這代表性的活動進行充分的合作,會導(dǎo)致對責(zé)任的不利評價與分配,它通常是根據(jù)國內(nèi)工業(yè)請求的主張。假如一個國外生產(chǎn)者有任何繼續(xù)進入美國市場的希望，都不得不對doc的大部分調(diào)查要求做出反應(yīng)以獲得信息。通常是通過重要的公司的產(chǎn)品、合法性、帳目和經(jīng)濟技術(shù)的轉(zhuǎn)移來對反傾銷調(diào)查做出反應(yīng)。doc通常在它開始調(diào)查的140天里進行初試（雖然最后期限可以再延長50天）。假如doc的初試是肯定的，對將來主要進口貨的清算（也就是最終的進口關(guān)稅服務(wù)的決定）暫停，那么覆蓋所有可能的反傾銷關(guān)稅的債券的公布要與初試的宣布同時進行。然后doc在初試的最后75天（這里，雖然最終期限可以延長，但是這次能延長時間長達60

55、天）里再次制定最后的決定。在最初的測試和最終的決定之間，doc對被調(diào)查者的數(shù)據(jù)進行實地查證，然后考慮由請求者和調(diào)查者遞交的切合實際和合法的意見，最后做肯定的假設(shè)，在宣布最后決定的時候，回答者必須付可能的反傾銷關(guān)稅押金。一旦doc發(fā)布最后的決定，國際貿(mào)易中心有45天的時間做最后的傷害裁決，如果那個決定（有83%可能發(fā)生的結(jié)果）是肯定的，那么主要預(yù)期進口貨的反傾銷關(guān)稅押金傾銷計算的價格相等反傾銷命令會被發(fā)布。反傾銷押金比率僅僅是對傾銷責(zé)任的估計。比率是根據(jù)某一時期調(diào)查得到的傾銷差價來計算的，在一般的納稅開始后將要結(jié)束的那個時期完成最近的四分之一。最后比率是由doc.執(zhí)行的行政回顧決定的?；仡櫝跗诎?/p>

56、括反傾銷稅命令實行一周年進口貨的最初義務(wù)稅，接著包括進口貨從第一個紀(jì)念日到下一個，doc.的最后決定為進口貨解決最初傾銷債務(wù)。如果傾銷物的總額多于押金，那么盤貨抵押的人就會負不同的利息，換句話說，如果傾銷物的總額少于押金，那么盤貨抵押的人會得到利息上的償還。另外，最后決定不但對過去的進口貨物制定最后的債務(wù)，同樣為將來的進口貨物建立了新的押金率。傾銷利潤通過行政回顧因此能一年重算一次。在另一方面，傷害的繼續(xù)存在是每五年輪回一次，因此被稱為晚期回顧。反傾銷稅命令五年后自動終止，除非被要求進行最后回顧。在這個回顧中，doc和國際貿(mào)易中心分別決定是否終止這個可能會給致傾銷延長或給傾銷帶來傷害的決定，如

57、果兩者做肯定的決定，那么這個命令將再實施五年。在1998年7月和2002年8月之間，已經(jīng)開始了354次的回顧，有256次是受到請求者爭論的。在256個有爭論的事例中有兩個仍然沒有得到解決，doc決意讓這個命令再實施是因為除了4個案例外的其他263個案例，然而國際貿(mào)易中心這次只投了72%的贊成票。原文二the devilish details of “unfair trade” lawby brink lindsey and dan ikensonsummary：the u.s. an brink lindsey and dan ikenson：brink lindsey 是加圖貿(mào)易政策研究中心

58、的主管，. dan ikenson 是該中心的貿(mào)易政策分析家tidumping law enjoys broad political support in part because so few people understand how the law actually works. its rhetoric of “fairness” and “l(fā)evel playing fields” sounds appealing, and its convoluted technical complexities prevent all but a few insiders and experts

59、 from understanding the reality that underlies that rhetoric. in this study we seek to penetrate the fog of complexity that shields the antidumping law from the scrutiny it deserves. here we offer a detailed, step-by-step guide to how dumping is defined and measured under current rules. in addition, we identify the many methodological quirks and biases that allow nor