股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、現(xiàn)金流與資本投資講義課件

Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005Law,CorporateGovernance,and1I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesI.IntroductionIthasbeenove2MotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?MotivationWhatcontributesto3本資料來源本資料來源4II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-financeII.IssuesandHypothesis:51.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

61.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

7EntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargesharehol81.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmControllerThereisf91.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmController-centralg101.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.2

FirmControllerCentralgo111.

CorporateGovernance1.3

BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement. -thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.1.

CorporateGovernance1.3

B12Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectiveness DeFondandJiambalvo(1991) Beasley(1996) Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc. Boardcompositionanddisclosure

ChenandJaggi（2000）Jensen(1993)arguesthatboar13TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboardsize14Theboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelations15IndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectors16DirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdings17DirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensation181.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa191.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa20SupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberC214．Institutioninvestors機構(gòu)投資者能夠降低公司內(nèi)部的代理成本，減少公司管理層的不良行為 JarrellandPoulsen(1987) Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988) 機構(gòu)投資者更傾向于反對減少股東財富的行為機構(gòu)投資者相比其他類型的投資者而言更需要透明度和信息的披露 Healyetal.(1999) Bushee和Noe(2000) 機構(gòu)投資者更偏好購買那些持續(xù)披露信息的公司的股票4．Institutioninvestors機構(gòu)投資者能夠22長期持有公司股票的機構(gòu)投資者，很可能出于自身的利益而合謀進(jìn)行不法行為機構(gòu)投資者可以從中得到的益處 財務(wù)性的收益，如低于市價的轉(zhuǎn)讓價格，阻止封閉式基金的贖回以及承銷、財務(wù)顧問方面的合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非財務(wù)性的收益，如影響公司在政治、經(jīng)濟或社會方面的政策長期持有公司股票的機構(gòu)投資者，很可能出于自身的利益而合謀進(jìn)行23就我國的實際情況而言，基金、證券等機構(gòu)重倉持有上市公司的股票，利用內(nèi)部信息進(jìn)行炒作、牟取暴利已不是秘密因此，在我國機構(gòu)投資者的持股比例同公司違規(guī)行為是正相關(guān)還是負(fù)相關(guān)或不相關(guān)需要實證檢驗。H4：Institutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandal就我國的實際情況而言，基金、證券等機構(gòu)重倉持有上市公司的股票24FinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials

FinancialdistressFirmsconfro25

3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

3.Economicdevelopment26

4.Law

WrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)

4.Law27

China’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?

China’sprovincessignificant28四、實證研究方法

（i）變量

SCANDAL，公司是否被監(jiān)管機構(gòu)認(rèn)定為違規(guī)并公開批評,譴責(zé)或處罰控制變量DEBT：公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率ROA：公司的資產(chǎn)收益率LIQUIDITY：公司的流動比率四、實證研究方法（i）變量292．實證回歸模型

Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(β0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+β5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）) （1）

2．實證回歸模型Matchingscandalfirm30五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)

（一）數(shù)據(jù)

Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals. ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.

Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160

五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)（一）數(shù)據(jù)31虛構(gòu)利潤虛列資產(chǎn)虛假陳述重大遺漏擅自改變資金用途大股東占用資產(chǎn)違規(guī)擔(dān)保股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、現(xiàn)金流與資本投資講義課件32五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)

Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.

Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange (ii)

Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits

(iii)FirmSize.

53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraud Whenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttime五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)Eachofthescandalfi33SampledescriptionSampledescription34

35logistic回歸分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentlogistic回歸分析Governanceandfin36CorporateGovernance

Ownership

LARGEST回歸系數(shù)為負(fù),在5%水平上顯著,LARGESTSQ的回歸系數(shù)為正，在10%水平上顯著第一大股東持股比例從零開始增大,公司越不會commitscandal;當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例達(dá)到一定水平,持股比例越高,公司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回歸系數(shù)為正，LOCAL在5%水平上顯著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上顯著 非國有法人和地方政府控制的公司更有可能違規(guī)CorporateGovernance

Ownership37董事會BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不顯著 董事會規(guī)模和獨立董事席位（比例）CHAIRCEO不顯著 CEO是否兼任董事持股董事人數(shù)（比例）和付報酬董事人數(shù)（比例）均不顯著CHAIRHOLDING為負(fù)，在10％水平上顯著董事長持股比例越高，公司越不會commitscandal董事會BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不顯著38監(jiān)事會監(jiān)事會規(guī)模不顯著持股監(jiān)事人數(shù)（比例）不顯著付報酬監(jiān)事比例顯著為正(10%水平) 取得報酬的監(jiān)事比例越高，公司越可能commitscandal監(jiān)事會監(jiān)事會規(guī)模不顯著39機構(gòu)投資者機構(gòu)投資者持股比例不顯著機構(gòu)投資者機構(gòu)投資者持股比例不顯著40分拆上市或整體上市分拆上市或整體上市沒有顯著影響分拆上市或整體上市分拆上市或整體上市沒有顯著影響41Controls流動比率的回歸系數(shù)顯著為負(fù) 流動比率越高的公司，financialdistress的可能較小,違規(guī)可能較小DEBT的回歸系數(shù)為正，但統(tǒng)計上不顯著ROA的回歸系數(shù)顯著為負(fù) 資產(chǎn)收益率較高的公司違規(guī)可能較小Controls42RegiondevelopmentNortheast顯著為正,公司發(fā)生丑聞的可能性較高midyangtz顯著為正,公司發(fā)生丑聞的可能性較高Regiondevelopment43Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，該省人均GDP對數(shù)值為負(fù)，并在統(tǒng)計上顯著 經(jīng)濟越發(fā)達(dá)，公司發(fā)生丑聞的可能性越小Economicdevelopment44LegaldevelopmentMeasureoflegaleffectiveness檢察院(procuratorialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立案經(jīng)濟案件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:TheratioofsavedlossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate: Thismeasuresthecorruptnessofofficials.Thenumberofcadresatcountylevelorabove(縣處級以上)involvedinprocuratatedividedbythepopulation

LegaldevelopmentMeasureofle45Legaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_Rate

RCMP:Thenumberofcommercialcasesreceivedbythecourtpermillionofpopulation律師協(xié)會(lawyerassociation)Lawyer_per_capitaLawyer_GDP_Ratio

Legaldevelopment法院(courtsys46Legaldevelopment

ProcuratorialCases_per_capitaProcuratorialCases_gdpShowpositiverelationshiptopropensitytocommitscandal? Measurestheextentofillegalactivity,butnotthelaweffectivenesswhentheeffectivenessofprocuratorialsystemisextremelylowLegaldevelopmentProcuratoria47LegaldevelopmentRCMP顯著為正,RCMP平方顯著為負(fù)TwodifferentsceneriesWhenthelaweffectivenessisextremelylowWhenlawbecomeseffective(e.g.Shanghai) BetterlegalenvironmentLegaldevelopment48FinancialdevelopmentMeasurementPrivate_Invest:Obtainedbysubtractingthefixed-assetinvestmentmadebySOEsandcollectivefirmsfromthetotalamountoffixed-assetinvestmentinaprovinceFIN_Competition:Subtractingthecreditissuedbythefourmajorstatebanksfromthetotalamountofcredit,wegetthecreditissuedbylocalfinancialinstitutions.Theproportionofcreditissuedbylocalfinancialinstitutionstothetotalamountofcreditcanserveasameasureoffinancialcompetition.FinancialdevelopmentMeasureme49股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、現(xiàn)金流與資本投資講義課件50Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005Law,CorporateGovernance,and51I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesI.IntroductionIthasbeenove52MotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?MotivationWhatcontributesto53本資料來源本資料來源54II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-financeII.IssuesandHypothesis:551.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

561.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

57EntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargesharehol581.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmControllerThereisf591.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmController-centralg601.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.2

FirmControllerCentralgo611.

CorporateGovernance1.3

BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement. -thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.1.

CorporateGovernance1.3

B62Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectiveness DeFondandJiambalvo(1991) Beasley(1996) Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc. Boardcompositionanddisclosure

ChenandJaggi（2000）Jensen(1993)arguesthatboar63TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboardsize64Theboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelations65IndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectors66DirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdings67DirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensation681.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa691.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa70SupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberC714．Institutioninvestors機構(gòu)投資者能夠降低公司內(nèi)部的代理成本，減少公司管理層的不良行為 JarrellandPoulsen(1987) Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988) 機構(gòu)投資者更傾向于反對減少股東財富的行為機構(gòu)投資者相比其他類型的投資者而言更需要透明度和信息的披露 Healyetal.(1999) Bushee和Noe(2000) 機構(gòu)投資者更偏好購買那些持續(xù)披露信息的公司的股票4．Institutioninvestors機構(gòu)投資者能夠72長期持有公司股票的機構(gòu)投資者，很可能出于自身的利益而合謀進(jìn)行不法行為機構(gòu)投資者可以從中得到的益處 財務(wù)性的收益，如低于市價的轉(zhuǎn)讓價格，阻止封閉式基金的贖回以及承銷、財務(wù)顧問方面的合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非財務(wù)性的收益，如影響公司在政治、經(jīng)濟或社會方面的政策長期持有公司股票的機構(gòu)投資者，很可能出于自身的利益而合謀進(jìn)行73就我國的實際情況而言，基金、證券等機構(gòu)重倉持有上市公司的股票，利用內(nèi)部信息進(jìn)行炒作、牟取暴利已不是秘密因此，在我國機構(gòu)投資者的持股比例同公司違規(guī)行為是正相關(guān)還是負(fù)相關(guān)或不相關(guān)需要實證檢驗。H4：Institutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandal就我國的實際情況而言，基金、證券等機構(gòu)重倉持有上市公司的股票74FinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials

FinancialdistressFirmsconfro75

3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

3.Economicdevelopment76

4.Law

WrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)

4.Law77

China’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?

China’sprovincessignificant78四、實證研究方法

（i）變量

SCANDAL，公司是否被監(jiān)管機構(gòu)認(rèn)定為違規(guī)并公開批評,譴責(zé)或處罰控制變量DEBT：公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率ROA：公司的資產(chǎn)收益率LIQUIDITY：公司的流動比率四、實證研究方法（i）變量792．實證回歸模型

Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(β0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+β5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）) （1）

2．實證回歸模型Matchingscandalfirm80五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)

（一）數(shù)據(jù)

Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals. ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.

Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160

五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)（一）數(shù)據(jù)81虛構(gòu)利潤虛列資產(chǎn)虛假陳述重大遺漏擅自改變資金用途大股東占用資產(chǎn)違規(guī)擔(dān)保股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、現(xiàn)金流與資本投資講義課件82五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)

Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.

Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange (ii)

Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits

(iii)FirmSize.

53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraud Whenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttime五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)Eachofthescandalfi83SampledescriptionSampledescription84

85logistic回歸分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentlogistic回歸分析Governanceandfin86CorporateGovernance

Ownership

LARGEST回歸系數(shù)為負(fù),在5%水平上顯著,LARGESTSQ的回歸系數(shù)為正，在10%水平上顯著第一大股東持股比例從零開始增大,公司越不會commitscandal;當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例達(dá)到一定水平,持股比例越高,公司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回歸系數(shù)為正，LOCAL在5%水平上顯著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上顯著 非國有法人和地方政府控制的公司更有可能違規(guī)CorporateGovernance