清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵

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ChapterSeventeenAuctions清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第1頁!WhereareweinthecourseWeareworkingonafewimportantadditionstoourmicroeconomicsframeworkWearediscussingaimportantcaseofnon-petitivemarket清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第2頁!WhoUsesAuctions?Ownersofart,cars,stamps,machines,mineralrightsetc.Q:Whyauction?A:Becausemanymarketsareimperfectanditishardtodiscoverpotentialbuyers’truevaluationsofyourasset.Auctionshelptodiscoverthisinformation.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第3頁!TypesofAuctionsEnglishauction:bidsarepublicannouncementsbidpricerisesuntiltherearenofurtherbidshighestbidwinswinnerpayshisbid.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第4頁!TypesofAuctionsSealed-bidsecond-priceauction:bidsareprivateinformationbidsaremadesimultaneouslyhighestbidderwinswinnerpayssecond-highestbidalsoknownasaVickreyauction.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第5頁!ReservePriceAsellerspecifiedbidlevelbelowwhichnosaleismade.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第6頁!Economists’ClassificationofAuctionsCommon-valueauctions:itemforsalehasthesamevaluetoeverypotentialbuyerpotentialbuyersdifferintheirownestimatesofthismonvalue.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第7頁!AuctionDesignParetoefficiency:theitemmustselltothebuyerwiththehighestvaluationoftheitem.WhichauctionsareParetoefficient?清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第8頁!AuctionsandEfficiencyEnglishauctionwithareservepriceneednotbeefficientsinceifthereservepriceissetabovethe(unknowntotheseller)highestbuyervaluation,thentherewillbenosaleandsonogains-to-trade.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第9頁!AuctionsandEfficiencySealed-bidfirst-priceauctionneednotbeefficient.Nobuyerknowsotherbuyers’valuations,sothehighestvaluationbuyermaybidtoolowandlosetoanotherbidder.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第10頁!WhyUseaReservePrice?Supposethereare2buyers.Thesellerbelieveseachbuyer’svaluationis$20withchance1/2and$50withchance1/2.I.e.withchance1/4each,thesellerbelievesshefacesbuyervaluations($20,$20),($20,$50),($50,$20)and($50,$50).清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第11頁!WhyUseaReservePrice?Withchance1/4each,winningbidswillbe$20,$21,$21and$50ifthereisnoreserveprice.Seller’sexpectedrevenueis

($20+$21+$21+$50)/4=$28

withnoreserveprice.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第12頁!WhyUseaReservePrice?Setareservepriceof$50.Withchance1/4therewillbenosale.Withchance3/4thewinningbidwillbe$50.Seller’sexpectedrevenueis清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第13頁!Second-Price,Sealed-BidAuctionbidsareprivateinformationbidsaremadesimultaneouslyhighestbidderwinswinnerpayssecond-highestbidalsoknownasaVickreyauction.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第14頁!Second-Price,Sealed-BidAuctionE.g.twobidderswithtruevaluationsv1andv2.Bidsareb1andb2.Expectedgaintobidder1is清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第15頁!Second-Price,Sealed-BidAuctionSincetruth-tellingisbestforeverybidder,thehighestvaluationbidderwillwin.Hencethesecond-price,sealed-bidauctionisPareto-efficient.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第16頁!Common-ValueAuctionsBidderi’sestimateis

whereisthemonvalueandisbidderi’sestimationerror.Ifeverybidistruthful,thewinneristhebidderwiththelargestestimationerrorsoatruthfulwinneronaveragepaysmorethanthetruevalue--thewinner’scurse.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第17頁!TypesofAuctionsSealed-bidfirst-priceauction:bidsareprivateinformationbidsaremadesimultaneouslyhighestbidwinswinnerpayshisbid.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第18頁!TypesofAuctionsDutchauction:auctioneerannouncesahighbidandthengraduallylowersthebidfirstbuyertoacceptwinsandpaysthatprice.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第19頁!Economists’ClassificationofAuctionsPrivate-valueauctions:everypotentialbuyerknowsforsureherownvaluationoftheitemforsalealltheseindividualvaluationsareindependentofeachother.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第20頁!AuctionDesignGoals:Paretoefficiencymaximizationoftheseller’sprofit.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第21頁!AuctionsandEfficiencyEnglishauctionwithnoreservepricemustbeefficientsince,ifabuyerwithalowvaluationwasabouttobuy,thehighestvaluationbuyerwouldbidhigher.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第22頁!AuctionsandEfficiencyDutchauctionneednotbeefficient.Nobuyerknowsotherbuyers’valuations,sothehighestvaluationbuyermaydelaytoolongandlosetoanotherbidder.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第23頁!AuctionsandEfficiencySealed-bidsecond-priceauctionisParetoefficienteventhoughnobuyerknowstheotherbuyers’valuations(moreonthislater).清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第24頁!WhyUseaReservePrice?I.e.withchance1/4each,thesellerbelievesshefacesbuyervaluations($20,$20),($20,$50),($50,$20)and($50,$50).UseanEnglishauction.Bidsmustberaisedbyatleast$1.Withchance1/4each,winningbidswillbe$20,$21,$21and$50ifthereisnoreserveprice.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第25頁!WhyUseaReservePrice?Withchance1/4each,thesellerbelievesshefacesbuyervaluations($20,$20),($20,$50),($50,$20)and($50,$50).Setareservepriceof$50.Withchance1/4therewillbenosale.Withchance3/4thewinningbidwillbe$50.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第26頁!ReservePriceandEfficiencyThereservepricecausesanefficiencylosssince,withchance1/4,thereisnotrade.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第27頁!Second-Price,Sealed-BidAuction

Nobidderknowsanyotherbidder’struevaluationoftheitemforsale.Yet,itisindividuallyrationalforeachbiddertostatetruthfullyhisownvaluation.Why?E.g.twobidderswithtruevaluationsv1andv2.清華大學(xué)中級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)講義清華李稻葵共31頁，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第28頁!Second-Price,Sealed-BidAuctionExpectedgaintob