績(jī)效審計(jì)與公共管理改革【外文翻譯】

外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文原文PerformanceAuditandPublicManagementReformAuditisoneoftheoldestandmostvenerablestatefunctions.TheFrenchCourdesComptestracesitsoriginsbackto1318;theUKNationalAuditOfficecites1314asthedateofitsfirstmanifestation;theDutchAlgemeneRekenkamerfindsancestorsasrunningbackto1386.Stateauditthuslongprecededtheemergenceofmodernformsofdemocraticgovernment.Howeverstateauditofficeshavemademanyadaptationsinthecourseoftheirlonghistoryandduringthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiestheyfashionedacrucialroleforthemselveswithinthemachineryofdemocraticaccountability.Onthiskindofhistoricalscale,performanceauditisaveryrecentactivity.Althoughmoreorlessplausibleclaimscanbemadefortheexistenceofperformanceaudit-likeactivitiesbacktothe1960s—orevenconsiderablyearlier—performanceauditasalarge-scale,self-considerablydistinctpracticedatesmainlysincethelate1970s.Performanceauditrepresentsamodernvariantofaudit—nottheonlyonebut,aswellshalldemonstrate,achallengingandfascinatingone.Itisdistinctivetostateauditanddoesnothaveaclosecounterpartinprivate-sector,commercialaudit.Overalmostexactlythesameperiodasperformanceaudithasemergedasadistinctformofaudit,thegovernmentofWesternEurope,NorthAmerica,andAustralasiahaveembarkeduponextensiveprogramsofpublicmanagementreform.Thesehaveaimedatmodernizing,streamlining,andinsomecasesminimizingthewholeofthestateapparatus.Althoughthedetailsofthesereformprogramshavevariedconsiderablybetweenonecountryandanother,mostofthemhavegivenacentralplacetothethemesofdecentralizationandperformancemanagement.Thishasentailedawidespreadrethinkingofthebalancebetweentheautonomyandthecontrolofpublicorganizations.Ithasgeneratedasearchformechanismandincentiveswillhelprealizethesenewmanagementideasinpractice.Primafacie,itappearshighlyprobablethatthereisaconnectionbetweenthesetwophenomena:onthehandthegrowthofperformanceauditandontheotherthesearchforanewsolutiontotheancientgovernmentalproblemofgivingautonomyyetretainingcontrol.Yetthereseemstohavebeenlittlesystematicinvestigationofwhatthenatureofthisinteractionmightbe.Oneofourambitionsistofillthisgap.Webegin,inthenextchapter,bylookingattheboundariesanddefinitionsofperformanceaudit,andtheymovedirectlytodescribethepatternsofmanagementreforminthefivecountriesthatformthebasisforourcomparisons:France,Finland,theNetherlands,Sweden,andtheUK.Thisprovidesthecontextagainstwhichlaterchaptersandteaseouttheconnectionsbetweenthedevelopmentofperformanceauditandtheforcesofmanagementchange.Iftheofficialdescriptionsareanythingtogoby,performanceauditisnotjustatechnicaltool.Itdoesnotatallcorrespondtothetraditionalimageofauditingasaprocesscenteredon‘checkingthebooks’inordertoseethattheyhavebeenaccuratelyandproperlykept.Performanceaudithasamoreambitiousmanifesto.Itspractitionersdeclarethattheyareseekingtoestablishwhetherpublicpoliciesorprogramsorprojectsororganizationshavebeenconductedwithdueregardtoeconomy,efficiency,effectiveness,andgoodmanagementpractice.Itthusbringstogether,inapotentnewcombination,theoldertraditionof’’audit’withamuchmorerecentfocuson‘performance‘.Theexacttermswithinwhichauditbodiesundertakethisactivityvaryfromcountrytocountryandovertime.Soweshouldnotrushtosayexactlywhat‘it’isorisn’t,butrathershouldproblematizeandexploretheconcept.Inthatchapterwewillalsotakeabrieflookatsomeofthemanyotherusestowhichtheterm‘a(chǎn)udit’hasrecentlybeenput,adiversificationofmeaningandpracticethatrecentlyledoneacademictowriteanambitioustextentitledTheAuditSociety.Forthemoment,however,itwillsufficetosaythatsetsofpracticestermed‘performanceaudit’orvalue-for-moneystudies’havebecomecentralactivitiesforanincreasinglypowerfulgroupoforganizations-SupremeAuditInstitutions.Inmostdemocraticcountries,theSAIislocatedneartheheartoftheapparatusofthestate.Potentially,therefore,performanceauditshouldbeofconsiderablepoliticalanddemocraticsignificance.Itispracticedbypowerful,independentinstitutionsandispresentedasamodeofinvestigationaimedatestablishingwhether,atwhatcost,andtowhatdegreethepolicies,programs,andprojectsofgovernmentareworking.Giventhesegeneralcharacteristics,onemightexpectthattheconsiderablecommunityofscholarsworkinginsubjectssuchaspoliticalscience,publicadministration,publicmanagement,andpublicfinanceandaccountancywouldhavegeneratedalargeliteratureaboutperformanceaudit.Surprisingly,thisisnotthecase.OnemayspeculateonthereasonswhySAIsand,withinthem,performanceaudithavesufferedrelativeneglectascomparedwith,say,variousaspectsofpublicmanagementreform.Severalreasonsfortheapparentdisparityofinterestinperformanceauditandpublicmanagementreformsuggestthemselves.Tobeginwith,publicmanagementreformhasbeenled—oratleastfronted—bypoliticians,forwhomitisnaturaltomakepublicclaimsthatwhattheyaredoingisinnovative,valuable,andsuccessful.Furthermore,suchchangehasgenerateditsownsupporting‘industry’,includingvariouskindsofconsultantwhohavetakeneveryopportunitytopropelsuchreformevenhigheruppoliticalandadministrativeagendas.Bycontrast,SAIsaresingleinstitutions—andgenerallyrathersoberones.Thebulkoftheirworkappearstobetechnicalanddetailedandtheytakesomepainstostandclearofpartypoliticalcontroversy.Typically,supremeauditinstitutionsarementionedbrieflyingeneraltextbookswhichdescribetheinstitutionsofgovernmentinagivencountry,butfewbooksorarticleshavebeenwrittenspecificallyaboutthem.TheUSA,thoughnotpartofthepresentstudy,wasperhapssomethingofanexceptiontothisgeneralneglect,withacertainamountofanalyticalliteraturefocusingupontheGeneralAccountingOffice.Onlyinthelastfewyearshasthetrickleofjournalarticlesandbookletsbeguntogathersomemomentum.Inthepast,SAIsseldomwentoutoftheirwaytopublicizethemselves—itisonlyinthelastdecadethatmostofthemhavebeguntoproducebookletsandbrochuresforpopularconsumption,ortodealproactivelywiththemassmedia.Somearestillcautiousintheserespects.Finally,thereis,ofcourse,adifferenceofscale.Publicmanagementreformhassweptacrossentirepublicsectors,affectingministries,executiveagencies,quangos,localauthorities,andotherkindsofpublicbody.SAIs,bycontrast,aresingleorganizations,seldomemployingmorethanafewhundredstaff.Thus,changesinwhatauditorsdosimplydonotappeartobeasimportantornewsworthyaschangesthataffecttheworkoftensorhundredsofthousandsofpublicofficials,andwhichmayimpactdirectlyoncitizens’useofpublicservices.Eveniftheaboveconsiderationsgosomewaytowardsexplainingtherelativelackofmediaandscholarlyattentiongiventothedevelopmentofperformanceaudit,thatdoesnotmeanthatsuchactivitiesareinsignificant.Onthecontrary—andasweshallshow--performanceaudithasbecomethelargestsingleactivityforsomeSAIsandanimportantpartoftheworkofalltheSAIsinthisstudy.Thisisarelativelyrecentdevelopment.Althoughthedefinitionofperformanceauditislessthanstraightforward,itisprobablyaccuratetosaythat,allowingforsomeearlier,partialprecedents,itsemergenceasadistinctandmainstreamactivitydatesmainlyfromthelate1970sand1980s.Thus,overthelasttwodecades,anumberofSAIshaveinvestedaconsiderableproportionoftheirresourcesindevelopingarelativelynewareaofactivity,onethatisdirectlyfocusedonthoseissuesofperformancethathavethemselvesbecomesuchacentralfocusofconcernformoderngovernments.Whilegovernmentshavedeclaredthemselvestobeintenselyconcernedwiththe‘threeEs’(economy,efficiency,andeffectiveness)atthesametimeasSAIshavebeendevelopingperformanceauditasawayofinvestigatingthosesamethreeEs,theconnectionbetweenthesetwolinesofactivityhasnotbeenasstraightforwardasmightatfirstappear.Ofcourse,someimpactsarefairlyobvious.Forexample,arecentUKNationalAuditOfficehandbookacknowledgesthatperformanceaudithashadtorespondtothefactthat:‘Twothirdsofgovernmentbusinessisnowcarriedoutbyagencies,outputsanddeliveryaremoreimportantthaninputs,andthereismuchgreaterinvolvementoftheprivatesectorinthedeliveryofpubliclyfundedprograms’.Thisisanexampleofadirectinfluence,runningfrompublicmanagementreformtoperformanceaudit.However,thewholepictureisconsiderablymorecomplicated,withdirectandindirectinfluencesrunninginbothdirections.Ouraimhasthereforebeentostudythepracticeofperformanceauditandrelateittocontemporarydevelopmentsinpublicmanagement.Wehaveinvestigatedthe‘stateoftheart’ofperformanceauditandexploreditslinkswiththeprocessesofmanagementreform.Inempiricalterms,wehavehadtwinfoci.First,wehavegatheredmaterialaboutpublicmanagementreformineachcountry—thisdescribesthecontextinwhichSAIshavedevelopedperformanceaudit.Muchofthishasnecessarilybeensecondarydata,thoughsomeofitderivesfromotherrecentworkbymembersofourteam.Second,inrelationtotheperformanceauditsideoftherelationship,wehaveconductedextensiveprimaryresearch.Ourmainfocushasbeenontheperformanceauditreportandontheprocessthatleadsuptothatreport.Someotherrecentwork,thoughconceptuallysophisticated,hasbeenlimitedbyitsrelianceonamoregeneraltypeofevidence.Wewouldcontendthattheacidtestofwhatperformanceaudit’is’,oriscapableof,mayliemoreinthebedrockofindividualauditsthaninthesuperstructureofwhatSAIssayaboutperformanceauditingeneral,althoughbothtypesofevidenceare,ofcourse,usefulintheirownright.Wehavethereforecounted,categorized,andreadalargenumberofauditreports.Inpracticalterms,theseseemedtheleastunsatisfactoryunitforcomparativeanalysis.Theyhadtheadvantageofbeingconcrete,discrete,andthebasisforanumberofrecordingsystemswithinSAIsthemselves.Unfortunately,however,theyalsocarriedsomedisadvantages.First,notallSAIsdistinguishbetweenperformanceauditreportsandothertypesofreport.Second,notallperformanceauditreportsareinthepublicdomain.Third,thereareotherimportantperformanceaudit‘products’apartfromindividualreports.Forexample,someperformanceauditworkbytheNAOtakestheformofunpublishedreportstodepartmentsratherthanreportstotheParliamentaryPublicAccountsCommittee.ThebulkoftheCour’sworkonbonnegestiontakesplaceintheformofunpublishedcommunicationswiththeauditedbodiesandtheministries,oftenatministeriallevel.Fourth,thereisveryconsiderablevariationbothbetweenandwithinperformanceauditreports.Theycomeindifferentshapesandsizesindifferentcountries,andevenwithinthecorpusofasingleSAIsuchreportsmaybelongorshort,expensiveorcheap,verybroadorquitenarrowinscope,etc.Indeed,thesevariationsareoneofthefeatureswedescribeandcommentupon.Finally,itshouldbepointedoutthatchoosingadifferentunitofanalysiswouldlikelyhaveyieldeddifferentinsights,butatthesametime,andbythesametoken,wouldprobablyhaveconcealedorobscuredsomeofthefeaturesthatourfocusonreportshasilluminated.Forexample,wehaveencounteredsomedifficultyinanalyzingthemethodsusedinperformanceaudit,partlybecausesomereportsuseavarietyofmethodswithinasinglestudywhileotherssayvirtuallynothingaboutwhichmethodsmayhavebeenadopted.Inconclusion,weshouldsaythat,althoughthisworkiscertainlynotintendedtobeprescriptive,wehaveneverthelessthoughtitappropriateinthefinalchapter,tosetoutanagendafordiscussion.Drawingfromourdescriptionsandanalyses,wehaveidentifiedanumberofissueslikelytoshapethefuturedevelopmentofperformanceaudit.Ineffect,theseconstituteasetofstrategicchoices,withsignificantimplicationsfortherolesofSAIs.Someoftheseissuescouldbeclarifiedbyfurtherresearch.Allofthemcouldbenefitfromwideranddeeperdebate.Justaspoliticsistooimportanttobelefttothepoliticians,theactivitiesofourSupremeAuditInstitutionsaretooimportanttobeleftexclusivelytoauditors.Source:ChristopherPollott,HikkaSumma.PerformanceAuditandPublicManagementReform[M],PerformanceorCompliance,2009.

譯文績(jī)效審計(jì)與公共管理改革審計(jì)是最古老且最莊嚴(yán)的國(guó)家職責(zé)之一，法國(guó)審計(jì)院的歷史可以追溯到1318年。英國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)處將1314年作為首次審計(jì)的日期；荷蘭總審計(jì)局的審計(jì)活動(dòng)最早可以追溯到1386年。因此，國(guó)家審計(jì)早前是出現(xiàn)在民主政府的現(xiàn)代形式中的。然而，國(guó)家審計(jì)處在19世紀(jì)與20世紀(jì)這一漫長(zhǎng)的歷史過(guò)程中順應(yīng)形勢(shì)，為自己塑造了一個(gè)在機(jī)構(gòu)里至關(guān)重要的民主責(zé)任的角色。在歷史的發(fā)展中，績(jī)效審計(jì)是最近才開(kāi)展起來(lái)的活動(dòng)。盡管有點(diǎn)看似合理的聲明就能夠完全說(shuō)明類(lèi)似績(jī)效審計(jì)活動(dòng)的存在，可以追溯到20世紀(jì)60年代，甚至更早，績(jī)效審計(jì)作為一個(gè)大規(guī)模自覺(jué)的獨(dú)立實(shí)踐的活動(dòng)是在20世紀(jì)70年代后期確定下來(lái)的。績(jī)效審計(jì)代表了一種現(xiàn)代的不同于傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì)，雖然不是唯一的一個(gè)，就如我們所證明的，它具有挑戰(zhàn)性并且具有吸引力。相對(duì)與國(guó)家審計(jì)，績(jī)效審計(jì)的顯著特點(diǎn)在于它不出現(xiàn)在私營(yíng)部門(mén)和商業(yè)審計(jì)。幾乎同時(shí)，績(jī)效審計(jì)顯示出了一種不同于一般財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)的模式。在西歐，北美和澳大利亞政府已開(kāi)始廣泛的公共管理改革方案。這些都旨在現(xiàn)代化，精簡(jiǎn)化，以及在某些情況下最大限度地整合了整個(gè)國(guó)家機(jī)器的結(jié)構(gòu)。盡管這些改革方案的細(xì)節(jié)在不同國(guó)家之間各異，但他們中的大部分都將分散集權(quán)和績(jī)效管理放在了一個(gè)重要的位置。這包含了如何平衡自治權(quán)和公共組織控制兩者之間關(guān)系的廣泛思考。它產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)對(duì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的探索，將有助于在實(shí)踐中尋找新的管理理念。表面上，似乎極有可能是有這兩種現(xiàn)象之間的連接：一方面績(jī)效審計(jì)的發(fā)展,另一方面尋找一個(gè)新的辦法來(lái)解決依舊被政府控制的自治權(quán)這一古老的問(wèn)題。但這看起來(lái)似乎是一種本質(zhì)在相互作用的系統(tǒng)調(diào)查。我們企圖之一便是填補(bǔ)這個(gè)空白。在下一章節(jié),我們開(kāi)始觀察績(jī)效審計(jì)的定義及范圍,并用以描述法國(guó)、芬蘭、荷蘭、瑞典和英國(guó)這五個(gè)國(guó)家之間的以管理模式改革為基礎(chǔ)的比較。為后面章節(jié)所提及的內(nèi)容提供了背景,理出了績(jī)效審計(jì)的發(fā)展和管理改革力量之間的關(guān)系。如果依據(jù)官方的解釋,那么公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)不僅僅只是一種技術(shù)工具。它并不如傳統(tǒng)印象中的審計(jì)只是一個(gè)能夠準(zhǔn)確地、適當(dāng)?shù)亍昂藢?duì)資料”的處理過(guò)程而已?？?jī)效審計(jì)會(huì)有更多的令人興奮的聲明。它的從業(yè)者聲明,他們正在探求要對(duì)是否要建立起已充分考慮到經(jīng)濟(jì)性和效率性，效果性和良好的管理實(shí)踐性的公開(kāi)政策、程序、計(jì)劃或組織。同時(shí)帶來(lái)的是一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的新組合：即傳統(tǒng)觀念中的審計(jì)和側(cè)重績(jī)效的現(xiàn)代審計(jì)相結(jié)合。隨著時(shí)間的推移，審計(jì)主體中的確切條款在不同國(guó)家的審計(jì)活動(dòng)間存在變化。所以我們應(yīng)該不要急于明確“績(jī)效審計(jì)”的準(zhǔn)確定義,而是應(yīng)該作為問(wèn)題來(lái)深入探尋它的概念。這一章節(jié)里我們也將簡(jiǎn)要地看一看一些“審計(jì)”在目前定義下的別的用途,審計(jì)實(shí)施和意義上的多樣化近年來(lái)引起了一個(gè)學(xué)者開(kāi)始撰寫(xiě)一部名為《審計(jì)社會(huì)》的鴻篇巨著。然而，目前，它將足夠表明那些被叫做“績(jī)效審計(jì)”或者“一項(xiàng)物超所值的研究”的實(shí)踐活動(dòng)已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)正在強(qiáng)大起來(lái)的機(jī)構(gòu)組織——最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的中心活動(dòng)。在大多數(shù)民主國(guó)家，最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)是一個(gè)接近于國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)中心的位置。因此,公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)潛在中應(yīng)是具有相當(dāng)大的政治與民主意義。它以強(qiáng)大的、獨(dú)立的公共機(jī)構(gòu)被人們所熟悉，并且以確定其是否應(yīng)該被成立、代價(jià)多少、如何開(kāi)展政府政策和計(jì)劃為目的，以調(diào)查研究為形式被我們所認(rèn)識(shí)?？紤]到這些總體特征，我們可能會(huì)希望這些學(xué)者所組成的團(tuán)體所涉及的學(xué)科是那些比如政治學(xué)、公共管理、公共財(cái)政和財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)等一些會(huì)產(chǎn)生大量關(guān)于績(jī)效審計(jì)文獻(xiàn)的學(xué)科。令人驚訝的是,情況不是這樣的。因此，為何我們?cè)谧罡邔徲?jì)機(jī)關(guān)以及其內(nèi)部中忽視了績(jī)效審計(jì)與所謂的公共管理改革各方面對(duì)比的原因是可以推斷出來(lái)的。績(jī)效審計(jì)與公共管理改革的自我建議在表面上的不一致是存在很多原因的。首先，公共管理改革已經(jīng)被引入或者至少被政客所提及，所以對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)，公開(kāi)聲稱(chēng)他們正在做的正是有所創(chuàng)新的、具有價(jià)值的以及可預(yù)見(jiàn)能成功的事情是很自然的。此外，這種改變已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了自己支持的“產(chǎn)業(yè)”，包括各種抓住任何機(jī)會(huì)把政治和行政推向更高層次的各種顧問(wèn)。相比之下，最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)是單一的、通常被認(rèn)為是嚴(yán)肅的機(jī)構(gòu)。他們大量的工作似乎是很有技術(shù)性且詳細(xì)，并且還要認(rèn)準(zhǔn)自己的立場(chǎng)，分清各種政黨政治的爭(zhēng)議。通常，最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)會(huì)在那些寫(xiě)關(guān)于一個(gè)國(guó)家的政府體系的教材上被簡(jiǎn)略提到，但很少被寫(xiě)入專(zhuān)門(mén)的書(shū)籍或文章。美國(guó)，雖然不是目前研究的一部分，或許是一個(gè)容易被忽視的例外，因?yàn)樗鼘⒁欢〝?shù)量的分析性文字集中在總審計(jì)署上。在過(guò)去的幾年里只有開(kāi)始少量的收集期刊文章和小冊(cè)子的勢(shì)頭。以前，最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)很少用自己的方式宣傳自己，他們中的大部分僅僅在過(guò)去的十年里才開(kāi)始生產(chǎn)和普及消費(fèi)那些小冊(cè)子，或者通過(guò)媒體來(lái)積極應(yīng)對(duì)。但始終有一部分對(duì)此持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度。當(dāng)然，最后績(jī)效審計(jì)的還存在規(guī)模上的差異。公共管理改革橫掃整個(gè)政府資助企業(yè)、部門(mén)、行政代理、半公營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)、地方政府以及其他一些公共體制。相比之下，最高審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)是個(gè)獨(dú)立組織，很少會(huì)雇傭超過(guò)100人的員工。因此，審計(jì)人員的看似不重要且沒(méi)有新聞價(jià)值的簡(jiǎn)單工作的一丁點(diǎn)變動(dòng)反而會(huì)影響幾