Winners-and-Losers-Distributional-Impacts-of-Highway-User-Fees贏家和輸家的公路使用費(fèi)分配的影響-P課件

CaseStudy:Oregon

Proposedchangeinhighwayusercharges:FromaGasolineTaxtoVehiclemilefee

PurposeofTax:ToCollectRoadUserFees(Wewillnotconsidercongestionfeeshere)Intent:RevenueNeutralFeeIntent:RevenueNeutralFeeVMTtaxsetat$.012/miletoreplace$.24/gallongasolinetax($.012=$.24/20mpg)BackgroundOregonlegislaturehasrealizedthefutilityoftryingtofundhighwayswiththecurrent24cent/gallontaxNopoliticalsupportforraisingthetaxGiventrendtowardsmorefuelefficientvehicles,fueltaxnowservesasaroaduserfeeaslightvehicleroaddamageismorerelatedtomilesratherthanfuelconsumedSuggestionbylegislativelyappointedRoadUserFeeTaskForce(RUFTF): ReplacegasolinetaxwithaVehicleMileTax(VMT)WhoGainsandLosesFromThisChange?DistributionofCosts:BetweenIncomeGroups Betweenregions(urban/rural)IdentificationimportantfordecisionsregardingrevenuedistributionRegressive,Progressive,andProportionalorNeutralTax/FeeStructuresAregressivefeetakesagreaterpercentageofincomefromlowerincomegroupsandhigherincomegroupspayasmallerpercentageofincomeAprogressivefeemeansthathigherincomegroupspayaprogressivelyhigherpercentoftheirincomeinfeesInaproportionalorneutralfeestructureallincomegroupspaythesamepercentoftheirincomeinfeesAverageOregonHouseholdExpendituresWithOregonGasolineTaxof$.24(2019,withaverageOregongasolinepriceof$1.46/gallon)IncomegroupNumberofHouseholdsAverageHHexpenditurewithgastax$.24/gallonAverageHHexpenditureas%ofincomeAveragetaxrevenuewithgastaxof$.24/gallonTaxas%ofincomeunder$.24/gallongastax1396586.63%1081.09%2759184.09%151.67%36511743.17%193.52%46215953.06%262.50%54018592.75%3066.45%66719931.81%328.30%AverageHHincome993522433

3703852096

67500109962AverageHouseholdtaxesunderGasolinetaxof$.29/gallon(Using2019AverageOregonpriceof$1.46/gallon)IncomegroupNumberofhouseholdsAveragetaxrevenuewithgastaxof$.29/gallonTaxas%ofincomeunder$.29/gallongastaxAveragechangeinTaxrevenuefor$.05increaseintax/gallon($)(as%ofincome)1391311.32%23(+.23%)275182.81%31(+.14%)365233.63%40(+.11%)462317.61%55(+.11%)540369.55%64(+.10%)667396.36%68(+.06%)Whathastheriseingasolinepricesdonetotheincidenceofoverallgasolineexpenditures?Average2019gasolinepriceinOregonwas$1.46/gallonwitha$.24/miletax–andthiswasregressiveWhathashappenedasgasolinepriceshaverisen–let’suseagasolinepriceof$2.64/gallonincluding$.24/milegastaxAverageOregonHouseholdGasolineExpendituresasaPercentofIncomeWithOregonGasolineTaxof$.24IncomegroupNumberofHouseholdsWithanAveragegaspriceof$1.46/gallon(2019)WithanAveragegaspriceof$2.64Changeinincidence1396.63%11.99%+5.36%2754.09%7.40%+3.31%3653.17%5.73%+2.56%4623.06%5.54%+2.48%5402.75%4.98%+2.23%6671.81%3.28%+1.47%AverageHHincome993522433

370385209667500109962TheSUITSINDEXTheSuitsIndex,boundedbetween-1and1Avalueof-1impliesthelowestincomegroupbearstheentireburdenofthetax;Avalueof1impliesthehighestincomegroupbearstheentiretaxburden.Avalueof0impliesthetaxisproportional.SuitsIndex=-0.17623SuitsIndexbasedonOregonstaticmodelIncomegroupAccumulatedincome(%)Accumulatedtax(%)12.1799388825.380472998211.6453543819.79382503325.1895983835.77177459443.3611776756.47871052558.551077272.046961286100100ThechangefromaGasTaxtoaVMTwillresultinanincreaseinthecostpermileofdrivingtosome;areductioninthepriceofdrivingtoothersPriceIncrease:VehicleswithMPG>20PriceDecrease:VehicleswithMPG<20NoChange:VehicleswithMPG=20ObjectionsraisedtochangetoVMT1.Itwillberegressive:Householdsinlowerincomegroupswillbethe“l(fā)osers,”higherincomehouseholdswillgainorloseless2.Ruralareaswilllosefromthechangeinpolicy3.ThispolicywillnotencourageuseofhighfuelefficiencyvehiclesIstheProposedChangeinUserFeeStructureaRegressiveChange?StaticAnalysis:Assumesthatbehaviorisnotaffectedbyachangeinfeestructure;eachdriverdrivesexactlythesameamountwitheachvehicleasbeforethefeewasimplementedDynamicAnalysis:TriestoaccountforthefactthatconsumerswillchangedrivingbehaviorinresponsetothechangeinthepriceofdrivingthatthetaxchangecausesStaticAnalysis:ImpactofaChangefroma$0.24/gallongasolinetaxtoa$.012/mileVMT(2019)IncomeGroupNumberofHouseholdsAverageHHExpendituresincluding$.24/gallontaxAverageHHExpendituresincluding$.012/mileVMTChangeinExpenditure(as%ofincome)139658.90666.727.81(+.07%)275917.84923.035.19(+.02%)365

1169.61-4.40(-.01%)

1595.101595.33

0.23(<0.01%)5401858.851833.51

-25.34(-.04%)6671992.601986.60-6.00(<.01%)

624

1174.01StaticAnalysis:ImpactofaChangefroma$0.24/gallongasolinetaxtoa$.012/mileVMT(2019)cont.SuitsIndex=-0.22542SuitsIndexbasedonOregonstaticmodelIncomegroupAccumulatedincome(%)Accumulatedtax(%)12.1799388827.545591225211.6453543826.45669222325.1895983842.12619447443.3611776759.05973543558.551077272.501016076100100AlternativePolicyScenarios:AlternativePolicy1:GasTaxof$.24/gallonforvehicleswith<20mpg;VMTof$.012/mileforvehicleswithmpg>20mpg(2019gasprices)AlternativePolicy2:Stepfee:a.MPG<medianMPGpays2cents/mile;b.betweenmedianMPGand20MPGpays1.5cents/mile;c.MPG>20pays1cent/mile

StaticModelAlternativePolicy1:GasTaxof$.24/gallonforvehicleswith<20mpg;VMTof$.012/mileforvehicleswithmpg>20mpg(2019gasprices)IncomeGroupAverageExpendituresUnderGasTax($)AverageMixedPolicyExpenditures($)ChangeinExpenditures(as%ofincome)1658.90675.3616.46(+1.66%)2917.84935.0117.17(+.08%)31174.011191.9117.90(+.05%)41595.101623.5728.47(+.05%)51858.851881.2522.40(+.03%)61992.602023.6831.08(+.03%)SuitsIndex=-0.18493AlternativePolicy2:Stepfee:a.MPG<medianMPGpays2cents/mile;b.betweenmedianMPGand20MPGpays1.5cents/mile;c.MPG>20pays1cent/mileIncomegroupNumberofHouseholdsAverageHHtaxrevenue24cents/galAveragetaxrevenuestepfeeAveragerevenuechange139108.31123.6015.29(+1.54%)275150.88176.6625.78(+1.15%)365192.99223.8830.89(+.08%)462262.21305.3243.11(+.08%)540305.56380.2774.71(+1.11%)667327.55404.1176.56(+.07%)SuitsIndex=-0.16165DYNAMICANALYSIS:

Oncebehaviorchangesbytheconsumerareconsidered(movementalongthedemandcurve),therelevantmeasureofthechangeinwelfareforconsumersisthechangeinconsumersurplus(CS)—notsimplythechangeintaxrevenue(TR)Forataxincrease,consumersmayenduppayinglessintaxes,buttheymaydosobydrivingless—andthatinvolvesanotherlossTogetdynamicresponse,weneedamodelthattakeintoaccountthebehavioralresponses–whichmaydifferbyincomegroupandbylocationWefirstuseanOLSmodel–thisgivesanestimationofchangesinvehicleuse(i.e.changesinhouseholdvehiclemilestraveled)

DynamicModel1:

OrdinaryLeastSquare(OLS)Regression

OLSMODELVARIABLESOurOLSmodelisbasedonthefollowingequationM=f(Pf,I,U,C,SUB,CHILD,WORKER,MALE)WhereMisthetotalannualmilesdrivenbythehousehold,Pfisthefuelcostpermileunderthegasolinetax

IisannualhouseholdincomeUisadummyvariable,=1ifurban,=0elseCisthenumberofvehiclesthehouseholdowns.SUB=1ifthehouseholdhasmorethanonetypeof vehicle,=0elseCHILDnumberofchildrenWORKnumberofworkersMALE=1ifrespondentmale,=0elseOLSResults:DependentVariable–AnnualHouseholdMiles(n=339)VariableNameCoefficientStandardErrorT-StatisticConstant-17.726.25-2.84FuelCost-8.762.39-3.67Income2.210.613.60FuelCost*Income0.720.243.05FuelCost*Substitution0.440.401.09Urban-0.160.10-1.67#Vehicles0.540.134.18VehicleSubstitution1.391.051.32MaleHead0.170.091.94#Worker0.210.053.95#Children0.040.040.91ItalicizedvariablesarelogarithmicChangesinConsumerSurplus,TaxRevenueandWelfarebyIncomewithchangetoVMT=$.012/miIncomeGroupAverageChangeinConsumerSurplusAverageChangeinTaxRevenueAverageChangeinWelfare1-7.935.31-2.612-6.886.52-0.3639.97-4.515.464-2.588.616.03530.44-13.8116.63613.69-2.7810.91AverageChangesinConsumerSurplus,TaxRevenueandWelfarebyLocation($/Household)ImpactofaChangefroma$0.24/gallongasolinetaxtoa$.012/mileVMT:AlternativePolicy1andAlternativePolicy2

SuitsIndex=-0.133withgasolinetaxSuitsIndex=-0.142withVMT=1.2cents/milesSuitsIndex=-0.145withAlternativePolicy#1SuitsIndex=-1.111withAlternativePolicy#2SuitsIndexbasedonOregonOLSmodel

ConclusionsTheDynamicModelComparisonofthechangeintaxrevenuesmakesthepolicyimpactappearlessregressivethanthestaticmodel(SeeSuitsIndices)However,istheappropriatemeasurethechangeintaxpaidorthechangeinconsumersurplus?ALLoftheVMT-feepolicyscenarioshaveaconsiderablysmallerimpactonincidencethantheincreaseingasolinepricesinrecentyearscausedbyexternalforcesDifferentVMT-feestructureshavedifferentimpactsonincidenceorequity,butthedifferenceisnotlargeCONCLUSIONS/REMARKS(cont’d.)IfwegotoVMT,verysmallimpact:likelytohavelittleimpactondrivingrelativetorecentincreasesingasolinepricesPolicyquestion:Ifwedon’tgotoVMTandcan’tpasshighergasolinetaxes,howdowefundroads?Alternativefundingsources?Localoptionstaxes:salestaxes,localgasolinetaxesHigherRegistrationfeesFromGeneralFundsBondingDowereallywantgreaterrelianceonnon-userfees?WhateffectwouldthesetaxeshaveonregressivityrelativetotheVMTandgastaxes?

OtherPossibilitiesforaVMTVMT-feesmayalsobedesignedtoachievesustainabilityobjectives,suchasreducingfuelconsumption,reducinggreenhousegasemissions,andencouragingtheownershipofgreenervehiclesCongestionpricingbasedonVMT-feetechnologyVMTforcongestionandenvironmentinadditiontogasolinetax?QuestionsandComments

ThisresearchwasfundedpartiallybyODOTandOTREC.