porter波特五力模型詳解

Porter'sFiveForces

AMODELFORINDUSTRYANALYSIS

Themodelofpurecompetitionimpliesthatrisk-adjustedratesofreturnshouldbeconstantacrossfirmsandindustries.However,numerouseconomicstudieshaveaffirmedthatdifferentindustriescansustaindifferentlevelsofprofitability;partofthisdifferenceisexplainedbyindustrystructure.

MichaelPorterprovidedaframeworkthatmodelsanindustryasbeinginfluencedbyfiveforces.Thestrategicbusinessmanagerseekingtodevelopanedgeoverrivalfirmscanusethismodeltobetterunderstandtheindustrycontextinwhichthefirmoperates.

DiagramofPorter's5Forces

SUPPLIERPOWER

Supplierconcentration

Importanceofvolumetosupplier

Differentiationofinputs

Impactofinputsoncostordifferentiation

Switchingcostsoffirmsintheindustry

Presenceofsubstituteinputs

Threatofforwardintegration

Costrelativetototalpurchasesinindustry

BARRIERS

TOENTRY

Absolutecostadvantages

Proprietarylearningcurve

Accesstoinputs

Governmentpolicy

Economiesofscale

Capitalrequirements

Brandidentity

Switchingcosts

Accesstodistribution

Expectedretaliation

Proprietaryproducts

THREATOF

SUBSTITUTES

-Switchingcosts

-Buyerinclinationto

substitute

-Price-performance

trade-offofsubstitutes

BUYERPOWER

Bargainingleverage

Buyervolume

Buyerinformation

Brandidentity

Pricesensitivity

Threatofbackwardintegration

Productdifferentiation

Buyerconcentrationvs.industry

Substitutesavailable

Buyers'incentives

DEGREEOFRIVALRY

-Exitbarriers

-Industryconcentration

-Fixedcosts/Valueadded

-Industrygrowth

-Intermittentovercapacity

-Productdifferences

-Switchingcosts

-Brandidentity

-Diversityofrivals

-Corporatestakes

I.

Rivalry

Inthetraditionaleconomicmodel,competitionamongrivalfirmsdrivesprofitstozero.Butcompetitionisnotperfectandfirmsarenotunsophisticatedpassivepricetakers.Rather,firmsstrivefora

competitiveadvantage

overtheirrivals.Theintensityofrivalryamongfirmsvariesacrossindustries,andstrategicanalystsareinterestedinthesedifferences.

Economistsmeasurerivalrybyindicatorsof

industryconcentration

.TheConcentrationRatio(CR)isonesuchmeasure.TheBureauofCensusperiodicallyreportstheCRformajorStandardIndustrialClassifications(SIC's).TheCRindicatesthepercentof

marketshare

heldbythefourlargestfirms(CR'sforthelargest8,25,and50firmsinanindustryalsoareavailable).Ahighconcentrationratioindicatesthatahighconcentrationofmarketshareisheldbythelargestfirms-theindustryisconcentrated.Withonlyafewfirmsholdingalargemarketshare,thecompetitivelandscapeislesscompetitive(closertoamonopoly).Alowconcentrationratioindicatesthattheindustryischaracterizedbymanyrivals,noneofwhichhasasignificantmarketshare.Thesefragmentedmarketsaresaidtobecompetitive.Theconcentrationratioisnottheonlyavailablemeasure;thetrendistodefineindustriesintermsthatconveymoreinformationthandistributionofmarketshare.

Ifrivalryamongfirmsinanindustryislow,theindustryisconsideredtobedisciplined.Thisdisciplinemayresultfromtheindustry'shistoryofcompetition,theroleofaleadingfirm,orinformalcompliancewithagenerallyunderstoodcodeofconduct.Explicitcollusiongenerallyisillegalandnotanoption;inlow-rivalryindustriescompetitivemovesmustbeconstrainedinformally.However,amaverickfirmseekingacompetitiveadvantagecandisplacetheotherwisedisciplinedmarket.

Whenarivalactsinawaythatelicitsacounter-responsebyotherfirms,rivalryintensifies.Theintensityofrivalrycommonlyisreferredtoasbeingcutthroat,intense,moderate,orweak,basedonthefirms'aggressivenessinattemptingtogainanadvantage.

Inpursuinganadvantageoveritsrivals,afirmcanchoosefromseveralcompetitivemoves:

Changingprices-raisingorloweringpricestogainatemporaryadvantage.

Improvingproductdifferentiation-improvingfeatures,implementinginnovationsinthemanufacturingprocessandintheproductitself.

Creativelyusingchannelsofdistribution-using

verticalintegration

orusingadistributionchannelthatisnoveltotheindustry.Forexample,withhigh-endjewelrystoresreluctanttocarryitswatches,Timexmovedintodrugstoresandothernon-traditionaloutletsandcorneredthelowtomid-pricewatchmarket.

Exploitingrelationshipswithsuppliers-forexample,fromthe1950'stothe1970'sSears,RoebuckandCo.dominatedtheretailhouseholdappliance

ThecompetitionengenderedbyaThreatofSubstitutecomesfromproductsoutsidetheindustry.Thepriceofaluminumbeveragecansisconstrainedbythepriceofglassbottles,steelcans,andplasticcontainers.Thesecontainersaresubstitutes,yettheyarenotrivalsinthealuminumcanindustry.Tothemanufacturerofautomobiletires,tireretreadsareasubstitute.Today,newtiresarenotsoexpensivethatcarownersgivemuchconsiderationtoretreadingoldtires.Butinthetruckingindustrynewtiresareexpensiveandtiresmustbereplacedoften.Inthetrucktiremarket,retreadingremainsaviablesubstituteindustry.Inthedisposablediaperindustry,clothdiapersareasubstituteandtheirpricesconstrainthepriceofdisposables.

Whilethetreatofsubstitutestypicallyimpactsanindustrythroughpricecompetition,therecanbeotherconcernsinassessingthethreatofsubstitutes.ConsiderthesubstitutabilityofdifferenttypesofTVtransmission:localstationtransmissiontohomeTVantennasviatheairwaysversustransmissionviacable,satellite,andtelephonelines.Thenewtechnologiesavailableandthechangingstructureoftheentertainmentmediaarecontributingtocompetitionamongthesesubstitutemeansofconnectingthehometoentertainment.ExceptinremoteareasitisunlikelythatcableTVcouldcompetewithfreeTVfromanaerialwithoutthegreaterdiversityofentertainmentthatitaffordsthecustomer.

III.BuyerPower

Thepowerofbuyersistheimpactthatcustomershaveonaproducingindustry.Ingeneral,whenbuyerpowerisstrong,therelationshiptotheproducingindustryisneartowhataneconomisttermsamonopsony-amarketinwhichtherearemanysuppliersandonebuyer.Undersuchmarketconditions,thebuyersetstheprice.Inrealityfewpuremonopsoniesexist,butfrequentlythereissomeasymmetrybetweenaproducingindustryandbuyers.Thefollowingtablesoutlinesomefactorsthatdeterminebuyerpower.

BuyersarePowerfulif:

Example

Buyersareconcentrated-thereareafewbuyerswithsignificantmarketshare

DODpurchasesfromdefensecontractors

Buyerspurchaseasignificantproportionofoutput-distributionofpurchasesoriftheproductisstandardized

CircuitCityandSears'largeretailmarketprovidespoweroverappliancemanufacturers

Buyerspossessacrediblebackwardintegrationthreat-canthreatentobuyproducingfirmorrival

Largeautomanufacturers'purchasesoftires

BuyersareWeakif:

Example

Producersthreatenforwardintegration-producercantakeoverowndistribution/retailing

Movie-producingcompanieshaveintegratedforwardtoacquiretheaters

Significantbuyerswitchingcosts-productsnotstandardizedandbuyercannoteasilyswitchtoanotherproduct

IBM's360systemstrategyinthe1960's

Buyersarefragmented(many,different)-nobuyerhasanyparticularinfluenceonproductorprice

Mostconsumerproducts

Producerssupplycriticalportionsofbuyers'input-distributionofpurchases

Intel'srelationshipwithPCmanufacturers

IV.SupplierPower

Aproducingindustryrequiresrawmaterials-labor,components,andothersupplies.Thisrequirementleadstobuyer-supplierrelationshipsbetweentheindustryandthefirmsthatprovideittherawmaterialsusedtocreateproducts.Suppliers,ifpowerful,canexertaninfluenceontheproducingindustry,suchassellingrawmaterialsatahighpricetocapturesomeoftheindustry'sprofits.Thefollowingtablesoutlinesomefactorsthatdeterminesupplierpower.

SuppliersarePowerfulif:

Example

Credibleforwardintegrationthreatbysuppliers

BaxterInternational,manufacturerofhospitalsupplies,acquiredAmericanHospitalSupply,adistributor

Suppliersconcentrated

Drugindustry'srelationshiptohospitals

Significantcosttoswitchsuppliers

Microsoft'srelationshipwithPCmanufacturers

CustomersPowerful

Boycottofgrocerystoressellingnon-unionpickedgrapes

SuppliersareWeakif:

Example

Manycompetitivesuppliers-productisstandardized

Tireindustryrelationshiptoautomobilemanufacturers

Purchasecommodityproducts

Grocerystorebrandlabelproducts

Crediblebackwardintegrationthreatbypurchasers

Timberproducersrelationshiptopapercompanies

Concentratedpurchasers

Garmentindustryrelationshiptomajordepartmentstores

CustomersWeak

Travelagents'relationshiptoairlines

V.BarrierstoEntry/ThreatofEntry

Itisnotonlyincumbentrivalsthatposeathreattofirmsinanindustry;thepossibilitythatnewfirmsmayentertheindustryalsoaffectscompetition.Intheory,anyfirmshouldbeabletoenterandexitamarket,andiffreeentryandexitexists,thenprofitsalwaysshouldbenominal.Inreality,however,industriespossesscharacteristicsthatprotectthehighprofitlevelsoffirmsinthemarketandinhibitadditionalrivalsfromenteringthemarket.Thesearebarrierstoentry.

Barrierstoentryaremorethanthenormalequilibriumadjustmentsthatmarketstypicallymake.Forexample,whenindustryprofitsincrease,wewouldexpectadditionalfirmstoenterthemarkettotakeadvantageofthehighprofitlevels,overtimedrivingdownprofitsforallfirmsintheindustry.Whenprofitsdecrease,wewouldexpectsomefirmstoexitthemarketthusrestoringamarketequilibrium.Fallingprices,ortheexpectationthatfuturepriceswillfall,detersrivalsfromenteringamarket.Firmsalsomaybereluctanttoentermarketsthatareextremelyuncertain,especiallyifenteringinvolvesexpensivestart-upcosts.Thesearenormalaccommodationstomarketconditions.Butiffirmsindividually(collectiveactionwouldbeillegalcollusion)keeppricesartificiallylowasastrategytopreventpotentialentrantsfromenteringthemarket,suchentry-deterringpricingestablishesabarrier.

Barrierstoentryareuniqueindustrycharacteristicsthatdefinetheindustry.Barriersreducetherateofentryofnewfirms,thusmaintainingalevelofprofitsforthosealreadyintheindustry.Fromastrategicperspective,barrierscanbecreatedorexploitedtoenhanceafirm'scompetitiveadvantage.Barrierstoentryarisefromseveralsources:

Governmentcreatesbarriers.Althoughtheprincipalroleofthegovernmentinamarketistopreservecompetitionthroughanti-trustactions,governmentalsorestrictscompetitionthroughthegrantingofmonopoliesandthroughregulation.Industriessuchasutilitiesareconsiderednaturalmonopoliesbecauseithasbeenmoreefficienttohaveoneelectriccompanyprovidepowertoalocalitythantopermitmanyelectriccompaniestocompeteinalocalmarket.Torestrainutilitiesfromexploitingthisadvantage,governmentpermitsamonopoly,butregulatestheindustry.Illustrativeofthiskindofbarriertoentryisthelocalcablecompany.Thefranchisetoacableprovidermaybegrantedbycompetitivebidding,butoncethefranchiseisawardedbyacommunityamonopolyiscreated.Localgovernmentswerenoteffectiveinmonitoringpricegougingbycableoperators,sothefederalgovernmenthasenactedlegislationtoreviewandrestrictprices.

Theregulatoryauthorityofthegovernmentinrestrictingcompetitionishistoricallyevidentinthebankingindustry.Untilthe1970's,themarketsthatbankscouldenterwerelimitedbystategovernments.Asaresult,mostbankswerelocalcommercialandretailbankingfacilities.Bankscompetedthroughstrategiesthatemphasizedsimplemarketingdevicessuchasawardingtoasterstonewcustomersforopeningacheckingaccount.Whenbankswerederegulated,bankswerepermittedtocrossstateboundariesandexpandtheirmarkets.Deregulationofbanksintensifiedrivalryandcreateduncertaintyforbanksastheyattemptedtomaintainmarketshare.Inthelate1970's,thestrategyofbanksshiftedfromsimplemarketingtacticstomergersandgeographicexpansionasrivalsattemptedtoexpandmarkets.

Patentsandproprietaryknowledgeservetorestrictentryintoanindustry.Ideasandknowledgethatprovidecompetitiveadvantagesaretreatedasprivatepropertywhenpatented,preventingothersfromusingtheknowledgeandthuscreatingabarriertoentry.EdwinLandintroducedthePolaroidcamerain1947andheldamonopolyintheinstantphotographyindustry.In1975,Kodakattemptedtoentertheinstantcameramarketandsoldacomparablecamera.Polaroidsuedforpatentinfringementandwon,keepingKodakoutoftheinstantcameraindustry.

Assetspecificityinhibitsentryintoanindustry.Assetspecificityistheextenttowhichthefirm'sassetscanbeutilizedtoproduceadifferentproduct.Whenanindustryrequireshighlyspecializedtechnologyorplantsandequipment,potentialentrantsarereluctanttocommittoacquiringspecializedassetsthatcannotbesoldorconvertedintootherusesiftheventurefails.Assetspecificityprovidesabarriertoentryfortworeasons:First,whenfirmsalreadyholdspecializedassetstheyfiercelyresisteffortsbyothersfromtakingtheirmarketshare.Newentrantscananticipateaggressiverivalry.Forexample,KodakhadmuchcapitalinvestedinitsphotographicequipmentbusinessandaggressivelyresistedeffortsbyFujitointrudeinitsmarket.Theseassetsarebothlargeandindustryspecific.Thesecondreasonisthatpotentialentrantsarereluctanttomakeinvestmentsinhighlyspecializedassets.

Organizational(Internal)EconomiesofScale.ThemostcostefficientlevelofproductionistermedMinimumEfficientScale(MES).Thisisthepointatwhichunitcostsforproductionareatminimum-i.e.,themostcostefficientlevelofproduction.IfMESforfirmsinanindustryisknown,thenwecandeterminetheamountofmarketsharenecessaryforlowcostentryorcostparitywithrivals.Forexample,inlongdistancecommunicationsroughly10%ofthemarketisnecessaryforMES.Ifsalesforalongdistanceoperatorfailtoreach10%ofthemarket,thefirmisnotcompetitive.

Theexistenceofsuchaneconomyofscalecreatesabarriertoentry.ThegreaterthedifferencebetweenindustryMESandentryunitcosts,thegreaterthebarriertoentry.SoindustrieswithhighMESdeterentryofsmall,start-upbusinesses.TooperateatlessthanMEStheremustbeaconsiderationthatpermitsthefirmtosellatapremiumprice-suchasproductdifferentiationorlocalmonopoly.

Barrierstoexitworksimilarlytobarrierstoentry.Exitbarrierslimittheabilityofafirmtoleavethemarketandcanexacerbaterivalry-unabletoleavetheindustry,afirmmustcompete.Someofanindustry'sentryandexitbarrierscanbesummarizedasfollows:

EasytoEnterifthereis:

Commontechnology

Littlebrandfranchise

Accesstodistributionchannels

Lowscalethreshold

DifficulttoEnterifthereis:

Patentedorproprietaryknow-how

Difficultyinbrandswitching

Restricteddistributionchannels

Highscalethreshold

EasytoExitifthereare:

Salableassets

Lowexitcosts

Independentbusinesses

DifficulttoExitifthereare:

Specializedassets

Highexitcosts

Interrelatedbusinesses

DYNAMICNATUREOFINDUSTRYRIVALRY

Ourdescriptiveandanalyticmodelsofindustrytendtoexaminetheindustryatagivenstate.Thenatureandfascinationofbusinessisthatitisnotstatic.Whilewearepronetogeneralize,forexample,listGM,Ford,andChryslerasthe"Big3"andassumetheirdominance,wealsohaveseentheautomobileindustrychange.Currently,theentertainmentandcommunicationsindustriesareinflux.Phonecompanies,computerfirms,andentertainmentaremergingandformingstrategicalliancesthatre-maptheinformationterrain.Schumpeterand,morerecently,Porterhaveattemptedtomovetheunderstandingofindustrycompetitionfromastaticeconomicorindustryorganizationmodeltoanemphasisontheinterdependenceofforcesasdynamic,orpunctuatedequilibrium,asPortertermsit.

InSchumpeter'sandPorter'sviewthedynamismofmarketsisdrivenbyinnovation.Wecanenvisiontheseforcesatworkasweexaminethefollowingchanges:

Top10USIndustrialFirmsbySales1917-1988

1917

1945

1966

1983

1988

1

USSteel

GeneralMotors

GeneralMotors

Exxon

GeneralMotors

2

Swift

USSteel

Ford

GeneralMotors

Ford

3

Armour

StandardOil-NJ

StandardOil-NJ(Exxon)

Mobil

Exxon

4

AmericanSmelting

USSteel

GeneralElectric

Texaco

IBM

5

StandardOil-NJ

BethlehemSteel

Chrysler

Ford

GeneralElectric

6

BethlehemSteel

Swift

Mobil

IBM

Mobil

7

Ford

Armour

Texaco

Socal(Oil)

Chrysler

8

DuPont

Curtiss-Wright

USSteel

DuPont

Texaco

9

AmericanSugar

Chrysler

IBM

GulfOil

DuPont

10

GeneralElectric

Ford

GulfOil

StandardOilofIndiana

PhilipMorris

10LargestUSFirmsbyAssets,1909and1987

1909

1987

1

USSTEEL

GM(Notlistedin1909)

2

STANDARDOIL,NJ(Now,EXXON#3)

SEARS(1909=45)

3

AMERICANTOBACCO(Now,AmericanBrands#52)

EXXON(StandardOiltrustbrokenupin1911)

4

AMERICANMERCANTILEMARINE(RenamedUSLines;acquiredbyKidde,Inc.,1969;soldtoMcLeanIndustries,1978;bankruptcy,1986

IBM(Ranked68,1948)

5

INTERNATIONALHARVESTER(RenamedNavistar#182);divestedfarmequipment

FORD(Listedin1919)

6

ANACONDACOPPER(acquiredbyARCOin1977)

MOBILOIL

7

USLEATHER(Liquidatedin1935)

GENERALELECTRIC(1909=16)

8

ARMOUR(Mergedin1968withGeneralHost;in1969byGreyhound;1983soldtoConAgra)

CHEVRON(Notlistedin1909)

9

AMERICANSUGARREFINING(RenamedAMSTAR.In1967=320)

Leveragedbuyoutandsoldinpieces)

TEXACO(1909=91)

10

PULLMAN,INC

(AcquiredbyWheelabratorFrye,1980;spun-offasPullman-Peabody,1981;1984soldtoTrinityIndustries)

DUPONT(1909=29)

GENERICSTRATEGIESTOCOUNTERTHEFIVEFORCES

Strategycanbeformulatedonthree

HYPERLINK"http://www.QuickMBA.com/stra