LOWY-危機后的危機：拉達克將如何塑造印度與中國的競爭（英文）-2021.5-48正式版

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TheCrisisaftertheCrisis:HowLadakhwillShapeIndia’sCompetitionwithChina

ARZANTARAPORE

MAY2021

THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

TheLowyInstituteisanindependentpolicythinktank.ItsmandaterangesacrossallthedimensionsofinternationalpolicydebateinAustralia—economic,politicalandstrategic—anditisnotlimitedtoaparticulargeographicregion.Itstwocoretasksareto:

producedistinctiveresearchandfreshpolicyoptionsforAustralia’sinternationalpolicyandtocontributetothewiderinternationaldebate

promotediscussionofAustralia’sroleintheworldbyprovidinganaccessibleandhigh-qualityforumfordiscussionofAustralianinternationalrelationsthroughdebates,seminars,lectures,dialoguesandconferences.

LowyInstituteAnalysesareshortpapersanalysingrecentinternationaltrendsandeventsandtheirpolicyimplications.

Theviewsexpressedinthispaperareentirelytheauthors’ownandnotthoseoftheLowyInstitute.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

KEYFINDINGS

Thestill-unresolvedLadakhcrisishascreatedanewstrategicrealityforIndia,markedbyrenewedpoliticalhostilitywithChina,andanincreasedmilitarizationoftheLineofActualControl.

ThisnewstrategicrealityimposesunequalcostsonIndiaandChina.Indiaislikelytodefermuch-neededmilitarymodernizationandmaritimeexpansionintotheIndianOcean–whichwouldimpairitsabilitytocompetestrategicallywithChina.

Incontrast,Chinaincurredonlymarginalmaterialcosts;itwasprobablymoreconcernedwiththeprospectofcontinueddeteriorationinitsrelationshipwithIndia.Eventhatcostwasmorethreatenedratherthanrealised,andlargelyreducedwhenthedisengagementplanwasagreed.

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

InMay2020,Chinalaunchedseveralnear-simultaneousincursionsacrosstheLineofActualControl(LAC)inLadakh,intoterritoryhithertocontrolledbyIndia.Bothsidesreinforcedtheirpositionswithtensofthousandsoftroops,engagedinadeadlyskirmish,andreportedlycameclosetowar.AnagreementtodisengagetroopswasannouncedinFebruary2021,butimplementationhasbeenhalting.Regardlessofhowdisengagementprogresses,thecrisisposessignificantchallengesforIndia’slong-termstrategiccompetitionwithChina.

AsaresultoftheLadakhcrisis,IndiafacesanewstrategicrealityinwhichChinaisaclearandabidingadversary.ForIndia,thepoliticalrelationshipisnowdefinedbyhostilityanddistrust,andtheLACwillremainmoreheavilymilitarisedandviolence-prone.Giventhisnewreality,IndiaislikelytofurtherdefermilitarymodernisationandmaritimeexpansionintotheIndianOcean.InthefaceofunremittingChinesenavalexpansion,IndiariskslosingsignificantpoliticalandmilitaryleverageintheIndianOcean.Atthesametime,Chinaappearstohaveescapedsignificantharm.Itsbetter-resourcedmilitarycouldbetterabsorbthematerialcostsofthemobilisation.ItmayhavebeenmoreconcernedbytheprospectofanincreasinglyhostileIndia,butthedisengagementagreementhaslimitedeventhosemodestpoliticalcosts.

ThecentralpolicychallengeforIndiaisbalancingtheheightenedChinesemilitarythreatonthenorthernborderwiththerapidlygrowingChinesemilitarypresenceintheIndianOcean.Itcanmanagethischallengebyfocusingonmilitarystrategiesofdenialratherthanpunishment,focusingonimposingpoliticalratherthanmaterialcostsonChina,andacceptingmoreriskattheLACinexchangeforlong-termleverageintheIndianOceanregion.HowIndiarespondswillshapenotonlyitsstrategiccompetitionwithChina,butalsotheinterestsoflikemindedpartnersincludingAustralia,whichdependonanincreasinglycapableandactiveIndia.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

Whateveritsdenouement—whetherwarorpeaceorsomethinginbetween—thecrisiswillfurthercomplicateIndia’seffortstocompetestrategicallywithChina.

INTRODUCTION

ThebordercrisisinLadakhmayendinwarorpeace—oritmayneverend.BeginninginMay2020,thePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)launchedincursionsinseverallocationsincustomarilyIndian-controlledterritoryacrosstheLineofActualControl(LAC).

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Bothsidesreinforcedtheirpositionswithtensofthousandsoftroops,aswellastanksandaircraft,andbuiltinfrastructuretosustainalong-termpresencethroughthecomingwinter.TheLAChad,ineffect,beenchangedbyforce,withfewapparentoptionsforresolution.

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ThecrisisescalatedwhenaskirmishintheGalwanValleyleft20IndiansoldiersandanunknownnumberofChinesesoldiersdead.Thetwosideshaveenduredseveraltensestandoffssincetheirborderwarin1962,butthiswasthefirstlossoflifeontheLACsince1975.InlateAugust,Indianforcesoccupiedtactically-valuablepeaksontheKailashRangenearChushul—which,althoughonIndian-controlledterritory,neverthelessgaveIndiasignificantmilitaryleverageinthecrisis.

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AroundPangongTso(lake),shotswerefiredforthefirsttimeinnearlyhalfacentury,andChinalaunchedcyber-attacksagainstIndiancivilianinfrastructure.

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Tensionssoared.ThecommanderoftheIndianArmy’sNorthernCommandlaterrevealed,“wewereabsolutelyonthebrink”ofwar.

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Formonths,ChinashowednosignsofreversingtheincursionsuntilthesurpriseannouncementinFebruary2021ofaphaseddisengagementplan.

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Infact,thetwoforeignministershadinSeptember2020struckanin-principleagreementtodisengage,whichappearedtogonowhereuntilthedetailsofthefirstphaseofdisengagementweresecretlyagreedataCorpsCommanders’meetinginlateJanuary.

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Thecrisis’futuretrajectoryremainsunclear.Disengagementmayproceedasintended,leadingtonewdispositionsandproceduresformanagingtheborder.Or,ifdisengagementgoesawry,thetwosidesmayyetengageinopenwarfare.Orthecrisismaynevergetitsphoto-opportunityhandshakeorclimacticbattle—keepingIndiaandChinaperpetuallyclosetoconflictandbecomingthecentraldefiningfeatureofanunstablerelationship.

Whateveritsdenouement—whetherwarorpeaceorsomethinginbetween—thecrisiswillfurthercomplicateIndia’seffortstocompetestrategicallywithChina.Thecrisishasusheredinanewstrategicreality,whichincludesdeeperpoliticalantagonismbetweenthecountries,andamoremilitarisedandviolence-proneLAC,whichwillendureevenif—abigif—disengagementcontinuesasplanned.Thisnewstrategicrealitywillposeyetanotherpoliticallysalientobstacleto

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theIndianmilitary’slong-frustratedattemptstobuildpowerprojectioncapabilitiesintotheIndianOceanregion.EveryquantumofscarcemilitaryresourcesthatIndiainvestsinthelandfrontier—relativelyunthreateningtoChina’sglobalambitions—isaquantumthatitwillnotinvesttocounterbalanceChina’smoreconsequentialmilitaryexpansionintotheIndianOcean.ArelativelyperipheralbordercrisisinLadakhtherebyrisksgeneratingafarmoresignificantcrisisinIndia’sstrategiccompetitionwithChina—thecrisisafterthecrisis.

AskirmishintheGalwanValleyon15June2020left20IndiansoldiersandanunknownnumberofChinesesoldiersdead,markingthefirstlossoflifeontheLineofActualControl(LAC)since1975.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

Thispaperisdividedintothreeparts.First,IsetabaselineunderstandingofthenewpoliticalandmilitaryrealityontheIndia–Chinaborder,emergingasaresultoftheLadakhcrisis.Second,IarguethatthisnewrealitywillcomplicateIndia’seffortstocompetewithChinabecauseitfurtherdefersIndia’smilitarymodernisationandmaritimeexpansionintheIndianOceanandimposesonlymarginalcostsonChina.Third,IoffersomerecommendationsforhowIndiacanuselessonsfromtheLadakhcrisistocompetemoreeffectivelyinthefuture.

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THENEWSTRATEGICREALITY

TotheextentthattheFebruarydisengagementplanentailsatleastapartialPLAwithdrawal,itisanevolutioninthecrisis.ButitdoesnotinitselfmeetNewDelhi’sdeclaredgoalofareturntothestatusquoante.

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And,unlessdisengagementiscompletedequallyonbothsides,andaccompaniedbythewithdrawalofforcesfromtheatre—whichisunlikely—itriskscodifyingChina’smilitaryrevisionoftheterritorialstatusquo.Beyondthestatusofspecificparcelsofland,thecentraleffectoftheLadakhbordercrisisonIndiansecuritypolicyisanewandmorehostileapproachtoChina,manifestedatboththepoliticalandoperationallevels.ForIndiandefencepolicy,thistranslatesintoamoreheavilymilitarisedandviolence-proneLAC,andanationaldefenceprioritythatwillrequirerebalancingresourcesawayfromotherimperatives.

Politicalhostilityanddistrust

Atthepoliticallevel,NewDelhiseesthePLA’sLadakhincursionsasanabrogationofdecadesofpainstakingpoliticalcompromisesandconfidence-building.Afterthebruising1962borderwar,decadespassedbeforethecountriesnormalisedrelationsagain,anddecadesagainbeforetheyconcludedthreediplomaticagreementsonmanagingtheunresolvedborder.Theseagreements—signedbetween1993and2013

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—wereoperationallyusefulbecausetheyprovidedguidelinesformaintaining“peaceandtranquility”onthefrontier.Butpoliticallytheywereinvaluablebecausetheyallowedthetworisingpowerstotabletheirterritorialdisputeandproceedwithbuildingawidereconomicandpoliticalrelationship.

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FromNewDelhi’sperspective,China’stransgressionsin2020—itsunprecedentedtrooppresenceacrossandneartheLAC,aswellasthefatalskirmishintheGalwanValleyon15June—haveobliteratedthediplomaticarchitectureuponwhichbordermanagementandthebilateralrelationshipwerebuilt.Littlewonder,then,thatExternalAffairsMinisterSJaishankardecriedtheLadakhcrisisashaving“profoundlydisturbedtherelationship”,andplaceditunder“exceptionalstress”.

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InthewordsofformerIndianAmbassadortoChinaandNationalSecurityAdviserShivshankarMenon,“politicalrelationswillnowbemoreadversarial,antagonistic,andcontentious…thereisnograndbargain,nomodusvivendi,noacceptedrulesoftheroadtobehad”.

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ForIndia,thisisnotamatteroflocalmilitaryprocedures,butaruptureintheentirebilateralrelationship.

“Politicalrelationswillnowbemoreadversarial,antagonistic,andcontentious…thereisnograndbargain,nomodusvivendi,noacceptedrulesoftheroadtobehad”.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

Videoframegrabtakenfromfootagerecordedinmid-June2020,showingChinese(foreground)andIndiansoldiers(R,background)duringanaltercationintheGalwanValley.Image:AFP/ChinaCentralTelevision(CCTV)viaGettyImages.

Sucharuptureisunlikelytoberepaired,despitetheprogressmadebyagreeingtodisengagement.Reversingthepreviouspolicy,NewDelhihasnowmadethewiderbilateralrelationshipconditionalonborderstability.Speakingpublicly,weeksafterdisengagement,ExternalAffairsMinisterJaishankarmadethisclear:

Thefutureofourrelationship…ifyouwanttoseeprogress,Ineedpeaceandtranquilityontheborder.Ican’thavetensionontheborder.Ican’thavethekindofissuesIhadinGalwan,andthensay,well,youknow,let’scarryonwithbusinessintherestofourrelationship.That’sunreal.

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ThisnewpoliticalframinghasdoubtlesscrateredIndia’strustinChinaasadiplomaticpartner.Anyfuturediplomaticarrangementswillprobablybehardertoreach,andevenifthetwosidesfindenoughcommongroundtostrikeanagreement,IndianleaderswillprobablyrequireadditionalassurancesthatChinawillhonouritscommitments.NewDelhiisnowlikelyto“distrustuntilverified”.

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VerifyingChina’scompliance,andhedgingagainstitsnon-compliance,willrequirealargerandmorewatchfulmilitarypresenceonthegroundneartheLAC.

Militarythreat

Attheoperationallevel,therefore,along-termincreasedmilitarisationoftheLACisallbutinescapable.EveniftheFebruary2021disengagementplanisexecutedandleadstonewconfidence-building

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measures,India’snewfounddistrustofChinawilllikelydemandaheaviermilitaryposturenearbythatenablesrapidmobilisationtotheLAC.Shortofthatnewborder-managementarchitecture,Indiaispreparingtomaintainitslargermilitarypresenceonthebordervirtuallyindefinitely.Traditionally,theIndianArmyhadmaintainedapeacetimestrengthofaboutoneinfantrydivisioninLadakh.Duringthecrisis,itreinforcedthemwithafurthertwodivisions,plusadditionalenablers.Intotal,some40000–50000IndiansoldiersweredeployedtoeasternLadakh.

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ThesetroopswerejoinedbyIndia’smostadvancedmainbattletanks,self-propelledhowitzers,surface-to-airmissiles,andbrand-newRafalemultirolefighters.

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TheChiefofArmyStaff,GeneralNaravane,publiclydeclaredthattheArmywillmaintainthatadditionaldeployment“foraslongasneeded”,suggestingthereisnooperationalurgencytoreturntopeacetimepositions.

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Notwithstandingthebeginningsofdisengagement,ChineseforcesremaininsomeareaspreviouslycontrolledbyIndia.ThemostoperationallyvaluableoftheseistheDepsangPlain,innortheasternLadakh,wherethePLAimpededIndianpatrollingintermittentlybeforetheMay2020incursions.

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Evenwiththedisengagementplan’sinitialbufferzonesinplace,suchasatPangongTso,forcesfrombothsideswillremaindeployedintheatrethroughitsgradualexecution.Privately,Indianofficialshavesuggestedthat—giventhedifficultiesofdiplomaticallyormilitarilyreturningtothestatusquoante—thepermanentdeploymentsmaybetheirbestoptionformanagingthecrisisoverthelongterm.

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China’sactions,beforeandsincethecrisisbegan,haveofferedampleimpetusfortheIndiandeployments.QuiteapartfromthemultipleincursionsinMay2020,ChinahasreinforceditstroopsanddevelopedsupportinginfrastructureonitssideoftheLAC.ThePLA—mirroringtheIndianArmy—hasconstructedwinterisedhousingandlogisticstosustainitsrecentlydeployedforcesforthelongterm,alongwithfixedweaponspositions,suchasairfieldsandsurface-to-airmissilesystems.

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SomeofthismilitarydevelopmentpredatesthecrisisandisoccurringinallsectorsoftheLAC.Itacceleratedafterthe2017Doklamstandoff,whenIndianforcesphysicallyimpededtheconstructionofaChineseroadinterritorythatIndiamaintainsisBhutanese.

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Thatepisode,ofIndiasurprisinglythwartingChineseplans,mayhavesensitisedthePLAtoitstacticaldisadvantagesatpartsoftheLAC,andpromptedthePLAtoreinforceitspositions,nearDoklamandelsewherealongtheLAC.

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Indeed,Chinahasmorethandoubledthenumberofairbases,

Shortofthatnewborder-managementarchitecture,Indiaispreparingtomaintainitslargermilitarypresenceonthebordervirtuallyindefinitely.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

heliports,andairdefencesiteswithinoperationalreachoftheLACsince2017.

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Thisisnotaone-sidedaffair—IndiahassimilarlybeenupgradingitsmilitaryinfrastructureandcapabilitiesneartheLACinrecentyears,correctingmanyyearsofneglect.

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BothsidesinrecentyearshavesignificantlybolsteredthemilitaryforcesandinfrastructurewithinstrikingdistanceoftheLAC,allowingbothtoquicklyadoptanoperationallythreateningpostureintimesofcrisis.

Troopreinforcementandsupportinginfrastructureacceleratedafterthe2017

Doklamstandoff,whenIndianforcesphysicallyimpededtheconstructionofa

ChineseroadinterritorythatIndiamaintainsisBhutanese.

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China’sgrowingpresenceneartheLACalsoincludesnewciviliandual-use(civilian/military)infrastructure.Indisputedterritory,newbuildingsandroadsaredesignedtoaddpermanenceandcredibilitytoBeijing’sterritorialclaims—notunlikeintheSouthChinaSea,whereChinahasbuilt‘factsontheground’byreclaiminglandandconstructinginfrastructureonit.Thispracticeisnotsimplyatacticinterritorialdisputes;itispartofagranderexerciseinnation-buildingthatpredatesthecurrentcrisis.Since2017,Chinahasacceleratedaprogramofimprovinghousingandtransportinfrastructure,andfoundingentirenewsettlements,acrossTibet.Thiscivilconstructionhasastrategicpurpose.Beijing’saimistopromoteeconomicdevelopment,politicalallegiance,andbordersecurity—andthustoconsolidateChineseCommunistParty(CCP)control—initsdisputedandrestiveperiphery.

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Thispoliticalprojectisnotatacticthatmaybesubjecttodiplomaticbargaining,butapriorityaspartoftheParty’sprogramof“nationalrejuvenation”,anditisheretostay.

ForIndia,theoperationalthreatontheLACiscompoundedbythepersistentoperationalthreatontheLineofControl(LoC),whichseparatesIndian-andPakistani-controlledpartsofKashmir.Together,thepersistentthreatsontheLACandLoCsuggestIndiacouldquicklydescendintoanightmarishtwo-frontcontingency.NotwithstandingtheFebruaryagreementbetweentheIndianandPakistaniarmiestorenewtheirdefunctceasefire,themilitarythreatinJammuandKashmirremainsunchanged.

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Untilthesuddenly-announcedceasefire,cross-LoCfiringshadbeensteadilyincreasingforseveralyears.

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Themostlikelyscenarioforatwo-frontchallengewasalwaystheprospectofPakistaniopportunismexploitingtensionsontheLAC,ratherthantheotherwayround.

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Indeed,beforetheLACdisengagementandtheLoCceasefire,withtensionshighonbothfronts,ArmyChiefGeneralNaravanedeclaredthat“Thecollusivethreatisnotjustastrategicpaperortalk...It’smanifestingitselfontheground.”

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Together,thepersistentthreatsontheLACandLoCsuggestIndiacouldquicklydescendinto

nightmarishtwo-frontcontingency.

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THECRISISAFTERTHECRISIS:HOWLADAKHWILLSHAPEINDIA’SCOMPETITIONWITHCHINA

Withalargernumberoftroopsonbothsidesinrelativelymuchclosercontact,theriskofviolencewillbehigher.

IncreasedmilitarisationoftheLAC

FacedwithamorepoliticallyhostileandoperationallyrobustChina,Indiahasacceptedthatitsnewstrategicrealityfeaturesamoremilitarisedandviolence-proneLAC.Thishascommonlycometobeknownasthe“LoC-isation”oftheLAC,inreferencetotheheavilyarmedandconstantlyviolentLoCwhichsplitsIndian-andPakistani-controlledportionsofJammuandKashmir.Theanalogy,ofcourse,isimperfect.TheLoCinJammuandKashmirgenerallyrunsthroughlessinhospitableterrainandclimate,allowingforhigherforcedensity.

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India-Pakistanrelationsaremoreopenlyhostile,anduntiltherecentceasefireagreement,theLoCroutinelysawhighandrisingratesofcross-borderartilleryandsmall-armsexchanges.

Nevertheless,theLAChasalreadybeguntoresembletheLoCinsomeimportantways.IndiaislikelytoretainasignificantlyhighernumberoftroopsforwarddeployedontheLAC,evenduringandafterdisengagement;andthesetroopswilltakepositioninalargernumberofpoststomonitortheLAC.

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AtleastoneadditionalinfantrydivisionwillbepermanentlyrelocatedtoLadakh,evenafterthecurrentcrisisreinforcementsareredeployed.

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Ladakhpresentsparticulargeographicchallenges—thehighaltitudeandharshwinterimposephysicallimitsonsoldiering,andtoughdemandsonequipment.

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Troopsrequiresignificanttimetoacclimatisewhendeployingtotheregion,andspecialisedtrainingandequipmenttooperateeffectivelyasmountaininfantry.Theyalsorequirenewlogisticsarrangements—inparticular,remaininginforwardpositionsthroughouttheharshwinterwillrequirepre-positioningoffoodandstores,morewinterisedshelters,andmoreall-weatherequipment.

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Withalargernumberoftroopsonbothsidesinrelativelymuchclosercontact,theriskofviolencewillbehigher.Thedisengagementplanestablishessometemporarybufferareaswheretroopsareprohibited,butnotallplannedbufferareashavebeenimplemented,andtheywilllikelyonlybetemporary.

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Whereaspre-crisispatrolsonbothsideshadextremelystrictrulesofengagementandabidedbyawell-understoodchoreographytomanageencounterswiththeotherside,suchprocedureshavebeenseverelyunderminedbytheeventsoftheLadakhcrisis.Inthedeadly15Juneskirmish,bothIndianandPLAtroopsusedimprovisedhand-heldweapons,andinasubsequentincidentnearChushul,troopsonbothsidesdischargedtheirfirearms.

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Trustinthoseconfidence-buildingmechanismshasfallenandtheIndianArmyhasaccordinglyrelaxeditsrulesofengagementontheLAC,toincludelessrestrictionontheuseoffirearms.

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PangongTso(lake),whichstraddlestheLineofActualControl.Image:JaneSpicer.

Evenwithdisengagement,heavierforcesarenotfarbehindtheLAC.CommercialsatelliteimageryrevealsthattheChinesearmourwhichdisengagedfromPangongTsohasrelocatedtoastagingareanearRutog,andissupportedbynewsheltersthere,suggestinganintenttogarrisontherelongterm.

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Withalargernumberoftroops,backedbymoreheavyweaponssuchasartilleryandarmourincloseproximity,andwithlooserrulesofengagement,localcommandersfacingadversarytroopsmayfeelcompelledtouseescalatingforcetoholdtheirpositionorthwartenemyaction.

Evenwithoutinadvertentescalation,eithersidemayseektouseitsaccumulatedmilitarypowerontheLACtoimproveitsdefensivepositionorgaincoerciveleverage.IndiadidpreciselythiswhenitstroopstookupnewpositionsontheheightsoftheKailashRangeinlateAugust.EventhoughIndiawasdeployingmilitaryforceinterritoryitalreadycontrolled,theepisodeoccurredinthemidstofaheavilymilitarisedcrisisandraisedtheriskofunintendedescalation.Thus,withincreasedmilitarisation,encounterswiththeopposingsidehavebecomemoreunpredictableandmorepronetoescalation.

RebalancingtheIndianArmy

India’snewstrategicrealityisnotlimitedtoLadakh—IndiafacesincreasedthreatsanduncertaintyallalongtheLAC.AtNakuLa,attheinternationalborderinnorthernSikkim,IndianandChinesetroopsincloseproximityhaveclashedtwice,inMay2020andJanuary2021.

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CommercialsatelliteimageryrevealsthatChinabuiltnewroadsandfortificationsnearNakuLainthesecondhalfof2020.

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IntheeasternsectoroftheLAC,facingtheIndianstateofAruncahalPradesh,Chinahasnotonlycontinueditsmilitaryandcivilinfrastructureconstruction,

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India’snewstrategicrealityisnotlimitedtoLadakh—IndiafacesincreasedthreatsanduncertaintyallalongtheLAC.

buthasalsothreatenedtobuildanewdamonwhatIndiacallstheBrahmaputraRiver—amovewhichwouldgiveChinacontrolofacrucialwatersourcefornortheasternIndia.

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Thus,IndiahasnoassurancesthattheMay2020Ladakhincursionsweretheonlyorthefinalthreattotheterritorialstatusquo—otheractsofaggressionorcoercionmayyetoccur.

Recognisingthismoregeneralthreat,theIndianArmyhasbeguntorebalanceitsforces.Themostsignificantexpressionofthisrebalancingtodatewasthereorientationofacombined-armsStrikeCorpstofocusonChina.InDecember2020,theIndianArmyorderedoneofthoseformations,ICorps—oneofthreesuchstrikecorpstaskedwithpenetratingdeepintoPakistaniterritoryinwartime—toprepareforanewoperationalrole:launchingoffensivestrikesacrosstheLACinLadakh.

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Thisrebalancingisamajorcommitment—acostlysignaloftheIndianArmy’sintenttodevotegreaterresourcestotheLAC.Re-taskingaStrikeCorpsisnotsimplyamatterofpointingtheforcesinadifferentdirection—theconversionintomountaininfantrywillrequirere-trainingandre-equippingthatwilllikelytakeyearstocomplete,andwhichwillbeextremelydifficultandcostlytoreverse.

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Therefore,thisisnotatemporarysurgetomanagetheLadakhcrisis,butapermanentreassignmentofforces.

TheconversionwillalsorobtheArmyofoneofitsthreeStrikeCorpsdedicatedtoPakistan—averysignificanterosioninIndia’salready-slimlocalquantitativeadvantageoverPakistan.IndianmilitarystrategyreliescentrallyonthethreatofapunishingoffensiveagainstPakistan.So,theeliminationofalargeportionofthosestrikeforcesmayportend

long-overduere