贊同的知識(shí)：共同體認(rèn)識(shí)論的程序

KnowledgebyAgreement

TheProgrammeofCommunitarianEpistemology

Kusch,Martin,ReaderinHistoryandPhilosophyofScience,UniversityofCambridge

Abstract:KnowledgebyAgreementdefendstheideasthatknowledgeisasocialstatus

(likemoney,ormarriage),andthatknowledgeisprimarilythepossessionofgroups

ratherthanindividuals.Ch.1-6developanewtheoryoftestimony.Theybreakwiththe

traditionalviewaccordingtowhichtestimonyisnot,exceptaccidentally,agenerative

sourceofknowledge.Oneimportantconsequenceofthenewtheoryisarejectionof

attemptstogloballyjustifytrustinthewordsofothers.Ch.7-12proposea

communitariantheoryofempiricalknowledge.Itisarguedthatempiricalbeliefcan

acquirethestatusofknowledgeonlybybeingsharedwithothers,andthatallempirical

beliefspresupposesocialinstitutions.Asaresultallknowledgeisessentiallypolitical.Ch.

13-20defendsomeofthecontroversialpremisesandconsequencesofChs1-12:the

community-dependenceofnormativity,epistemologicalandsemanticrelativism,and

anti-realism,andasocialconceptionofobjectivity.

Preface

Contemporaryphilosopherscanbeclassifiedintermsoftheother-non-philosophical—

fieldsofinquirythatmostimpactontheirrespectivephilosophicalwork.Forpresent-day

epistemologistsandphilosophersofsciencethemostinfluentialfieldsarecognitive

science,evolutionarybiology,neuroscience,andphysics.Ibelongtothesmallminority

thatbelievesthatsomeofthemostimportantchallengestophilosophytodaycomefrom

thesociologyofknowledge.InthisprogrammaticessayIsketchhowepistemologymust

changeifitwishestodojusticetowhatisvaluableandlastinginthesociologists*

insistencethatknowledgeisasocialinstitution.Thisessayisnot,however,an

introductiontothesociologyofknowledge.Iseektobringoutthefundamentallysocial

natureofknowledgethroughadiscussionofphilosophicaltheories.Myaimistoarriveat,

orrecapture,someofthesociologists*insightsbydiscussingphilosophicaltextsand

arguments.

IamgratefultotheUniversityofCambridgeforasabbaticaltermintheautumnof1999,

andtotheBritishAcademyforaMatchingTermAwardinthespringof2000.Mostof

thebookwaswrittenduringthisperiodofeightmonths.Ispenttheautumnof1999atmy

oldalmamater,theUniversityofEdinburgh.Specialthanksaredue,asalways,toCarole

Tansleyforherfriendshipandforherhelpwithathousandpracticalities.CeliaandDavid

BloorentrustedtheirexquisitelyfurnishedNewTownflatintomyclumsyhands.(No

wonderthatDavid*sinfluencecanbefeltthroughoutthepagesthatfollow:mostofthese

pageswerewritteninhisstudy.)Forthismanythanks.

Asfarascommentatorsareconcerned,IammostgratefultoDavidBloor(again),David

Chart,HarryCollins,MichaelEsfeld,SarahGoreCortes,JeremyGray,Matthew

Ratcliffe,SimonSchaffer,andtwoanonymousrefereesforOxfordUniversityPress.All

ofthemreadthewholemanuscriptandmadenumerouscriticalandconstructive

comments.AnjanChakravartty,AnandiHattiangadi,JonasLarsson,PeterLipton,Donald

MacKenzie,andPaulTellerreadversionsofvariouschaptersandpreventedmefrom

manymistakes.Anjan*sandAnandi*sverydetailedcommentsonPartsIandII,

respectively,wereespeciallyvaluable.

Centralchaptersofthebookwerepresentedtoaudiencesofphilosophers,sociologists,

andpsychologistsinBath,Cambridge,Cork,Edinburgh,SanSebastian,Sheffield,and

Toronto.Particularlymemorablewasapresentationof"truthfinitism9totheMoral

SciencesClubinCambridgein1998:questionsbyMichaelEsfeld,JaneHeal,Susan

James,TimLewens,andHughMellorforcedmetorethinkanumberofissues.

Ialsooweaverysubstantialdebttotworeading-discussiongroupsintheDepartmentof

HistoryandPhilosophyofScienceinCambridge.TheEpistemologyReadingGroup

discussedrelativismandfeministepistemologyfortwotermsin1998,andIlearned

muchfromthesemeetings.TheSociologyofKnowledge/SocialEpistemologyGroup

metregularlyduringtheacademicyear1998/9.AlthoughIbenefitedfromtheinputofall

participantsandspeakers,asfarasthisbookisconcernedIfeelespeciallyindebtedtoa

talkbyMirandaFrickerandtovariouscommentsbyKatherineHawley.

ItwasmygoodfortunethatIwasabletopresentcentralthemesofthisessayintwo

undergraduatelecturecourses(intheautumnof1998andthespringof2001).Students*

commentsandquestionsmorethanoncehelpedmetoseewheremyargumentsneeded

improving.

Manyoftheideasexpoundedinthisbookwerefirsttestedininformalconversationswith

friends,students,andcolleagues.Imustbeginbythankingthreecolleagues:NickJardine,

PeterLipton,andSimonSchaffer.Nickpreventedmefromadoptingthegroupmind

hypothesis;Petersetthestandardforclarityandrigour;andSimontoldmewheremy

workbelonged.Icouldnothavewrittenthisbookwithoutthem.Encouragementand/or

criticalquestionsalsocamefromLouisCampos,Hsing-ZenChen,DavidGooding,Mia

Gray,MatthiasHild,JohnHolmwood,SusanJames,DominickJenkins,BernardKatz,

Ki-HeungKim,MatthiasKlaes,Maija-LiisaKakkuri-Knuuttila,JeffKochan,ErnaKusch

(who,yetagain,keptmeuptodateontheGermanintellectualscene),SanjoyMahajan,

MassimoMazzotti,YuvelMillo,IlkkaNiiniluoto,MaureenO'Malley,PaulinePadfield,

CatherinePickstock,IreneRafanell,MikeRich,UlinkaRublack,SteveShapin,Norman

Sieroka,PatriciaSoleyBeltran,MarkSprevak,andSteveSturdy.

Last,butnotleast,IamgratefultoPeterMomtchiloffforacceptingthisbookfor

publication,CharlotteJenkinsforseeingthebookthroughtopublication,andLaurien

Berkeleyforherhelpwiththecopy-editingprocess.

IdedicatethisbooktoSarahGoreCortesforhersupport-intellectual,emotional,

culinary,andmuchelsebesides.Istartedthinkingaboutthisbookshortlybeforewehad

ourfirstcoffeetogether.Seriouswritingbeganthesameweekweboughtcommunal

tableclothsandclothesracks.Andoneweekafterafirstdraftwascompleted,friendsand

familyshowereduswithrice—atlastaphilosophybookwithahappyending.

M.K.

Contents

INTRODUCTION1

Chapter1QUESTIONSANDPOSITIONS9

Chapter2THELIMITSOFTESTIMONY14

Chapter3INFERENTIALISM—PROANDCONTRA20

Chapter4THEGLOBALJUSTIFICATIONOFTESTIMONY29

Chapter5TESTIMONYINCOMMUNITARIANEPISTEMOLOGY45

Chapter6SUMMARY76

Chapter7QUESTIONSABOUTRATIONALITY83

Chapter8FOUNDATIONALISMANDCOHERENTISM91

Chapter9DIRECTREALISMANDRELIABILISM102

Chapter10CONSENSUALISMANDINTERPRETATIONALISM113

Chapter11CONTEXTUALISMANDCOMMUNITARIANISM131

Chapter12SUMMARY169

Chapter13BEYONDEPISTEMOLOGY173

Chapter14NORMATIVITYANDCOMMUNITY175

Chapter15MEANINGFINITISM197

Chapter16TRUTH212

Chapter17REALITY233

Chapter18OBJECTIVITY249

Chapter19RELATIVISM269

Chapter20SUMMARY280

EPILOGUE283

INTRODUCTION

MartinKusch

Thesubtitleofthisbookcombinestwoconceptsthat,untilnow,haveledseparatelivesin

philosophy.Tpistemology9isthebetterknownofthetwo.Itreferstooneofthecore

disciplinesofphilosophy.Epistemologystudiesquestionslike'Whatisknowledge?',

'Howisknowledgeacquired?9,or'Whatcanweknow?''Communitarianism'referstoa

positioninpoliticalphilosophy.1Communitariansinsistthatthecommunityis,inthe

orderofexplanation,priortotheindividual.Moralindividualsdonotprecedemoral

communities;moralindividualscanbeunderstoodonlythroughtheirmembershipin

moralcommunities.

Thisbookproposes'communitarianepistemology,asalabelforaspecificpositionin

epistemology.Anepistemologyqualifiesascommunitarianifitmakestwoclaims.The

firstclaimisthattheterm'knowledge'anditscognates,like'know'and'knower',mark

asocialstatus-like'headofdepartment9.Itfollowsfromthisideathattheexistenceof

knowledgeisdependentupontheexistenceofcommunities.Socialstatusesexistonlyin

sofarastherearecommunitiesthatconstitute,impose,orgrantthesestatuses.The

secondkeyclaimofcommunitarianepistemologyisthatthesocialstatus"knowledge9is

typicallygrantedto,orimposedon,groupsofpeople.Thesecondclaimformulatesa

secondandadditionalsenseinwhichknowledgeissocial.Knowledgeisnotjustsocialin

thatitisasocialstatus;itisalsosocialinthatitistypicallyattributedtogroupsrather

thantoindividuals.Butnotethe'typically9inthesecondclaim.Whilethefirstclaimis

withoutexception-knowledgeisalwaysandeverywhereasocialstatus—thesecond

claimspeaksonlytotypicalandcentralcasesofknowledge.Inother

endp.l

words,itallowsthatthereareexceptionalcaseswhereknowledgeisattributedto

individualsoutsidecommunities.

Communitarianepistemologycontrastswithmosttraditionalandcontemporarypositions

inepistemology.Itscompetitorsconceptualizeknowledgeasanalogoustonaturalkinds,

likealuminium,orassimilartoartefacts,likeworksofartorspiders'webs.Sincethese

alternativestocommunitarianismfailtorecognizeknowledgeasasocialstatus,they

happilythinkofknowledgeastheprimarypossessionofindividualsratherthangroups.

Forsuchindividualisticformsofepistemologyknowledgeissocialonlyinsofarasitis

transmittedfromoneindividualtoanother.

Communitarianepistemologydiffersfromsocialepistemology."Socialepistemology9

hascometorefertotworatherdifferentprogrammes.Ishallcallthemthe"sciencepolicy

programme9andthe"complementaryprogramme9.Thesciencepolicyprogrammeseeks

todeterminewaysofmakingsciencemoredemocraticandaccountabletothepublic.It

alsohopestoincreaseourabilitytochoosebetweenthedevelopmentofdifferentkindsof

knowledge.Thishopeisbasedontheassumptionthatonecaninfluencethecollective

productionofscientificknowledgebymanipulatingthesocialorganizationofscientific

communities.Changingsocialorganizationleadstoadifferenttypeofknowledge.2

Communitarianepistemologyisnotaformofsciencepolicy.Itsgoalistounderstand,

ratherthanchange,epistemiccommunities.Nevertheless,communitarianepistemology

agreeswiththesciencepolicyprogrammeononeimportantpoint:epistemologyand

politicsaremorecloselyconnectedthantraditionwouldhaveit.Tounderstand

knowledgeistounderstandepistemiccommunities;andtounderstandepistemic

communitiesistounderstandtheirsocialandpoliticalstructures.

Thecomplementaryprogrammeinsocialepistemologytriestoremedytheshortcomings

oftraditionalindividualisticepistemology.3Advocatesofthecomplementaryprogramme

distinguishbetweenindividualandsocialaspectsofknowledge.Theybelievethat

traditionalindividualisticepistemologywasontherighttrackasfarastheindividual

knowerisconcerned.Buttheycriticizethetraditionforitsallegedblindnessregarding

social

endp.2

aspectsofknowledge-regardinghowmuchwelearnfromothers,forexample.Social

epistemologyistherequiredadditionalfieldneededtoremedythisblindness.

Communitarianepistemologyismoreradicalthanthecomplementaryprogramme.Itnot

onlymaintainsthatthetraditionisnegligentofsocialaspectsofknowledge;italsoinsists

thatthetraditionisalsowrongregardingthecategoryoftheindividualisolatedknower

itself.Putinanutshell,forthecommunitarianusuallythereisnosuchknower.

Onecanintroduceapositioneithermonologicallyordialogically.Inthefirstcasethe

authordevelopsherstancewithoutmuchregardforearlierandcontemporaneouswork.

Themonologicalmethodhastheadvantageofclarityandsimplicity.Readersneednot

constantlychangegearbetweenexpositionofthenewandcriticismoftheold.Butthis

obviousadvantageofmonologueoftenismorethanoffsetbyseveraldisadvantages.

Readersmaynotbeconvincedthattheallegedlynovelviewreallyisasnewasitsauthor

proclaims.Andreadersmaynotappreciatetheneedforadeparturefromthereceived

alternatives.Thisessaythereforereliesonthedialogicalmethod.Ishalldevelop

communitarianepistemologyincontinuousdiscussionwithotherphilosophers.Ishall

undertaketoshowthatcommunitarianepistemologygivessuperioranswerstotheirvery

ownquestions.

Thisessayis4aninvitationto',ratherthan'asystemof,communitarianepistemology.It

doesnotoffercommunitarianproposalsconcerningalltraditionalepistemological

problems.Insteaditfocusesonjusttwoimportantsuchissues:thenatureoftestimony

andtherationalityofempiricalbeliefs.Ibelievethatthestrengths(andpossible

weaknesses)ofcommunitarianepistemologycomeoutclearlywithrespecttothese

centraltopics.Iintendtoaddressothercentralepistemologicalquestions(suchasthe

natureofaprioriknowledge)elsewhere.AtthesametimeIhopethatatleastsome

readerswillacceptthe'communitarian-epistemologicarinvitationextendedtothemhere.

Undoubtedly,morethanoneobstaclestandsbetweentheguidingideasofthisessayand

theirappreciationbymostofitsreaders.Mostofthesehindrances,Isuspect,havetodo

withcertain'realist'or4absolutist,intuitionsaboutlanguage,truth,reality,and

objectivity.Anyonewhogivesfreereintotheseintuitionsisboundtofind

communitarianepistemology

endp.3

intolerablyrelativistic.Theseintuitionsthereforeneedtobeaddressed,despitethefact

thatmanyofthemhavetheirproperplacenotinepistemologybutinotherfieldsof

philosophy.IdosoinPartIII.

Thecommunitarianepistemologydevelopedhereisnotfreeofintellectualdebts.The

mostimmediatedebtisowedtothefourleadingsociologistsofscientificknowledge:

BarryBarnes,DavidBloor,HarryCollins,andStevenShapin.Indeed,thestartingpoint

ofthisbookwastheattempttotranslatesomeoftheircentralinsightsintothelanguage

ofepistemology,andtoworkthroughthetensionsthatresultfromsuchtranslation.

However,thisbookdoesnotaimforafaithfultranslation.Oneimportantrespectin

whichthisbookisunfaithfultotheabove-mentionedauthorsisthatisdoesnotfocus

specificallyonscientificknowledge.Thisisbasedonthebeliefthat,atleastasfarastheir

basic'socialness'isconcerned,scientificandordinaryformsofknowledgedonotdiffer

fromoneanother.Moreover,myattempttobringtogethersociologyofknowledgeand

epistemologydoesnotleaveeithersideunchanged.Inotherwords,Igobeyondthe

sociologistsinanumberofrespects.IalsodifferfromthesociologistsinthatIdonotrest

myargumentonthepresentationanddiscussionofcase-studies(inthehistoryof

science).4Instead,Irelyonabundleoftime-honouredphilosophicalwaysofarguing:I

seektoshowthatindividualistic(andotherwise4anti-communitarian,)viewsare

incoherentandfailbytheirownstandards;thattheyhaveunwantedconsequences;that

theycontradictoureverydayexperience;orthattheycannotbemadeouttocoherewith

otherwell-entrenchedviews.IhopeIhavedonebetterthansimplypitintuitionagainst

intuition,orclaimagainstcounter-claim.

Mydebttothesociologistsofknowledgeisthemostimmediate,butitisnottheonlyone.

Barnes,Bloor,Collins,andShapinhavenotdevelopedtheirideasinavacuum,andthey

havenotjustdrawnontraditionsofsociologicaltheorizing.Mostoftheirinsightshave

emergedthroughacarefulandcriticalreflectiononthephilosophicalwritingsofMary

Hesse,DavidHume,PeterWinch,andLudwigWittgenstein.Icannotimaginewhat

contemporarysociologyofknowledgewouldbewithoutthisphilosophicalbackground.I

emphasizeithereinordertodownplaythedistancethatexists-inthemindofmany

epistemologists-betweenthesociologyofknowledgeandthephilosophicalstudyof

knowledge.

Thisdistancecanalsobereducedbypointingtoafurtherimportantphilosophicalbody

ofworkthat-likethisbook-buildsuponbothsociologyandphilosophy:feminist

epistemology.5Feministepistemologistshaveinvestigatedcommunitarian-

epistemologicalthemesforthepastfifteentotwentyyears,andIhavegreatlyprofited

fromtheirinsights.IfIdonotdiscussfeministepistemologyinanydetailhere,itisonly

becauseourrespectiveviewpointsaretoocloseforsuchdiscussiontobehelpfulin

clarifyinganddefendingthedistinctnessofthecommunitarianposition.6

Ihavewrittenthisbookforbothepistemologistsandsociologists.Inmyattempttobe

accessibleatleasttoadvancedundergraduatesinbothfields,Ihavesoughttoexplain

evenwidelyusedconcepts.Andyetitmustbeacknowledgedthatthisisnotanaltogether

easybooktoread.Anyprojectthatrunscountertowidelyheldintuitionsandthe

mainstreamofthedisciplineisboundtoappeardifficultanddemanding.Thisstudy,I

fear,isnoexceptiontothisrule.

endp.5

endp.6

PartITestimony

endp.7

endp.8

Chapter1QUESTIONSANDPOSITIONS

MartinKusch

Anycommunitarianrewritingofepistemologyhadbetterstartbyconsideringtestimony.

Thisisbecauseoldandnewformsofepistemologytypicallyuse'testimony'asa

coveringtermforallsocialaspectsofknowledge.

Traditionalepistemologythoughtoftestimonyasamechanismforthetransmissionof

knowledgefromoneindividualtoanother.Youknowonthebasisoftestimonythat

CambridgeiscoldinthewinterifyouhearaboutthecoldwintersinCambridgefroman

honestreporter.Alas,thetraditionpaidonlyscantattentiontothistypeofknowledge.It

distinguishedtestimonyfromother'sourcesofknowledge5onlyinordertosetitaside

andtoconcentrateonotherproblems.Fortunately,thingshavestartedtochange.Since

theearly1980sinterestintestimonyhasgrownrapidly.Perhapsthisgrowthwas

stimulatedbythesociologyofknowledgeandthefeministcritiqueofphilosophyand

science.Thesedaystestimonyisalmostafashionabletopicamongepistemologists;andit

isbecomingdifficulttokeepabreastofallofthenewdevelopments.Perhapsitwillbe

usefulthentohaveashorttaxonomyofthemainquestionscurrentlypursued:

Questionsconcerninglinguisticusageandintuitions.Howdowetalkaboutthe

knowledgethatwereceivefromothers,andwhatcommon-sense'theory'oftestimony

canwereconstructonthebasisofourtalk?

Questionsconcerningcognitiveandsocialpsychology.Whatarethepsychological

mechanismsbymeansofwhichwe(asindividuals)adoptorrejectwhatotherstellus?

Howdothesemechanismscomparewith,orrelateto,mechanismsinvolvedinperception,

memory,orinference?

Questionsconcerningsociallife.Doestherigourwithwhichtestimonyisassessedvary

withsocialcontext?Whatroledoestestimonyplayinsociallifeingeneral?Whatsocial

normsorconventionsgovernthesocialinstitutionoflanguageingeneral,and'telling

howthingsare9inparticular?

Questionsconcerningtestimonyandtrustinthesciences.Whatistheroleoftestimonyin

thenaturalandsocialsciences?Howcriticalorgulliblearescientistswhenitcomesto

assessingtheworkoftheircolleagues?Howdoscientistsgoaboutmakingtheir

testimonyacceptabletoothers?Whichsocialandpoliticalinfluencesplayaroleinthe

acceptanceorrejectionoftestimony?

Normativequestions.Hownarrowlyorhowwidelyshouldwedefinetestimony?Isour

generalrelianceupontestimonyjustifiable?Andifso,whatkindofjustificationdowe

want?Howmuchshouldwetrustothersinquestionsofknowledge?Howshouldwe

assessothers*competenceandhonesty?Dosomeoftheanswersgiventothesequestions

providereasontochangeourphilosophicalviewsofknowledge?Howcentralshould

testimonybeinouroverallviewofknowledge?

Epistemologists*discussionsoftestimonyusuallydonotseparateoutthesevarious

questions.Andoftenthereisgoodreasonforthemnottodoso.Tomentionjustone

example,questionsconcerningsociallifemightoverlapwithquestionsconcerningthe

roleoftrustandtestimonyinscience.Afterall,scienceisitselfaformofsociallife.And

thuswecanask,inthecontextofscience,whethertherigourwithwhichtestimonyis

assessedvarieswithsocialandscientificcontext.

Myaimistointroducecommunitarianismintoepistemology.Todothisistoexplainwhy

individualscanknowonlyinsofarastheyaremembersofepistemiccommunities.This

endeavourinvolvesidentifyingandexorcizingepistemologicalindividualism.As

concernstestimony,wefindtwomainexpressionsofsuchindividualism.Thefirstisthe

long-standingneglectoftestimony.AsIhavealreadymentioned,traditional

epistemologyhaslittletimefortestimony.Andwhenthetraditiondoespause

momentarilytotalkabouttestimony,itdoessoinadisparagingmanner-thusinturn

justifyingtheneglect.Thesecondexpressionofindividualismintheepistemologyof

testimonyisthewayinwhichtestimonyisdelimitedanddefined.First,the

endp.10

scopeofphenomenainvestigatedunderthistitlehasbeendisappointinglyslender.There

ismoretothesocialdimensionsofknowledgethanthereportingofpast,ortimeless,

facts.Thereisalsothecreationofnewknowledgeintheveryactofspeaking.Thinkof

utteranceslike'Iherebydeclareyouhusbandandwife'.Second,evenwithinthisnarrow

rangeofphenomena,epistemologistshavemissedimportantcommunitarianinsights.The

reportingofpastfactsisamuchmorecomplexsocialpracticethanepistemologistshave

allowedfor.Itismorethanthemeretransmissionofknowledgefromoneindividualto

another.Andthird,themannerinwhichtestimonyiscomparedtoothersourcesof

knowledgeoftenrevealsareluctance,orevenanoutrightrefusal,toengagewiththefacts

ofourepistemicinterdependenceoneachother.That,inanycase,iswhatIhopetoshow

inwhatfollows.Itissometimessaidthatthecurrentinterestintestimonysignalstheend

ofepistemologicalindividualism.ItshouldnowbeclearwhyIdisagreewiththis

assessment.

Iwillnotbeconcernedwithdocumentingtheneglectoftestimony.Thetargetofmy

criticismwillbethesecondsymptomofindividualismdistinguishedinthelastparagraph:

individualistictheoriesoftestimony.Ishallhavetocoverafairbitofground.Lestthe

fundamentaldividebelostinthedetailsofthediscussion,itisperhapsbesttostartwitha

fairlyabstractformulationofthecontrastbetweenindividualisticandcommunitarian

viewsoftestimony.

Theindividualisticviewoftestimony.Testimonyexhauststherealmofsocialaspectsof

knowledge.Testimonyisnotagenerativesourceofknowledge:itdoesnotconstitute

communitiesandstatuses.Testimonyisnothingbutthetransmissionofacomplete(pre-

existing)itemofknowledgefromoneindividualtoanother.Theitemsinquestionare

deliveriesofthetestifier'sperception,reason,ormemory.Testifierandrecipientneednot

belongtothesamegroup.Socialphenomena,likebelongingtothesamegroup,arenot

relevantparametersforunderstandingtestimony.Testifierandrecipientpossessonly

minimalsocialknowledge.Inthecaseofthetestifiersocialknowledgeconsistsof

knowledgeofwhoisabletounderstandthetestimony.Inthecaseoftherecipientsocial

knowledgeamountstosomecapacityforcheater-detection,andsomeinformationabout

thereliabilityofdifferenttypesofpeople.Therecipients(consciousorunconscious)

endp.l1

calculationofthetestifier'strustworthinessisdoneaccordingtostandardsthatare

assumedtobeuniversal.

Thecommunitarianviewoftestimony.Testimonyisoneofseveralsocialaspectsof

knowledge.Testimonyisnotjustameansoftransmissionofcompleteitemsof

knowledgefromandtoanindividual.Testimonyisalmostalwaysgenerativeof

knowledge:itconstitutesepistemiccommunitiesandepistemicagents,socialstatusesand

institutions,taxonomies(includingtaxonomiesofthenaturalworld),andthecategoryof

knowledgeitself.Testifierandrecipientcanbesingularorplural.Inthenormalcaseboth

aremembersofthesamecommunity,andtheysharecommongoalsandinterests.Their

membershipinthesamegroupmatterstotheirinteraction.Beingmembersofthesame

groupinclinesthemtohavenormativeexpectationsconcerningeachother'shonesty,

competence,andgullibility.Moreover,tobeacompetentrecipientoftestimonyamounts

tobeingabletojustifypubliclyone'sassessmentofthereliabilityofagiventestifier.

Finally,standardsofevaluationarealwayslocal.

Ishalldiscusstestimonyinfoursteps.InChapter2Ishallfocusonphilosophers1

attemptstodefinethescopeoftestimony.Ishallsuggestthatthisscopeismuchtoo

narrowtomeetthegoalofcapturing'ourepistemicinterdependence9.InChapter3Ishall

turntooneofthemostcontroversialissuesintheepistemologyoftestimony.SupposeI

tellyouthatIhaveblueeyes.Whatisitlikeforyoutocometobelieve,onthebasisof

mytelling,thatIdoindeedhaveblueeyes?Andwhatshoulditbelike?Some

philosophersthinkthattheprocessbymeansofwhichyoucometobelievethatIhave

blueeyesdoes,orshould,involveassumptionsaboutmyhonestyandcompetence.Other

epistemologistsdisagreeandmaintaininsteadthattestimonialknowledgecanbeacquired

withoutanysuchassumptionsbeinginplay.Ishallrejectthecentralassumptionsofboth

campsandarguethatbothcampsremaintiedtotheindividualisticviewoftestimony.

Chapter4isaboutanothercentraldebateintheepistemologyoftestimony:Canwegive

ageneralargumentforwhyitisrationaltohavetrustinthewordsofothers?Andwhat

kindofargumentisadequate?Reductionistsmaintainthatinordertojustifytestimony

weneedtoshowthatitsdeliveriescoincidewiththoseofothersourcesofknowledge.

Fundamentalistsproposethattestimonycanbevindicatedinsomeother,non-reductive,

endp.12

way.Ishallrefusetochoosebetweenthesetwopositions.Instead,Ishalloptforquietism

andcontextualism.Tobelievethattestimonyneedsageneralvindicationisitselfan

expressionofindividualism.Allwecan(andoccasionallyneedto)justifyisourreliance

onspecificinformantsinparticularcircumstances.Henceindividualistsareinerrorwhen

theyconflateaninstanceoftestimonywiththeveryideaoftestimony.Finally,Chapter5

ismoredirectlyconcernedwithmotivatinganddefendingacom