主觀幸福感外文翻譯及高考語文沖刺秘籍應(yīng)用寫作文體的主旨

PAGE1-Subjectivewell-beingIntroductionSubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingaremeasuresofwell-beingbasedonquestionssuchas:“Takingthingsalltogether,howwouldyousaythingsarethesedays–wouldyousayyou’reveryhappy,prettyhappy,ornottoohappythesedays?”(Gurin,Veroff,&Feld,1960,p.411,italicsinoriginal).1Subjectsmaybepromptedtogiveanumberbetween1and7,where1represents“Ingeneral,Iconsidermyselfnotaveryhappyperson”and7“Ingeneral,Iconsidermyselfaveryhappyperson”(Lyubomirsky&Lepper,1999,p.151).Inthepast,theywereaskedwhethertheysatisfieddescriptionssuchas:“Cheerful,gayspiritsmostofthetime.Occasionallybotheredbysomethingbutcanusuallylaughitoff,”“Upsanddowns,nowhappyaboutthings,nowdepressedaboutbalancedinthelongrun,”and“Lifeoftenseemssoworthlessthatthereislittletokeeponegoing.Nothingmattersverymuch,therehasbeensomuchofhurtthatlaughterwouldbeemptymockery”(Watson,1930,p.81).Answerstosuchquestionsareusedtoconstructnumericalmeasuresofbothindividualwell-being(thewell-beingofpersons)andsocialwellbeing(thewell-beingofgroups).Subjectivemeasuresofwell-beinghavebecomethesubjectofheateddiscussionintheacademyandbeyond.Onereasonisthattheyarefrequentlypresentedassubstitutesfor,orcomplementsto,traditionalincome-basedeconomicwelfaremeasuresandtoindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach(Kesebir&Diener,2008).Indeed,toencouragetheuseofsubjectivemeasuresforpublicpolicypurposes,proponentshaveadvocatedNationalWell-BeingAccounts(NWBAs),whichtrackpopulation-levelscoresonsubjectivemeasuresovertime(Diener&Seligman,2004;Diener,2006;Kahneman,Krueger,Schkade,Schwarz,&Stone,2004).Whileitishardtopredicttheextenttowhichsubjectivemeasureswillassumetheroletraditionallyplayedbyothermeasures,subjectivemeasuresseemtobegainingground.Forinstance,theirusewasrecentlyendorsedbyFrenchPresidentNicholasSarkozy’sCommissionontheMeasurementofEconomicPerformanceandSocialProgress.TheCommission,whichwasheadedbyNobelMemorialPrizelaureatesJosephE.StiglitzandAmartyaSen,hadbeenchargedwiththetaskofexploringalternativestoGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)asameasureofeconomicperformanceandsocialprogress(Stiglitz,Sen,&Fitoussi,2009).Subjectivemeasuresofwell-beingarefrequentlyreferredtoasmeasuresofsubjectivewell-being(Andrews&Robinson,1991).Thus,forexample,Stiglitzandcoauthorswrite:“Recommendation1:Measuresofsubjectivewell-beingprovidekeyinformationaboutpeople’squalityoflife.Statisticalofficesshouldincorporatequestionstocapturepeople’slifeevaluations,hedonicexperiencesandprioritiesintheirownsurveys”(Stiglitzetal.,2009,p.58,italicsinoriginal).Theterm“subjectivewell-being”(Diener,1984)–denotingthatwhichsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingaredesignedtorepresent–hasitsownencyclopediaentries(e.g.,Diener,2001)andhandbookarticles(e.g.,Diener,Lucas,&Oishi,2005).Bynow,anestablishedbodyofliteratureemployssubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingtoshedlightonthecausesandcorrelatesofsubjectivewell-being.Thoughissuesaboutthereliabilityandvalidityofsuchmeasuresremain,scientificandvalidityandmoreonexaminingsubstantiveempiricalrelationships.Nevertheless,considerableconfusionremainswhenitcomestowhatsubjectivewell-beingisandhowitrelatestowhatIwillcallwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehave，whenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Ithasbeenpointedoutthatsubjectivemeasuresdifferfromeconomicandcapability-basedmeasureswithrespecttotheunderlyingaccountofwelfareorwell-being(Adler&Posner,2008;Angner,2008,2009a).2Ithasalsobeennotedthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresdifferamongthemselves(Bruni,2008,pp.117–120;Tiberius,2006,pp.494–495).Yet,whenitcomestothenatureofsubjectivewell-beinganditsrelationtowell-beingsimpliciter,existingliteraturefailstocapturethedegreeofdiversity,anddisagreement,amongproponentsofsubjectivemeasures.Theresultisafalseimpressionofhomogeneityandanobstacletofruitfulcommunicationandcooperationwithinandacrossdisciplinaryboundaries.Thispaperexaminesthenotionof“subjectivewell-being”asthetermisusedinliteratureonsubjectivemeasuresofwell-being.Inordertoexaminewhatsubjectivewell-beingisandhowitrelatestowell-beingsimpliciter,Ibeginbyexploringtheaccountsofwellbeingimplicitintheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures–aswellastherolethatsubjectivewell-beingplaysinthoseaccounts–andproceedtoexaminewhatsubjectivewell-beingisthoughttobe.Myaimistoestablishthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresdifferatleastsuperficiallyonatleasttwopoints.First,theydisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwellbeingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Second,theydisagreeaboutthenatureofsubjectivewell-being:aboutwhetheritisconstitutedbyacognitive,hedonic,emotional,ormoodstate,orsomecombination,andaboutwhethertocallthatstate“happiness,”“satisfaction,”orsomethingelseentirely.Inanefforttoreconcilethesedifferences,Iproposeaninterpretationaccordingtowhichsubjectivemeasurespresupposepreferencehedonism:anaccountaccordingtowhichwell-beingisamatterofdesiredmentalstates.Thisreadinghasnot(tomyknowledge)beenexplicitlyendorsedbyproponentsofsubjectivemeasures.Yet,itsucceedsinreconcilingmuchthathasbeenwrittenaboutsubjectivemeasuresandithastheadditionaladvantageofattributingtoproponentsofsubjectivemeasureanaccountofwell-beingthathasclearaxiologicalfoundationsandisrelativelyplausible.Aproperappreciationofthenatureofsubjectivewell-beinganditsrelationtowell-beingsimpliciterisimportantforavarietyofreasons.Amongotherthings,suchanappreciationcanhelpbothproponentsandcriticsofsubjectivemeasurestodevelopclearerandmoreeffectivearguments.Proponentsofsubjectivemeasures–likethosewhoargueforthedevelopmentofNWBAs–willwanttoidentifythemostplausibleinterpretationofthesemeasures,soastopermitthedevelopmentofasstrongacaseaspossibleintheirfavor.Critics–likethosewhoargueforthesuperiorityoftraditionaleconomicorcapability-basedmeasures–willwanttozeroinonthemostplausibleinterpretationofsubjectivemeasuressoastoavoidthechargethattheyareattackingastrawman.Myhopeisthatintheend,aclearerappreciationforthefoundationsofsubjectivemeasurescanhelpremoveobstaclestoscientificcommunication,collaboration,andprogress.Subjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterInthissection,Iexploretherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterinthewritingsonsubjectivemeasures.Iwillarguethatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingdisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Asmystartingpoint,Itaketheconceptofwell-being,thatis,whatIhavesofarcalledwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehavewhenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Letuscallthisthe“core”conceptofwell-being.Therearemanyothertermsthatareusedinthesamesense,including“aperson’sgood,benefit,advantage,interest,prudentialvalue,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,andutility”(Moore&Crisp,1996,p.599).Becausetheconceptofwell-beingisintendedtocapturewhatisultimately–andnotjustinstrumentally–goodfortheindividual,itisalsosupposedtocapturethatwhichwehavereasontopromote–asanendandnotjustasameans–bothinourownlivesandinthelivesofothers.AsThomasScanlonputsit:Itiscommonlysupposedthatthereisasimplenotionofindividualwell-beingthatplaysthefollowingthreeroles.First,itservesasanimportantbasisforthedecisionsofasinglerationalindividual,atleastforthosedecisionsinwhichheorshealoneisconcerned(thatistosay,inwhichmoralobligationsandconcernsforotherscanbeleftaside).Second,itiswhataconcernedbenefactor,suchasafriendorparent,hasreasontopromote.Third,itisthebasisonwhichanindividual’sinterestsaretakenintoaccountinmoralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3Inparticular,itisfrequentlyassumedthatwell-beingisoneconsiderationorassomepeoplewouldargue,theonlyconsiderationthatshouldserveasanend,andnotjustameansforpublicpolicy.HereIwilltakeitforgrantedthatwhenproponentsofsubjectivemeasurestalkaboutsuchmeasuresasrepresentingwell-being,theyusetheterminthecoresense(Angner,2009a,inpress).First,asindicatedabove,subjectivemeasuresareoftenpresentedasalternativestoothermeasuresofwelfareorwell-being;thiswouldmakelittlesenseif,infact,subjectivemeasureswerenotintendedtorepresentthatwhichtheothermeasuresweredesignedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,theproponents’conceptofwell-beingplaystheverysameroleasthatplayedbythecoreconcept:thosewhodefendtheuseofsubjectivemeasuresofwellbeingoftenemphasizethattheythinkofwell-beingasthatwhichisultimatelygoodfortheindividual,asthatwhichisworthpromotinginthelifeofothers,andasacentral(sometimestheonly)ultimategoalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&Seligman,2004,quotedabove).Third,anumberofproponentsexplicitlyciteclassicalphilosophicalliteratureinenthusiasticagreementwhilesignalingthattheyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthesamesenseasphilosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&Sarin,1997;Layard,2005;Watson,1930).Overtheyears,philosophershavetriedtoshedlightontheconceptofwell-beingbydevelopinganddefendingvariousaccounts,orconceptionsofwell-being.Here,IfollowParfit(1984,pp.493–502)individingsuchaccountsintothreemainclasses:mentalstateaccounts,preference-satisfactionordesire-fulfillmentaccounts,andobjective-listaccounts.4Accordingtomental-stateaccounts,well-beingisa“mentalstate”ora“stateofmind.”Becausetheseaccountsallseewelfare“ashavingtoenterourexperience,”theyaresaidtosatisfytheexperiencerequirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlonwrites:“Experientialtheoriesholdthatthequalityoflife‘forthepersonwholivesit’iscompletelydeterminedbyitsexperientialquality,”where“experientialquality”refersto“whatitwouldbeliketoliveit”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).Onthisview,then,subjectivelyfeltexperienceisbothnecessaryandsufficientforaperson’swell-being.Accordingtodesire-fulfillmentorpreference-satisfactionaccounts,bycontrast,apersoniswellofftotheextentthatherdesiresarefulfilledand/orherpreferencesaresatisfied.Scanlonputsitthisway:Desiretheoriesrejecttheexperiencerequirementandallowthataperson’slifecanbemadebetterandworsenotonlybychangesinthatperson’sstatesofconsciousnessbutalsobychangeselsewhereintheworldwhichfulfillthatperson’spreferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).Suchaccountsdonotrequirethatapersonwhoiswelloffexperienceanyfeelingsofhappinessorsatisfaction.Whattheydorequireisthatherdesiresarefulfilled(orthatherpreferencesaresatisfied),whichdoesnotcomedowntothesamething.Thetwokindsofaccountdescribedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoassubjectiveaccounts,becausetheydescribeaperson’swell-beingas(atleastpartly)afunctionofhisorherfeelings,experiences,desires,andsoon.Accordingtoso-calledobjectiveaccounts,bycontrast,aperson’swell-beingdoesnotdependonsuchsubjectivefactors.Onsuchaccounts,“certainthingsaregoodorbadforbeings,independentlyinatleastsomecasesofwhethertheyaredesiredorwhethertheygiverisetopleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifyingthelistofthingsthataregoodforpeopleregardlessofwhattheywantisnotoriouslydifficult,butoneprovisionallistofsuchthingsincludes“moralgoodness,rationalactivity,thedevelopmentofone’sabilities,havingchildrenandbeingagoodparent,knowledge,andtheawarenessoftruebeauty”(Parfit,1984,p.499).Obviously,therearemanyversionsofaccountsofeachkind.Thetri-partitedivisionpermitsustocaptureamajordifferencebetweensubjectivemeasuresofwell-being,traditionaleconomicwelfaremeasures,andwelfareindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach.Ithasbeennotedelsewherethattraditionaleconomicwelfaremeasuresarebasedonpreference-satisfactionaccountsofwell-being(Angner,2009a,b,inpress;Harsanyi,1982;Hausman&McPherson,2006).Thisisevident,amongotherthings,fromthefactthatwelfareeconomiststraditionallyhavedefendedtheirmeasuresbyshowingthattheyareutilityfunctions,thatis,thattheyareindicesofpreferencesatisfaction.Ithasalsobeennotedthatmeasuresinspiredbythecapabilityapproacharebasedonobjective-listaccountsofwell-being(Nussbaum,2008;Sen,1987).Thisisclear,amongotherthings,fromtheassumptionthatcertainthings–inparticular,havingalargecapabilityset–arethoughttobegoodforapersonregardlessofwhetherthosethingswouldmakethepersonhappier,andofwhetherthepersondesiresthem.5Meanwhile,itisfairlyobviousthatmanyproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresthinkofwell-beingasamentalstate.Thereisabundantevidence,foronething,thattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Intheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures,well-beingisoftendescribedasamatterexclusivelyofindividualsubjective,hedonic,oraffectiveexperience.Forexample,DavidG.MyersquotesMadamedelaFayetteassaying:“Ifonethinksthatoneishappy,thatisenoughtobehappy,”andaddsthat“l(fā)ikeMadamedeLaFayette,socialscientistsviewwell-beingasastateofmind.Well-being,sometimescalled‘subjectivewell-being’toemphasizethepoint,isapervasivesensethatlifeisgood”(Myers,1992,pp.23,27).Myersevidentlytakeswell-beingtobesomethingthoroughlysubjective;note,inparticular,theuseoftheterm“subjectivewell-being”assynonymouswith“well-being.”Theexplicitreferencetostatesofmindstronglysuggeststhatwhathehasinmindissometypeofmental-stateaccount.Similarly,EdDienerwrites:“Theareaofsubjectivewell-beingissubjective.[It]resideswithintheexperienceoftheindividual”(Diener,1984,p.543).DienerandEunkookSuhreinforcethepoint:Subjectivewell-beingresearchisconcernedwithindividuals’subjectiveexperiencesoftheirlives.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatwell-beingcanbedefinedbypeople’sconsciousexperiences—intermsofhedonicfeelingsorcognitivesatisfactions.Thefieldisbuiltonthepresumptionthattounderstandtheindividuals’experientialqualityofwell-being,itisappropriatetodirectlyexaminehowapersonfeelsaboutlifeinthecontextofhisorherownstandards(Diener&Suh,1997,p.191).DienerandSuh,likeMyersandtheauthorstowhomherefers,apparentlyusetheterm“well-being”interchangeablywith“subjectivewell-being.”ThefactthatDienerandSuharguethatwell-beingisnotonlyconcernedwiththeindividual’ssubjectiveexperiences,butdefinedbythem,stronglysuggeststhattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Severalauthorsemphasizethesubjectivecharacterofwell-being,astheyusetheterm,bycontrastingsubjectivemeasureswith“objective”ones,includingsocialandeconomicindicators.Dienermakesthispointinthefollowingway:NotablyabsentfromdefinitionsofSWB[subjectivewell-being]arenecessaryobjectiveconditionssuchashealth,comfort,virtue,orwealth.AlthoughsuchconditionsareseenaspotentialinfluencesonSWB,theyarenotseenasaninherentandnecessarypartofit(Diener,1984,p.543).6Thisquoteconfirmsthat,inDiener’swork,anindividual’swell-beingisdefinednotbytheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichshefindsherself,butbyhersubjectiveexperiences,thoughheallowstheformertobecausallyresponsibleforthelatter.DanielKahneman,whoidentifieswell-beingwithhappiness,addsthathappiness“isnottobeconfusedwithgoodfortune,whichisanassessmentofthecircumstancesofsomeone’slife”(Kahneman,1999,p.5).InKahneman’sview,itispossibletoenjoygoodfortune–presumablyincome,health,andsoon–withoutbeinghappy.AngusCampbell(1976),quotedinDiener(1984,p.543),expandsonthispoint.Campbellmaintains:“Thegrossnationalproduct,importantasitundoubtedlyis,isclearlynottheultimatetouchstoneagainstwhichthequantumofhappinessinthiscountrycanbeassessed”(Campbell,1976,p.117).Hecontinues:Ifweareprimarilyconcernedwithdescribingthequalityoflifeexperienceofthepopulation,wewillneedmeasuresdifferentfromthosethatareusedtodescribetheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichpeoplelive.Wewillhavetodevelopmeasuresthatgodirectlytotheexperienceitself.Thesesubjectivemeasureswillsurelynothavetheprecisionofindicatorsthatareexpressedinnumberofdollars,unitsoftime,ornumbersofsquarefeet,buttheywillhavethegreatadvantageofdealingdirectlywithwhatitiswewanttoknow,theindividual’ssenseofwell-being(Campbell,1976,p.118,italicsinoriginal).6Qualityoflife,onCampbell’sview,isafunctionofindividuals’senseofwell-being.Ifwewanttostudythequalityoflife,then,weneedtostudytheindividuals’experienceoftheirlives,nottheobjectivecharacteristicsoftheirexistence.Thesewritingsclearlygiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Indeed,theevidencesuggeststhattheseauthorsadopttheexperiencerequirementandthinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate.Theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Thenotionthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being,bytheway,explainstheidentificationof“subjectivemeasuresofwell-being”and“measuresofsubjectivewell-being.”O(jiān)thers,however,appeartoresisttheviewthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-beingalone(cf.Angner,inpress).Increasinglyfrequently,itissuggestedthatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatesconstitutebutonecomponentofwell-being.Forexample,Kahnemanwrites:Objectivehappinessisnotproposedasacomprehensiveconceptofhumanwell-being,butonlyasasignificantconstituentofit.Maximizingthetimespentontherightsideoftheaffectgridisnotthemostsignificantvalueinlife,andadoptingthiscriterionasaguidetolifemaybemorallywrongandperhapsself-defeatingaswell.However,thepropositionthattherightsideofthegridisamoredesirableplacetobeisnotparticularlycontroversial.Objectivehappinessisacommonelementofmanyconceptionsofwell-being(Kahneman,2000,p.691).Thepointisclearenough:well-beinghasmultiplecomponents,ofwhich“objectivehappiness”isonlyone(albeitanimportantone).AsimilarpositionisdefendedbyDiener,JeffreyJ.Sapyta,andSuh,whousetheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedcomponentofwell-beingandwhoarguethatalthoughsubjectivewell-beingisnotsufficient,itis“essentialtowell-being”(Diener,Sapyta,&Suh,1998,p.33;cf.Kesebir&Diener,2008,p.69).Seligmantoocanbeattributedthisview:Iusehappinessandwell-beinginterchangeablyembracingbothpositivefeelings(suchasecstasyandcomfort)andpositiveactivitiesthathavenofeelingcomponentatall(suchasabsorptionandengagement).Itisimportanttorecognizethat“happiness”and“well-being”sometimesrefertofeelings,butsometimesrefertoactivitiesinwhichnothingatallisfelt(Seligman,2002,p.261).Insum,thesepassagesallseemtoexpressthenotionthatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponentsandthatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateconstitutesoneofthesecomponents.Itisunfortunatethattheseauthorsdonotsaymoreaboutthenumberandnatureoftheremainingcomponents,butitisquiteclearthattheyneednotbesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theideathatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponents,thoughitdoesnotfitneatlyintoParfit’staxonomy,hasbeendefendedbyseveralmodernphilosophers.Bytheendofhisdiscussion,Parfithimselfindicatesthatitmightbepossibletoformamoreplausibleaccountofwell-beingbytakingeachofthethreekindsofaccountasdescribinganecessary(butnotindividuallysufficient)conditionforwell-being(Parfit,1984,p.501;cf.Haybron,2008,p.18).Parfit’ssuggestionappearstohavebeenpickedupbySimonKeller(2004),whowritesthatwelfare–likephysicalfitness–ismulti-dimensional.Hebelievesthatyoucanbebetteroff(orfitter)simpliciterthanIamwithoutscoringhigheralongalltherelevantdimensions;yet,therearecasesinwhichwecannotsaythateitheroneofusisbetteroff(fitter)becausethereisnofactofthematter.InKeller’sview,onecomponentofwell-beingistheachievementofone’sgoals,nomatterwhatthosegoalsare(Keller,2004,p.36).Onmyreading,authorslikeKahnemancanbeunderstoodasagreeingwithKelleraboutthemulti-dimensionalityofwell-being,althoughhemaynotbeproposingthesamecomponents.Notice,however,thatthetwoproposalsarenotincompatible.Inanycase,theseproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresstillgiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theauthorsdonot,however,treatwell-beingasconstitutedbyasubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatealone.Instead,theytreatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being.Thesewritersarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstitute,notwell-being,butacomponentofwell-being.Thediscussioninthissectionhasshownthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingappeartodisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.Somethinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Othersthinkofsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstituteacomponentofwell-being.Hence,proponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingarenotahomogeneousgroup:theydisagreewitheachotherabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.主觀幸福感1.引言幸福的主觀測量是基于一些問題的幸福感的測量，如：“在一起，你覺得這些天過得怎么樣呢——你會說你這些日子很高興，挺快樂的，或者不太高興嗎？格瑞，威戎夫＆費爾德，960年，第411，斜體原件）。被試可能會給予數(shù)字1到7之間的提示，其中1代表“總的來說，我認為我不是一個很快樂的人”和7代表“總的來說，我認為自己一個非常幸福的人”（柳博米爾斯基及萊佩爾，1999年，第151頁）。在過去，他們會被問及對這樣的描述是否滿意，如：“性格開朗，大部分時間是同性戀心境。有時為一些事煩惱，但通?？梢砸恍Χ^，”“跌宕起伏，時而為事情感到高興，時而為長期的均衡感到惆悵，”和“生活通常似乎都是這么沒有意義以至于沒什么值得一個人去繼續(xù)向前的。沒什么重要的事情，已經(jīng)有這么多的傷害，笑聲全成了無意義的嘲弄”（華生，1930年，第81頁）。這些問題的答案是用來創(chuàng)建個體幸福（個人的幸福）和社會幸福（團體的幸福）的諸多方法。主觀幸福感的測量已成為了在學(xué)術(shù)界及以后熱烈討論的對象。其中一個原因是，他們經(jīng)常被作為對傳統(tǒng)的以收入為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟福利措施，和對通過能力的方法得到啟發(fā)的指標(biāo)的替代品，或補充（凱士比與迪納，2008）。事實上，為了鼓勵使用主觀措施來達到公共政策的目的，支持者都提倡國家幸福報告，它是通過追蹤一段時間的人口水平分?jǐn)?shù)的主觀措施（迪納與塞利格曼，2004;迪納，2006；卡內(nèi)曼，克魯格，施卡德，施瓦茨，斯特尼，2004）。雖然現(xiàn)在很難預(yù)測在何種程度上的主觀措施將承擔(dān)傳統(tǒng)上由其他措施所發(fā)揮的作用，但是主觀措施似乎正在提高它的地位。例如，最近法國總統(tǒng)薩科齊的委員會也贊同將它們用在經(jīng)濟績效和社會進步的測量上。該委員會是由諾貝爾紀(jì)念獎獲得者約瑟夫斯蒂格利茨和阿馬蒂亞森領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的，已經(jīng)承擔(dān)負責(zé)了探索國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的替代品的任務(wù)，是用來作為經(jīng)濟績效和社會進步的措施的（斯蒂格利茨，森與羅菲圖西，2009）。幸福的主觀測量通常也指主觀幸福感的測量（安德魯斯＆羅賓遜，1991）。因此，例如，斯蒂格利茨和同事寫道：“建議1：主觀幸福感的測量能提供有關(guān)人們對生活質(zhì)量的關(guān)鍵信息。統(tǒng)計局應(yīng)將記錄人們的生活評價，享樂經(jīng)驗和優(yōu)先事項的問題納入到他們自己的調(diào)查中”（斯蒂格利茨等，2009年，第58頁，原斜體）。所謂“主觀幸福感”（迪納，1984）—是指幸福的主觀測量的目的是代表—有自己的百科全書的條目（例如，迪納，2001）和手冊制品（例如，迪納，盧卡斯，＆歐石，2005）。到現(xiàn)在，既定的文學(xué)使用幸福的主觀測量來闡明主觀幸福感的影響因素和相關(guān)。雖然對這些措施的信度和效度的問題依然存在，但是科學(xué)和效度以及在實證研究的實質(zhì)性關(guān)系更多。盡管如此，當(dāng)涉及到什么是主觀幸福感以及它與我稱其為絕對幸福的有何聯(lián)系時仍然相當(dāng)?shù)睦Щ??！拔覀儞碛惺裁?，我們的生活什么時候會變得好，什么時候我們的生活不是一定道義上的好，但是有利于我們”（提比略，2006，第493，原斜體）。據(jù)指出，主觀措施不同于有關(guān)于潛在的福利或幸福報告的經(jīng)濟和以能力為基礎(chǔ)的措施（阿德勒和波斯納，2008；安格納，2008，2009）。也有人指出，主觀測量的支持者彼此不同（布魯尼，2008年，第117-120；厄斯，2006年，第494-495）。然而，當(dāng)涉及到主觀幸福感的本質(zhì)及其與絕對幸福的關(guān)系時，現(xiàn)有文獻未能找到多樣性程度和主觀測量的支持者之間的不同意見。其結(jié)果會是一種同質(zhì)性的假象和對富有成效的溝通的障礙以及學(xué)科間和跨學(xué)科之間的合作。本文探討了“主觀幸福感”的概念，將其作為使用在文學(xué)上的幸福主觀測量的術(shù)語。為了研究什么是主觀幸福感，以及它如何關(guān)乎絕對幸福，我開始通過探索隱含在文學(xué)里的有關(guān)主觀測量的幸福報告，以及主觀幸福感在這些報告中所起的作用，并著手研究主觀幸福感被認為是什么。我的目標(biāo)是建立主觀措施的支持者的差異至少在表面上至少有兩點。首先，他們對主觀幸福感和絕對幸福之間的關(guān)系持不同意見：主觀幸福感是否構(gòu)成絕對幸福或僅僅是它的一個組成部分。第二，他們在主觀幸福感本質(zhì)上的意見不同：它是否是由認知，享樂，情緒或情緒狀態(tài)，或它們的組合構(gòu)成，以及有關(guān)該國是否能完全被稱作“幸?！保皾M足”或別的其他。為了努力協(xié)調(diào)這些分歧，我提出了一個根據(jù)主觀測量預(yù)先假定偏好享樂主義的解釋：根據(jù)幸福是一個理想的精神狀態(tài)問題的報告。這個解釋還沒有（據(jù)我所知）被主觀測量的支持者明確表示贊同。然而，它成功地協(xié)調(diào)著許多關(guān)于主觀測量的寫作，而且它具有歸因于主觀測量支持者的額外優(yōu)勢，一個幸福報告具有明確的價值論基礎(chǔ)，是相對合理的。給主觀幸福感的本質(zhì)及其與絕對幸福之間的關(guān)系一個適當(dāng)?shù)脑u價對于許多原因來說是重要的。除其他事情，這樣的一個評價可以同時幫助主觀測量的支持者和批判者去進行更清晰，更有效的辯論。主觀測量的支持者，就像那些為國家幸福報告的發(fā)展?fàn)幷摰娜艘粯?，想要確認這些測量的最合理的解釋，以允許盡可能強有利于他們的發(fā)展的情況。批判者，就如同為傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟或以能力為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟的優(yōu)越性辯論的人一樣，想要清空關(guān)于主觀測量的最合理的解釋，以避免受到他們是在攻擊一個稻草人的指控。在最后，我的希望是一個對主觀測量的基礎(chǔ)的更明確的評價可以幫助消除學(xué)術(shù)交流，合作和進步的障礙。2．主觀幸福感和絕對幸福在這個部分，我將就著作中的主觀測量來探討主觀幸福感和絕對幸福之間的關(guān)系。我會爭辯說，主觀幸福感的測量的支持者在主觀幸福感和絕對幸福之間的關(guān)系上持不同意見：主觀幸福感是否構(gòu)成絕對幸?；騼H僅是它的一個組成部分。如同我一開始的觀點一樣，我認為幸福的概念，也就是所謂的迄今我都成為絕對幸福：“我們擁有什么，我們的生活什么時候會變得好，什么時候我們的生活不是一定道義上的好，但是有利于我們”（提比略，2006年，第493，原斜體）。讓我們稱其為幸福的核心概念吧。還有許多其他的名詞，在同一意義上使用，包括“一個人的好，利益，優(yōu)點，興趣，審慎的價值，福利，幸福，繁榮，幸福和實用”（摩爾＆酥，1996年，第599）。因為幸福是為了追求最終的，而不僅僅是幫助性地有利于個人，幸福也應(yīng)該是我們有理由鼓勵追求的，是作為目的，而不僅僅是作為一種手段，無論是在我們自己的生命里以及他人的生命里。正如托馬斯斯坎倫指出：大家普遍認為個體幸福有一個簡單的含義，它起著以下三個作用。首先，它作為一個單個人的理性決策的重要依據(jù)，至少對那些在他或她獨自關(guān)注時（也就是說，在這種道義上的義務(wù)和對他人的關(guān)切上能夠予以擱置）的決定。第二，它關(guān)注恩人如朋友或父母，有理由推廣。第三，它是以將其個人的利益考慮到道德觀點里為基礎(chǔ)的（斯坎倫，1998年，第93頁）。特別是，人們經(jīng)常認為幸福是一個因素，或者像有些人會認為，唯一的因素應(yīng)作為結(jié)果，而不僅僅是為公共政策的一個手段。當(dāng)主觀測量支持者談到用這種測量代表幸福感時我會認為這是理所當(dāng)然的，他們在核心概念上使用這個術(shù)語（安格納，200