




版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請進行舉報或認領(lǐng)
文檔簡介
Managing
Risk
for
theNext
Wave
of
DigitalCurrenciesJuly2023By
BernhardKronfellner,
StevenAlexanderKok,
James
Mackintosh,
andChristianN.
Schmid(BCG);MikeBalestrino(BCapital);
andSamirGhosh(FalconX)ManagingRiskfor
theNextWave
ofDigital
CurrenciesThe
digital-currency
marketplace
has
been
in
turmoil
since
the
current“crypto
winter”
began
in
mid-2022.
Holdings
have
been
breached,fraudulent
and
illicit
schemes
have
been
revealed,
and
digital-currencyo?erings
have
lost
value,
making
the
risks
more
evident.(For
anoverviewofwhatledto
thecryptowinter,
andofwherethingsstandnow,
seethesidebar“DeFiSummer,CryptoWinter,
andtheFuture.”)Recentactionsby
theUSSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)have
furtherensuredthattherisksofdigitalcurrencywillbe
topofmindfor
investorsfor
sometimeto
come.Inthisarticle,
weaimto
describetherisksthatcomewithsupportingando?eringdigitalcurrencies,
aswellasappro-priatetoolsandmethodsto
mitigatethem.
Aslongasclientsdemandaccessto
digitalcurrencies,
frombasiconesto
stablecoinsandevencentralbankdigitalcurren-cies(CBDCs),
theserisk-mitigationtoolsshouldbecomepartoftheoperatingmodelofmostbanksand?nancialservicesorganizations.At
thesametime,
digitalcurrenciesare
hereto
stay.
Theirprimaryfunction—toholdandtransfervaluewithoutacentralauthorityvalidatingandprocessingtransactions—willcontinueto
be
attractiveto
investorsandother?nan-cialservicescustomers.
Inaddition,
therapidpaceofinnovationcontinues.
Financialinstitutionshave
adutytoprovidethesamelevelofasset-speci?co?erings,
capabili-ties,
andguardrailsthattheydowithothercomparableassetclasses.RisksAssociatedwithDigitalCurrenciesWhiledigitalcurrenciesare
availableinavarietyofformsand?avors(seethesidebar“AGuideto
Digital-CurrencyProductsandServices”),
theycan
allbe
assessedagainstcommonriskcategoriesrelevantto
?nancialinstitutions.Exhibit1showsthesecategoriesarrangedroughlyinorderofthesourceofrisk—from
broadmarketforces
to
particu-laractorsinthedigital-currencyecosystemto
gapsinthe?nancialinstitution’sownrange
ofcapabilities.Thispresents?nancialinstitutionswithaseriesofstrategicchallenges.
Chiefrisko?cers(CROs)shouldbe
askingtwoquestions.
First,
whatare
themostimportantnewrisksassociatedwithdigitalcurrencies?Second,
howto
bestmanagethoserisks?For
boththesequestions,
?nancialinstitutionsneedto
pay
attentionto
thefactorsuniquetodigitalcurrencies—requiringnewpractices,
methods,
andways
ofthinking.01MANAGING
RISK
FOR
THE
NEXT
WAVE
OF
DIGITALCURRENCIESDeFiSummer,
CryptoWinter,
andtheFutureManyinvestorsacquireddigital-currencyholdingsduringthesteepupswingof“DeFisummer,”
whichbeganinAugust2020.
AstheCOVID-19pandemicsurged,
sodidthevalueofdecentralized?nance(DeFi)o?erings.
(Seetheexhibit.)Likemanyspeculativeinvestorsbeforethem,someassetmanagersmadedigital-currency-relatedbetswithoutfundamentalrisk-managementpracticesinplace.Thedigital-asseteconomyisnowinaperiodofregrouping.Analysisindicatesahighlevelofresearchanddevelop-ment,
mostlytakingplacequietlywithininnovativecompa-nies.
Asinallbearmarkets,
thisiswhencasualinvestorsandsubstandardplayersdepart,
anddigital-assetdevelop-erspreparetheirnextwave
ofo?erings.Developingariskstrategyfor
digitalcurrencies,
includingthoseyoualreadyownoroversee,
doesnotmeanignoringthedownturn.
Itdoes,
however,
meancontinuingto
servecustomerneeds,
balancingthevalueofexposureindigitalcurrenciesagainsttherisksandnecessaryprecautions.DeFisummerendedinNovember2021.
LatercamethecollapseofthestablecoinTerra
inMay
2022,
followedinJuneby
thebankruptcyoftheSingapore-basedhedgefundThreeArrowsCapital.
ThencamefurtherinterestratehikesfromtheFederal
ReserveandtheFTXbankruptcy.Eachtime,
therisksbecameclearer,
andmoreinvestorspulledback.
By
May
2022,
thecurrentcryptowinterwasfullyunderway,
markedby
asteepdropinvalues.
(Theterm“cryptowinter”makesreferenceto
“Winteriscom-ing,”themottoofoneofthewarringhousesintheTVseriesGameofThrones.
Themottorefersnotonlyto
theharshnessofwintersinthehouse’scontinentbutalsototheinevitabilityofdi?culttimes.)Exhibit-CryptoMarketPricesvs.
DeveloperActivity,
2014-2023800kTerra
collapseMay
2022Bitcoin
(in$)70,000FTXcollapseNov.
202265,00060,000DeFi
summerAug.
2020–Nov
202155,00050,00045,00040,00035,00030,00025,00020,00015,00010,000May
2022ThreeArrowsCapitalbankruptcyJune2022Cryptowinter5,0000May
2022–?Jan.
2014Jan.
2015Jan.
2016Jan.
2017Jan.
2018Jan.
2019Jan.
2020Jan.
2021Jan.
2022Jan.
2023DeveloperactivityBitcoin(in$)Sources:
DataStatista;
CoinMarketCap;
BCGanalysis.BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP+BCAPITAL+FALCONX02The
digital-asset
economy
isnow
in
a
period
of
regrouping.AGuideto
Digital-CurrencyProductsandServicesMainProductsMainServicesDigital
Currencies.
Thesevirtualcurrencies—Bitcoin,Ethereum,
andmanymore—arecommon?nancialproductsthatallleverageblockchaintechnology.
Manyofthemhave
valueprimarilyasspeculativeinvestmentvehi-cles,
whichincreasestheirvolatilityandthusa?ectstheirriskpro?le.Centralized
Exchanges
andBrokerages.
Thesehubsandplatformsenablepeopleandinstitutionsto
tradedigitalcurrencieswith?atcurrenciesorwithoneanother.Exchangesfacilitatepricediscoveryandmatchordersamongparticipants.
Brokeragesfacilitatepricediscoveryandtransactionsacrossexchanges.
Bothexchangesandbrokeragesprovideadditionalservicesrelatedto
creditandderivatives.Somedigital-currencyo?erings(“coins”)have
non-specula-tivevalue.
Theyare
utilitarian,
withusecasesthatincludecar
rentalsandthetracingofgoodsalongasupplychain.Becausedigitalcurrenciesare
onlyminimallyregulated,
ahighlevelofriskmonitoringandmitigationisconsideredbestpracticefor
allofthem,
eventhosewithprimarilyutilitarianvalue.Digital-Currency
Storage
Services.
Alsoknownascryptowalletservices,
thesemay
be
o?eredby
banksorthird-par-tyentitiesto
facilitatethemanagementandsafekeepingofdigitalcoins,
protectingthemfrombeinghackedandenablingtherecoveryoflostkeys.
Theyalsoprovidequali-?edstoragewhenrequiredby
regulations.
Coldwallets,whichhave
onlyanintermittentconnectionto
theinternet,are
saferfromcyberattackthanmore-connectedoptions.Hotwallets,
whichmaintainaninternetconnection,
allowfor
moreconvenientexchangesandtransfersoffunds.Digitalcurrenciesrequireasystem
ofveri?cationto
vali-datetheintegrityofeachnewcoin.
Theydothisby
linkingitcrediblyto
theblockchain.
Thereare
twoprimaryap-proaches.
Inproof-of-work
(PoW)veri?cation,
eachnewcoinmustbe
generatedthroughmathematicalcomputa-tion,
witheachsuccessivecoinrequiringhigherlevelsofprocessingpower.
Proof-of-stake
(PoS)
digitalcurrenciesverifythevalueofeachdigitalcointhrougha?rmationbycurrentcurrencyholders,
quali?edby
thenumberofcoinstheyalreadyhave
“staked”(committedto
keepilliquid).Payment-Processing
Services.
Retailersandotherswhoreceivepaymentsindigitalcurrencyusetheseservicestomanagetheprocess.
Theseservicesare
alsousedforconversionfromonedigitalcurrencyto
another.CustodyServices.
Otherservicesincludedigital-currencymanagement,
inwhichintermediariesactonbehalfofthecurrencyowner,
andsecurityservicesthatoverseeencryp-tion,
safeguardprivatekeys,
andperformsomeoftherisk-mitigationfunctionsdescribedinthisarticle.AtypicalPoS
system
ismoreresistantto
cyberattackandusesmuchlessenergythanitsPoW
counterparts.
Ethere-umconvertedfromPoW
to
PoS
inSeptember2022,
be-comingthemostprominentdigitalcurrencyto
doso.Stablecoins.
Theseare
digitalcurrencieswhosevalueispeggedto
thevalueofanothercurrencyorcommoditybythealgorithm.
Theytendto
be
backedby
other?nancialassetsascollateralandare
thusrelativelyprotectedfromsomerisks.
Ifachain’stokeniscollateralized,
thedigitalcurrencyislikelyto
be
astablecoin.Central
BankDigital
Currencies
(CBDCs).
CBDCsare
aformofdigitalcurrencybeingconsideredby
somecentralbanksornationalgovernments.
CBDCswouldbe
releasedthroughanational?nancialinfrastructurethatwouldmanagethedigitalledgersystem
andveri?cation.BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP+BCAPITAL+FALCONX04Exhibit1-SevenCategoriesofDigital-CurrencyRisk1Market
riskPricevolatility234567Counterparty
riskIllicit-?nance
riskRegulatory
riskSecurity
riskAnotherplayer’sdefaultFraud,
moneylaundering,
etc.ContinuouslyevolvinglocalgovernmentthinkingOperational
riskReputational
riskIncludingsmartcontractsandtechnologicalchallengesDamageto
thepublicimageSource:
BCG/FalconX/BCapitalanalysis.12Market
Risk:
Price
VolatilityCounterparty
Risk:
Default
from
OtherParticipantsTheriskofgettingcaughtinaspeculativebubbleormar-ket-drivenpricecashdependsonhowspeculativetheactivityisinadigitalcurrency.
Stablecoins,
whichareTheintrinsiccharacteristicsofdigitalcurrenciesmakethemakinto
anon-transparentilliquidasset.
Moreover,peggedto
?at-currencyvaluesandholdunderlyingcollater-al(inthepegcurrency,
ormorsuchastreasuries),
arriskfree.
Butevenstablecoinscan
be
volatile,
especiallywhenthecollateralisinadequate(forexample,
usingyetanotherstablecoinascollateral),
insu?cient(notfullybacked),
oralgorithmic(stabilizedby
automaticbalanceagainstanotherstablecoinorunderlyingcollateralpool).whileinprincipletheyare
decentralizedby
design,
liquidityischanneledviaaratherconstrainedsetofmarketpartici-pants(mostnotably,
digital-currencyexchanges)thatfor
allintentsandpurposeshave
beensubjectthemselvestosigni?cantchallenges.
Thechallengesfor
exchangesrangefromine?ectiveinternalcontrolsto
issuesmostlyrelatedto
proprietary-trading-stylefailures(insomecases,
drivingtheseexchangesto
bankruptcy).
Ifeithertheseexchangesorsomeholdersofadigitalcurrencycannotmeettheirobligations,
orappearto
be
likelyto
default,
thevalueofthedigitalcurrencycan
droprapidly.
Aswithderivativesmarkets,
lossesfromcounterpartyriskcan
spreadrapidlyacrossadigital-currencyecosystem,
creatingahighlevelofvolatilitythata?ectsotherassetclassesaswell.
Thisposesadi?cultconundrumfor
?nancialinstitutionsfromacustomer-protectionperspective:
customersare
essentiallyholdinganassetthatisperceivedto
operateasacurrency(withmarket?uctuationsakinto
thoseintheforeign-ex-changemarket),
buttheyare
exposedto
aratherdi?erentriskpro?le,
drivenby
theintrinsicnatureofthedigitalcurrencyandtheoperatingqualityoftheecosystemthatsupportsit.Even
stablecoins
canbevolatile,
especiallywhenthecollateral
isinadequate,
insu?cient,oralgorithmic.Anotherissueistherelativelackofmarketcontrolsthattraditionallyprotectparticipantsfromextremevolatilityandfromborderline-illegalmarketswings(suchaspump-and-dumpschemes).
Intherealmofdigitalcurrency,marketcontrolsare
stillcatchingup,
andthiscan
becomeproblematicwhena?rmiso?eringclientsnearreal-timeexchangefor
?atpaymentpurposes.
For
example,
havingawalletthatholdsbitcoin,
andconvertsto
?atatthepointofpurchase,
can
leadto
challengesintermsofliquidityman-agement,
internaltradingpools,
andcustomerexpecta-tions.
Thesechallengesmightresultinconstrainingtheo?eringofsomeservicesto
asubsetofdigitalcurrencies,ortakingothermitigationmeasures(describedlater).05MANAGING
RISK
FOR
THE
NEXT
WAVE
OF
DIGITALCURRENCIES35AttackIllicit-Finance
Risk:
QuestionableActorsSecurity
Risk:
Vulnerability
tOnecommonconcernaboutdigitalcurrenciesistheex-tentto
whichfraud,
moneylaundering,
pricemanipulation,anddeceptiveactivityare
prevalent.
Whileinabsoluteterms,
theshareoffraudrelatedto
cryptogloballyisnotlarge,
itcan
stillbe
material:
accordingto
theFinancialTimes,
cryptocurrencyscamsincreasedby
morethan41%inEnglandandWales
(andpresumably
elsewhere)between2021and2022.
Theriskofillicit?nance
challenges
thecorebankingservicesofvaluecustodyandfraudprotection.Ifnotproperlysecured,
digitalcurrenciesare
vulnerabletolargeblockchain-analysis?rm,
$3.8billionwerestolenfromdigital-currencybusinessesin2022,
especiallyfromDeFiprotocols.
Overall,
illicitaddressessentnearly$23.8billionworthofcryptocurrencyin2022,
a68%increaseover2021.)Intruderscan
stealordepletedigital-currencyhold-ings,
andtheymay
alsocaptureprivatekeys
(thecryp-tographiccodesusedto
gainaccessto
holdings).
Ifprivatekeys,
passwords,
orwalletsare
stolenorlost,
theirvaluemay
be
unrecoverable.
Manyoftheblockchain-intelligenceandanti-money-launderingmethods
described
later,
intherisk-mitigation
section,
have
evolved
to
manage
securityrisk.Practiceslike“rugpulls”—wherepromoterswithdrawtransactionsfromadigital-currencyo?therebydilutingitsvalue—arelikeconventionalpump-and-dumpschemes.
Thedigital-currencymarket,
inpartbecauseofitscross-jurisdictionalnature,
doesnothave
thesamelevelofprotectionsandcontrolsinplacethathaveevolvedoverhundredsofyearsinthe?nancialservicesindustry.
Butevenifallthesecontrolswereinplace,
digitalcurrenciesare
designedto
supportperson-to-persontrans-actions,
withoutbanksorotheroversightgroupsasinter-mediaries.
Thisexposesclientsto
theriskoffraud.Illicitaddresses
sentnearly
$23.8billionworthofcryptocurrency
in2022,
a68%increase
over
2021.Intrinsically,
thecustodianmodelfor
digitalcurrenciesisdi?erentfromcustodyfor
anyotherassetclass.
Inotherassetclasses,
abankhasasingleomnibusstructuretomanagetheaggregateexposureto
themarket(thisistypicallydonewithretailsecuritiesholdings,
for
example).4Regulatory
Risk:
Continuously
Evolving
LocalGovernment
ThinkingWithdigitalcurrencies,
atthemostbasiclevel,
banksprovidecustodyto
safeguardthekeyto
theholdings.
At
amorenuancedlevel,
bankscan
providecustomerswithanongoingviewofthedigitalcurrency’sexposureto
marketrisk.
Beyondthat,
bankshave
limitedrecourseto
supportcustomers,
makingdepositinsurancecostspotentiallyhigher.
Amodelsimilarto
otherassetclasses,
recognizingthecustomer’sfulllevelofmarketexposure,
mightbepreferable.
Forthcomingevolutionsofdigitalcurrenciesessentiallyaimatahigherlevelof“selfcustody”asapreconditionfor
peer-to-peertransactions.
This,
inprinci-ple,
couldreducetransactioncostsando?erajurisdic-tionalpaymentrailatthepotentialexpenseoftransferringcustodyriskto
customers.Governmentsaroundtheworldare
developingnewrulesfor
digitalcurrencies.
TheSEC,
for
example,
initsJune2023lawsuitagainstBitcoinandCoinbase,
named19cryptocurrenciesassecurities,
therebysettingthestage
forpotentialregulatorychanges.
Theuncertaintiesaroundthiscasewillrequireattention,
andaddincrementalcostsintheservicingofdigitalcurrencies.
Moregenerally,
theconstantlyevolvingnatureofdigital-currencyregulationsmeansthatcomplianceprofessionalsare
payingcloseattentiontisheaded.”Banksandother?nancialinstitutionshave
playedarela-tivelylimitedrolethusfar
inhelpingto
shaperegulatorye?orts.
Withdigitalcurrencies,
whereo?eringstendtocrossmultipleregulatoryjurisdictions,
theymay
have
alargerroleto
play
inthefuture.
(Seethesidebar“TheCallfor
Digital-CurrencyRegulation.”)6OperationalRisk:
Complexity,
SmartContracts,andNewTechnologiesDigitalcurrencieshave
moreunderlyingcomplexitythanothertypesofvaluestorageandtransfermechanisms.Typically,
theyare
supportedby
foundingcompanies(argu-ably,
withthenotableexceptionofbitcoin),
withcomplexandsomewhatopaquegovernancestructures(suchasdecentralizedautonomousorganizations).
Also,involvenoveltechnologiesandbehavioralpatterns.
Asaresult,
it’spossibleto
losetrackofalltherami?cationsofhowthevalueofthecurrencyshouldevolve,
alongwiththeconsequencesofanygiventradethatsupportsorunder-pinsdigitalcurrencies.
Somedigital-currencyinvestorsmayhave
beencaughtunaware
by
thiscomplexity.BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP+BCAPITAL+FALCONX06TheCallfor
Digital-CurrencyRegulationEven
beforetheSEC
actions,
manyobserverswerecallingfor
stronger,
clearerregulationandmoretransparency.
Reg-ulatoryagenciesaroundtheworldare
intheprocessof?nalizingsuchregulationsoratleastare
developingplansfor
them.
Also,
inOctober2022,
theFinancialStabilityBoard,
aninternationalorganizationthatmakesrecom-mendationsabouttheglobal?nancialsystem,
proposedstricterregulationofcryptoassets—inparticular,
stable-coins—amongthenationswiththe20largesteconomies(theG-20nations).
TheGlobalFinancialMarketsAssocia-tionexpressedsupportfor
thisproposal,
stating:
“Inafast-evolvingandcompetitiveenvironment,
itisimportantfor
globalstandardsettingbodiesto
promotethecoordina-tionofane?ective
andalignedglobalregulatory
framework.”Even
amongdigital-currencyfunds,
thereisacallfor
stron-ger,
clearerregulationthathelpsinvestorsandbanksreduceandmitigaterisk.
Stakeholdersaskthatthecodesandapplicationsbe
fair,
andthattheregulationsre?ectasolidunderstandingofthetechnologyanditsvalue.Regulatorsare
wellplacedto
convenetheconversationsthattheindustryneedsmost,
withtherightpeopleintheroom,
readyto
listento
oneanother.
Crypto-nativeinstitu-tionsshouldbe
includedinearlydiscussions.
Theyhavetheexpertiseandhands-onexperienceto
recommendafeasibleapproach.Regulatorswilldiscoverwithdigitalcurrencieswhattheyhave
discoveredwithmanyothertechnologies.
For
everymajornewtechnological
advance,
a
balance
mustbe
struckbetweencon?ictingpriorities.
Inthiscase,
thoseprioritiesincludeinnovation,
customerprivacy,
andthetransparencyneededby
law
enforcementto
trackillicitactivity.07MANAGING
RISK
FOR
THE
NEXT
WAVE
OF
DIGITALCURRENCIESEven
among
digital-currency
funds,there
is
a
call
for
stronger,
clearerregulation
that
helps
investorsand
banks
mitigate
risk.Considerforking,
whichtakesplacewhensomepartici-pantschoosenotto
followorrecognizetheoriginalcon-sensusprotocol.
Instead,
theyspinoutacompetingrecordoftransactions,
asifcreatinganalternatetimeline.
Eachpathmay
have
itsowntransactionrecord,
controlledby
itsowncommunity.
Insomecases,
thisisdonedeliberately—to
createnewcurrencies,
for
example.
Nonetheless,
thepathsshareacommonhistorHowto
MitigateRisksBankscan
mitigatetherisksofdigitalcurrenciesattwolevelsatonce:
speci?cto
eachinvestment(“bottomup”)andoverall(“topdown”),
withorganization-widecapabili-ties.
Exhibit2showsrisk-mitigationstrategiesthatcan
bedeployed.
Typically,
thesemeasuresare
tablestakes,
anditisunusualto
seeabankorother?nancialservicesinstitu-tionadoptmorecomprehensivemeasuresanddosocon-sistently.
By
puttingacomprehensivesetofcomplementa-ry
mitigationsinplace,
?nancialinstitutionscan
ensurethatdigitalcurrenciesare
o?eredandleveragede?ectively.producesariskoflosingvalueorcontrol.Anotheroperationalriskisanerrorinasmartcontract,
acore
tenetofmanydigital-currencyandotherblock-chain-relatedapplications.
Insimpleterms,
asmartcon-tractrepresentstheintentionto
codifyautomaticexecu-tionandprovidethecodesomesortofpowerofattorney.For
example,
asmartcontractmightspecifythatanauto-maticsaleofdigitalcurrencieswilltake
placeunderpre-es-tablishedconditions(likeacomplexstandingorder).
Ingeneral,
derivativecontractscan
be
linkeddirectlyto
digi-tal-currencyinvestmentssothatoptionscan
be
executeddirectlyandautomatically.
AmistakeinthedrLet’stake
acloserlookatinvestment-levelstrategies,
andthenwe’llexaminemeasuresthatcan
be
takenatanorganizationallevel.BlockchainIntelligence
(BI).
Alsoknownasblockchainanalytics,
BIisacornerstonecapabilityintrinsicto
digitalcurrenciesandblockchainingeneral.
To
alargeextent,itisthefoundationofdigitalcurrencies’enhancedcapabil-ities,
especiallywhenitcomesto
granulartransparencyandtraceability.codingofthatcontractcouldleadto
anautomatictransac-tionthatwas
notintentional—andthatcouldleadtosubstantialaccidentallosses.
Onceexecuted,
thereisessentiallynorecourse.BIisusedby
CROs,
riskexecutives,
law
enforcement,
andgovernmentregulatorsto
detectandmitigateillicit-?nanceandcounterpartyrisks.
Third-partyvendorso?erincreas-inglysophisticatedAI-basedtoolsandanalyticpracticesformonitoringdigitalcurrencies’blockchaintransactions.7Reputational
Risk:
Damage
to
thePublic
ImageBiglossesandmajormisstepsindigitalcurrencytendtobe
widelyreportedevents.
Withdigitalcurrencies,
lossesresultfromexposureto
theecosystem,
andunlike?atcurrencies,
theirperceivedstabilityisunrelatedto
howacountryorgovernmentperforms.
Reputationaldamagemay
resultfromthesuddencollapseofavendororex-change,
theexposureofaminingscamorPonzi
scheme,
amalwareoutbreak,
therapiddeclineofutilitytokens,
orbacklashagainstafraudulentinitialcoino?eringorwalletservice.
Althoughsomethreatsto
abank’simagemaycomefrompublicmisperception,
muchreputationalriskre?ectsdecisionsmadeby
employeesateverylevelofthehierarchy.BIisusedto
detect
andmitigate
illicit-?nance
andcounterparty
risks.For
example,
BIsystemscan
usemachinelearningtodetectpatternsintransactionhistoriesthatare
consistentwithmoneylaunderingorillicit?nance.
Thesesystemsandcomplianceprofessionals,
givingtheseauthoritiesvisibilityintoreal-time?nancial?ows.
Whenthereisaproblemwithacounterparty,
investigatorscan
identifytherelatedtransactions.
Thisgivesbanksmoreabilityto
re-ducerisksto
theircustomers.Anti-money-laundering(AML)techniquesare
well-estab-lishedformsofBIorientedtoward
counterpartyandillicit-?nancerisks,
includingthe?nancingofterrorismandsanctionsnoncompliance.
Thereare
somespeci?cways
inwhichkeyAMLcontrolsoperatedi?erentlyinadigital-currencyspace:09MANAGING
RISK
FOR
THE
NEXT
WAVE
OF
DIGITALCURRENCIESExhibit2-Strategiesfor
MitigatingInvestmentRisksAssessmentofvendor
and
Proof-of-stake
Safe
storagepartnerrelationshipsBroadermitigationstrategiesBuildinginstitutionalcapabilitiesBlockchainintelligenceAssetresearchparticipation1.
Marketrisk2.
Counterpartyrisk3.
Illicit-?nancerisk4.
Regulatoryrisk5.
Securityrisk6.
Operationalrisk7.
ReputationalriskSource:
BCG/FalconX/BCapitalanalysis.?
KnowYour
Customer
(KYC).
KYC
evaluatescompa-niesandinvestorswhentheyjointheblockchainordigitalcurrency.
Itcontinuallycompilesknowledgeofen-tities’backgrounds,
transactionalhistories,
andexpectedfutureactivity.BIalsoplays
aroleinthedeploymentofautomatedcon-trols.
Theseallowbanksandother?nancialservices?rmsto
continuallymonitorandimprovetheirpractices.
Auto-matedcontrols,
for
example,
can
helplimitexposure.
Insomedigital-currencyinvestments,
rapidliquiditymay
notbe
available.
Therefore,
banksandinvestorsneedto
keeptheirexposurewithinthelimitsofacceptablerisk—evenifallthefundspassmustnext).
Asdiscussedpreviously,
digital-currencyholderscanbe
hurtby
thedominoe?ectfromanotherfund’sorex-change’sfailure,
eveniftheydon’t
holdthatfundordobusinessonthatexchangedirectly.
Thus,
aswithanyriskyinvestment,
anautomaticstop-lossandhedgingshouldbeconsideredasoptions.?
KnowYour
Transaction
(KYT).
KYT,
arecentlydevel-opedapplication,
evaluateseachblockchaintransactionasithappens.
Thisisessentiallytheprocessoftransac-tionmonitoring,
extendedto
theecosystemlevel.
Anef-fectiveKYTsystem
can
verifyinrealtimethatatransferisnotgoingto
abadactororaknownsanctionedwallet.Platformsanddashboardsfor
digitalcurrencies,
anotherimportantBIo?ering,
bringtogether
溫馨提示
- 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
- 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
- 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁內(nèi)容里面會有圖紙預覽,若沒有圖紙預覽就沒有圖紙。
- 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文庫網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲空間,僅對用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護處理,對用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對任何下載內(nèi)容負責。
- 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當內(nèi)容,請與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
- 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。
最新文檔
- 創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)支持政策分析會議服務合同
- 合同變更確認條款
- 生化檢驗合同范本
- 桌椅拆除合同范本
- 股權(quán)期權(quán)授予合同范本
- 政府采購服務類合同范本
- 第2單元第6課 奔向光明-亮度傳感器的應用和條件控制-教學設(shè)計2023-2024學年清華大學版(2012)初中信息技術(shù)九年級下冊
- Unit 2 Exploring English Understanding ideas 教學設(shè)計-2024-2025學年高中英語外研版(2019)必修第一冊
- 信用貸款合同
- 簡單月嫂用工合同范本
- 普通話講解課件
- DB3502T 078-2022 代建工作規(guī)程
- 冠心病課件完整版本
- 光伏發(fā)電+儲能項目三期項目建筑安裝工程投標方案(技術(shù)方案)
- 2024關(guān)于進一步提升基層應急管理能力的意見詳細解讀課件
- 生活垃圾轉(zhuǎn)運站技術(shù)規(guī)范 CJJT47-2016知識培訓
- 課前三分鐘有效利用活動方案
- HIV陽性孕產(chǎn)婦全程管理專家共識2024年版解讀
- 人教版九年級數(shù)學復習教案全冊
- 《工程熱力學》(第四版)全冊配套完整課件
- 2024時事政治考試題庫(100題)
評論
0/150
提交評論