世界銀行-為了勞動還是為了離婚單方面離婚法與婦女勞動成果（英）-2024.1

Policy

Research

Working

Paper10661For

Labor

or

for

Divorce?Unilateral

Divorce

Laws

and

Wom

en’s

Labor

OutcomesNajat

El

MekkaouiSara

LoukiliYeganeh

FourouheshfarNada

EissaMiddle

East

and

Nort

h

Africa

RegionO?ce

of

t

he

Chief

EconomistJanu

ary

2024Policy

Research

Working

Paper

10661AbstractDespite

substantial

p

rogress

in

closi

ng

the

gender

gap

,women’s

labor

force

p

articip

ation

in

the

Middle

East

andNort

h

Africa

rem

ains

one

of

the

low

est

glob

ally,

at

a

m

ere18

p

ercent.

is

p

ap

erinvestigates

the

e?ect

of

the

introduc-tion

of

unilateral

divorce

law

s

on

women’s

labor

outcomes,using

data

f

rom

the

Demograp

hic

and

Health

Surveyp

rogram

that

sp

ans

decades

and

aquasi-exp

erimental

dif-ference-in-di?erences

design

in

t

hree

countries:

Morocco,the

A

rab

Rep

ublic

of

Egypt,

and

Jord

an.

e

resu

lt

s

high-li

ght

that

no-fault

d

ivorce

legislat

ion

was

associated

with

amodest

increase

in

m

ot

hers’

labor

outcomes,

m

easu

red

bycu

rrent

emp

loyment,

afew

y

ears

after

the

ref

orm

.

ese?ndings

are

likely

induced

by

a

p

owershift

and

anticip

atorye?ects

that

drive

women

into

the

lab

orf

orce.

However,when

a

longertime

window

is

considered,

10

ormore

yearsafter

the

ref

orm

,

the

study

documentsa

negative

e?ect

ofthe

ref

orm

on

women’s

labor

outcomes

in

Morocco,

anda

positive

e?ect

in

the

A

rab

Republic

of

Egyp

t

and

Jord

an.ese

di?erences

can

be

attributed

to

a

set

of

cou

nt

erv

ailinge?ects,

including

social

norms,

labor

market

dynamics,

andevolution

of

the

legislat

ion,

that

make

the

derived

utilityf

rom

m

arriage,

in

some

cases,

m

ore

attractive

than

thatderived

f

rom

emp

loyment,

and

vice

v

ersa.

ese

?ndingsp

artially

con?

rm

resu

lt

s

f

rom

p

revious

research

on

the

re

la-tionship

between

no-fault

divorce

and

women’s

agency

andemp

owerment

in

the

Middle

Eastand

North

Africa

region,but,

at

the

same

time,

contrast

with

p

rominent

p

ersp

ectiveson

legislat

ion

that

aims

at

red

u

cing

gender-based

discrim-ination.

Instead,

they

show

that

t

here

might

be

u

nd

esirede?ects

of

legislation

and

provide

a

policy

relev

ant

discussionon

that

basis.is

paper

is

a

p

roduct

of

the

O?ce

of

the

Chief

Economist,

Middle

East

and

Nort

h

Africa

Region.

It

is

p

art

of

a

largere?

ort

by

the

World

Bankto

provide

open

access

to

its

research

and

make

a

contribution

to

development

p

olicy

discussionsarou

nd

thew

orld

.

Poli

cy

Research

Working

Pap

ers

are

alsop

osted

on

the

Web

at

http

:///p

rwp

.

eau

t

hors

may

be

contacted

at

najat.el-mekkaoui@daup

hine.p

sl.eu

or

sara.loukili@daup

hine.eu.e

Policy

Research

Working

Paper

Series

disseminates

the

?ndings

of

work

in

progress

to

encourage

the

exchange

of

ideas

about

developmentissues.

An

objective

of

the

series

is

to

get

the

?ndings

out

quickly,

even

if

the

presentations

are

less

than

fully

polished.

e

papers

carry

thenames

of

the

authors

and

should

be

cited

accordingly.

e

?ndings,

interpretations,

and

conclusions

expressed

in

this

paper

are

entirely

thoseoftheauthors.eydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsa?liatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsofthe

World

Bankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.ProducedbytheResearchSupport

TeamForlabororfordivorce?ForLabor

orforDivorce?UnilateralDivorce

Lawsand

Women’s

Labor

Outcomes1NAJAT

EL

MEKKAOUI

,SARALOUKILI

,YEGANEHFOUROUHESHFAR

,NADAEISSA2345JEL-Codes:J12;J16;J22;D10;D13.Keywords:

Unilateral

divorce,

Labor

force

participation,

MENA

region,

Morocco,

Jordan,Egypt,Mothers,Intra-householdbargaining.1

The

authors

are

grateful

and

thank

Nelly

Elmallakh,

Nazmul

Chaudhury

and

Daniel

Halim

for

their

helpful

suggestionsand

comments.

This

work

was

supported

by

the

MENA

Chief

Economist

Office

under

the

labor

and

gender

researchprograms

(TTLs:

Nelly

Elmallakh

and

Nazmul

Chaudhury).

It

is

part

of

a

larger

effort

by

the

World

Bank

to

provide

openaccess

to

its

research

and

make

a

contribution

to

development

policy

discussions

around

the

world.

Policy

ResearchWorking

Papers

are

also

posted

on

the

Web

at

/prwp.

The

author(s)

may

be

contacted

atnajat.el-mekkaoui@dauphine.psl.eu

orsara.loukili@dauphine.eu.2UniversitéParis-DauphinePSL

LEDaDIALIRD,EMANESandERF.3UniversitéParis-DauphinePSL,LEDaDIALIRD,EMANES.4The

Euro-MediterraneanEconomistsAssociation(EMEA),EMANESandLEDaDIALIRD.5GeorgetownUniversity,ERF,

and

the

NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(NBER).Forlabororfordivorce?1.

IntroductionOne

of

the

most

persistent

and

salient

features

of

labor

markets

in

the

Middle

East

andNorth

Africa

(MENA)

region

is

that

women

participate

significantly

less

than

men

despitesubstantial

reduction

of

the

gender

education

gap

(Assaad

et

al.,

2020)

–the

averagefemale

labor

force

participation

rate

in

the

region

is

a

mere

18

percent

(WDI,

World

Bank,2021).

For

example,

in

Morocco

only

23

percent

of

women

participate

in

the

labormarket

and

this

rate

is

even

lower

for

countries

like

Jordan

where

it

did

not

exceed

13percent

in

2021.Under

the

canonical

collective

householdmodel,marriagemarkets

andlegislations

governing

divorce

influence

the

labor

supply

of

spouses

and

theintrahousehold

decision

process

(Chiappori

et

al.,

2002;

Fernandez

and

Wong,

2014;Field

et

al.,

2021).

While

a

large

body

of

literature

has

studied

the

consequences

of

theintroduction

of

more

liberal

divorce

laws

on

intrahousehold

distribution

of

bargainingpower

and

labor

supply

within

the

collective

household

labor

supply

framework(Chiappori,

1988;

1992;

Apps

and

Rees,

1988),

less

is

known

about

MENA

regioncountries

in

this

regard.

Particularly

in

circumstances

where

traditional

gender

rolesprevail

as

social

norms

and

where

women

possess

limited

influence

or

bargaining

powerwithin

the

marriage,

their

choices

regarding

work

may

not

be

adequatelyacknowledgedor

facilitated

(Alesina,

2013;

Qian,

2008;

Jensen,

2012;

Heath

and

Mobarak,

2015;Jayachandran,2015;2021).Figure

1.

Relationship

between

gender

progressive

lawsand

FLFPby

Country102030FLFP

rate4050MENASouthAsiaOECDEast

AsiaLatin

AmericaEurope

Central

AsiaFitted

valuesSub-saharan

AfricaSource:

Authors

fromWorldBank,Women,Business,

and

the

Law

(2023)

database.

Note:

Used

data

comes

from

theWorld

Bank’s

time

series

onWomenBusinessand

the

Law

index

(1971-2023)for

122

countries

belongingto

the

MENA,

OECD

high-income,

SouthAsia,Latin

America,

EastAsia,Sub-SaharanAfrica,andEuropeandCentralAsiaregions.Thelatestyear,2023,isconsidered.Theindexscoresarebasedontheaverage

ofeacheconomy’sscoresforthe

8

topics

included

in

the

aggregate

score:

mobility,

workplace,

pay,

marriage,

parenthood,

entrepreneurship,

assets,

and

pension.

The

index

scoresrange

between

0

and

100

and

a

higher

score

indicates

more

gender

equal

laws.

The

corresponding

values

for

female

labor

force

participation

rate

foreachcountry

arefromthe

WorldBank,

WorldDevelopmentIndicators

database.2Forlabororfordivorce?An

institutional

environment

favorable

to

women

(as

illustrated

by

figure

1),

such

as

no-fault

divorce

laws,

coupled

with

increased

chances

of

success

in

marriage

markets6

orthe

possibility

of

accessing

the

labor

market

in

the

event

of

a

divorce,

would

influenceintrahousehold

decision-making

processes,

even

if

a

divorce

does

not

ultimately

occur(Duflo,

2012).

Hence,

divorce

and

marriage

legislation

can

exert

a

substantial

influenceonthese

power

dynamics

and

effectively

boost

women's

participation

inthe

labor

force.This

paper

investigates

the

effects

of

divorce

legislation

reforms

on

women’s

laboroutcomes

in

three

MENA

region

countries:

Morocco,

the

Arab

Republic

of

Egypt,

andJordan.

At

varying

dates

during

the

late

1990s

and

early

2000s,

MENA

region

countriesconsecutively

introduced

different

forms

of

unilateral

divorce

and

child

custodylegislation

reforms

(Welchman,

2007;

Appendix

A).

These

reforms

allowed

women

toeasily

access

divorce

without

having

to

prove

fault

nor

require

consent

of

spouse.

In

pastresearch,

Hassani-Nezhad

and

Sj?gren

(2014)

investigated

a

similar

question

usingcross-country

variation

in

the

timing

of

introduction

of

unilateral

divorce

between

18MENA

countries

using

aggregate

data

and

focusing

on

younger

women’s

labor

forceparticipation

in

comparison

to

women

in

relatively

older

age

groups.

They

showed

thatthe

entry

into

force

of

unilateral

divorce

laws

effectively

increased

labor

forceparticipation

of

younger

women.

Using

a

different

empirical

strategy

and

employingindividual

panel

data,

we

investigate

the

effects

of

unilateral

divorce

and

custodylegislation

reforms

on

women’s

labor

outcomes

by

exploring

differences

betweenwomenwhoaremoreor

lessaffectedbythereform.Insteadofexploitingcross-countryvariations,

we

purposefully

isolate

estimates

for

one

country

at

a

time

to

assess

howcontext-dependent

the

findings

can

be.

In

fact,

a

growing

body

of

literature

has

shownthat

the

relationship

between

intrahousehold

distribution

of

bargaining

power,

socialnorms

on

gender

roles,

and

labor

supply

is

context-dependent,

especially

as

far

asdeveloping

countries

are

concerned

(Duflo

and

Udry,

2004;

Ashraf

et

al.,2009;

2014;2016;

Bau,

2016;

Heath

and

Tan,

2020;

Field

et

al.,

2021).

Moreover,

by

using

micro

data,we

explore

pathways

between

micro-level

gender-based

discrimination

and

inequalitiesand

macro-level

outcomes,

adding

to

the

growing

micro-founded

literature

that

relates6Marriage

markets

in

countries

of

the

Middle

East

and

North

Africa

differ

from

other

countries

where

most

researchonthecanonical

collectivehouseholdlabor

supply

is

developed

and

can

be

characterized

by

underdevelopment

andmissing

markets

(Anukriti

and

Dasgupta,

2017).

Marriage

rates

are

substantially

higher,

mate

selection

ofteninvolves

familyarrangements,

divorcelegislationislimitingto

womenand

social

normsabout

genderrolestend

todetermine

spousalrelations.3Forlabororfordivorce?gender

inequalities

to

macroeconomic

growth

and

development

outcomes

(Seguino,2010;2013;2020;SantosSilvaandKlasen,2021).Women

face

several

barriers

to

enter

the

labor

force,

including

discriminatory

laborlaws,

inadequate

maternity

leave

policies,

and

very

limited

legal

social

protection

againstworkplace

harassment

and

gender-based

violence

(World

Bank,

2021).

Cultural

factorsalso

play

a

significant

role,

as

traditional

gender

roles

and

societal

expectations

oftendiscouragewomen

frompursuingcareersandlimittheirmobility(Jayachandran,2015;Heath

and

Tan,

2020;

Field

et

al.,

2021).

As

such,

deeply

ingrained

stereotypes,

andbiases,

still

highly

present

in

the

MENA

region,

perpetuate

the

belief

that

women

areprimarily

responsible

for

household

chores

and

child-rearing,

creating

an

unequalburden

of

unpaid

work

and

limiting

their

ability

to

engage

in

paid

employment.

On

amacroeconomiclevel,andthroughoutthe

economicliterature,theU-shapedlaborforceparticipation

curve

hypothesis

is

a

stylized

depiction

of

the

relationship

between

femalelabor

force

participation

and

economic

development

(Goldin,

1995).

Although

thishypothesis

is

widely

spread

in

cross-country

analysis

of

the

subject,

some

studies

suchas

Gaddis

et.

al

(2013)

or

Eastin

&

Prakash

(2013)

find

no

or

weak

evidence

of

thisrelationship.

They

conclude

that

an

S-shaped

relationship

is

more

likely

to

exist

and

thatthrough

this

paradigm,

the

“dangers

of

the

middle

phase”

should

urge

to

put

in

place

newnorms

and

new

institutions

promoting

women

in

the

workforce

(Eastin

&

Prakash,2013).

Thus,

at

a

macro-level,

economic

and

institutional

barriers

combine

to

create

acomplex

web

of

challenges

that

impede

female

labor

force

participation,

exacerbatinggenderinequalitiesandhinderingeconomicgrowthanddevelopment

aswhole.At

a

micro-level

(individuals

and

households),

women’s

labor

force

participation

isfound

to

have

an

inverse

U-shaped

function

of

bargaining

power

(Moeeni,

2019).Accordingly,

the

importance

of

intra-household

bargaining

power

dynamics

to

femalelabor

forceparticipation

decisions

can

be

explained

by

the

not-so-rare

men’s

oppositionto

the

labor

participation

of

their

spouses.

Asaad

and

al.

(2017)

show

that

women’semploymentintheMENAregionisaffectedbyearlymarriageandfindthatmarriagebythe

median

age

reduces

the

probability

of

working

for

women.

In

this

regard,

the

reformof

legislation

on

divorce

can

constitute

a

strong

shock

to

the

risk

of

divorce

making

iteasier

and,

subsequently,

altering

the

perceived

risk

of

marital

dissolution

which

altersintrahouseholdrelations

anddecisions

(StevensonandWolfers,2006;Stevenson,2007;Alesina

and

Giuliano,

2007).

Literature

suggests

that

enhancing

the

overall

legalframework

potentially

increases

women’s

bargaining

power

within

the

household,4Forlabororfordivorce?making

their

divorce

threats

more

credible

in

case

of

conflict.

Moreover,

alteredmarriage

contracts

arguably

provide

women

with

incentive

to

supply

labor

and

remainin

the

labor

market

through

many

channels.

Chiappori

et

al.

(2002)

find

evidence

of

ashift

to

higher

female

bargaining

power

intra-household

and

El

Lahga

and

Moreau(2007)

suggest

lowerdegreesofspecializationin

domesticproduction.Drawingon

thisstrand

of

literature,

our

central

hypothesis

is

that

divorce

legislation

reform

shouldincrease

women’s

bargaining

power

during

the

marriage,

potentially,

allowing

morewomenintothelabormarket.To

test

this

argument,

we

construct

a

pseudo-panel

of

mothers

that

we

assign

totreatmentand

controlgroupsbasedontheages

oftheiryoungestchild.Usingdata

fromthe

Demographic

and

Health

Survey

(DHS)

program

that

spans

over

decades

and

a

quasi-experimental

difference-in-differences

design,

we

assess

how

the

implementation

of

theright

to

unilateral

divorce

affects

women's

labor

outcomes

in

Morocco,

The

ArabRepublic

of

Egypt,

and

Jordan.

We

follow

cohorts

of

“treated”

mothers

for

several

periodsbefore

and

after

the

reform

thus

including

the

short-term

and

long-term

effects

oflegislative

reforms

onwomen’s

socio-economic

position.

Our

findings

suggest

that

therearetwomainmechanisms:apower-shifteffect

andananticipatoryeffect.Our

results

show

that

the

power-shift

effect

is

most

prevalent

impacting

mainly

marriedmothers

with

children

below

the

legal

age-custody

cutoff,

for

whom

divorce

is

less

costly.However,

this

effect

can

be

offset

by

higher

costs

in

the

labor

market

that

remain

barriersto

women’s

labor

marketization.

This

study

contributes

to

the

literature

on

the

effects

ofdivorce,

child

custody

and

alimony

legislation

on

women’s

labor

outcomes

(Parkman,1992;

Gray,

1998;

Bremmer

and

Kesselring,

2004;

Genadek

et

al.,

2007;

Stevenson,

2008;Bargain

et

al.,

2012;

Hassani-

Nezhad

and

Sj?gren,

2014;

Fernández-Kranz,

2022;Corradini

and

Buccione,

2023).

Additionally,

it

shows

how

the

effects

of

legislation

areheavily

dependent

on

context,

be

it

social

or

economic.

The

following

section

brieflysummarizes

the

institutional

and

legal

background

of

the

reform

in

Morocco,

The

ArabRepublic

of

Egypt,

and

Jordan.

Section

3

presents

the

conceptual

framework.

Section

4describes

the

empirical

strategy

and

data

used,

while

section

5

summarizes

the

resultsandprovides

adiscussion,andsection6concludes.5Forlabororfordivorce?2.

InstitutionalBackgroundDivorce

legislation

in

the

Middle

East

and

North

Africa

region

is

a

part

of

a

broader

FamilyCode

that

covers

issues

including

inheritance,

marriage,

divorce,

alimony,

child

custodyand

child-support,

among

other

personal

status

dispositions.

Family

structures

in

thesecountries

are

characterized

by

a

prevalence

of

patrilineality,

and

social

order

is

thus

basedon

the

superiority

of

men

in

terms

of

rights

and

power.

This

system

of

kinship

and

theimportant

place

reserved

for

the

code

of

honor

have

cemented

the

family

and

are

one

ofthe

possible

explanations

for

the

persistence

of

certain

customs

and

traditions

favoringthe

traditional

role

of

women

to

their

participation

in

the

workforce.

Historically,

familylaws

in

these

countriestreat

women

and

men

separately

with

often

unequal

dispositions,such

as

access

to

divorce.

Against

this

backdrop,

the

introduction

of

unilateral

divorceprovisions

has

fundamentally

changed

one

side

of

the

relational

balance

between

thesexes,

by

granting

women

a

right

that

was

previously

available

only

to

men

(Welchman,2007;

Engelcke,2019).They

additionally,empoweredwomento

exercise

greater

controlover

their

marital

status,

seek

divorce

on

their

terms,

and

secure

their

economic

well-being

after

divorce.

For

reference,

figure

1

in

Appendix

A

shows

a

timeline

of

introductionof

unilateral

divorce

reforms

in

select

MENA

countries

as

well

as

child

custodydispositions

and

age

cutoffs

related

to

child

custody

alimony.

Additionally,

figure

2

inAppendixAshowsthe

evolutionofdivorceratesinTheArabRepublic

ofEgypt,Morocco,and

Jordan,

which

are

relatively

more

stable

than

in

the

years

preceding

the

increase

ofchild

custody

age

in

all

three

countries.

We

provide

more

discussion

on

the

relevance

ofthis

observation

in

section

3

on

the

conceptual

framework.

Let's

first

examine

the

majorchangesinthefamilycodes.The

Arab

Republic

of

Egypt.

The

reform

of

family

laws,

in

2000,

introduced

significantchanges

that

integrated

new

rights

for

women

within

the

family

(Welchman,

2007).

Oneof

the

key

advancements

was

the

establishment

of

the

"Khul"

divorce

provision.

Thisprovision

allows

women

to

initiate

divorce

by

returning

their

dowries

or

financialcompensation

to

their

husbands,

without

having

to

prove

fault

or

seek

their

consent.Moreover,the

reform

addressedthe

issue

of

financial

supportfor

womenafter

divorce.Itintroduced

the

concept

of

"nafaqa,"

which

refers

to

the

right

of

divorced

women

toreceive

financial

maintenance

from

their

ex-husbands

for

a

specified

period.

Thisprovision

ensures

that

women

are

not

left

financially

vulnerable

after

divorce

and

helpsto

protect

their

economic

well-being.

Additionally,

the

reform

emphasized

the

importance6Forlabororfordivorce?of

child

custody.

It

recognized

the

mother's

primary

right

to

custody

of

her

children,particularly

for

younger

children,

unless

it

is

determined

to

be

against

their

best

interests.Incaseofadivorce,the

motherobtainscustody

ofamalechildupto

theageof10,

andofafemalechildup

to

the

ageof12years(article20).Anamendment

tothisarticlein

2005raised

the

age

of

custody

to

15

for

girls

and

boys,

without

distinction.

Throughout

theduration

of

custody,

the

non-custodial

parent

(father)

must

pay

a

pension

to

the

guardianmothertocompensate

herforthecaregiventothechildren.Morocco.In2004,a

new

Family

Code7

that

expandedwomen's

rights

and

responsibilitieswas

introduced.

The

law

received

positive

international

coverage

and

aligned

withMorocco's

international

commitments,

namely

the

CEDAW

(see

Charrad,

2012;

Sadiqi,2013).Thenew

Family

Code

enshrinedequal

rightsand

duties

for

both

spouses.

Theruleof

"the

wife's

obedience

to

her

husband"

was

abandoned,

women

no

longer

needed

amatrimonial

guardian,

the

age

of

marriage

was

set

at

eighteen

for

both

sexes,

instead

offifteen

for

girls

in

the

previous

Code,

and

polygamy

became

subject

to

such

conditions

thatit

was

made

very

difficult.

In

terms

of

divorce

proceedings,

the

new

Code

introduced

aform

of

unilateral

divorce

that

is

on

grounds

of

discord

and

open

to

both

spouses“Chikak”.

This

provision

empowers

women

to

dissolve

their

marriages

without

proof

offault.Intheeventofmaritaldissolution,evenunderthe“Chikak”,custodyofthechildrenreverts

primarily

to

the

mother,

then

to

the

father,

then

to

the

maternal

grandmother.Custodymust

be

guaranteed

bydecent

housingand

pension

bythe

non-custodialparent(articles

163

et

167)

and

lasts

until

the

child

reaches

the

age

of

legal

majority,

whethermale

or

female.

Then,

the

child

may,

at

the

age

of

fifteen,

choose

which

of

his

or

her

parentswill

assume

custody

(article

166).

Overall,

the

introduced

reforms

of

family

laws

inMoroccoin2004

markedasignificantadvancementinwomen'srightswithinthefamily.Jordan.

Despite

social

and

political

resistance8

the

first

amendment

of

the

Personal

StatusLaw,

in

2001,

by

Royal

Decree,

introduced

notable

changes

including

raising

the

minimummarriage

age,

restricting

polygamy,

enhancing

custody

rights

for

women,

and

grantingthem

access

to

a

form

of

unilateral

divorce.

The

later

provision

was

deemed

ratherconservative

since

it

still

required

women

to

relinquish

some

or

all

their

financial

rights.The

amendment

still

failed

to

pass

in

parliament

in

2004

and

it

wasn’t

until

2010

that7Family

Codeof

February5,

2004.8Harris,Kelli

M.M.(2015):PersonalStatusCodeReforminJordan:

StateNegotiationsandWomen'sRightsintheCode.Washington:GeorgetownUniversity./bitstream/handle/10822/760898/Harris_georgetown_0076M_12957.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y7Forlabororfordivorce?unilateral

divorce

was

passed

under

‘Tafriq

lil

iftida’

or

‘Iftida’

but

remained

subject

topayment

of

a

“ransom”

by

the

wife

in

exchange

for

marriage

dissolution

(JordanianPersonal

Status

Law,

section

4,

Article

114).

After

2010,

under

the

new

Personal

StatusLaw,

mothers

are

entitled

to

child

custody

until

the

youngest

child

reaches

the

age

of

15(article

126-127)

while

fathers

remain

sole

legal

guardians.

No

distinctions

are

madebetween

female

and

male

children

in

terms

of

custo