世界銀行-中非經(jīng)貨共同體經(jīng)濟(jì)晴雨表2023年12月第5卷（英）

Macroeconomics,

Trade&

InvestmentCEMACEconomic

BarometerDecember2023VOL.5ChadCentralAfricanRepublicCameroonEquatorialGuineaGabonRepublicofCongoMacroeconomics,

Trade&

InvestmentCEMACEconomic

Barometer1December2023The

CEMAC

Economic

Barometer

is

a

World

Bank

publicationthat

presents

a

snapshot

of

recent

developments

in

and

theeconomic

outlook

of

the

CEMAC

region,

followed

by

a

briefassessment

at

the

country

level.

The

Economic

Barometeralso

includes

a

focused

technical

section

on

a

theme

ofregional

relevance.

This

edition’s

special

topic

provides

policyoptions

for

the

CEMAC

countries

to

take

better

advantage

offuture

commodity

price

booms.1

TheCEMACEconomicBarometerwaspreparedbyanMTIteamcomprisingRobertJohannUtz(LeadEconomistandTask

Team

Leader),DjenebaDoumbia(EconomistandTask

Team

Leader),ErickTjong(EconomistandTaskTeam

Leader),AminaCoulibaly(SeniorEconomist),VincentBelinga(SeniorEconomist),DemetKaya(SeniorEconomist),MarilyneYoubi

(Economist),PierreMandon(Economist),DiderotGuyDEstaingSandjongTomi(Economist),SoniaBarbaraOndoNdong(Economist),FerdinandOwoundiFouda(Economist),ClaudiaNoumedemTemgoua(Economist),andJoanaMonteiroDaMota(formerETconsultant),undertheguidanceofCheickFantamadyKante(CountryDirector),SandeepMahajan(PracticeManager)andTheoDavidThomas(Director),andwiththesupportofIreneSitieneiandIfeomaClementinaIkenye(ProgramAssistants).Thereportbene?tedfromcommentsfromCleliaRontoyanni(ProgramLeader)andJamesCust(SeniorEconomist).Theupdatere?ectsinformationavailableasofOctober27,2023.PleasecontactDjenebaDoumbia(ddoumbia@)andErickTjong(etjong@)foranyquestionsorcomments.SECTION1—Recent

EconomicDevelopments

and

OutlookintheCEMAC

RegionSECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

Region3TheeconomiesintheCEMAC(CommunautéeconomyremainslargelydependentonéconomiqueetMonétairedel’AfriqueCentrale)regionexperiencedcontinuedrecoveryin2022supportedby

higheroilpricesandimprovedtermsoftradeofotherexportcommodities.TheCEMACeconomyasawholegrewbyabout3.0percent(0.4percentpercapita)onaveragein2022.However,growthisexpectedtodecelerateslightlyin2023,withanaveragegrowthrateof2.5percent(0.0percentpercapita).In2022,thepaceofgrowthremainedunevenacrosstheregion,withgrowthrangingfrom3.8percentforCameroonto0.5percentfortheCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR).CameroonhasbeenthefastestgrowingcountryinCEMACsince2020,bene?ttingfromthegoodperformanceoftheagroindustryandservicesectors.At

theotherendofthespectrum,inEquatorialGuinea,followingthepositivegrowthobservedin2022(3.1percent),theeconomyisexpectedtocontractby2.5percentin2023onthebackoflowerhydrocarbonproductionandweakerdomesticdemand.hydrocarbonsandotherextractiveindustries.In2022,hydrocarbonsrepresentedmorethanhalfoftotalgovernmentrevenuesinCEMAC,highlightingtheexposureofthe?scalpositiontovolatilecommodityprices.Cameroon,theleastoil-dependentcountryinCEMACwithoilamountingto21percentofrevenues,hashadthehighestgrowthratesinrecentyears.Ontheotherhand,EquatorialGuinea,wherethehydrocarbonsectorrepresents

91percentofrevenues,hashadthelowestgrowth.CEMACcountrieshavebeentakingmeasurestokeeppublicspendinganddebtundercontrol,butfuelsubsidiesrepresentaheavyburdenonthe?scalbalance.OverallpublicexpenditureshavebeencontainedacrossCEMAC,andgovernmentdebthasbeenonadownwardpathsincetheCOVID-19crisisdisruptedpublic?nancesin2020.InallcountriesexceptfortheRep.ofCongo,debtwasbelowtheregionalconvergencetargetof70percentofGDPin2022.However,publicspendingonfuelsubsidiesinCEMACcountriesreachedCFAF

1,243billionin2022,about1.8percentoftheregion’sGDP.

The?scalcostofsubsidiesvariedfrom0.5percentofGDPinCARto3.4percentinCongo.2

WhilemostCEMACcountriesembarkedonsubsidyreformin2023,reformsarenotyetcompleteandtheir?scalcostpreventstheCEMACeconomiesfromtakingfulladvantageofthehigheroilpricestorebuild?scalandexternalbuffers,ortoexpandsocialprotectionprogramsandotherinvestmentsneededtoachievemoremeaningfulpovertyreduction.CEMAC’s?scalandexternalpositionsimprovedin2022amidhigheroilprices,buttheregionaleconomy’srelianceonoilandotherextractivesexposesittovolatilityincommoditymarkets.FiscalbalancesimprovedinallCEMACcountries,turningintoasurplusof3.2percentofGDPin2022,comparedtoade?citof1.4percentinthepreviousyear.

Higheroilexportreceiptsandfavorabletermsoftradeofotherexportcommoditieshavealsopositivelyimpactedtheregion’scurrentaccountbalance,whichimprovedfrom-1.3percentofGDPin2021to1.9percentofGDPin2022.However,CEMAC’s2

In2022the?scalcostoffuelsubsidiesreached0.7percentinGabon,1.3percentinEquatorialGuinea,and2.8percentinCameroon.DataforChadwasnotavailableforthisperiod.4SECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

RegionDespitepolicymeasuresadoptedby

theregionalinCEMACstoodat6.9percent,upfrom6.1percentintheprevioussixmonthsandstillabovetheregionaltargetof3percent.Moreover,duringthe?rstsixmonthsof2023,foodin?ationinCEMACwas9.6percentonaverage.Therisinglivingcosts,especiallyfoodprices,areadverselyimpactinghouseholds,particularlythemostvulnerable.PovertyremainshighandlargelystagnantacrossCEMACduetoloweconomicgrowthcombinedwithfasterpopulationgrowth.Over2021and2022,about31.1percentoftheregion’spopulationlivedonlessthanUS$2.15(2017PPP)perday,theinternationalpovertyline.Povertyratesvarygreatly,rangingfrom2.4percentinGabonto65.5percentinCAR.CEMACcountries’?scalpolicies,characterizedbyregressivetaxsystemsthatrelymostlyonindirecttaxescombinedwithlowsocialspending,arelessconducivetopovertyreductionorimprovedhumancapitaldevelopmentoutcomescomparedtoothereconomiesintheirrespectiveincomegroups.4centralbanktocontainin?ationarypressures,risinglivingcostscontinuetoimpactlivelihoodsacrossCEMACcountries.In2022and2023,theBankofCentralAfricanStates(BEAC)hascontinuedtotightenitsmonetarypolicytocontainin?ationarypressuresandsupporttheexchangeratearrangement.TheBEACincreasedthepolicyrateinMarch2023byanother50basispointsto5.0percent,acumulativeincreaseof175basispointssinceNovember2021.Moreover,theBEACendeditsweeklyliquidityinjectionsinMarch2023aftersteadilyscalingthembacksinceJune2021.Whiletherealeffectiveexchangerate(REER)ofCEMACcountriesdepreciatedbetween2021and2022,ithasbeenincreasingsinceend-2022inmostCEMACcountrieslinkedtohigherin?ationrateintheregion.Thisindicatesadeteriorationinpricecompetitivenessastheregionalcurrency–theCFA

franc(CFAF)–hasappreciatedinrealeffectivetermsagainstthecurrenciesofmajortradingpartners.3

Improvedtermsoftradehelpedtosupportthebuildupofgrossreserves,whichreachedCFAF

6,851billionatend-2022,equivalentto4.1monthsofimports(upfromCFAF

4,969billionin2021).AsofJuly2023,theregion’sgrossreserveshadincreasedfurther,reachingCFAF6,906billion.TheoutlookfortheCEMACregionismoderatelypositivebutsubjecttosigni?cantrisks.Overthemediumterm,economicgrowthisprojectedtoslowdownmarginally,withanaveragerealGDPgrowthof2.3percentin2024-25.ExceptforEquatorialGuinea,wherehydrocarbonproductionisprojectedtodeclineonaccountofmaturingoil?elds,economicactivityinallCEMACcountriesisexpectedtoexpand.Theriskstotheregionaloutlookaresigni?cant.In?ationarypressures,especiallyonfoodprices,ifnotcoupledwithwell-targetedHigherconsumerpricescontinuetoimpactfoodsecurityandlivingconditionsinCentralAfricawherepovertylevelsarepersistentlyhigh.GlobaltradedisruptionstriggeredbytheprotractedwarinUkrainearestillimpactingprices,especiallyasmanyCEMACcountriesrelyheavilyonfoodimports.Inthe?rsthalfof2023,averagein?ation3

Adecreaseintherealeffectiveexchangerate(REER)ofacountrymeansadepreciationofthecountry’slocalcurrencyagainstthebasketofitstradingpartners’currencieswhileanincreaseintheREERre?ectsanappreciation.4

PovertydatawasnotavailableforEquatorialGuineaasofOctober2023;however,anationalhouseholdsurveyisunderway.SECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

Region5policies,couldamplifyfoodinsecurity,poverty,andcuttingregulatorybarriers,couldgreatlybene?tCentralAfricaneconomies.ThespecialtopicofthisEconomicBarometerproposesaseriesofpoliciesthatcouldmaximizetheeconomicgainsandsocialbene?tsderivedfromCEMAC’snaturalwealth.Improvingthequalityandef?ciencyofinstitutionsandpublicinvestmentsininfrastructure,andfocusingspendingonhealth,educationandlaborskills,andotherpublicserviceswouldenableamoreresilient,inclusive,anddiversi?edgrowthpath.andsocialtensions.Whilecommoditypricesareprojectedtoremainabovetheaverageofthepast?veyears,afaster-than-projecteddeclineinoilpriceswouldadverselyimpactCEMAC’sexportearningsand,consequently,thecountries’?scalandexternalbalances.Ontheotherhand,aprotractedcon?ictintheMiddleEastcouldleadtohigheroilprices.Thiswouldbene?tCEMAC’soilrevenuesandexportsbut,intheabsenceoffuelsubsidyreform,wouldincreasethe?scalpressurecomingfromfuelsubsidies.Furthermore,aprotractedtighteningofglobal?nancialconditionswouldraisedebtservice,squeezing?scalspaceandunderminingeconomicgrowth.Weaker

demandfromChinaorothermajorexportdestinationscouldalsoadverselyimpacttheregion’seconomicoutlook.Otherrisksincludeheightenedpoliticalinstability,worseningsecurityconditionsincertainregionsofcountriessuchasCARandCameroon,aweakeninginthepaceofreforms,andclimaticshocks.ConsideringCEMAC’smoderategrowthprospectsandseveralrisks,structuralreformsareneededtoachievedevelopmentaspirationsandbetterlivingstandardsintheregion.CentralAfrica’srichnaturalresourcesrepresentgreatpotentialtodrivetheregion’sfuturegrowth.At

thesametime,economicdiversi?cationremainsakeydevelopmentchallenge.Somecountriesarepursuingpoliciestodiversifytheireconomiesbeyondtheoilandgassectorsbypromotinglocalagriculture,industry,andentrepreneurship.Reformstofacilitateintraregionaltrade,suchasimprovingcooperationinborderandtradecontrols6SECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

RegionEconomicgrowthintheCEMACregionisrecoveringfromtheCOVID-19crisis,withrealGDPexpectedtogrowby

2.5percentin2023……resultinginmoderategainsinGDPpercapitainsomecountries.Figure1.RealGDPgrowthinCEMAC,2019-2025Figure2.RealGDPpercapitagrowthinCEMACcountries(inpercent),2022-20234.03.02.01.00.0-1.02.01.00.0-1.0-2.0-3.0-4.0-5.0-6.0-2.020222023e2019

2020

2021

2022

2023e

2024f

2025fTheregion’sexternalpositionhasimprovedthankstohighercommodityprices.HigheroilpricesalsostrengthenedCEMAC’s?scalposition…Figure3.Oilprices(rhs)andexternalpositioninCEMAC(lhs),2019-2025Figure4.FiscalbalanceandrevenuesinCEMAC(%ofGDP),2019-2025252015105412.010.08.0100.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.00.026.04.002.00.0-2-4-2.0-4.02019

2020

2021

2022

2023e

2024f

2025f02019

2020

2021

2022

2023e

2024f

2025fCurrentAccountBalance(%ofGDP)TradeBalance(%ofGDP)Non-oilrevenues(lhs)Oilrevenues(lhs)Fiscalbalance(rhs)Crudeoilprice(US$/bbl)CEMACConvergencecriteria-Fiscalbalance(rhs)SECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

Region7…andpublicdebtintermsofGDPhasbeendecreasingthankstogrowthandeffortstocontainpublicspending.Onmonetarypolicy,theBEAChasbeenincreasingeffortstocontainin?ationandsupporttheexchangeratepeg.FIgure5.GovernmentdebtandexpendituresinCEMAC(%ofGDP),2019-2025Figure6.EvolutionofpolicyratesinWestandCentralAfricaandintheEU,2020-202320151058060402005.55.04.54.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.002019

2020

2021

2022

2023e

2024f

2025fCurrentexpenditures(lhs)Capitalexpenditures(lhs)Publicdebt(rhs)WAEMUCEMACECBCEMACConvergencecriteria-Debt-to-GDPratio(rhs)Still,therealeffectiveexchangerateofCEMACcountrieshasincreasedinthepastyear,re?ectingtheappreciationofCFA

Francagainstthebasketoftradingpartners’currencies.Risinglivingcosts,andfoodpricesinparticular,continuetoimpacthouseholds’purchasingpowerinCEMACcountries.Figure7.

CEMAC:RealandNominalEffectiveExchangeRates,2020-2023Figure8.Averagein?ationinCEMAC(inpercent),2020-20238615013011090420-2REER,CameroonREER,GabonCentralAfricanRep.REER,averageREER,Congo,Rep.REER,EquatorialGuineaNEER,averageCorein?ationEnergyin?ationFoodin?ationHeadlinein?ationCEMACConvergencecriteria-In?ation8SECTION1

—

Recent

Economic

Developments

andOutlookintheCEMAC

Region…affectingthemostvulnerableinaregionwherealmostoneinthreepeoplestillliveonlessthanUS$2.15perday.Thepersistenceofpovertyhighlightstheneedofreformstoboosttrade,createmorejobs,andstrengthensocialpoliciestoprotectpeople’slivelihoods.Figure9.PeoplelivinginpovertyinCEMAC(%oftotalpopulation),2021-2025Figure10.PovertyratesinCEMAC,2019-202590%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%PercentofpopulationlivingunderUS$2.15perday7060504030201002019

2020

2021

2022

2023e

2024f

2025f202120222023e2024f2025fCameroonCentralAfricanRepublicGabonChadCongo,Rep.Under2.15$/dayUnder6.85$/dayUnder3.65$/daySources:Nationalauthorities,WorldBank,Bruegel,andWorldBankstaffcalculations.Notes:PovertydataisnotavailableforallcountriesandperiodsandisbasedonnowcastandforecastprojectedbasedonactualdatafromnationalhouseholdsurveysforCameroon(2014),CentralAfricanRep.(2021),Chad(2018),Congo(2011),andGabon(2017).ProjectionsforGabonweremadepriortotheAugust2023coupd’état.9SECTION2—CountryUpdates55

TheCountryUpdatessectionisbasedontheWorldBank’sMacroPovertyOutlooks(MPOs)forthe2023AnnualMeetingsforsixCEMACcountries.TheMPOprovidesanoverviewofrecentdevelopments,forecastsofmajormacroeconomicvariablesandpovertyduring2023-2025,andadiscussionofcriticalchallengesforeconomicgrowth,macroeconomicstability,andpovertyreductionmovingforwardinaspeci?ccountry.TheMPOsforthe147countriescoveredarereleasedtwiceannuallyfortheSpringandAnnualMeetingsoftheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.TheMPOsforSub-SaharanAfricacanbeaccessedhere:/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook/mpo_ssa.10CameroonTable

1/Cameroon202227.9Population,millionGDP,

currentUS$billion42.1GDPpercapita,currentUS$Internationalpovertyrate($2.15)aLowermiddle-incomepovertyrate($3.65)aUppermiddle-incomepovertyrate($6.85)aGiniindexa1,506.725.747.074.846.6Schoolenrollment,primary(%gross)bLifeexpectancyatbirth,yearsbTotal

GHGEmissions(mtCO2e)105.760.3127.2Source:WDI,MacroPovertyOutlook,andof?cialdata.(a)Mostrecentvalue(2021),2017PPPs.(b)WDIforSchoolenrollment(2017);Lifeexpectancy(2021).Cameroon’s

economy

is

at

the

onset

of

a

modest

economic

recovery.Progress

on

poverty

reduction,

however,

has

remained

weak

due

tolow

per

capita

economic

growth,

with

1

out

of

4

Cameroonians

livingbelow

the

international

poverty

line

($2.15

PPP

a

day).

The

economicoutlook

for

Cameroon

is

expected

to

remain

moderately

favorable

overthe

medium

term,

but

with

risks

tilted

signi?cantly

to

the

downside.SECTION2

—

CAMEROON11Key

ConditionsandChallengesCameroonisthelargesteconomyintheEconomicandMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica(CEMAC),accountingforover40percentoftheregion’sGDPandover60percentofregionalforeignexchangereserves.TheCameroonianeconomyisalsomorediversi?edthantherestoftheCEMAC,withtheoilandgassectoraccountingforonly4percentofthecountry’sGDPand15percentofits?scalrevenuesin2022.Cameroon’sdebtpressureshaveintensi?ed,callingforcautious?scalpoliciesandimproveddebtmanagement.Thecurrentpublic-sectordrivendevelopmentmodelappearstohaverunoutofsteamandisnotabletodeliveronCameroon’sambitionofbecominganuppermiddle-incomecountryby2030,asgovernanceindicatorshavedeteriorated,humancapitalremainsweak,thebusinessenvironmentisunfavorable,andclimatechangerepresentsagrowingthreat.Povertyreductionremainsweakduetosloweconomicgrowth.OneinfourCameroonianslivesbelowtheinternationalpovertylineof$2.15PPPaday,withthepovertyheadcountrateprojectedtohavedeclinedbyjust0.6percentagepointsbetween2020and2023.Combinedwithrapidpopulationgrowth,thisimpliesthattheabsolutenumberofpoorCamerooniansisrising.Inequalityalsoremainshigh,withtheconsumptionGiniat46.6andlargedifferencesinlivingstandardsamongregionsandbetweenurbanandruralareas.SixoutofCameroon’stenregionsareaffectedbycon?ict,includingspilloversfromcon?ictsinneighboringcountries.Furthermore,climatechangeposesasigni?cantthreattothecountry’srelianceonnaturalresourcesandthelivelihoodsofover70percentoftheworkforceengagedinagriculture.RecentDevelopmentsCameroon’seconomicrecoverycontinuedin2022withrealGDPgrowthestimatedat3.8,despitestrongexternalheadwindssuchashigherimportpricesandtightening?nancialmarkets.Growthwassupportedmainlybytheagroindustryandservicesectors.In?ationstoodat6.3percentatend-2022year-on-year,upfrom3.5percentatend-2021.Drivenbyfoodprices,whichroseby13.7percent,in?ationaveraged7.5

percenty-o-yattheendofMay2023.Thecurrentaccountde?citnarrowedfrom3.7percentofGDPin2021to3.2percentin2022,re?ectinghigherpricesforoilexports.12SECTION2

—

CAMEROONTheBankofCentralAfricanStates(BEAC)continuedtotightenitsmonetarypolicytocontainin?ationarypressuresandsupporttheexternalviabilityoftheexchangeratearrangement.TheBEACincreasedthepolicyrateinMarch2023by50basispointsto5.0percent,acumulativeincreaseof175basispointssinceNovember2021.Moreover,inMarch2023,theBEACendeditsweeklyliquidityinjectionsaftersteadilyscalingthembacksinceJune2021.Sincethestartof2023,Cameroon’s?scalsituationhasimprovedduetohigheroilrevenuesandreducedfuelsubsidiesandotherspendingcuts.Nonoiltaxrevenuesgrewslightlyinthe?rsthalfof2023,drivenbycorporateincometaxandVAT

receipts.However,unpaidfuelsubsidiesfrom2022ofCFAF

330billion(1.1percentofGDP)werecarriedovertothe2023budget,bringingthetotalspendingonfuelsubsidiesto1.5percentofGDP,

downfrom3percentin2022.Recentreforms,notablytheincreaseinfuelpricesatthepumpasofFebruary2023,havecreated?scalspaceandenhancedinclusivegrowthprospectsbutcouldleadtoin?ationarypressures.Simulationsshowthatthereductioninfuelsubsidiesandresultingincreaseinfuelpricescouldtemporarilyraisepovertyincidenceby1percentagepointintheshortrun.To

cushiontheeffectofthesereforms,certaingroups,suchasfarmers,havereceivedtaxexemptionsandrebates.Thestateincreasedstatutoryminimumwageandpublicsectorwages,butthismaynotsigni?cantlyimpactpoverty,asmostpoorworkersareininformaljobs.To

reducepoverty,budgetarysavingsshouldbechanneledintosocialprotectiontargetedtothepoorandvulnerable.Despiteitsimproved?scalperformance,Cameroonstillfacesahighriskofdebtdistress,accordingtothelatestWB-IMFdebtsustainabilityanalysis(DSA).Cameroon’s?nancialsectorremainsweakduetopersistentNon-PerformingLoans(13percentofportfolio)andhighexposuretothesovereign(35percent).Nevertheless,?nancialsoundnessindicatorsimprovedmarginallyin2022.Domesticcredittotheprivatesectorincreasedby13.6percentin2022,upfrom12.0percentin2021.SECTION2

—

CAMEROON13OutlookCameroon’seconomicoutlookismoderatelyfavorableforthemediumtermbuthassigni?cantdownsiderisks.Cameroon’srealGDPgrowthisprojectedtoreach4.3percent,onaverage,over2024-26,supportedbysustainedactivityinthesecondaryandtertiarysectors.Thesecondarysector’sgrowthisexpectedtobedrivenbyagri-foodindustries,construction,andreconstructionintheNorth-WestandSouth-Westregions,andadditionalpowergenerationfromnewhydropowerplants.Thetertiarysectorisexpectedtoseegrowthintelecommunications,?nancialservices,andhospitality.Averagein?ationcouldmoderatefrom5.9percentatend-2023to4percentatend-2024andshoulddeclinetobelow3percentinthemediumterminlinewiththeCEMACconvergencecriterion.Thecurrentaccountde?citisexpectedtoimproveandstabilizearound3percentofGDPinthemediumterm,supportedbyimportsubstitutionandeffortstoboostexportcompetitiveness.Exportsofprocessedgoodsareexpectedtoincreasegradually,particularlyintheregionalmarket.The?scalpositionisexpectedtoimproveslightlythankstothegradualreductionoffuelsubsidiesandothercutstocurrentexpenditure.Continuedeconomicrecoveryandrevenueadministrationmeasuresshouldsupportimprovedrevenuemobilizationin2023.Thepublicdebt-to-GDPratioisexpectedtodeclinetoaround40percentby2025.Riskstothisoutlookinclude(i)afurthertighteningofglobalandregional?nancialconditions,(ii)adverseimpactsofthewarinUkraineoncommodityand?nancialmarkets,and(iii)apersistentsecuritycrisisintheNorth-West,South-West,andFarNorthregions.Tighteningglobalandregional?nancialconditionscouldincreasedebtpressures,squeeze?scalspace,andimpactthecountry’sgrowthprospects.Risingin?ationarypressureswouldalsonegativelyaffecthouseholdconsumptionandfurthersloworevenreversepovertyreduction;andfurtherreductionsinfuelsubsidiescouldincreasepovertyunlessappropriatemeasuresareputinplacetomitigatethoseimpactsonthevulnerable.Inaddition,thetake-or-payagreementfollowingthecompletionofNachtigalcouldpotentiallycostthebudgetapproximatelyCFAF150billion.Iftheserisksweretomaterialize,theywouldresultinslowerGDPgrowth,affecting?scalandexternalbalances,andthepaceofpovertyreduction.Whilethepercentageofpeoplelivingbelowtheinternationalpovertylineisexpectedtoslightlydecreasefrom24.2percentin2023to23.6percentin2025,theabsolutenumberofCameroonianslivingbelowthepovertylineisprojectedtoriseduetopopulationgrowth.14SECTION2

—

CAMEROONFigure1/Cameroon:RealGDPgrowthandFigure2/Cameroon:ActualandprojectedpovertycontributionstorealGDPgrowthratesandrealGDPpercapita10.08.0Povertyrate(%)RealGDPpercapitagrowth(%)390807060504030201006.024.02.010.00-2.0-4.0-6.0-1-2-3ImportsStatisticaldiscrepancyPrivateconsumptionGross?xedcapitalformationInventoriesExportsGovernmentconsumptionGDPInternationalpovertyrateLowermiddle-incomepov.rateUppermiddle-incomepov.rateRealGDPpercapitagrowthSource:WorldBank.Source:WorldBank.Note:seeTable

2.SECTION2

—

CAMEROON15Table2/Cameroon:Macropovertyoutlookindicators(annualpercentchangeunlessindicated

otherwise)202020212022

2023e

2024f

2025fRealGDPgrowth,atconstantmarketpricesPrivateConsumption0.53.33.63.93.83.64.03.64.23.74.53.8GovernmentConsumptionGrossFixedCapitalInvestmentExports,GoodsandServicesImports,GoodsandServicesRealGDPgrowth,atconstantfactorpricesAgriculture2.33.47.64.13.12.52.48.22.66.47.68.9-21.0-5.40.53.210.17.39.19.39.39.08.68.89.43.63.74.04.24.50.14.14.34.75.05.6Industry1.34.14.24.54.85.4Services0.33.23.43.53.73.6In?ation(ConsumerPriceIndex)CurrentAccountBalance(%ofGDP)FiscalBalance(%ofGDP)Revenues(%ofGDP)2.52.56.35.94.03.0-3.6-3.212.645.8-2.3-3.7-3.113.747.1-2.1-3.2-1.815.546.3-0.8-3.0-0.815.445.90.2-2.8-1.015.344.10.0-2.6-1.015.642.9-0.1Debt(%ofGDP)PrimaryBalance(%ofGDP)Internationalpovertyrate($2.15in2017PPP)a,b24.846.373.624.646.173.424.446.073.124.245.772.823.945.572.423.645.272.0Lowermiddle-incomepovertyrate($3.65in2017PPP)a,bUppermiddle-incomepovertyrate($6.85in2017PPP)a,bGHGemissionsgrowth(mtCO2e)0.47.00.67.31.07.61.17.91.28.21.38.6EnergyrelatedGHGemissions(%oftotal)Source:WorldBank,Poverty&EquityandMacroeconomics,Trade&InvestmentGlobalPractices.EmissionsdatasourcedfromCAITandOECD.Notes:e=

estimate,f=forecast.Povertydataareexpressedin2017PPP,

versus2011PPPinpreviouseditions-resultinginmajorchanges.See(a)Calculationsbasedon2009-and2014-ECAM-IV.Actualdata:2014.Nowcast:2015-2022.Forecastsarefrom2023to2025.(b)Projectionusingpointtopointelasticityatregionallevelwithpass-through=1basedonGDPpercapitainconstantLCU.16Central

AfricanRepublicTable

1/CentralAfricanRepublicPopulation,million20225.6GDP,

currentUS$billion