A Techno-Economic Agenda for the Next Administration-此為英文文檔

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Thenextadministrationneedstoplaceinnovation,productivity,

andcompetitivenessatthecoreofitseconomicpolicy.Tothatend,thisreportoffersacomprehensivetechno-economicagendawith

82actionablepolicyrecommendations.

KEYTAKEAWAYS

nGiventheanemicproductivitygrowthofrecentyearsandahollowingoutofadvancedtechnologymanufacturingsectorstoChina,theUnitedStatesneedsamuchmorerobusttechno-economicpolicyagenda.

nThatwillonlyhappenwithpresidentialleadership.Yet,neither“middle-out”“Bidenomics”norinwardfacing“AmericaFirst”economicsissufficient.

nRegardlessofwhothenextpresidentis,theyshouldsetagoaltore-establishunparalleledU.S.nationaltechno-economicpowerwhilelimitingChina’srelativeadvancement.

nThisrequirespoliciestosupportfasterproductivitygrowth,afasterpaceofinnovationandinnovationadoption,andamuchlargerU.S.shareofglobaladvanced-industryproduction.

nTocontributetothiseffort,thisreportenumerates82specificstepstowardsuchatechno-economicpolicyagenda,organizedaround13keypolicyareas.

nThemostcriticalinitialstepistocreateaNationalCompetitivenessCouncilwithintheWhiteHouse,akintotheNSCandNEC.Withoutthat,thereisno“nervecenter”forthisagendain

government.

SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS

OverallStrategy

1EstablishaNationalCompetitivenessCouncil.

BudgetPolicy

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Supportincreasingtaxestocover70to80percentofthebudgetdeficitshortfalltoeliminatethebudgetdeficit.

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Supportcuttingsomespending,especiallyentitlementstotheelderly,tocoveraround20to30percentoftheshortfall.

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Increasefederalinvestmentbyatleast$100billionto$200billion

annuallytosupportenterprisecapabilitiesforinnovation,productivity,andcompetitiveness,andamorerobustinternationaltechno-economicstrategy.

TaxPolicy

5DoubletheR&Dtaxcreditandrestorefirst-yearexpensing.

6Restorefirst-yearexpensingoncapitalequipment.

7Toincreaserevenues,taxqualifieddividendsasnormalincomeand

establishamodestcarbontax.

8Institutea“SuperChips”taxcredit.

ForeignPolicy

9Createatechno-economicallianceofkeypartners.

10Limitforeignaidtonationsthatplaybytherules.

11PressinternationalaidbodiesthattheUnitedStatessupportstoadopt

similarpolicies.

12Operationalizeexistingalliedtechnology-productionandtradealliances.

13IncreaseU.S.leadershipontechpolicytoprotectU.S.interests,notjustU.S.values.

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TradeExpansion

14ResetandrestartAmerica’sbilateraltradeagenda.

15JointheComprehensiveandProgressiveTranspacificPartnershipAgreement(CPTPP).

16ReneweffortstomaketheWTOmoratoriumondigitaldutiespermanent.

17DevelopamoreintegratedNorthAmericanproductionsystem.

18Includemeasurestoreduceborderbarriersandencourage“innovation

corridors”alongtheborder.

19Developandpromotean“InnovationTradeAgreement”thatwouldhavezero

tariffsongoodsacrossallhigh-techindustries.

20Leadinitiativesandnegotiatenewagreementstobuildanopen,rules-based

systemforthefreeflowofdataamonglike-mindedpartners.

TradeEnforcement

21DirecttheU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)toworkwithwillingalliesto

developafull“ChinaBillofParticulars”report.

22Ensurenewtariffsarereciprocaltoourtradingpartners.

23UrgeCongresstoreformSection337oftheTariffActtoallowtheU.S.

InternationalTradeCommission(USITC)tobetterrespondtounfairChinese

imports.

24Imposeexportcontrolsjudiciously.

25Developanewmultilateralexportcontrolregime.

26SupportmultilateraleffortstolimittechnologytransfertoChinaandother

formsoffree-ridingonU.S.andallied-nationtechnology.

27RampupeffortstolimitChinesecyber-IPtheftandespionage.

28Increasefederaleffortstodisrupttheglobalflowofcounterfeits.

29BroadentheCommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS).

30UrgeCongresstoinstituteatariffflooronrareearthminerals,ideallywith

U.S.allies.

31ExpandexportstoChina.

ExportPromotion

32SupportEXIMreauthorizationandexpansion.

33UseforeigntripsasanopportunitytopromoteU.S.exports.

34ChargetheCommerceDepartmentwithdevelopingandintegratednational

exportassistancesystem.

RegulatoryPolicy

35CreateaunitwithintheOfficeofManagementandBudget’s(OMB’s)Office

ofInformationandRegulatoryAffairs(OIRA)tosystematicallyconsiderhow

proposedagencyregulationsimpactinnovationandcompetitiveness.

36Establishanexecutiveorderthatcallsonallagenciestoembracesize

neutralitywhenitcomestoallfederalpolicies.

37Createaninnovation-friendlyAIregulatoryapproachtoartificialintelligence

(AI)andpromoteitglobally.

38RequiretheFederalRailroadAdministration(FRA)todesignregulationsto

supportinnovationandautomationinthecommercialfreightindustry.

39RequiretheFederalAviationAdministration(FAA)toexpediteitsrulemaking

onkeydroneissues.

40Pressothernationstostopfree-ridingonAmericafordrugdevelopment

throughtheirdrugpricecontrols.

41ReformtheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA)toallowmore

building,especiallyinmetropolitanareas.

42Pushbackagainstothernationsweakeningstandardsessentialpatents(SEPs).

43Stoptreatingbroadbandlikeapublicutility.

AntitrustPolicy

44AppointaFederalTradeCommission(FTC)chairwhowillwithdrawthe

2023DOJ-FTCMergerGuidelines,theSection5policystatement,andtheOrangeBookstatement.

45ContinuetoignoreenforcementoftheflawedRobinsonPatmanAct(RPA)—

orworkwithCongresstorepealit.

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46SupportlegislationpreventingtheFTCfromenactingunfairmethodsof

competitionrulemakings.

47ScalebackcompetitionenforcementattheFTC.

48ApprovestrategictransactionsbetweenthedefenseindustrialbasesofNATO

countries.

49SupporttheadditionofacompetitionchapterattheWTO.

DigitalPolicy

50Refocusbroadbandpoliciesonfindingandimplementingpoliciesthat

benefitconsumers.

51Appointagencyheadswhoseinterestisinnovative,efficientuseofthe

airwaves.

52Pushforpassageoffederaldataprivacylegislation.

53CreateanationalAIroadmapforadoption.

54Supportstatepreemptionondigitalpolicies.

55SupportexpandingSection230liabilityprotectiontocoverAI-basedonline

services.

56Chargethefederalchieftechnologyofficer(CTO)withworkingwithagencies

toestablishdigitaltransformationstrategiesforindustriestheyaffect.

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R&D,Technology,andManufacturingPolicy

DefendtheBayh-DoleAct.

TasktheCommerceDepartmentwithconductingdetailedindustryanalysisandstrategyforkeyindustries,includingsemiconductors,pharmaceuticals,aerospace,software,machinery,andothers.

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RequiretheDefenseDepartmenttoconductathoroughreviewofour

nation’sdefenseanddual-useindustrialbasetoidentifyandamelioratenon-alliedforeigndependencies.

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SupportpassageoflegislationliketheCHIPSActforthebiopharmaceuticalindustry.

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Launchajointindustry-university-governmentR&Dpartnershiptoreducethecostofdrugdevelopmentandproduction.

62Limitlow-wageimmigrationwhileenablingimmigrantswithgraduate

degreesinphysicalsciences,computerscience,andengineeringtoremain

intheUnitedStates.

63ExpandSTEMinitiativestoincludeafocusonindustrialskills(“STEMI”).

64AppointadirectoroftheNationalScienceFoundation(NSF)willingto

pushtheagencytoplayastrongerroleinadvancingandcommercializing

researchcriticaltoU.S.advanced-industrycapabilities.

65SupportbuildingouttheManufacturingUSAnetworkclosertothenetwork

of45institutesoriginallyintended.

66Supporttheestablishmentofatleastonenationalresearchinstitutefocused

onindustrialresearchrelatedtoU.S.advanced-industrycompetitiveness.

67Establishanationalcommissiononcorporateshort-termism.

68Supporttheestablishmentofanadvancedmanufacturingscale-upcapitalprogram.

69Holdnationallabstostrongerperformancestandardsfortechtransferto

firmsintheUnitedStates.

70BanChinesefundingofresearchatU.S.universities.

71Holduniversitiesandcollegesaccountableforbiasingadmissionsand

gradingagainstSTEMstudents.

CleanEnergyInnovationPolicy

72SelecttechnologiesthathaveboththepossibilityofreachingP3anda

substantialimpactonemissions.

73PressureothernationstoboostcleanenergyR&D.

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GovernmentOrganizationandOperation

74SetrobustAIadoptionmilestonesinfederalagenciesthatresultinreduced

headcounts.

75ReplaceslowandcostlylegacygovernmentITsystems.

76Focusonimprovingservicedeliveryandcustomerexperience.

77Offeranoptionalfederalelectronicidentification(e-ID).

78Usethefederalgovernmentasatestbedforpilotingnewtechnologies.

79RestructuretheCouncilofEconomicAdvisors(CEA)astheCouncilof

EconomicandEnterpriseCapabilitiesAdvisors(CEECA).

80Requireeachmajoragencytodevelopaninnovationstrategy.

81Holddepartmentdeputysecretariesresponsiblefor“cleaningoutthe

cobwebs”soagenciesmoveatamuchfasterpace.

82Directkeyfederalagenciestoincorporateproductivitygrowthintotheir

missions.

INTRODUCTION

GivenAmerica’spoorproductivitygrowth,adeephollowingoutofits

advancedtechnologymanufacturingsectors(especiallytoChina),andanemicapplicationofinnovationacrossallsectorsoftheeconomy,theUnited

Statesisindesperateneedofarobusttechno-economicpolicyagenda.

Andthiscanonlyhappenwithpresidentialleadershipandinitiative.Both

majorpartycandidateswanttostrengthenAmerica’seconomy;however,

neitherBidenomics(whichemphasizespublicspending,growingthemiddleclassthroughredistribution,advancingequity,deconcentratingmarkets,

anddrivingthe“green”transition)northe“AmericaFirst”agenda(which

emphasizessmallergovernment,anuneasewith“BigTech,”deregulation,andhighertariffs)willdothejob.Andwhilerecentpolicyinitiatives,suchastheCHIPSandScienceAct,arestepsintherightdirection,theydon’tgonearlyfarenough.

GivenAmerica’sincreasinglypolarizedpoliticsandideologicalpolicydebates,thechoiceofwhooccupiestheWhiteHouseafterinaugurationday2025willhavesignificantimplicationsforthedirectionofahostofpublicpolicyareas.

However,regardlessofwhothenextpresidentis,webelievetheyshould

makere-establishingunparalleledU.S.nationaltechno-economicpowerandconstraintsonChina’stechno-economicadvancementtheirtopgoal.This

meansputtinginplaceanarrayofpoliciestosupportfasterproductivitygrowth,asignificantlymorerobustpaceofinnovationandinnovation

adoption,andamuchlargerU.S.shareofglobaladvanced-industry

production.TheInformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation(ITIF)isreleasingthistechno-economicpolicyagendatohelpthenextadministrationadvancethateffort.Theagendaisorganizedaroundanoverallstrategyplus12keypolicyareas—82specificpolicyrecommendationsinall—forthe

administrationtobothoperationalizeandurgeCongresstoenact.

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OVERALLSTRATEGY

Perhapsthesinglemostimportantstepforthenextadministrationisto

establishconsensusaroundtherighteconomicgoal:restoringunprecedentedU.S.advanced-industryleadership.Theaimshouldnotbetorestore

manufacturingoutputandjobsperse.Indeed,thiscouldbeachievedwithmuchmorelow-skill,commodity-basedmanufacturing,butthatwouldnotfurtherU.S.techno-economicpower.

Similarly,thegoalshouldnotbetoeliminatethetradedeficitperse.For

example,thiscouldbeachievedbyexportingmorefoodandoilandboostingtourism;butagain,neitherofthesesupportsU.S.techno-economicpower.

Norshouldthegoalbetogrowthemiddleclass.Ifthatisachievedwith

expandedre-distributionalpolicies(eithertaxbreaksorspendingincreases)thatarenotmerelyashort-termmiddle-class“sugarhigh,”itwouldtakefunding

awayfrompoliciesneededtorestoreU.S.techno-economicpower.Thereis,infact,onlyonewaytosustainablygrowthemiddleclass(aswellastheworkingclassandthepoor),andthatistoboosttherateofproductivitygrowth,ideallyto2.5to3percentayear.

ThegoalshouldbetoreverseAmerica’slossoftechno-economicpowerto

China,aswellastosurpassChina’scontinuedadvancementinadvanced

industries,toensurethatadecadefromnow,theUnitedStatesleadsinmostadvancedindustries,bothcriticalandemerging.

Afinalpoint:BoostingU.S.techno-economicpowercannotbeachievedwithoutprosperouslargecorporations.Ratherthantheenemythatmustbebrokenup,unfairlyregulated,orbrowbeaten,big,technologicallysophisticatedcorporations

arethesinequanonofwinningtheglobaltechnologyrace,spurringinnovation,anddrivingproductivitygrowth

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RECOMMENDATION1:ESTABLISHANATIONALCOMPETITIVENESSCOUNCIL

Attheendoftheday,theproblemisnotsomuchknowingwhattodo,butratherhavingpeopleintheWhiteHousewiththeincentivesandabilitytosolveAmerica’sinnovation,productivity,andcompetitivenesschallenges.Butwecertainlyhavenotseenthatduringthiscentury.The

CouncilofEconomicAdvisorsisthehomeforconventionalneoclassicaleconomists,focused

largelyonoverallmacroeconomicpolicy.TheNationalSecurityCouncil,whilehavinghadsomefocusontheseissues,seesthemthroughthelensofnationalsecurity,intelligence,andforeignpolicy.AndtheNationalEconomicPolicyteamfocuseslargelyonbroaddomesticeconomic

policyissues,oftenrelatedtosocialpolicy,businessregulation,infrastructure,collegedebt,inflation,andsmallbusiness.

WhatisneededisaNationalCompetitivenessCouncil(NCC)focusedonformulatingand

coordinatingadvanced-industrycompetitivenesspolicyacrossthefederalenterprise.Webelieve

thatthisissoimportantthatitdeservesitsownrecommendation.TheNCCwouldoversee

analysisofU.S.advanced-industrycapabilities,especiallyvis-à-visChina.Itwouldassess

ChinesepoliciesdesignedtoerodeU.S.advanced-industryleadership.Itwouldidentifykey

sectorsneededforU.S.leadershipandorganizeawhole-of-governmentapproachtoadvance

thatonthesectorallevel(e.g.,semiconductors,biopharmaceuticals,aerospace,autonomous

systems,AI,etc.)TheNCCshouldbestaffednotbyeconomistswhofocusprincipallyonprice-mediatedmarkets,butratherby“productionists”:analystswhohaveadeepunderstandingoffirm,industry,andtechnologydynamics.

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RECOMMENDATIONS2–4:BUDGETPOLICY

Fromabudgetperspective,theU.S.governmenthaslargelybecomeaninsurerandproviderofincomesupportfortheelderly,andthatcrowdsoutneededinvestment.Assuch,unlessthebudgetdeficitissignificantlyreduced,therewillbenofundingavailableforcriticaltaxandbudgetinvestments,includingexpandingU.S.militarycapabilitiesandtheneeded

expenditurestoboostproductivityandwinthetechno-economiccompetitionwithChina.Absentthat,policymakingwillbeafightoverrearrangingthedeckchairs.

Wearenotna?veaboutthepoliticalrealitiesofbudgetpolitics.MostAmericanvoterswant

afreelunchanddon’tmindpassingtheirdebtontotheirchildren.Theyopposevirtuallyalltaxincreasesandmostallspendingcuts,especiallyonentitlements.Republicansrefuseto

raisetaxes.Democratsrefusetocutspending.Asaresult,trueinvestment—eitherintheformofdirectspendingortaxexpenditures—isslowlysqueezed.Chinaisgoingintheopposite

direction,boostinginvestmentinadvancedindustrieswithtrulystaggeringamounts.

Therealityisthatnothingshortofadefaultonthenationaldebtwilllikelyprovidethepoliticalcoverforthebudget“castoroil”thathastobeadministered.Butbythetimethathappens,

wewillhavesufferedfrommanyyearsofdecliningneedednationalinvestment.Butatleastthenextadministrationcansetthestagefortakingneededactions.

2.Supportincreasingtaxestocover70to80percentofthe

budgetdeficitshortfallinordertoeliminatethebudgetdeficit.Thisshouldnotbedonebyincreasingtaxes

onbusiness,asAmericaneedsstrongcompaniesthatcaninvestandcompeteinglobalmarkets—althoughtaxescouldbeincreasedbyeliminatingloopholesin

Unlessthebudgetdeficit

issignificantlyreduced,therewillbenofundingavailableforcriticaltaxandbudgetinvestments.

speculation-drivenindustriessuchashedgefunds,forinstance,througheliminating

thecarriedinterestloophole.Highertaxesforwealthyindividualssuchasbillionaires

arenotunreasonable,asU.S.taxesasashareofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)are6.3

percentagepointslowerthantheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)average.

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Iftaxeswereincreasedtocover75percentofthecurrentbudgetdeficit,theUnitedStateswouldstillhavebelow-averagetaxrates

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3.Supportcuttingsomespending,especiallyentitlementstotheelderly,tocoveraround20to30percentoftheshortfall.ThiscanbedoneinpartbyindexingSocialSecuritytoinflation,notnominalwagegrowth;reducingbenefitsreceivedforearlyretirement(toencouragepeopletoworklonger);andraisingtheminimumretirementage.

4.Increaseinvestment(directandtaxexpenditures)byatleast$100billionto$200billion

annuallytosupportenterprisecapabilitiesforinnovation,productivity,andcompetitiveness,aswellassupportamorerobustinternationaltechno-economicstrategy.

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Whenweusetheterm

“investment,”wedon’tmeananarrayofsocialspendingsoldwiththepatinaof“investment.”Spendingonchildcare,housing,healthcare,incomesupport,andmosttransportation

infrastructureisnotinvestmentinthesenseofpayingforitself.Itisconsumptionpaidfor

bythegovernment,evenifsomeofit,suchasinfrastructure,iscapitalized.Wemeanmoneyappropriatednowthatwillhaveapositivenationalreturnoninvestment(ROI)innet-present-valueterms,suchastaxincentivestospurbusinessinvestment,spendingforresearchanddevelopment(R&D),andsupportforadvancedmanufacturing.

RECOMMENDATIONS5–8:TAXPOLICY

Incontrasttoprogressiveswhoseetaxpolicyasatoolforredistributionandconservatives

whoseeitasanobstacletofreedom,webelievetaxpolicyshouldbeatoolforinnovation,

competitiveness,andproductivity.Incontrasttomanyfreemarketconservatives,werejectthenotionthatthebesttaxcodeisaneutralone.Incontrasttomostliberals,werejectthenotionthatthetaxcodeshouldfirstandforemostprioritizeredistribution.TheU.S.government

shouldnotbeneutralaboutinnovation,productivity,andcompetitiveness;itshoulduseallpolicylevers,includingtaxpolicy,tospurallthree.Assuch,weproposethefollowingsteps.

5.DoubletheR&Dtaxcreditandrestorefirst-yearexpensing.TheR&DtaxcreditnotonlyspursmoreR&DinvestmentintheU.S.economy;itmakesR&D-intensivecompaniesinthe

UnitedStatesmoregloballycompetitive

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Thenextadministration’sfirstbudgetshould

includedoublingtheR&Dtaxcreditratefrom20to40percentfortheregularcreditandfrom14to28percentfortheAlternativeSimplifiedCredit(ASC),aswellasfullexpensingofR&Dexpendituresfortaxpurposes,andexpandingtherefundableR&Dcreditforpre-

profitstart-ups

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6.Restorefirst-yearexpensingoncapitalequipment.The2018TaxCutsandJobsAct

createdafive-yearprovisiontoallowallfirmstoexpenseinthefirstyearfortaxpurposesexpendituresoncapitalequipment.Byloweringtheafter-taxcostofinvestinginnew

machinery,equipment,andsoftware,thisprovisionspursfasteradoptionof

existingandemergingtechnologies.However,thisprovisionhasexpired.

TheadministrationshouldworkwithCongresstomakethisprovisionpermanent.Theadministrationshouldideallygobeyondthisand

includeinitsbudgetaninvestmenttaxcreditforinvestmentinnewmachineryandequipment,structuredsimilarlytotheASC.

7.Toincreaserevenues,taxqualifieddividendsasnormalincomeand

establishamodestcarbontax.Theformerwouldencouragecompaniestoretainmoreearningsforinvestmentandthelatterwouldhelp

spurcleanenergyinnovationanddeployment,whilebothwouldraiserevenuetopayfortheneededtaxincentives.

8.Institutea“SuperChips”taxcredit.CompanionlegislationoftheCHIPSActestablisheda25percentinvestment creditforfirmsinvestinginsemiconductormachinery andequipment.ThenextadministrationshouldcallonCongresstocreateasimilarprogramthatwould,

forfiveyears,allowcompaniesinasetofadvancedindustriestotakea25percenttaxcreditonall

machinery,buildings,andequipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS9–13:FOREIGNPOLICY

TobeeffectiveinaworldwhereChinaisseekingtoreplaceAmericaastheglobalhegemon,

Americaneedsanewkindofforeignpolicy—an“economicNATO.”Thiswouldmeanmovingawayfromtheoldmodelofeconomicstatecraftbasedonanassumptionofunalloyedthatassumed

U.S.powerwasunalloyed,andespeciallyrejectingneoconservativeadventurism,tobeusedto

punishadversariesandrewardfriends,evenwhendoingsodamagesU.S.globalcompetitiveness.,toonerecognizingForeignpolicyinsteadmustrecognizethelimitsofU.S.powerandtheneedtousethatpowerinwaysthatbenefitU.S.techno-economiccompetitiveness.

9.Createatechno-economicallianceofkeypartners.Thenextadministrationshouldseektocreateanallianceofkeypartnersthatplaybylong-standingtraderulesandnormsvis-

à-vistheU.S.economyandarewillingtoworkwiththeUnitedStatestolimitChina’s

techno-economicadvantage.Specifically,theUnitedStatesshouldworktocreateanew

transatlanticG2withtheEuropeanUnion,whichisperhapsChina’sgreatestfear

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Ideally,thiswouldbedoneviaacomprehensivetradeandinvestmentpartnershipagreementthat

createsadefactofreetradezone.Thiswouldmeanaligningondefensiveandoffensivetrademeasureswhilelimitingtheuseofavarietyofpolicies,suchasantitrust,dataprivacy,digitalservicestaxes,andotherregulationsthatodiscriminateagainstmemberstatecompanies.

ThegoalistocreategenuinelyprotectedlargemarketsthatarefreefromunfairChinese

competition—especiallyforadvancedtechnologyproducts.Moreover,asthebenefitsofsuchapartnershipandagreementbecomeapparent,othernationswouldhopefullybewillingtomakethedomesticpolicychangesneededtojoin.Thesenationswould,amongotherthings,needtoadopta“buyallied”systemwhereinparticipating

governmentsagreetobuyfrommembernationsthat

committoreciprocity.ReciprocitywouldalsoapplytoAmericaneedsanew

programssuchastheInflationReductionAct(IRA)taxkindofforeignpolicy

5ineim.Iiliislitnigcioirrsecure—an“economicNATO.”

10.Limitforeignaidtonationsthatplaybytherules.Thenext

administrationshouldalignallitstradeanddevelopmenttoolsinsupportofitstechno-

economicinterests.TheUnitedStatescannolongeraffordtosupportnationswhose

actionsareagainstU.S.techno-economicinterests,includingthosethathaveclose

technologytransferandothereconomicrelationshipswithChina.TheUnitedStateshas

avarietyofprogramsandpoliciesthatprovideaidtoothernations,includingGeneralizedSystemofPreferences(GSP)tradetariffexemptionsandpreferentialdevelopmentfinance(suchasthatprovidedbytheMillenniumChallengeCorporationandtheDevelopment

FinanceCorporation(DFC)).Thenextadministrationshoulddecreethattheseeconomic

benefitsarenolongeravailabletonationswithmorethandeminimismercantilistand

discriminatorypoliciesthathurttheU.S.economyorthatarenotadequatelylimiting

technologytransferswithChina.ThiswouldmeannomoreaidtocountriesontheU.S.

TradeRepresentative(USTR)301WatchList,tocountriesthatimposedatalocalizationorotherdigitalprotectionisttools,andtocountriesthathaveaveragetariffsonU.S.exportshigherthanU.S.tariffsontheirimports.

11.PressinternationalaidbodiesthattheUnitedStatessupportstoadoptsimilarpolicies.Thenextadministrationshouldpressinternationaldevelopmentinstitutionstosupportonlythosecountriesthatarecommittedtotheopen,rules-basedtradingsystemandthatarenotharmingU.S.firmsandeconomicinterests.Forexample,itisstrikingthatagencies

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suchastheWorldBankprovidesupportfornationswithanti-U.S.economicandtrade

policies.Thenextadministrationshouldpressuretheseorganizationstonotsupportsuchnations,andinsteadtoconcentratemoresupporttonationsthatplaybytherules.Iftheyrefusetodothat,theUnitedStatesshouldreducefundingtothemandincreasefundingtoourowndevelopmentagencies.

12.Operationalizeexistingalliedtechnology-productionandtradealliances.TheUnitedStates

mustreclaimitsleadershipontheinternationalstage,andwinningthetechno-economiccompetitionwithChinawillrequiremuchcloseralliances,especiallyinkeyindustries

andtechnologies.Thenextadministrationshouldbuildoncurrentefforts,includingthe

NATODIANA,theU.S.-Japan2nmsemiconductorpartnership(i.e.,Rapidus),andcurrentquantumcomputingpartnershipstoestablishmuchclosersharedtechnologyprogram

partnershipswithkeyallies.Thiscouldincludepartneringwithsuchalliesonareaslikeroboticsandaerospace,AIuseinthemilitary,developingasharednetworkofadvanced-industrycentersinwhichfirmsfrombothcountriescouldparticipateineachother’s

programs,andjointparticipationinnationalscienceprograms.

13.IncreaseU.S.leadershipontechpolicyinwaysthatprotectnotjustU.S.valuesbutalsoU.S.

interests.Alltoooften,U.S.globalpolicyworkstospreadU.S.valuesaroundtheglobe

butdoeslittletopushbackagainstnationswhosepoliciesare