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CentrefortheNewEconomyandSociety
ChiefEconomistsOutlook
September2024
ChiefEconomistsOutlook
Disclaimer
ThisdocumentispublishedbytheWorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.Thefndings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedandendorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,Partnersorotherstakeholders.
?2024WorldEconomicForum.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orbyanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem.
2
ChiefEconomistsOutlook
ChiefEconomistsOutlookSeptember2024
Thisquarterlybriefngbuildsonthelatestpolicydevelopmentresearchaswellasconsultationsandsurveyswithleadingchiefeconomistsfromboththepublicandprivatesectors,organizedbytheWorldEconomicForum’sCentrefortheNewEconomyandSociety.
Itaimstosummarizetheemergingcontours
ofthecurrenteconomicenvironmentand
identifyprioritiesforfurtheractionbypolicy-
makersandbusinessleadersinresponseto
thecompoundingshockstotheglobaleconomyfromgeoeconomicandgeopoliticalevents.
ThesurveyfeaturedinthisbriefngwasconductedinAugust2024.
3
Contents
Executivesummary 5
1.Turbulentcrosswinds 7
Hopingforasoftlanding 7
Monetarypolicyturningacorner 11
2.Abrewingstorm 14
Debtdynamicsdarken 14
Fiscalpolicychallenges 16
3.Betterbalancedgrowth 19
Theprospectsforanewgrowthagenda 19
References 23
Contributors 27
Acknowledgements 28
Cover:Gettyimages
4
Executivesummary
TheSeptember2024ChiefEconomists
Outlooklaunchesamidcontinuingeconomicuncertainty.Theshort-termoutlookfortheglobaleconomyhasbeguntostabilize,butmanyvulnerabilitiesremain.Amajorityofthechiefeconomistssurveyed(54%)expecttheconditionoftheglobaleconomytoremain
unchangedoverthenextyear,butfourtimesasmanyexpectconditionstoweaken(37%)ratherthantostrengthen(9%).
Therearereasonsforcautiousoptimism,
notablyincludingacontinuedgradual
easingofinfationratesandashifttoloosermonetarypolicy.However,theprolonged
sluggishpaceofglobalgrowth,compoundedbyheightenedpoliticalvolatility,leavesmanycountriesvulnerabletoeconomicshocks.
Chiefamongthecurrentsourcesof
uncertaintyistheUSpresidentialelectioninNovember.Eightoutof10chiefeconomistsagreetheUSelectionresultwillhavea
signifcantimpactoneconomicpolicy
globally.AgainstabackdropofheightenedsuperpowertensionsbetweentheUSandChina,geopoliticalandgeoeconomicrisksarealsoincreasing.
Theregionaloutlookremainsvaried.SouthAsiaisaclearstand-outperformer,with
sevenoutof10chiefeconomistsexpectingstrongorverystronggrowthin2024and
2025.TheoutlookfortheUSeconomyisbroadlypositive,withalmostnineoutof10chiefeconomistsexpectingmoderateorbettergrowthoverthesameperiod.
Bycontrast,almostthree-quartersof
respondentsexpectonlyweakgrowthin
Europethisyearwithamodestimprovement
in2025.InChina,almostfourin10
respondentsexpectweakorveryweakgrowthboththisyearandnext.
Accordingtoamajorityofthechief
economistssurveyed,publicdebtburdens
representathreattomacroeconomicstabilityinbothadvanced(53%)anddeveloping
(64%)economies.Risingdebt-servicingcostshaveledtoafscalsqueeze,and3.3billion
peoplenowliveincountriesthatspendmoreondebtinterestthanoneducationorhealth.
Lookingtotheyearahead,amajorityof
respondentsnotethatcurrentdebtdynamicsaregoingtounderminegovernmentefforts
toboostgrowthandleavecountriespoorly
preparedfornexteconomicdownturn.
Moreover,thediffcultfscalpositionthat
manycountriesareinmeanstheyarelikely
tostruggletopreparefornumerousstructuralchangesthatareunderway,includingthe
energytransition,demographicshiftsandevolvingnationalsecurityneeds.
Policy-makersfacethetwinchallengeof
drivinghigherratesofeconomicgrowth
whilealsotryingtoinfuenceitsstructural
character:makinggrowthlessdamagingto
theenvironment,forexample,orlesslikelytoleadtosectionsofsocietybeing“l(fā)eftbehind”.Aroundtwo-thirdsofthechiefeconomists
agreethatpolicy-makersshouldprioritize
economicgrowth,withasimilarproportion
agreeingthatprogressonothergoalsmust
bemade,evenifthisexertsadragongrowth.
5
However,thereisdeeppessimismonthecurrentsituation,withonly12%ofchiefeconomistsagreeingthatpolicy-makersarecurrentlydoingwellatdelivering
balancedgrowth.
Twomainobstaclestomakingprogressonmorebalancedgrowtharehighlightedbythechiefeconomists:alackofpoliticalconsensusorwill(citedby91%)anda
lackofglobalcollaboration(67%).Onthefrstofthese,respondents’viewseemstobethattheproblemisoneofleadership
ratherthanbroadopposition.Onthe
second,thereislittleprospectofashort-termturnaround,aslargemajoritiesofthechiefeconomistsexpecteffortstoboost
globalcollaborationtobeunderminedbothbydomesticpoliticaltrends(83%)andbygeopoliticaltensions(91%).
6
ChiefEconomistsOutlook
1.Turbulentcrosswinds
Hopingforasoftlanding
Theshort-termoutlookfortheglobaleconomyisstabilizingbutmany
vulnerabilitiesremain,accordingtothelatestWorldEconomicForumsurvey
ofchiefeconomists.Whileamajorityofrespondents(54%)expecttheconditionoftheglobaleconomytobeunchangedoverthenextyear,fourtimesasmanyexpectconditionstoweaken(37%)
ratherthanstrengthen(9%).
Figure1.Theglobaleconomicoutlook
Lookingattheyearahead,whatareyourexpectationsforthefutureconditionoftheglobaleconomy?
MuchweakerSomewhatweakerUnchangedSomewhatstrongerMuchstronger
37549
Shareofrespondents(%)
Note:Thenumbersinthegraphsmaynotaddupto100%becausefgureshavebeenroundedup/down.
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
Therearereasonsforcautiousoptimism,
suchasaneasingofinfationandevidenceoftheresilienceofglobalcommercedespitethedramaticshocksofrecentyears.1Yet,
iftheeconomyisstabilizing,itisdoingso
attheweakestlevelindecades,withthe
InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)projectingthatglobalgrowthwilleasefrom3.2%in
20242to3.1%in2029.3Thisweakness,compoundedbypoliticalvolatilityinmanycountries,posesnumerousthreatsin
theyearsahead.Forexample,itcouldhindertheeffectivedevelopmentand
implementationofpolicyonahostofissues.Itwillalsoleaveeconomiesmorevulnerabletoeconomicshocksthanmightotherwise
bethecase.
Theextentoffnancialmarkets’nervousnessaboutsuchshockswasdramatically
highlightedinearlyAugust2024.Stock
marketstumbledinresponsetoaninterestrateriseinJapanandanuptickinUS
unemploymentthatwaswidelyinterpretedasheraldingarecession.Overthecourseofafewdays,theS&P500indexdroppedby
1Beattie,A.(2024,August).
2InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024,July).
3InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024a,April).
7
morethan5%,whileJapan’sTOPIXslumpedbymorethan20%.4Meanwhile,theVIX–
commonlyregardedasagaugeofinvestornervousness–hitapeakof65.73on5
August,alevelnotseensincetheoutbreakofthepandemicinearly2020.5
BythemiddleofAugust,theseinitial
responseshadbeenreversedtoasignifcantextent.6Withhindsight,themarketresponse,particularlytotheUSlabourmarketupdate,appearstohavebeenanover-reaction.7
Amongthechiefeconomists,expectationsoflabourmarketlooseninginmostadvancedeconomieshadalreadypickedupin
recentmonths,from31%ofrespondentsintheAprilsurveyto57%inthelatest
survey.Nevertheless,USfnancialmarketsremainedjittery,andinearlySeptember,asell-offfocusedonhigh-techstockswasexacerbatedbyanothersubduedsetof
monthlylabourmarketdata.8
Theissueappearstobethatuncertaintyandcomplexityarebothexceptionally
highatpresentandafteryearsofdramaticeconomicdisruptionsandpolicyresponses,evenseasonedmarketparticipantsare
strugglingtocalibratetheirresponsestothelatestdevelopments.
Moreover,marketturmoilinAugustwas
triggeredbyarelativelyminorchange.
Whatdoesthatsuggestaboutthelikely
responseifamuchmoresubstantial
disruptionweretohit?Thereisnoshortageofpotentialshocks.Chiefamongthemis
theUSpresidentialelectioninNovember.
Eventhoughthetwocandidates’policy
platformshaveyettobefullyfeshedout,
theelectionmarksapoliticalandeconomicinfectionpointfortheUSandtheworld.
Thisisrefectedintheresultsofthelatest
surveyofchiefeconomists.Eightoutof
10respondentsagreedtheelectionresultwillhaveasignifcantimpactoneconomicpolicyglobally,whilerisksassociated
withtheelectionrecurredfrequentlywhenrespondentswereaskedabouttheirworriesfortheyearahead.
Figure2.USelections
Lookingattheyearahead,doyouagree/disagreewiththefollowingstatements?
StronglydisagreeDisagreeUncertainAgreeStronglyagree
TheresultoftheforthcomingUSelectionwillhaveasigni?cantimpactoneconomicpolicyglobally
11940
40
Shareofrespondents(%)
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
4TheEconomist.(2024,September).
5O’Connell,B.etal.(2024,August).
6Aquilina,M.etal.(2024,August).
7Edwards,W.(2024,August).
8Stafford,P.&NeilAlim,A.(2024,September).
8
Geopoliticaltensionsareanotherpotential
sourceofmacroeconomicshocksand
werecitedrepeatedlyasaconcernbythe
chiefeconomists.Againstabackdropof
heightenedsuperpowertensionsbetweentheUSandChina,geopoliticalandgeoeconomicrisksareincreasing,includingrisksofwar.9
Theglobaleconomyhasmanagedtoadapttonumerousgeopoliticaldisruptions,butthisisnotacost-freeprocess.10Forexample,
thelatestWorldInvestmentReportcites
worseninggeopoliticaltensionsasoneofthekeydriversofa10%slumpinglobalforeigndirectinvestmentlastyear.11Morerecently,shippingcostsbetweenEastAsiaandNorthEuropemorethandoubledbetweenApril
andJuly2024followinganintensifcationofattacksonshipsintheRedSea.12
Thechiefeconomists’outlookfortheglobaleconomyissubjecttosignifcantregional
variation(Figure3).ThestrongestresultsinthelatestsurveyareforpartsofAsia.SouthAsiaisaclearstand-outperformer,with
sevenoutof10chiefeconomistsexpectingstrongorverystronggrowthin2024and
2025.Thisrefectsthecurrentbuoyant
economicactivityinIndia,wheretheIMF
recentlyreviseditsforecastforGDPgrowththisyearfrom6.8%to7.0%.13
TherearealsorobustresultsforCentral
AsiaandEastAsiaandPacifc.The
overwhelmingmajorityofrespondents
expectmoderateorstrongergrowth,withasizeableminorityofbetweenone-ffthand
one-thirdexpectingstrongorverystrong
growthinthetworegionsboththisyearandnextyear.Bycontrast,theweakoutlook
forChinacontinuestomakeitanoutlieramongtheAsianeconomies.Almostfourin10respondentsexpectweakorveryweakgrowthinChinain2024and2025.Thisextendsaprotractedrunofsluggishresults,refectingthecountry’scontinuingstruggles,particularlywithdefationary
pressuresandwidespreaddysfunctioninthepropertymarket.14
Thechiefeconomists’expectationsfor
theUSeconomyarebroadlypositive,with
almostnineoutof10expectingmoderate
orbettergrowththisyearandnext.This
isconsistentwiththeviewthattheUS
economyisexperiencingasoftlanding,
despiteitsprotractedperiodoftightmonetarypolicyandrecentstringoflabourmarket
disappointments.15Giventhattherehasbeenamarkedrecentpatternofweakconsumersentimentdespiterelativelyrobusthard
data,16itisnotablethattherearenowsignsthatconsumerconfdenceispickingup.17
Europeistheregionallaggardonceagain,withalmostthree-quartersofrespondentsexpectingweakgrowththisyear.Numerousfactorsarecontributingtotheregion’s
sluggishness,andpoliticaluncertaintyin
numerouscountries–notleastintwoof
theregion’slargestcountries,GermanyandFrance–makesitaparticularchallenge
toformulateaneffectiveandconsistent
9Gill,I.&Kose,A.(2024,January).
10UnitedNationsConferenceforTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD).(2024,July).
11UnitedNationsConferenceforTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD).(2024a,June).
12Strauss,D.(2024,July).
13InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024,July).
14Leahy,J.(2024,August).
15FinancialTimes.(2024,August).
16McLeod,S.(2024,April).
17TheConferenceBoard.(2024,August).
9
response.Germany,inparticular,hasbeenadragonrecentgrowthacrosstheregion;inthesecondquarterof2024,itseconomycontractedforthefourthtimeinthelasttwoyearsby0.1%quarteronquarter.18However,
thechiefeconomistsaremodestlyoptimisticthatconditionsinEuropearesettoimprove,withalmosttwiceasmany(53%)expectingmoderateorbettergrowthin2025asin
2024(29%).
Figure3.Growthexpectations
Whatisyourexpectationforeconomicgrowthinthefollowinggeographies?
VeryweakWeakModerateStrongVerystrong
SouthAsia
EastAsiaandPaci?c
CentralAsia
UnitedStates
MiddleEast
andNorthAfrica
Sub-SaharanAfrica
LatinAmerica
andtheCaribbean
China
Europe
2024
29
61
10
2025
3
26
55
16
2024
3
63
33
2025
3
70
233
2024
11
68
184
2025
4
67
264
2024
11
66
23
2025
15
71
15
2024
3
31
48
17
2025
34
48
17
2024
4
41
44
11
2025
4
26
52
19
2024
37
60
3
2025
26
71
3
2024
6
31
54
9
2025
3
35
59
3
2024
3
69
263
2025
47
50
3
Shareofrespondents(%)
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
18StatistischesBundesamt.(2024,August).
10
ChiefEconomistsOutlook
Intheotherregionscoveredinthesurvey,theoutlookiseithersteadyorpositive.Growth
perspectivesarepositivebutremainuncertainfortheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.TheIMFprojectsgrowthfortheMiddleEastandNorthAfricatorisefrom2.2%in2024to4.0%
in2025.19Almosthalfofchiefeconomists
expectgrowthtoremainmoderate,but
twiceasmanyexpectittobeweakrather
thanstrong,aviewechoingconcernsaboutinstabilityintheregion.Sub-SaharanAfrica
looksequallypoisedtosurpassglobalgrowthaverages,withgrowthforecastscomingin
at4.1%(upfrom3.7%in2024).20Theshareofchiefeconomistswhoexpectmoderate
orstrongergrowthinthisregionincreases
from55%in2024to71%in2025.InLatin
AmericaandtheCaribbean,overtwo-thirdsofchiefeconomistsexpectmoderategrowth,slightlyupfrom2024.At2.7%in2025(up
from1.9%in2024),theIMFalsoprojectsgrowthinthemoderaterange.21
Monetarypolicyturningacorner
Globalinfationiscontinuingitsdownwardtrajectory.Thepaceofdecelerationis
easingandtherearebothcountriesand
categoriesofgoodsandserviceswhere
infationarypressuresareprovingstubborn,butoveralldevelopmentsfortheglobal
economyarepositive.Whenaskedaboutthepotentialmacroeconomicdevelopmentsthatmadethemhopefulfortheyearaheadchiefeconomistsfrequentlycitedtheeasingofinfation.
ThelatestIMFprojectionshowsfull-yearglobalinfationfallingfrom6.8%in2023to
5.9%in2024,withasharpdivergencein
expectationsbetweenadvancedeconomies(2.7%)anddevelopingeconomies(8.2%).22Forbothgroups,IMFprojectionsremain
signifcantlyabovepre-pandemiclevels
(1.4%and5.1%,respectively)23andaWorldBankblognotesthatinfationratesremainabovetargetin40%ofthecountriesthat
haveinfationtargets.24Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatwhileashifttoamore
accommodatingmonetarystancehasstartedtooccur,itissomewhatpatchyandvariedinitstiming.
Forexample,theeasingofinterestratesintheUSwasdelayedinthefrsthalfoftheyearowingtostubborninfationarypressures,particularlyforso-called
“supercoreservices”,asub-categoryof
servicesthatexcludesenergyandhousing
andthatincludesmanysectorswherepricesaretiedcloselytoconditionsinthelabour
market,suchascleaning,childcareand
hairdressing.25InJune2024,whiletheoverallUSrateofconsumerpriceinfationstood
at2.5%,therateforsupercoreserviceswas3.3%.26
Thelatestsurveyofchiefeconomists
suggestsasoliddegreeofconfdencethattheUShasturnedacorneroninfation,withtheproportionofrespondentsexpecting
highinfationdroppingfrom21%in2024
tojust6%in2025.Inbothyears,the
largeproportionexpectingmoderate
infationremainedunchangedat65%.In
Europe,thereisaverysimilarpattern,withexpectationsofhighinfationdroppingfrom21%thisyearto3%nextyear.
19InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024,July).
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024a,April).
24Jongrim,HA.etal.(2024,August).
25Anstey,C.(2024,June).
26FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis.(2024,August).
11
Figure4.Infationexpectations
Whatisyourexpectationforinfationinthefollowinggeographies?
2024
39
55
2025
74
2024
55
35
2025
13
68
2024
20
48
32
19
69
2024
23
58
81
2024
22
63
21
68
2024
65
2025
26
65
2024
21
59
2025
35
59
2024
50
43
46
46
2024
33
2025
16
53
31
VerylowLowModerateHighVeryhigh
LatinAmerica
andtheCaribbean
SouthAsia
Sub-SaharanAfrica
CentralAsia
MiddleEast
andNorthAfrica
UnitedStates
Europe
EastAsiaandPaci?c
China
6
6
19
10
19
2025
12
19
2025
15
4
15
2025
11
15
21
3
6
21
3
3
7
2025
7
42
213
Shareofrespondents(%)
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
EvenforSouthAsia,whererespondents
aremostoptimisticaboutgrowth,thereisamarkedimprovementininfationexpectationsbetween2024and2025.Unsurprisingly,theregionswherethegrowthoutlookisweakestalsohavethemostpronouncedexpectationofdisinfation.InLatinAmericaandthe
Caribbean,theproportionofrespondents
expectinghighinfationdroppedsharplyfrom2024to2025from55%to19%,whilein
Sub-SaharanAfrica,therewasadeclinefrom32%to12%.
InChina,consumerpriceinfationhasnot
surpassed1%sinceFebruary2023and
hasturnednegativemultipletimessince
then.27InJuly,theinfationratepickedupto0.5%,28butthesamemonthsawanannualfallof0.8%inproducerprices,29whichcanoftenprovideanearlysignaloffuturetrendsforconsumerprices.Nevertheless,thereissomeoptimismfromthechiefeconomists,withahalvingoftheproportionexpecting
verylowinfationinChina,from33%in2024to16%in2025.
27NationalBureauofStatisticsofChina.(2024a,August).
28Ibid.
29NationalBureauofStatisticsofChina.(2024b,August).
12
Giventhisglobalbackdrop,itisnotsurprisingthatthelatestsurveyofchiefeconomists
pointstoagenerallooseningofmonetary
policyoverthenextyear(Figure5).This
isparticularlytruefortheUS,Europeand
China,buteveninregionswhereonlya
minorityexpectloosening,theoutlookisforratestoholdunchangedratherthanincrease.Thehighestproportionofrespondents
expectingtightermonetarypolicyinany
regionisforEastAsiaandPacifc(15%),
refectingtheuniquecircumstancesofJapan.
ThetimingandpaceofUSinterestrate
cutsremainthefocusofgreatattention,
buttheFederalReserveisfarfromthefrst
majorcentralbanktomove.RefectingthecomparativeweaknessofeconomicactivityinEurope,theEuropeanCentralBank30andtheBankofEngland31cutratesby0.25
percentagepointsinJuneandAugust,
respectively.ChinaalsoannouncedmodestcutstoarangeofpolicyratesinJulyto
bolstersentimentandactivity.32However,Japanhasbeenamonetaryoutlierfor
decades,andthispatternshowsnosignofchanging:whiletherestoftheworld’smajorcentralbankshavebeenfocused
oncalibratingtheirmonetaryloosening,attheendofJuly,theBankofJapanraisedinterestratesforonlythesecondtime
in17years.33
Figure5.Monetarypolicyoutlook
Lookingattheyearahead,whatisyourexpectationformonetarypolicyinthefollowinggeographies?
LooserUnchangedTighter
Europe
Asia
Central
8
China
UnitedStates
16
84
46
9
91
46
EastAsiaandPaci?c
MiddleEastandNorthAfrica
9
91
South
Asia
4
32
64
15
30
56
LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
10
5534
4
35
62
Sub-SaharanAfrica
4
36
60
Shareofrespondents(%)
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
30EuropeanCentralBank.(2024,August).
31BankofEngland.(2024,August).
32Leng,C.&Hale,T.(2024,July).
33BankofJapan.(2024,July).
13
2.Abrewingstorm
Debtdynamicsdarken
Persistentlyweakgrowthexacerbatesthe
risksposedbycountries’debtlevels,whichhaveincreasedsignifcantlyoverthelast
fveyears.Intheviewofamajorityofthe
chiefeconomistssurveyed,publicdebtlevelsareathreattomacroeconomicstability,
bothinadvanced(53%)anddeveloping(64%)economies.
Concernsaboutgrowingpublicdebt
burdenshavebeenelevatedforsometime,
buttheyhavebecomemoreprominent
asdebtratioshaveworsenedandas
electionsaroundtheworldhavehighlightedpoliticaltensionsaroundtheneedforfscal
consolidation.Moreover,thisyearhasalreadyseenevidenceofthepotentialfordramatic
societalconsequenceswhendebtlevelsareeconomicallyunsustainable.UnrestinKenyainJune,inwhichmorethan20peopledied,haditsrootsinadebtcrisisthatsawinterestpaymentsswelltoabsorbalmost60%of
totalgovernmentrevenues.34
Figure6.Debtrisks
Lookingattheyearahead,doyouagree/disagreewiththefollowingstatements?
StronglydisagreeDisagreeUncertainAgreeStronglyagree
Currentsovereigndebtlevelsrepresentathreattomacroeconomicstability
*Emerginganddevelopingeconomies
Advanced
121818476
E&D*
31221586
Shareofrespondents(%)
Source:ChiefEconomistsSurvey.(2024,August).
In2023,globalpublicdebtasaproportionofGDPstoodat93.2%,upfrom84.2%
in2019.35Thisjumpislargelyarefection
ofthefscalimpactofthepandemic,but
itisnotablethatdebt-to-GDPratiosfellin2021-22beforethetrendreversedlastyearaseconomicreboundeffectssubsidedandgovernmentrevenuesfell.TheIMFexpects
furtherslippagethisyear,inpartbecauseitisanelectionyearinsomanycountries,andelectionstendtoleadtoalooser
fscalstance.36
Thelevelandpaceofchangeindebt
levelsdiffersignifcantlybetweenadvancedeconomiesanddevelopingones.
34TreasuryofKenya.(2024,January).
35InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024b,April).
36Ibid.
14
Intheformer,thepublicdebtburden
increasedfrom103.9%to111.0%between2019and2023,althoughtherearesome
notableoutliers,suchastheUS(122.1%in2023),Italy(137.3%)andJapan(252.4%).37Amongemerginganddevelopingeconomies(E&D),wheredebtisasourceofmuch
greatereconomicinstability,debtlevelsare
loweronaveragebuthaveincreasedmore
rapidly,from55%in2019to68.0%in2023.38
However,acountry’slevelofdebtisjust
onepartoftheequation.Debtsustainabilityisdeterminedbytheinteractionoffour
elements:growthrates,debtlevels,interestratesandtheprimarybalance(governmentrevenueslessspending,excludingoutlaysondebtservicing).39
Eachoftheseelementsisasourceofstrainatpresent.Asdiscussedintheprevious
section,themacroeconomicoutlookisfor
persistentlysluggishgrowthrates.Regardingtheprimarybalance,theevidencesuggeststhatcountriesareslipping.According
totheIMF,theproportionofadvanced
economieswithprimarybalancesbelow
debt-stabilizationlevelsjumpedfrom11%
in2022to32%in2023,withanequivalentincreasefordevelopingeconomiesfrom20%to41%.40In2023,therewere16developingcountriesindebtdistress,upfromfve
in2016.
Meanwhile,thecombinationofelevated
debtlevelsandhighinterestrateshas
pushedinterestpaymentsintoeconomicallydamagingterritoryformanycountries.
Thereare54developingcountriesthat
spendmorethan10%oftotalrevenueson
debtservicing,and3.3billionpeoplelivein
countriesthatspendmoreondebtinterest
thanoneducationorhealth.41Evenadvancedeconomiesareseeingtheprofleofpublic
spendingbeingsignifcantlyaffected:intheUS,thecostofdebtservicing($870billion)isprojectedtosurpassthecountry’sdefencespending($822billion)thisyear.42
Thisprocessoffscalspacebeingsqueezedasresourcesareredirectedtowardsdebt
servicingisincreasinglywidespread.Amorestarkpotentialoutcomeofprolongeddebt
unsustainabilityisdefault,oracountry’s
failuretomeetatleastpartofitsdebt-
servicingobligations.Thesurveyofchief
economistspointstoasignifcantdifferenceinthelikelihoodofariseindefaultsoverthenextyearbetweenadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.Only9%expectdefaultstopickupintheformer,butthisfgurejumpsto39%forthelatter.Ifdefaultsdooccur,thechief
economists’expectationofcontagionto
othercountriesisslightlyhigherforadvanced(62%)thanfordevelopingeconomies(59%).Thisisprobablyarefectionoftheextentof
theshockthatwouldberequiredtotrigger
advanced-economydefaultsinthefrstplace.
37InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).(2024b,April).
38Ibid.
39Adrian,T.etal.(2024,March).
40InternationalMo
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