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HowCEOsCanNavigatetheNewGeopoliticsofGenAI

DECEMBER09,2024

By

NikolausLang

,LeonidZhukov,

DavidZuluagaMartínez

,

Marc

Gilbert

,MeenalPore,andEtienneCavin

READINGTIME:15MIN

Asthe

generativeAI

maptakesshape,theUSandChinaareassertingtheirdominance.Tech

companiesfromtheseGenAIsuperpowershavebuiltasubstantialleadinthecreationandlarge-

scalecommercializationoftop-performinglargelanguagemodels(LLMs).InaworldwhereGenAIisquicklybecomingacriticalresource,theUSandChinaarecurrentlyonpacetocontrolthesupply.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup1

Butsomethinginterestingishappeninginparallel.Asmallgroupofcountries—the“GenAImiddlepowers”—isemerging,eachwithitsowndistinctstrengthsthatmayenableittocompeteona

regionalandevenglobalscaleasasupplierofthetechnology.Theimplicationsforcompaniesaresigni?cant.

ForcorporateleaderswhoareintegratingGenAIintoanincreasingshareoftheirproductsandservices,andwhoareoperatingacrossmultiplegeographies,relyingsolelyonGenAIsuppliedbycompaniesintheUSorChinacouldposeseriouschallenges,withlocalregulations,data

requirements,andtheavailabilityofLLMsallsubjecttoshi代singovernmentpolicy.AlthoughamoremultipolarsupplyofGenAIincreasescomplexity,itwouldalsocreatecriticaloptionality.

CEOsneedtounderstandthisdynamic—andbeabletonavigatetheevolvinggeopoliticsofGenAI.Thetraditionalapproach—determiningwhichcountrycanacquirethemostadvanced

semiconductors,forexample,orwhichhasthemostfavorableregulatoryenvironment—won’t

su?ce.CompanyleaderscanassesstherelativestrengthofGenAIsuperpowersandmiddlepowersacrossthesixkeyenablersofGenAIsupply:capitalpower,talent,intellectualproperty(IP),

data

,

1

energy,andcomputingpower.

SuperpowersandMiddlePowers:TheEmergingGenAILandscape

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Relativeperformanceacrossenablers,onanormalizedscaleof0to

US

CHINA

EU

JAPAN

SOUTHKOREA

UAE

SAUDIARABIA

CapitalpowerTalentIPDataEnergyComputi

ngpower

?2024BostonConsultingGroup2

Thisisnotaboutacountry’srateofGenAIadoption,whichcano代enbedecoupledfromitsabilitytosupplythetechnology.TheformerwasassessedinarecentBCGstudyof73globaleconomies’

exposuretoandreadinesstodeployGenAI

.(Seethesidebar“TheAdoptionAdvantage”)

THEADOPTIONADVANTAGE

ThisanalysisisfocusedonthesupplyofgenerativeAI,whichwillbeparamountinshapingthegeopoliticaldynamicsofthetechnology.Butthe?ipsideofsupply—theactualadoptionofthetechnology—isalsoofcriticalimportance.Rapidand

extensiveadoptioncanpositivelyimpactcompetitivenessandproductivity,leadingtobroadereconomicprosperity.Formanycountryleaders,promotingadoptionofAI

acrosstheeconomymaybetherightpolicypriority.

BCG’srecentAIMaturityIndex

o?ersacomprehensiveassessmentofcountries’exposuretoAI-driveneconomicdisruptionacrossindustriesaswellastheir

readinesstoseizetheeconomicadvantagethetechnologymakesavailable.

AsgenerativeAImatures,foundationLLMswillincreasinglybeputtousethroughindustry-orfunction-speci?capplications.RobustecosystemsofcompaniesworkingonthisapplicationlayerofthetechnologywillbeanimportantdriverofsuccessforcountrieslookingtomaketheirindustriesmorecompetitivethroughAI.

Indiaisapowerfulexampleofacountrythatiswell-positionedtofostersuchan

ecosystem.Thegovernment’sIndiaAIMissioniscommittedtosupportingextensiveadoptionthroughthecreationofcentersofAIexcellence,whichaimtointegratethe

technologyintokeysectorslikeagricultureandeducation.Indiaalsobene?tsfromitshistoricalstrengthintechtalent,asitishometoalargepoolof215,000AI

specialists.

WhileIndiancompanieshavealreadyreleasedsomeLLMs,thecountryislikelyto

increasinglyfocusonfosteringanecosystemofcompaniesheavilyinvestedinindustry-speci?cGenAIapplications,suchasSetu’sSesamefor?nanceand

insurance,Fractal’sVaidya.aiforhealthcare,andLexlegis’Lexlegis.aiforlegalservices.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup3

FocusingourresearchonsupplyenablesustohelpCEOsdeterminehowtoensuretheircompanyhasreliableand?exibleaccesstothisgame-changingtechnology.Hereisacloserlookatthemajorplayersandtheothercontenders.

TheGenAISuperpowers

TheUSandChinaarecurrentlytheonlyplayerswithrobustaccesstoandcontroloversizeable

portionsofthewholeGenAIvaluechain.TheyproducethemostIPandtheyhavethelargestAI

talentpools;theyhavesomeoftherichestdataecosystemsintheworldandthemostdatacenterinfrastructurecapacity,andtheyleadincapitalaccess.

Today’sDefaultIs“MadeintheUSA”

TheUShashadapronouncedheadstartonGenAI,buildingondecadesof

AI

leadership.Nearly

2

70%oftheworld’snotableAImodelssince1950havebeendevelopedbyorinpartnershipwithUS-basedcompaniesoracademicinstitutions,ashave57%oftop-performingLLMs.(SeeExhibit1.)

:TheUSishometosome60%ofthetop2,000AIscholarsintheworldandattractedroughlyone-

quarterofallAIspecialiststhatrelocatedgloballybetween2022and2024;itstotalAItalentpoolhasgrowntonearlyhalfamillionpeople,thelargestintheworld.AndUS-basedAIscholarshave

contributed35%oftheworld’smostin?uentialpapersinthe?eldofAIsinceits

inception.3

US-basedGenAIstartupshavealsoreceivedunparalleledprivateinvestment:atotalof$65billion

since2019.Inaddition,AI-directedcapitalexpenditureswithinestablishedtech?rmslikeAlphabet,Amazon,Meta,andMicroso代areexpectedtoexceed$200billionfor2024.Withmassivecomputingcapacity,afull-stackapproachextendingtohardwarecodesign,deeppockets,globalreach,accesstotheworld’stoptalent,andin-housemodeldevelopersordeeppartnershipwithoutsidedevelopers,

?2024BostonConsultingGroup4

thesecompaniesaresingularlypositionedtosupportUSleadershipinGenAIintheforeseeablefuture.

Beyondtalentandcapital,theUSalsohastheinfrastructuretosupportinferenceatscale—thatis,tosupplyGenAIonanongoingbasistomodelusers.Itisthelargestdatacenterhubintheworld,withanestimatedcapacityofapproximately45gigawattsin2024.TheUShasreliableaccessto

cutting-edgehardware(throughUS-basedNvidiaandstronggeopoliticaltiestoTaiwan-based

TSMC)tosupportdatacenterexpansion,thoughlongleadtimestoconnecttotheelectricalgridmaycreatechallenges.

Made-in-ChinaModelsAreCatchingUp

SomesignsindicatethatChinaiscatchinguptotheUSonsomekeyenablersandmakingrapid

progressintheproductionoftopLLMs.TwoChinesecompanies,AlibabaandtheGenAIstartup

01.AI,contributeoverone-quarteroftheworld’stopopen-sourcemodels.Establishedtechgiants

BaiduandTencenthavealsoreleasedhigh-performingmodels,ashaveanewgenerationofGenAIstartups,theso-calledAItigers:ZhipuAI,BaichuanAI,MoonshotAI,andMiniMaxAI.TopChinesemodelshavesubstantiallyreducedthegapcomparedtostate-of-the-artalternativesinthelastyear.

(SeeExhibit2.)AndtopChinesemodelshavee?ectivelyclosedthegapinChineselanguagebenchmarks.

:

TheChineseGenAIecosystemhasbene?ttedfromaccesstoforeignopen-sourceoropen-weights

foundationmodels:01.AI’sYimodelfamily,forexample,isbasedonMeta’sLlama.(Seethesidebar“

ALandscapeofOpen-SourceandClosedModels

”)TheChinesegovernmenthassignaleditsintenttoensureanamplesupplyofdomesticopen-sourceoptionsthatplayasimilarroleinthefuture,

supportingagrowingnumberofsmallercompaniesastheyrampuptheirtechnicalcapabilities.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup5

AlthoughittrailstheUS,ChinastillhasastrongAItalentbench—andpotentnationalresearch

championslikeTsinghuaUniversityandShanghaiJiaoTongUniversity.ThefourAItigersareall

foundedbyTsinghuafacultyoralumni.China’sstrengthinAItalentisapparentinitsleadershiponpatents,withmorethan76,000AIpatents?ledwiththeWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization

between2019and2023,aboutfourtimesasmanyastheUS.

Chinaalsohasampledatacenterinfrastructure,withapproximately20gigawattsofcapacity,andsigni?cantcapitalthroughitspublicR&Dbudget,whichhasaveraged$50billionperyearbetween2016and2023.Infact,governmentventurecapitalfundsdemonstrateChina’scommitmentto

boostingAIinnovationthroughpublicinvestment.GovernmentVCshaveinvestednearlyaquarterof

theirtotalfundsinAI?rms,exceeding$180billionintotalsince2000,ofwhichroughly$100billion

4

wasinvestedbetween2019and2023.Andprivateinvestment,domesticaswellasforeign,hasactivelydrivenprogressamongtheAItigers,whichtogetherwith01.AIhaveraisedmorethan$6billioninthelastfewyears—includingfromChinesehyperscalers,notablyAlibaba.

METHODOLOGY

OurresearchdrawsonanextensivequantitativecomparisonoftherelativestrengthoftheUS,China,andGenAImiddlepowersacrossthekeyenablersofGenAIsupply.Thiscomparisonwasusedasabasisforfurtheranalysis,ratherthanasastrict

index;itenabledustoidentifythecountriesandregionswiththemostopportunityandthesalientstrengthsandchallengesofeach.

Thequantitativeassessmentofrelativestrengthacrossenablersdrawsinpartonthehistoryofcountries’strengthsinandcontributiontoAIasabroadfamilyof

technologies,ofwhichGenAIisonlyasubset.Thisinpartre?ectslimitationsin

reliabletransnationaldata,giventherecencyofGenAI’sriseinimportance.But,moreimportantly,indicatorsassociatedwiththelongarcofthehistoryofAIspeaktotheenduranceofcriticalcapabilities,particularlyontalentandinnovation

ecosystems.

Sinceourprimaryobjectivewastodeveloparelativesenseofstrengthacross

enablers,wedevelopednormalizedscoresbyenablercountryorregionpairsinthefollowingway:

?Eachindicatorleadstoanabsolutevaluebycountryorregion.Thesevaluesarenotnormalizedbypopulation,sizeoftheeconomy,orothersuchfactors

?2024BostonConsultingGroup6

becausecompetitioninthesupplyofGenAIislargelyafunctionofscale.

?Valuesforeachindicatorarethen(linearly)normalizedintocountryorregionscoresonascalefrom0to1,where1equalsthehighestactualcountryvalueinourdatasetand0issetasabsolute0(exceptfortheenergyenabler,which

re?ectsindustrialelectricityprices:inthiscase,0equalsthelowestactualprice.

?Then,foreachcountryorregion,wetaketheaveragenormalizedscoreacrossindicatorstogeneratetheenablerscore.Acountrywouldonlyhaveascoreof1inanenablerifithadthehighestabsolutevalueofallcountriesinourdatasetforallindicatorsassociatedwiththeenablerinquestion.

Thefollowingaretheindicatorsweusedtodevelopthestage-settinganalysisofrelativestrengthacrosstheenablersofGenAIsupply,withthesourcesforeach

indicatedinparentheses.Forfurtherdetailsoftheanalysisanddatausedinthisstudy,pleasecontacttheauthors.

Talent:

?Shareofthetop2,000AIresearchersworldwide,basedonthelocationoftheauthorsofleadingAIpublications.(AMiner)

?Shareofthetop300AIinstitutions,alsobasedonthelocationofauthorsofleadingAIpublications.(AMiner)

?SizeoftheAI-specializedtalentpoolworkingwithinacountry(thoughnotnecessarilyemployedbyalocalcompany).(BCGTalentTracker)

IntellectualProperty:

?Shareofnotablemachinelearningmodelsdevelopedsince1959by,orin

partnershipwith,researchersorinstitutionsfromaparticularcountry.(EpochAI)

?TotalnumberofAIpublicationsproducedbyauthorsand/orinstitutionsfromaparticularcountrybetween2019and2023.(SCImago)

?TotalnumberofcitationsofAIpublicationsproducedbyauthorsand/or

institutionsineachcountrybetween2019and2023,excludingself-citations.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup7

(SCImago)

?TotalnumberofAIpatents?ledthroughtheWIPObetween2019and2023.

(WIPO)

Data:

?RankingintheUnitedNationse-GovernmentDevelopmentIndex,whichmeasuresgovernmentdigitization.(UnitedNations)

?Totalnumberofactivehandset-basedandcomputer-based(i.e.,connectedbyUSB/dongle)mobile-broadbandsubscriptions,togaugerelativemagnitudesofdigitaldatageneration.(InternationalTelecommunicationUnion)

Thesemetricsaredirectionallyindicativeofthedegreeofdigitizationaswellasthevolumeof(digital)dataproducedineachcountry.Theydonot,however,accountforotherimportantfactors,suchastheregulatory?exibilityofdatausesor(relatedly)thelevelofcontextualizationofdata(i.e.,howeasilydataofdi?erenttypesand

sourcescanbeusedinanintegratedfashion).

Energy:

?Thecostofelectricityforatypicalcommercial/industrialuserperkilowatt-hour,basedonthe“l(fā)argestbusinesscity”withineachcountry.(fDiBenchmark)

Acriticalcomponentofenergyasanenablerisleadtimetogridinterconnectionfordatacenterbuildouts,awidelyacknowledgedchallengeinmostgeographies.

Unfortunately,thisisanindicatorforwhichreliablycomparablecross-countrymetricsarenotreadilyavailable,whichiswhythequantitativedimensionofourcomparativeanalysisislimitedtothecostofelectricity.

ComputingPower:

?Existingdatacentercapacity,includinghyperscaler,colocation,andenterprise

facilities,measuredingigawatts.TheonlyexceptionisChina,forwhichdemand

?2024BostonConsultingGroup8

hasbeenusedinstead,asoverallcapacityinChinaisdi?culttoestimate.(BCGHendersonInstituteanalysisofcountryandindustryreports)

?Binaryscoreforaccesstocutting-edgesemiconductorsoptimizedforAI

workloads,suchasNvidia’sA100orH100chips.Countriesandregionswithnoformalaccessbarriersreceiveascoreof1;thosefacingsuchbarriers(inthe

formofexportrestrictions,forexample)receiveascoreof0.(USDepartmentofCommerce;BCGHendersonInstituteanalysis)

?Binaryscoreforaccesstotier2semiconductors.Allcountriesinouranalysisreceivedascoreof1,astheyallhaveformallyopenaccesstothistypeof

hardware.(BCGHendersonInstituteanalysis)

CapitalPower:

?Venturecapitalfunding,from2019to2024,basedontheobservedAI-directed

shareofinvestmentsbyventurecapitalfunds,bycountry(including,inthecaseofChina,thesizeablepoolofgovernmentVCfundsdevotedtoAI).(Pitchbook)

?CorporateR&Dspendingbythe20largestpubliclytradedtechcompanies,bycountry.(EuropeanCommission;BCGHendersonInstitute)

?Sovereignwealthandpublicpension-fundinvestmentpower,adjustedforthe

shareofassetsundermanagementinequitiesandalternativeinvestments

(thereforeexcludingbonds,realestateandinfrastructureinvestments,andrisk-freeassets).(BCGHendersonInstitute)

CurrentlimitationsinChina’saccesstostate-of-the-artchipsforAImodeltrainingandinferencearelikelytodelayratherthanimpedefurtherprogress.ManyChinesecompaniesreportedlyretain

accesstochips,andNvidiahasdesignedmodelsnotcoveredbyUStraderestrictions;Chinesecompaniesacquired$5billionworthofthesechipsin2023.

Furthermore,Chinaisinvestingaggressivelyinitsdomesticchipmanufacturingcapacity:the

governmenthaspledgedapproximately$40billion,andHuaweirecentlyreleaseditsAscend910

chips,optimizedforAIworkloads.RegardlessofwhetheritcancompetewithNvidiaatthecutting

edgeofcomputinghardware—andespeciallytheso代warelayerontopofit—Huaweihasreachedamilestoneinrecentmonthswiththetrainingofahigh-performingLLM,iFlytek’sXinghuo4,entirelyonitsAscendplatform.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup9

Chinesecompaniesalsohaveambitionsoutsidetheirhomemarket.Alibaba,forexample,is

expandingitsdatacenterfootprintinMalaysia,Philippines,Thailand,SouthKorea,andMexico—extendingthereachofitsQwenfamilyofgenerativeAImodels.

GenAIMiddlePowersontheRise

ThisUS–Chinastoryhasfueledthe“twosuperpowers”narrative—andconvincinglyso.But

momentumisbuildinginotherpartsoftheworld.TheEU,forexample,hasstrongcomplementarityamongmemberstateswithestablishedstrengths.IntheGulf,highlyconcentratedandagilecapital,coupledwitha?ordableenergy,isacceleratingprogressevenintheabsenceofarobust,establishedtechsector.SouthKoreaandJapanbothhavestrongtechnologysectors,withthecapitaltoscale.

MadeintheEuropeanUnion

Forsome,whatmaybeoutofreachattheindividualcountrylevelbecomesfeasibleatthebloclevel.TheEUstandstobene?tfromthecomplementarityofenablersamongmemberstatesandthescaleitcanachieveasauni?edmarket.

BuildingonDistributedStrength.TheEUisalreadyhometoanascentGenAIstartupecosystem.France-basedMistralhascontributedsevenoftheworld’stopLLMsandhasreceived$1.2billioninfundingtodate.TheGermanstartupAlephAlphahasalsodevelopedpowerfulfoundationmodels

(twooftheworld’stopLLMs),thoughithasmostrecentlypivotedtoindustry-speci?capplications.

SmallerGenAIstartupsarealsoattractinginvestment.Kyutai,foundedin2023,hasreceivedaround$350millionandalreadyreleaseditsMoshiAImodel,specializedinadvancedspeech;with$220

millioninseedcapital,Hispushingtodevelopproductivity-enhancingAIagents;Poolside,

meanwhile,hasreceivedinvestmentsworth$626milliontobuildaleadingmodelforcode

generation;andBlackForestLabshasobtainedaround$150milliontofurtheritstext-to-imagefoundationmodel.

WhilethesecompaniesaremodestinsizeandfundingcomparedtoUSandChinesecounterparts,theyhaveastrongfoundationoftalentonwhichtobuild.TheEUhasanextensiveandgrowingpoolofAIspecialists,ofwhichtherearemorethan100,000inFranceandGermanyalone.(SeeExhibit3.)

?2024BostonConsultingGroup10

:TheEUalsohastheadvantageofbeingamassivemarket,withacombinedGDPof$18trillion.It’s

solargethatitscomparativelydemandingregulatoryframeworkforAI,includingtheGeneralData

ProtectionRegulation(GDPR)andtherecentlyenactedEUAIAct,isunlikelytodissuadeGenAI

5

suppliersfromoperatingthere.Infact,itsregulationscouldcreatedemandforEU-developedand-hostedintelligence,whichmaybeviewedasmoretrustworthyandprotectiveofusers’data.

TheEUhastheworld’sthird-largestdatacentercapacity,a代ertheUSandChina,with8gigawattsin

2024.Whileelectricitypricesintheregionarehigh,considerablevariabilitycanbeexploited:

industrialelectricitycancost20%lessinFrance,andcloseto60%lessinSwedenandFinland,thaninGermany.Moreover,companieslookingtosupplyGenAImodelstotheEUmarketmayhaveno

alternativetoscalingdatacenterstherefortheaforementionedregulatoryreasons.

Buildingontheabovestrengths,wealreadyseecomplementarityinaction:Mistral’smodels,for

example,aredesignedinFrance,trainedonItaliansupercomputers,andservedtoclientslargelyoutofSwedishdatacenters—poweredbythechipsmanufacturedusingEUVlithographyequipment

producedexclusivelybyNetherlands-basedASML.

BridgingtheFundingGap.TheEU’sgreatestchallengeliesinsecuringtheinvestmentsnecessarytokeepupwithmodelscalingandexpanddatacenterinfrastructure(whichincludesupgradingthepowergrid).TheEUhasahistoryoflagginginvestmentinthetechsector,andthereforeithasbeenunabletoscaletechchampions:whileUSGDPis1.5timesgreaterthanthatoftheEU,themarket

capoftheUSshareoftheworld’s1,000largestpublictechcompaniesiscloseto18timesgreater

6

thantheEUshare.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup11

Asaresult,EU-basedtechnology?rmshaveonlyafractionoftheinvestmentmuscleoftheirUS

counterparts:The20largestEUtechcompaniesspentacombined$40billiononR&Din2022,

comparedto$200billionforthe20largesttechcompaniesintheUS.Unsurprisingly,GenAIstartupsintheEUhaveonlyreceived$3.5billionininvestmentssince2019,or5%oftheprivateinvestment

receivedbyUS-basedGenAIstartups.

Therearesignsofpositivemomentum,however.TheDraghireportonEuropeancompetitiveness

andrecentannouncementsbytheEuropeanInvestmentBankandtheEuropeanCommissionall

stresstheneedforastrongerEUtechecosystem—withthefundingnecessaryforstartupstoscale

withinthebloc.TherearepoolsofresourcestheEUcouldtapinto,notablypublicR&Dspending

acrossmemberstates,whichaveragedabout$40billionperyearbetween2016and2022—butdoingsowillrequireaconcertede?ortinacomplexenvironmentofdistributeddecisionmaking.

Precedentsforsuchcollaborationexist,particularlyinjointe?ortslikethecreationoftheEuropeanairplaneconsortiumAirbus.Butorchestrationacrossnationalboundarieshasalsoattimesbeen

challenging,aswiththeGaiaXinitiativetodeveloptrustworthyandsovereigncloudinfrastructurefortheEU.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthepresentpolicymomentumtranslatesintotimelyaction.

MadeinSaudiArabiaortheUAE

Becauseofthehighcostofbuildingatop-performingGenAIecosystem,somecountriescanuse

publiclyavailableIPandinveststrategicallyintalentandcomputingpower.Countriesmayalsorelyonstrongaccesstocapitaltooutsourcethedevelopmentofmodelswhichtheycanneverthelessownandserveatscale.ThisapproachisbestsuitedtoeconomiessuchasSaudiArabiaandtheUAE,

whichhavecentralizedaccesstosigni?cantcapitalresourceslikesovereignwealthfunds.

InvestinginGrowth.IntheGulfregion,SaudiArabiaandtheUAEareeachmakingsigni?cantinvestmentstodiversifytheireconomiesandcontributetotheregion’sbroadertechnological

acceleration.

ThecommitmenttodirectinvestmentstowardAIisclear.TheUAEhaslauncheda$10billionAIVCfund—morethaneighttimesthetotalfundingreceivedtodatebyMistral,forexample.Saudi

Arabia,meanwhile,planstoinvest$40billioninAIdevelopment,ontopofarecentlyannounced

plantoinvest$100billionindatacenterexpansion(ProjectTranscendence)anditsearlier$100

billiontechfund(ProjectAlat).Thesecommittedinvestmentsdrawonmuchlargerpoolsofcapital:

ofthe20largestsovereignwealthfundsworldwide,UAEishometo?ve,totalingroughly$2trillioninassetsundermanagement,whileSaudiArabia’sPublicInvestmentFund(PIF)manages$920billion.

?2024BostonConsultingGroup12

:

BothcountrieshaveinvestedheavilyinbuildinganAIR&Decosystemthroughuniversitiesand

sovereign-wealth-backedstartupslikeG42intheUAE.Since2022,theAItalentpoolintheUAEandSaudiArabiahasgrownby36%and17%,respectively,and

incomingnetAItalentmigration

has

grownby40%and70%.(SeeExhibit4.)

DatacenterinfrastructureintheGulfremainssmallinabsoluteterms,withSaudiArabiaandthe

UAEeacharound0.4gigawattsincapacity.Butitisgrowingrapidly,inpartenabledbytheregion’s

lowenergycosts,whichcanbe30%to50%lowerthanintheUSonaverage.Therecenteasingof

cutting-edgechipexportrestrictionstotheUAE—whichtheSaudigovernmentexpectswilleventuallyextendtoSaudiArabiaaswell—willcontributetosustainedaccesstohardwareoptimizedforAI

workloads.Still,thepaceofactualdatacenterbuildoutisanopenquestion.

Progresstodatehasbeennotable:SaudiArabia’sAramcohasproducedwhatisreportedlythe

largestindustrialGenAImodelintheworld,andtheSaudiDataandAIAuthorityreleasedthe

leadingArabicLLMfamily,ALLaM,thelargestversionsofwhicharebuiltonthebasisofMeta’s

Llama-2.TwooftheEmiratiTechnologyInnovationInstitute’sFalconmodelscon

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