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HowCEOsCanNavigatetheNewGeopoliticsofGenAI
DECEMBER09,2024
By
NikolausLang
,LeonidZhukov,
DavidZuluagaMartínez
,
Marc
Gilbert
,MeenalPore,andEtienneCavin
READINGTIME:15MIN
Asthe
generativeAI
maptakesshape,theUSandChinaareassertingtheirdominance.Tech
companiesfromtheseGenAIsuperpowershavebuiltasubstantialleadinthecreationandlarge-
scalecommercializationoftop-performinglargelanguagemodels(LLMs).InaworldwhereGenAIisquicklybecomingacriticalresource,theUSandChinaarecurrentlyonpacetocontrolthesupply.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup1
Butsomethinginterestingishappeninginparallel.Asmallgroupofcountries—the“GenAImiddlepowers”—isemerging,eachwithitsowndistinctstrengthsthatmayenableittocompeteona
regionalandevenglobalscaleasasupplierofthetechnology.Theimplicationsforcompaniesaresigni?cant.
ForcorporateleaderswhoareintegratingGenAIintoanincreasingshareoftheirproductsandservices,andwhoareoperatingacrossmultiplegeographies,relyingsolelyonGenAIsuppliedbycompaniesintheUSorChinacouldposeseriouschallenges,withlocalregulations,data
requirements,andtheavailabilityofLLMsallsubjecttoshi代singovernmentpolicy.AlthoughamoremultipolarsupplyofGenAIincreasescomplexity,itwouldalsocreatecriticaloptionality.
CEOsneedtounderstandthisdynamic—andbeabletonavigatetheevolvinggeopoliticsofGenAI.Thetraditionalapproach—determiningwhichcountrycanacquirethemostadvanced
semiconductors,forexample,orwhichhasthemostfavorableregulatoryenvironment—won’t
su?ce.CompanyleaderscanassesstherelativestrengthofGenAIsuperpowersandmiddlepowersacrossthesixkeyenablersofGenAIsupply:capitalpower,talent,intellectualproperty(IP),
data
,
1
energy,andcomputingpower.
SuperpowersandMiddlePowers:TheEmergingGenAILandscape
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Relativeperformanceacrossenablers,onanormalizedscaleof0to
US
CHINA
EU
JAPAN
SOUTHKOREA
UAE
SAUDIARABIA
CapitalpowerTalentIPDataEnergyComputi
ngpower
?2024BostonConsultingGroup2
Thisisnotaboutacountry’srateofGenAIadoption,whichcano代enbedecoupledfromitsabilitytosupplythetechnology.TheformerwasassessedinarecentBCGstudyof73globaleconomies’
exposuretoandreadinesstodeployGenAI
.(Seethesidebar“TheAdoptionAdvantage”)
THEADOPTIONADVANTAGE
ThisanalysisisfocusedonthesupplyofgenerativeAI,whichwillbeparamountinshapingthegeopoliticaldynamicsofthetechnology.Butthe?ipsideofsupply—theactualadoptionofthetechnology—isalsoofcriticalimportance.Rapidand
extensiveadoptioncanpositivelyimpactcompetitivenessandproductivity,leadingtobroadereconomicprosperity.Formanycountryleaders,promotingadoptionofAI
acrosstheeconomymaybetherightpolicypriority.
BCG’srecentAIMaturityIndex
o?ersacomprehensiveassessmentofcountries’exposuretoAI-driveneconomicdisruptionacrossindustriesaswellastheir
readinesstoseizetheeconomicadvantagethetechnologymakesavailable.
AsgenerativeAImatures,foundationLLMswillincreasinglybeputtousethroughindustry-orfunction-speci?capplications.RobustecosystemsofcompaniesworkingonthisapplicationlayerofthetechnologywillbeanimportantdriverofsuccessforcountrieslookingtomaketheirindustriesmorecompetitivethroughAI.
Indiaisapowerfulexampleofacountrythatiswell-positionedtofostersuchan
ecosystem.Thegovernment’sIndiaAIMissioniscommittedtosupportingextensiveadoptionthroughthecreationofcentersofAIexcellence,whichaimtointegratethe
technologyintokeysectorslikeagricultureandeducation.Indiaalsobene?tsfromitshistoricalstrengthintechtalent,asitishometoalargepoolof215,000AI
specialists.
WhileIndiancompanieshavealreadyreleasedsomeLLMs,thecountryislikelyto
increasinglyfocusonfosteringanecosystemofcompaniesheavilyinvestedinindustry-speci?cGenAIapplications,suchasSetu’sSesamefor?nanceand
insurance,Fractal’sVaidya.aiforhealthcare,andLexlegis’Lexlegis.aiforlegalservices.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup3
FocusingourresearchonsupplyenablesustohelpCEOsdeterminehowtoensuretheircompanyhasreliableand?exibleaccesstothisgame-changingtechnology.Hereisacloserlookatthemajorplayersandtheothercontenders.
TheGenAISuperpowers
TheUSandChinaarecurrentlytheonlyplayerswithrobustaccesstoandcontroloversizeable
portionsofthewholeGenAIvaluechain.TheyproducethemostIPandtheyhavethelargestAI
talentpools;theyhavesomeoftherichestdataecosystemsintheworldandthemostdatacenterinfrastructurecapacity,andtheyleadincapitalaccess.
Today’sDefaultIs“MadeintheUSA”
TheUShashadapronouncedheadstartonGenAI,buildingondecadesof
AI
leadership.Nearly
2
70%oftheworld’snotableAImodelssince1950havebeendevelopedbyorinpartnershipwithUS-basedcompaniesoracademicinstitutions,ashave57%oftop-performingLLMs.(SeeExhibit1.)
:TheUSishometosome60%ofthetop2,000AIscholarsintheworldandattractedroughlyone-
quarterofallAIspecialiststhatrelocatedgloballybetween2022and2024;itstotalAItalentpoolhasgrowntonearlyhalfamillionpeople,thelargestintheworld.AndUS-basedAIscholarshave
contributed35%oftheworld’smostin?uentialpapersinthe?eldofAIsinceits
inception.3
US-basedGenAIstartupshavealsoreceivedunparalleledprivateinvestment:atotalof$65billion
since2019.Inaddition,AI-directedcapitalexpenditureswithinestablishedtech?rmslikeAlphabet,Amazon,Meta,andMicroso代areexpectedtoexceed$200billionfor2024.Withmassivecomputingcapacity,afull-stackapproachextendingtohardwarecodesign,deeppockets,globalreach,accesstotheworld’stoptalent,andin-housemodeldevelopersordeeppartnershipwithoutsidedevelopers,
?2024BostonConsultingGroup4
thesecompaniesaresingularlypositionedtosupportUSleadershipinGenAIintheforeseeablefuture.
Beyondtalentandcapital,theUSalsohastheinfrastructuretosupportinferenceatscale—thatis,tosupplyGenAIonanongoingbasistomodelusers.Itisthelargestdatacenterhubintheworld,withanestimatedcapacityofapproximately45gigawattsin2024.TheUShasreliableaccessto
cutting-edgehardware(throughUS-basedNvidiaandstronggeopoliticaltiestoTaiwan-based
TSMC)tosupportdatacenterexpansion,thoughlongleadtimestoconnecttotheelectricalgridmaycreatechallenges.
Made-in-ChinaModelsAreCatchingUp
SomesignsindicatethatChinaiscatchinguptotheUSonsomekeyenablersandmakingrapid
progressintheproductionoftopLLMs.TwoChinesecompanies,AlibabaandtheGenAIstartup
01.AI,contributeoverone-quarteroftheworld’stopopen-sourcemodels.Establishedtechgiants
BaiduandTencenthavealsoreleasedhigh-performingmodels,ashaveanewgenerationofGenAIstartups,theso-calledAItigers:ZhipuAI,BaichuanAI,MoonshotAI,andMiniMaxAI.TopChinesemodelshavesubstantiallyreducedthegapcomparedtostate-of-the-artalternativesinthelastyear.
(SeeExhibit2.)AndtopChinesemodelshavee?ectivelyclosedthegapinChineselanguagebenchmarks.
:
TheChineseGenAIecosystemhasbene?ttedfromaccesstoforeignopen-sourceoropen-weights
foundationmodels:01.AI’sYimodelfamily,forexample,isbasedonMeta’sLlama.(Seethesidebar“
ALandscapeofOpen-SourceandClosedModels
”)TheChinesegovernmenthassignaleditsintenttoensureanamplesupplyofdomesticopen-sourceoptionsthatplayasimilarroleinthefuture,
supportingagrowingnumberofsmallercompaniesastheyrampuptheirtechnicalcapabilities.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup5
AlthoughittrailstheUS,ChinastillhasastrongAItalentbench—andpotentnationalresearch
championslikeTsinghuaUniversityandShanghaiJiaoTongUniversity.ThefourAItigersareall
foundedbyTsinghuafacultyoralumni.China’sstrengthinAItalentisapparentinitsleadershiponpatents,withmorethan76,000AIpatents?ledwiththeWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization
between2019and2023,aboutfourtimesasmanyastheUS.
Chinaalsohasampledatacenterinfrastructure,withapproximately20gigawattsofcapacity,andsigni?cantcapitalthroughitspublicR&Dbudget,whichhasaveraged$50billionperyearbetween2016and2023.Infact,governmentventurecapitalfundsdemonstrateChina’scommitmentto
boostingAIinnovationthroughpublicinvestment.GovernmentVCshaveinvestednearlyaquarterof
theirtotalfundsinAI?rms,exceeding$180billionintotalsince2000,ofwhichroughly$100billion
4
wasinvestedbetween2019and2023.Andprivateinvestment,domesticaswellasforeign,hasactivelydrivenprogressamongtheAItigers,whichtogetherwith01.AIhaveraisedmorethan$6billioninthelastfewyears—includingfromChinesehyperscalers,notablyAlibaba.
METHODOLOGY
OurresearchdrawsonanextensivequantitativecomparisonoftherelativestrengthoftheUS,China,andGenAImiddlepowersacrossthekeyenablersofGenAIsupply.Thiscomparisonwasusedasabasisforfurtheranalysis,ratherthanasastrict
index;itenabledustoidentifythecountriesandregionswiththemostopportunityandthesalientstrengthsandchallengesofeach.
Thequantitativeassessmentofrelativestrengthacrossenablersdrawsinpartonthehistoryofcountries’strengthsinandcontributiontoAIasabroadfamilyof
technologies,ofwhichGenAIisonlyasubset.Thisinpartre?ectslimitationsin
reliabletransnationaldata,giventherecencyofGenAI’sriseinimportance.But,moreimportantly,indicatorsassociatedwiththelongarcofthehistoryofAIspeaktotheenduranceofcriticalcapabilities,particularlyontalentandinnovation
ecosystems.
Sinceourprimaryobjectivewastodeveloparelativesenseofstrengthacross
enablers,wedevelopednormalizedscoresbyenablercountryorregionpairsinthefollowingway:
?Eachindicatorleadstoanabsolutevaluebycountryorregion.Thesevaluesarenotnormalizedbypopulation,sizeoftheeconomy,orothersuchfactors
?2024BostonConsultingGroup6
becausecompetitioninthesupplyofGenAIislargelyafunctionofscale.
?Valuesforeachindicatorarethen(linearly)normalizedintocountryorregionscoresonascalefrom0to1,where1equalsthehighestactualcountryvalueinourdatasetand0issetasabsolute0(exceptfortheenergyenabler,which
re?ectsindustrialelectricityprices:inthiscase,0equalsthelowestactualprice.
?Then,foreachcountryorregion,wetaketheaveragenormalizedscoreacrossindicatorstogeneratetheenablerscore.Acountrywouldonlyhaveascoreof1inanenablerifithadthehighestabsolutevalueofallcountriesinourdatasetforallindicatorsassociatedwiththeenablerinquestion.
Thefollowingaretheindicatorsweusedtodevelopthestage-settinganalysisofrelativestrengthacrosstheenablersofGenAIsupply,withthesourcesforeach
indicatedinparentheses.Forfurtherdetailsoftheanalysisanddatausedinthisstudy,pleasecontacttheauthors.
Talent:
?Shareofthetop2,000AIresearchersworldwide,basedonthelocationoftheauthorsofleadingAIpublications.(AMiner)
?Shareofthetop300AIinstitutions,alsobasedonthelocationofauthorsofleadingAIpublications.(AMiner)
?SizeoftheAI-specializedtalentpoolworkingwithinacountry(thoughnotnecessarilyemployedbyalocalcompany).(BCGTalentTracker)
IntellectualProperty:
?Shareofnotablemachinelearningmodelsdevelopedsince1959by,orin
partnershipwith,researchersorinstitutionsfromaparticularcountry.(EpochAI)
?TotalnumberofAIpublicationsproducedbyauthorsand/orinstitutionsfromaparticularcountrybetween2019and2023.(SCImago)
?TotalnumberofcitationsofAIpublicationsproducedbyauthorsand/or
institutionsineachcountrybetween2019and2023,excludingself-citations.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup7
(SCImago)
?TotalnumberofAIpatents?ledthroughtheWIPObetween2019and2023.
(WIPO)
Data:
?RankingintheUnitedNationse-GovernmentDevelopmentIndex,whichmeasuresgovernmentdigitization.(UnitedNations)
?Totalnumberofactivehandset-basedandcomputer-based(i.e.,connectedbyUSB/dongle)mobile-broadbandsubscriptions,togaugerelativemagnitudesofdigitaldatageneration.(InternationalTelecommunicationUnion)
Thesemetricsaredirectionallyindicativeofthedegreeofdigitizationaswellasthevolumeof(digital)dataproducedineachcountry.Theydonot,however,accountforotherimportantfactors,suchastheregulatory?exibilityofdatausesor(relatedly)thelevelofcontextualizationofdata(i.e.,howeasilydataofdi?erenttypesand
sourcescanbeusedinanintegratedfashion).
Energy:
?Thecostofelectricityforatypicalcommercial/industrialuserperkilowatt-hour,basedonthe“l(fā)argestbusinesscity”withineachcountry.(fDiBenchmark)
Acriticalcomponentofenergyasanenablerisleadtimetogridinterconnectionfordatacenterbuildouts,awidelyacknowledgedchallengeinmostgeographies.
Unfortunately,thisisanindicatorforwhichreliablycomparablecross-countrymetricsarenotreadilyavailable,whichiswhythequantitativedimensionofourcomparativeanalysisislimitedtothecostofelectricity.
ComputingPower:
?Existingdatacentercapacity,includinghyperscaler,colocation,andenterprise
facilities,measuredingigawatts.TheonlyexceptionisChina,forwhichdemand
?2024BostonConsultingGroup8
hasbeenusedinstead,asoverallcapacityinChinaisdi?culttoestimate.(BCGHendersonInstituteanalysisofcountryandindustryreports)
?Binaryscoreforaccesstocutting-edgesemiconductorsoptimizedforAI
workloads,suchasNvidia’sA100orH100chips.Countriesandregionswithnoformalaccessbarriersreceiveascoreof1;thosefacingsuchbarriers(inthe
formofexportrestrictions,forexample)receiveascoreof0.(USDepartmentofCommerce;BCGHendersonInstituteanalysis)
?Binaryscoreforaccesstotier2semiconductors.Allcountriesinouranalysisreceivedascoreof1,astheyallhaveformallyopenaccesstothistypeof
hardware.(BCGHendersonInstituteanalysis)
CapitalPower:
?Venturecapitalfunding,from2019to2024,basedontheobservedAI-directed
shareofinvestmentsbyventurecapitalfunds,bycountry(including,inthecaseofChina,thesizeablepoolofgovernmentVCfundsdevotedtoAI).(Pitchbook)
?CorporateR&Dspendingbythe20largestpubliclytradedtechcompanies,bycountry.(EuropeanCommission;BCGHendersonInstitute)
?Sovereignwealthandpublicpension-fundinvestmentpower,adjustedforthe
shareofassetsundermanagementinequitiesandalternativeinvestments
(thereforeexcludingbonds,realestateandinfrastructureinvestments,andrisk-freeassets).(BCGHendersonInstitute)
CurrentlimitationsinChina’saccesstostate-of-the-artchipsforAImodeltrainingandinferencearelikelytodelayratherthanimpedefurtherprogress.ManyChinesecompaniesreportedlyretain
accesstochips,andNvidiahasdesignedmodelsnotcoveredbyUStraderestrictions;Chinesecompaniesacquired$5billionworthofthesechipsin2023.
Furthermore,Chinaisinvestingaggressivelyinitsdomesticchipmanufacturingcapacity:the
governmenthaspledgedapproximately$40billion,andHuaweirecentlyreleaseditsAscend910
chips,optimizedforAIworkloads.RegardlessofwhetheritcancompetewithNvidiaatthecutting
edgeofcomputinghardware—andespeciallytheso代warelayerontopofit—Huaweihasreachedamilestoneinrecentmonthswiththetrainingofahigh-performingLLM,iFlytek’sXinghuo4,entirelyonitsAscendplatform.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup9
Chinesecompaniesalsohaveambitionsoutsidetheirhomemarket.Alibaba,forexample,is
expandingitsdatacenterfootprintinMalaysia,Philippines,Thailand,SouthKorea,andMexico—extendingthereachofitsQwenfamilyofgenerativeAImodels.
GenAIMiddlePowersontheRise
ThisUS–Chinastoryhasfueledthe“twosuperpowers”narrative—andconvincinglyso.But
momentumisbuildinginotherpartsoftheworld.TheEU,forexample,hasstrongcomplementarityamongmemberstateswithestablishedstrengths.IntheGulf,highlyconcentratedandagilecapital,coupledwitha?ordableenergy,isacceleratingprogressevenintheabsenceofarobust,establishedtechsector.SouthKoreaandJapanbothhavestrongtechnologysectors,withthecapitaltoscale.
MadeintheEuropeanUnion
Forsome,whatmaybeoutofreachattheindividualcountrylevelbecomesfeasibleatthebloclevel.TheEUstandstobene?tfromthecomplementarityofenablersamongmemberstatesandthescaleitcanachieveasauni?edmarket.
BuildingonDistributedStrength.TheEUisalreadyhometoanascentGenAIstartupecosystem.France-basedMistralhascontributedsevenoftheworld’stopLLMsandhasreceived$1.2billioninfundingtodate.TheGermanstartupAlephAlphahasalsodevelopedpowerfulfoundationmodels
(twooftheworld’stopLLMs),thoughithasmostrecentlypivotedtoindustry-speci?capplications.
SmallerGenAIstartupsarealsoattractinginvestment.Kyutai,foundedin2023,hasreceivedaround$350millionandalreadyreleaseditsMoshiAImodel,specializedinadvancedspeech;with$220
millioninseedcapital,Hispushingtodevelopproductivity-enhancingAIagents;Poolside,
meanwhile,hasreceivedinvestmentsworth$626milliontobuildaleadingmodelforcode
generation;andBlackForestLabshasobtainedaround$150milliontofurtheritstext-to-imagefoundationmodel.
WhilethesecompaniesaremodestinsizeandfundingcomparedtoUSandChinesecounterparts,theyhaveastrongfoundationoftalentonwhichtobuild.TheEUhasanextensiveandgrowingpoolofAIspecialists,ofwhichtherearemorethan100,000inFranceandGermanyalone.(SeeExhibit3.)
?2024BostonConsultingGroup10
:TheEUalsohastheadvantageofbeingamassivemarket,withacombinedGDPof$18trillion.It’s
solargethatitscomparativelydemandingregulatoryframeworkforAI,includingtheGeneralData
ProtectionRegulation(GDPR)andtherecentlyenactedEUAIAct,isunlikelytodissuadeGenAI
5
suppliersfromoperatingthere.Infact,itsregulationscouldcreatedemandforEU-developedand-hostedintelligence,whichmaybeviewedasmoretrustworthyandprotectiveofusers’data.
TheEUhastheworld’sthird-largestdatacentercapacity,a代ertheUSandChina,with8gigawattsin
2024.Whileelectricitypricesintheregionarehigh,considerablevariabilitycanbeexploited:
industrialelectricitycancost20%lessinFrance,andcloseto60%lessinSwedenandFinland,thaninGermany.Moreover,companieslookingtosupplyGenAImodelstotheEUmarketmayhaveno
alternativetoscalingdatacenterstherefortheaforementionedregulatoryreasons.
Buildingontheabovestrengths,wealreadyseecomplementarityinaction:Mistral’smodels,for
example,aredesignedinFrance,trainedonItaliansupercomputers,andservedtoclientslargelyoutofSwedishdatacenters—poweredbythechipsmanufacturedusingEUVlithographyequipment
producedexclusivelybyNetherlands-basedASML.
BridgingtheFundingGap.TheEU’sgreatestchallengeliesinsecuringtheinvestmentsnecessarytokeepupwithmodelscalingandexpanddatacenterinfrastructure(whichincludesupgradingthepowergrid).TheEUhasahistoryoflagginginvestmentinthetechsector,andthereforeithasbeenunabletoscaletechchampions:whileUSGDPis1.5timesgreaterthanthatoftheEU,themarket
capoftheUSshareoftheworld’s1,000largestpublictechcompaniesiscloseto18timesgreater
6
thantheEUshare.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup11
Asaresult,EU-basedtechnology?rmshaveonlyafractionoftheinvestmentmuscleoftheirUS
counterparts:The20largestEUtechcompaniesspentacombined$40billiononR&Din2022,
comparedto$200billionforthe20largesttechcompaniesintheUS.Unsurprisingly,GenAIstartupsintheEUhaveonlyreceived$3.5billionininvestmentssince2019,or5%oftheprivateinvestment
receivedbyUS-basedGenAIstartups.
Therearesignsofpositivemomentum,however.TheDraghireportonEuropeancompetitiveness
andrecentannouncementsbytheEuropeanInvestmentBankandtheEuropeanCommissionall
stresstheneedforastrongerEUtechecosystem—withthefundingnecessaryforstartupstoscale
withinthebloc.TherearepoolsofresourcestheEUcouldtapinto,notablypublicR&Dspending
acrossmemberstates,whichaveragedabout$40billionperyearbetween2016and2022—butdoingsowillrequireaconcertede?ortinacomplexenvironmentofdistributeddecisionmaking.
Precedentsforsuchcollaborationexist,particularlyinjointe?ortslikethecreationoftheEuropeanairplaneconsortiumAirbus.Butorchestrationacrossnationalboundarieshasalsoattimesbeen
challenging,aswiththeGaiaXinitiativetodeveloptrustworthyandsovereigncloudinfrastructurefortheEU.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthepresentpolicymomentumtranslatesintotimelyaction.
MadeinSaudiArabiaortheUAE
Becauseofthehighcostofbuildingatop-performingGenAIecosystem,somecountriescanuse
publiclyavailableIPandinveststrategicallyintalentandcomputingpower.Countriesmayalsorelyonstrongaccesstocapitaltooutsourcethedevelopmentofmodelswhichtheycanneverthelessownandserveatscale.ThisapproachisbestsuitedtoeconomiessuchasSaudiArabiaandtheUAE,
whichhavecentralizedaccesstosigni?cantcapitalresourceslikesovereignwealthfunds.
InvestinginGrowth.IntheGulfregion,SaudiArabiaandtheUAEareeachmakingsigni?cantinvestmentstodiversifytheireconomiesandcontributetotheregion’sbroadertechnological
acceleration.
ThecommitmenttodirectinvestmentstowardAIisclear.TheUAEhaslauncheda$10billionAIVCfund—morethaneighttimesthetotalfundingreceivedtodatebyMistral,forexample.Saudi
Arabia,meanwhile,planstoinvest$40billioninAIdevelopment,ontopofarecentlyannounced
plantoinvest$100billionindatacenterexpansion(ProjectTranscendence)anditsearlier$100
billiontechfund(ProjectAlat).Thesecommittedinvestmentsdrawonmuchlargerpoolsofcapital:
ofthe20largestsovereignwealthfundsworldwide,UAEishometo?ve,totalingroughly$2trillioninassetsundermanagement,whileSaudiArabia’sPublicInvestmentFund(PIF)manages$920billion.
?2024BostonConsultingGroup12
:
BothcountrieshaveinvestedheavilyinbuildinganAIR&Decosystemthroughuniversitiesand
sovereign-wealth-backedstartupslikeG42intheUAE.Since2022,theAItalentpoolintheUAEandSaudiArabiahasgrownby36%and17%,respectively,and
incomingnetAItalentmigration
has
grownby40%and70%.(SeeExhibit4.)
DatacenterinfrastructureintheGulfremainssmallinabsoluteterms,withSaudiArabiaandthe
UAEeacharound0.4gigawattsincapacity.Butitisgrowingrapidly,inpartenabledbytheregion’s
lowenergycosts,whichcanbe30%to50%lowerthanintheUSonaverage.Therecenteasingof
cutting-edgechipexportrestrictionstotheUAE—whichtheSaudigovernmentexpectswilleventuallyextendtoSaudiArabiaaswell—willcontributetosustainedaccesstohardwareoptimizedforAI
workloads.Still,thepaceofactualdatacenterbuildoutisanopenquestion.
Progresstodatehasbeennotable:SaudiArabia’sAramcohasproducedwhatisreportedlythe
largestindustrialGenAImodelintheworld,andtheSaudiDataandAIAuthorityreleasedthe
leadingArabicLLMfamily,ALLaM,thelargestversionsofwhicharebuiltonthebasisofMeta’s
Llama-2.TwooftheEmiratiTechnologyInnovationInstitute’sFalconmodelscon
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