高盛 - 2025科技泡沫破裂25周年經(jīng)驗(yàn)與教訓(xùn)報(bào)告 Global Strategy Paper 25 Years on;Lessons from the bursting of the technology bubble

Note:ThefollowingisaredactedversionoftheoriginalreportpublishedMarch27,2025[22pgs].

27March2025|7:11PMGMT

GlobalStrategyPaper

25Yearson;Lessonsfromtheburstingofthetechnologybubble

PeterOppenheimer

+44(20)7552-5782|

peter.oppenheimer@

GoldmanSachsInternational

nThisweekmarksthe25thanniversaryofthetechnologybubblebursting.Giventhecorrectionsofarintechnologystocksin2025,particularlyintheUS,we

investigatetheparallelsanddifferencesbetweenthetwoperiodsandexaminewhatlessonscanbelearned.

nThetechnologybubblewasprimarilydrivenbyexuberancearoundthe

commercialisationoftheinternet,withtheNasdaqindexincreasing?vefold

between1995and2000.Withinamonthofthebubblebursting,inMarch2000,ithadlostoverathirdofitsvalue.

nAcriticaldifferencebetweenthedominanttechnologycompaniestodayand

thoseofthetechnologybubbleisthatvaluationsaremuchlessextremeandthefundamentalsofthetechnologysectoraremuchstronger.

nMosttechnologycyclesresultinabroadeningoutofopportunitiesasnewcompetitionemergesandcompanies‘piggyback’ontheembedded

infrastructuretogeneratenewgoodsandservices.

nWecontinuetobelievethatthetechnologysectorisnotinabubbleandthat

thereremainattractiveinvestmentopportunities.Inlinewithourviewonbroadermarkets,however,weseebene?tsfromdiversi?cationwithintechnology,and

beyond,tocapturemultiplegrowthopportunities.

SharonBell

+44(20)7552-1341|

sharon.bell@

GoldmanSachsInternational

LiliaPeytavin

+33(1)4212-1716|

lilia.peytavin@

GoldmanSachsBankEuropeSE-ParisBranch

GuillaumeJaisson

+44(20)7552-3000|

guillaume.jaisson@

GoldmanSachsInternational

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcerti?cationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March20252

Twenty-?veyearsagothisweek,stockmarketsaroundtheworldcollapsedasthe

technologybubble?nallyburst.Giventheextraordinaryriseintechnologystocksinrecentyears,particularlyintheUS,andtheircorrectionsofarin2025,itisworth

exploringtheparallelsanddifferencesbetweenthetwoperiodsandexaminingwhatlessonscanbelearned.

Theriseintechnologystocksinthelate1990s,drivenbyexuberancearoundthe

commercialisationoftheinternet,wasextraordinaryinmagnitudeandcompareswithsomeofthebiggestbubblesin?nancialhistory.

n1630s–TheTulipManiainHolland

n1720–TheSouthSeaBubbleintheUK,andtheMississippiBubbleinFrance

n1790s–TheCanalManiaintheUK

n1840s–TheRailwayBubbleintheUK

n1873–TheRailwayBubbleintheUS

n1920s–TheStockMarketBoomintheUS

n1980s–TheLandandStockBubbleinJapan

n1990s–TheTechnologyBubble,Global

n2007–TheHousing/BankingBubbleintheUS(andEurope)

Whentheinternet-basedcompanyYahoo!madeitsinitialpublicoffering(IPO)inApril

1996,thepriceofitsstockrosefrom$13to$33withinasingleday,morethandoublingtheworthofthecompany.Growingconcernaboutthepaceandscaleofspeculation

wasexpressedbypolicymakers.ByDecemberofthatyear,thethenheadoftheFederalReserveAlanGreenspanfamouslywarnedof‘irrationalexuberance’inaspeechattheAmericanEnterpriseInstituteinWashingtonDC.Later,inFebruary1997,beforetheUSCongress,henotedthat“regrettably,historyisstrewnwithvisionsofsuch‘neweras’that,intheend,haveproventobeamirage”Thesecommentsturnedouttobevery

prescient,butalsopremature.

Inthemonthsthatfollowedthesewarnings,sharesinnew‘.com’companieswere

risingexponentially.TheNasdaqindexincreased?vefoldbetween1995and2000,

eventuallyreachingaP/Evaluationof200x,signi?cantlyhigherthaneventhe70xP/E

ratiooftheNikkeiduringtheJapanesestockmarketbubble.In1999,forexample,

Qualcomsharesroseinvalueby2619%.Thisscaleofpriceappreciationbecame

commonplace

(Exhibit1)

.In1999alone,thirteenmajorlargecapstocksallincreasedinvaluebyover1000%andanothersevenlargecapstockseachrosebyover900%;for

comparison,Nvidiarosebyover1180%fromitslowin2022toitshighin2024.Most

equitymarketspeakedinMarch2000andbyApril2000,just1monthafterpeaking,theNasdaqhadlost34%ofitsvalue,andoverthenextyearandahalfhundredsof

companiessawthevalueoftheirstockdropby80%ormore.Priceline,forexample,fell94%.Eventually,bythetimeithadbottomedoutinOctober2002,theNasdaqitselfhadfallennearly80%.

27March20253

Exhibit1:Thetechbubblesawextravagantvaluationsintech,especiallyinEurope

Monthlydata.Lastdatapointisasof26March2025

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

12mfwdP/E

EuropeTechnology

USTechnology

909294969800020406081012141618202224

Source:Datastream,Worldscope,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Lessonsfrombubbles

Thetechnologybubblewasfuelledbyagrowingexcitementaroundtheinternet.

Enthusiasmaroundaninnovationisacommoncharacteristicaroundspeculativebubblesinthestockmarket.Oneacademicstudy1foundthat,inasampleof51major

innovationsintroducedbetween1825and2000,bubblesinequitypriceswereevidentin73%ofthecases.Theyalsofoundthatthemagnitudeofthesebubblesincreaseswiththeradicalnessofinnovations,withtheirpotentialtogenerateindirectnetwork

effectsandwiththeirpublicvisibilityatthetimeofcommercialisation.

Inthissense,severalofthefactorsthatdrovethecycleinthelate1990sresonatewithenthusiasmforAIanditsrelatedtechnologiestoday.Aseachangeintechnologyseemstobeatacriticalpointofcommercialisation,bringingthepotentialforhigherfuture

growth.Theproblemnow,asthen,ishowtovaluethescaleofthebene?tsthatwillaccrueandidentifywhowillbethebiggestwinners(andlosers).Ultimately,bubblesdevelopastheaggregatevalueofcompaniesthatmaybeinvolvedintheinnovationexceedthefuturepotentialcash?owsthatitislikelytogenerate.

Lookingathistory(seeGlobalStrategyPaper:WhyTechnologyisnotabubble;lessonsfromhistory,4June2018),wecanmakeseveralinterestingobservationsabouthow

theseperiodsevolvethathelptocontextualisethespeedofchangeweareexperiencingacrosseconomiesandsocietytoday.Althoughitisdif?culttogeneralise,somecommoncharacteristicsare:

nAbreakthroughintechnologyemergesandreachescommercialscale.

1SeeSorescu,A.,Sorescu,S.M.,Armstrong,W.J.,andDevoldere,B.(2018):Twocenturiesofinnovationsandstockmarketbubbles.MarketingScienceJournal,37(4),507–684

27March20254

nNewcompaniesandcapital?oodintothespace.

nSpeculationbuildsandvaluationsofcompaniesrise,oftenresultinginabubble.

nThebubblebursts,butthetechnologytendstore-emergeasaprincipaldriverintheeconomyandstockmarket.

nThetechnology/industrybecomesdominatedbyafewlargeplayers.

nSecondaryinnovationsemerge,creatingnewcompaniesandproductsthatareenabledbytheinitialtechnologyanditsincreasedadoption.

nOtherindustriesaredisruptedbytheinnovations,forcingincumbentseithertoadaptordisappear.

nThesecondaryinnovationscreatenewemploymentopportunitiesand,withthem,newsourcesofdemand.Productivitytendstorise,butusuallyonlyafterthefulladoptionofthisnewtechnologyandnetworkeffectsarerealised.

nThespeedofinnovationisoftenassociatedwithsigni?cantchangesinbroader

society,seeninshiftingsocialattitudes,consumerbehaviour,governmentpolicyandbusinesspractices.Thesecreatenewchallengesandopportunitiesforcompanies

adjustingtomeetthechangingdemands.

Whytechnologytodayisnotabubble

Acentraldriverofbubblesinthepasthasbeennotjuststrongperformance

(Exhibit2)

butrisingvaluationsthatreachalevelthatmakesanunrealisticclaimonfuturepotentialrevenues.Wehavearguedthatwhileenthusiasmfortechnologystockshasrisen

sharplyinrecentyears,thishasnotrepresentedabubblebecausetheprice

appreciationhasbeenjusti?edbystrongpro?tfundamentals–seeGlobalStrategyPaper:WhyAIisnotabubble,5September2023.

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March20255

Exhibit2:Marketreturnshavebeendrivenbyabinaryspreadbetweentechnologyandothersectors

Totalreturnperformance(USD).Indexedto100onJan-2009

2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

WorldTechnologyWorldex.TMT

858789919395979901030507091113151719212325

Source:Datastream,Worldscope,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit3

demonstratestherapidgrowthinglobaltechnologypro?ts(muchofwhichhasemanatedfromUScompanies)sincethe?nancialcrisis,whiletheaggregateof

non-technologycompanieslargelystagnatedforadecade.

Exhibit3:Techearningshaveoutstrippedthoseoftheglobalmarket

12mtrailingEPS(USD).Indexedto100onJan-2009

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

WorldTechnologyWorldex.TMT

858789919395979901030507091113151719212325

Source:Datastream,Worldscope,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Consequently,the‘PEG’ratioforthesector–thevaluationadjustedforexpected

growth–wasinlinewiththerestofthemarket

(Exhibit4)

.Althoughthiscouldalsobesaidoftheperiodinthelate1990swhenenthusiasmfortechnologycompaniesspread

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March20256

intorisingvaluationsacrossthewholemarketasitboostedfutureeconomicgrowthexpectations,therewasalsoaspikeinrelativevaluationspriortotheburstingofthebubbleand,ofcourse,theexpectedfuturegrowthratesatthetimeturnedouttobeillusory.

Exhibit4:ThePEGratiofortechnologyversustheworldstockmarkethasnowconverged

PEGratio(12mfwdP/Edividedbysecond12mfwdEPSgrowth)

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

MSCIACWorld

InformationTechnology

MSCIACWorld

95979901030507091113151719212325

Source:Datastream,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Whiletherecentascentoftechnologyhasbeensupportedbyfundamentals,oneotherphenomenonofthepastdecadeisthattechnologypro?tshavebeenincreasingly

concentratedinasmallnumberofdominantcompanies.Thistendencyforconcentrationisnotuniqueeither.Whattendstohappenisthatnewtechnologiesattractcapitaland

newcompetitionthatresultsinasigni?cantriseinnewentrants–justaswesawinthetechnologybubbleinthelate1990s.Veryoften,whenabubbleburstsmanyofthe

competitorsdisappear,leavingafewdominantplayers.Someexamplesare:

nStandardOilcontrolledover90%ofoilproductionintheUSby1900and85%ofsales.

nBy1969AT&Thadreached90%ofUShouseholds.

nIn1981IBMhadover60%marketshareinmainframecomputers.

nBy2000Microsofthada97%shareinoperatingsystemsgivenitsdominationinthePCandlaptopmarket.

nIninternetsearchesGooglehasover75%marketshare–itsnextbiggestcompetitor,MicrosoftBing,hasroughly12%.

Severalofthelargesttechnologycompaniestodayarethosethatsurvivedthe

technologybubbleof2000anditsviolentshakeout.Sincethen,thesearethe

successfulfewthathavemanagedtoscaleinthewavesofsoftwaredevelopmentand

27March20257

cloudcomputingthatdominatedintheearlypartofthiscentury.Importantly,however,justaswehaveseenforthetechnologysectorinaggregate,thedominantUS

technologycompanieshaveachievedtheirprominencebecauseofextraordinarypro?tgrowthratherthanspeculationaboutfuturepossiblegrowth

(Exhibit5

).TheriskisthatanewwaveoftechnologiesaroundAIattractsanewwaveofcompetition,forcingdownthereturnsoftheincumbents.

Exhibit5:ThedominanceofthebiggestcompaniesintheUSequitymarketisafunctionoftheirvastlysuperiorearningspoweroverthepastdecade

Magni?centSevenandS&P500,12mtrailingEPS.Indexedto100onJan-2005

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Magnificent7

S&P500

050607080910111213141516171819202122232425

Source:FactSet,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Nevertheless,whilethesedominantcompanieshavebeensupportedbystrong

pro?tabilityinrecentyears,wehadbeguntoseesomeevidenceofbubblebehaviourinmorespeculativenon-pro?tablegrowthcompaniesintheperiodbeforetheinterestraterisingcyclein2022

(Exhibit6)

.Whenhigherin?ationforcedpolicyratestoriseacross

theworld,however,manyofthelongestdurationspeculativegrowthstockscollapsedinvalueundertheweightofahighercostofcapital.Thedominanttechnologycompaniesmanagedtooffsetthesefearsgiventheirstrongbalancesheetsandhighcashholdings.

27March20258

Exhibit6:Growthsplitintotwopartsinrecentyears:Unpro?tablegrowthvs.Qualitygrowth

PerformanceoftheGSUnpro?tabletechbasket(GSXUNPTC)vs.Magni?cent7.Indexedto100on01-Jan-2015

110

100

Unprofitabletech(GSXUNPTC)vs.Mag-7

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

20152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

GSXUNPTCisabasketdevelopedbyGSGlobalBanking&Markets

Source:Bloomberg,Datastream,GoldmanSachsFICCandEquities,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Thecurrentdominanttechnologycompaniesdonothavebubblevaluations

Acriticaldifferencebetweenthedominanttechnologycompaniestodayandthatofotherbubblesisthatvaluationsarelessextreme.As

Exhibit7

shows,theP/Efortheso-calledMagni?cent7twoyearsforwardisinthelow20swithanEV/Salesof5.1x.Theseareroughlyhalftheequivalentvaluationsofthedominant7companiesinthetechnologybubbleofthelate1990s,andalsocomparemuchmorefavourablytothevaluationsofthedominantJapanesecompaniesinthebubbleofthelate1980s,ortothedominantcompaniesinthe‘Nifty?fty’periodoftheearly1970s.

27March20259

Exhibit7:Dominantcompaniestodayarenotasexpensiveasthoseinprevious‘bubble’periodsinhistory

SizeValuation

MarketweightMarketCap($Bn)*24mfwdP/E*24mfwdEV/Sales

Magnificent7(2025)

Apple

6.9%

3365

26.1

7.5

NVIDIA

6.0%

2945

20.5

11.2

Microsoft

6.0%

2938

23.3

8.5

Amazon

4.5%

2180

25.5

2.8

Alphabet

4.0%

1948

16.2

2.0

MetaPlatforms

2.8%

1372

21.1

6.1

Tesla

1.9%

927

71.3

6.5

Magnificent7(2025)Aggregate

32.0%

15673

23.0

5.1

TechBubbleLeaders(2000)

Microsoft

4.5%

581

53.2

19.2

CiscoSystems

4.2%

543

101.7

17.5

Intel

3.6%

465

42.1

11.5

Oracle

1.9%

245

84.6

19.0

IBM

1.7%

218

23.5

2.3

Lucent

1.6%

206

37.9

4.1

NortelNetworks

1.5%

199

86.4

6.4

TechBubbleLeaders(2000)Aggregate

19.0%

2457

52.0

8.2

JapanFinancialBubble(1989)

NipponTelegraphandTelephone

IndustrialBankOfJapanSumitomoMitsuiBankingBankofTokyo-MitsubishiFujiBank

Dai-IchiKangyoBankSakuraBank

6.9%

4.6%

3.4%

3.3%

3.1%

2.9%

2.8%

157

105

77

75

71

65

62

100.1

154.2

49.2

49.8

52.8

44.0

62.1

JapanFinancialBubble(1989)Aggregate

27.0%

613

67.0

Nifty50(1973)

IBM

7.1%

48

35.5

EastmanKodak

3.6%

24

43.5

SearsRoebuck

2.7%

18

29.2

GeneralElectric

2.0%

13

23.4

Xerox

1.8%

12

45.8

3M

1.4%

10

39.0

Procter&Gamble

1.4%

9

29.8

Nifty50(1973)Aggregate

19.9%

135

34.3

*Actual(LTM)P/EandEV/Salesdatafrom02/01/1973forNifty50.**LTMP/EdataandEV/Salesfrom27/12/1989forJapanFinancialBubble.***24mfwdP/EandEV/Salesdatafrom24/03/2000forTechBubble.

Source:Datastream,Factset,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

AlsothecurrentcropofdominantUStechnologycompaniesaremuchmorepro?table,andenjoystrongerbalancesheets,thanthosethatdominatedin2000

(Exhibit8)

.

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March202510

Exhibit8:Thecurrentdominantcompaniesaremuchmorepro?tableandhavestrongerbalancesheetsthanthosethatdominatedduringthetechbubble

Next12monthestimateforBigTech&last12monthsforTechBubble

MarketWeight(%)

Magnificent7(2025)

Cashas%ofMarketCapNetDebttoEquityReturnonEquity(%)NetIncomeMargin(%)

Fundamentals

Microsoft

6.0%

2.7%

-17%

26%

35%

Apple

6.9%

1.9%

-24%

129%

27%

Nvidia

6.0%

3.4%

-55%

67%

55%

Amazon

4.5%

6.9%

-13%

18%

10%

Alphabet

4.0%

2.7%

-23%

27%

28%

MetaPlatforms

2.8%

4.4%

-13%

27%

34%

Tesla

1.9%

3.3%

-26%

12%

9%

Magnificent7(2025)Aggregate32.0%3.6%-24%44%28%

TechBubbleLeaders(2000)

Microsoft

4.5%

3.0%

-63%

35%

39%

CiscoSystems

4.2%

0.4%

-17%

22%

17%

Intel

3.6%

2.5%

-33%

26%

25%

Oracle

1.9%

1.0%

-61%

39%

15%

IBM

1.7%

2.7%

111%

39%

9%

Lucent

1.6%

0.9%

38%

36%

9%

NortelNetworks

1.5%

1.1%

-3%

-1%

-1%

TechBubbleLeaders(2000)Aggregate19.0%1.7%-4%28%16%

Source:Datastream,Factset,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Furthermore,manyoftheleadingtechnologycompanieshaveunderperformedand

de-ratedsincethestartofthisyear,partlypromptedbytheemergenceofnew

competitionfromChina,whichhasunderminedthecon?denceinthestrengthoftheircompetitivemoats

(Exhibit9)

.

Exhibit9:TheMagni?cent7haveunderperformedYTD

YTDreturn

10%

5%

S&P493:2%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

-20%

S&P500:-1%

Mag-7:-9%

1-Jan15-Jan29-Jan12-Feb26-Feb12-Mar26-Mar

Source:FactSet,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Followingtheirrecentunderperformance,theMagni?cent7nowcollectivelytradeataP/Eof27x,thelowestsinceearly2023

(Exhibit10

).Thisde-ratinghasoccurreddespiteconsensusexpectationsthatthegroupwillcollectivelycontinuetogrowEPSatafasterratethantheS&P493.

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March202511

Exhibit10:TheMagni?cent7nowtradeattheirlowestvaluationpremiumtotherestoftheS&P500

12mfwdP/E

40x

35x

30x

25x

20x

15x

Mag-7

Premiumvs.S&P493(RHS)

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

201420162018202020222024

Source:FactSet,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Therisktoincumbents

Whilevaluationsmaynotbeinbubbleterritory,whatlessonscanwelearnabouttheevolutionoftechnologycycles?Oneoftheinterestingpatternsfrompasttechnologycyclesisthatthedominantincumbentsoftenendupunderperformingasthe

competitivelandscapeevolves.Therisktothetechnologysectorfromhererelatestothreeissues:

1.Concentrationrisk

2.Overspendingoncapital

3.Newcompetition

Concentrationrisk

InGlobalStrategyPaper:TheConcentrationConundrum;Whattodoaboutmarket

dominance,wearguedthatequitieshadbecomeriskybecausetheyhadbecome

moreconcentratedbycountry(astheUSmarketincreasinglydominatedtheglobal

equitymarket),bysectorandbystock.Thesethreeformsofconcentrationarerelatedtoeachotherandareconnectedtothegrowthoftechnologycompanies.

Whiletheappreciationofthedominanttechnologystocksisnotunprecedented,theconcentrationthattheyhaveinthemarketis

(Exhibit11)

.

GoldmanSachsGlobalStrategyPaper

27March202512

Exhibit11:Thebiggest10USstocksaccountfor20%oftheentirevalueoftheglobalindex

WeightofbiggestUScompaniesinglobalmarketcap

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Weightoftop10UScompaniesintheWorld

Weightoftop5UScompaniesintheWorld

20%

15%

737679828588919497000306091215182124

Source:Datastream,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Theriskisthat,ifthesecompaniesdisappoint,itwouldhaveabiggerimpactonthe

broaderequitymarketthanwehavetypicallyseen.ThisisoneofthekeyreasonswhytheUSequitymarkethasunderperformedthisyear.MarketconcentrationwasalsoanissuelastyearinEuropewhenseveralofthelargestcompanies(theGRANOLAS)hadpro?twarningsandde-rated,pullingdownthebroaderindex.

Overspendoncapexanddecliningreturns

Oneofthelessonsthatwecandrawfrompreviousbubblesandtechnologycyclesis

thatcompetitionisoftenunderestimated,andthereturnsoncapitalinvestedbythe

innovatorsaretypicallyoverstated.Companiesattheepicentreofaninnovationoften

failtoachievethereturnsthattheirhighvaluationsimplyasthemarginalcostofthe

technologyfallsandcapacityincreasesovertime,whileatypicaloverlookedopportunityisthatinvestorsunderstatethereturnsavailabletonewentrantsinanindustrythat

emergeaftertheinitialinvestmentsaremadethatcanpiggybackonthecapexof

others.ThishasbecomeamorerelevantissueforthedominantincumbentsintheAIspacewiththeentranceofnewcompetition,particularlyfromChina.

Theproblemofincreasedcompetitionandoverspendbyincumbentswasevidentintheearlydaysoftheinternetandinthebubblethatfollowed.Whiletherewaswidespreadandbroadspeculationinanynewcompanythatofferedpotentialexposuretothe

industry,theincumbentwinnersweregenerallyseentobethetelecomcompanies.Theywereviewedasarelatively‘safe’routetothepotentialfortunesthattheinternetmaybeabletogeneratecomparedtothemorespeculativeunpro?tabledot-com

companies.Telecomshadthebene?tofbeingwell-establishedcompanies,inmanycasesformermonopoliesorstate-runenterprises,withlowvolatilityearningsandanexistingandlarge-scaleclientbase.Theyalsohadtangibleassetsandownedand

27March202513

developed?breopticnetworks,routers,wirelesssystemsandtelecomsequipmentthatweretheunderlyinginfrastructureoftheinternet.Theyap