Fad or Fact Soft Power in the Case of Taiwan

1、fad or fact? soft power in the case of taiwanyeh-chung luphd candidate in political science, george washington universitypaper prepared for the 2007 aacs annual conference, richmond, va, oct. 5-7, 2007.soft power is a phrase coined and popularized by joseph nye in the early 1990s. at that time much

2、of the world saw the us as an over-stretched empire whose power was in decline (e.g. kennedy 1987). nye countered this pessimistic view with his book, bound to lead (1990). he argued that the us may have lost its dominance in the world in terms of traditional economic and military power, but it stil

3、l had great advantages over its competitors in terms of soft power. in contrast to “hard” or “command” power, which is the ability to change what others do, nye defines “soft power,” or “co-optive power,” as the ability to shape what others want with attractiveness. this attractiveness rests on inta

4、ngible resources, such as culture, ideology, and institutions, which could help to legitimize a given states power and policy in the eyes of others. the ability to frame the international agenda and set the rules of the game is an important type of soft power. in his more recent book soft power nye

5、refines the notion with greater clarity. a countrys soft power, nye states, rests upon “the attractiveness of its culture, the appeal of its domestic political and social values, and the style and substance of its foreign policies” (nye 2004a). in the last couple of years, nye has expressed serious

6、concerns over americas turn toward unilateralism in its foreign policy. he sees it as reducing the popularity of the us around the world, including among its allies, and thus undermining the countrys soft power (nye 2004b). in recent years the concept of soft power has gained currency in taiwanese p

7、ublic discourse. one possible explanation for this phenomenon is to link taiwans employment of soft power to its state-building project. whereas nyes conception of soft power mainly focuses on the us foreign policy, taiwan employs this phrase to cope with external and internal issues simultaneously.

8、 internationally, taiwan employs soft power to achieve a legitimate, normal country status, in the hope that taiwan can legitimize its own policies in others eyes. in domestic arenas, taiwan employs its own version of soft power to achieve national cohesion to win peoples support for national goals,

9、 and the conception of soft power contributes to formulating new ties that bind in a divided society in terms of national identity.what does “soft power” mean in the taiwanese discourse? why has this concept attracted so much attention in this case? what are its policy implications? does the concept

10、 of soft power result in effective policy tools for taiwan? this paper will examine these questions and proceed in the following order: it will firstly describe the rise of this concept in policy discourse in taiwan. second, it will explore why this term has become popular in the context of taiwan.

11、part three will examine how this concept has affected the foreign policy of taiwan. part four will explore how the us, the most important audience for taiwans efforts, would perceive the latters soft power.this paper will tend to draw three points to current studies on soft power. first, this in-dep

12、th case study about taiwans soft power could help researchers to identify the components of soft power resources. second, this paper would help to further articulate the concept of soft power with the case of taiwan. last but not least, this paper would explore the relationship between often-conflat

13、ed soft power resources and state influence. this paper will conclude that we need to be more attentive to the context through which “resources” could turn into “influence” on a case-by-case basis.conception of soft powerin taiwan, the term “soft power” has been translated in several different ways.

14、 “soft” has been translated as “rou xing or “ruan xing” whereas “power” has been translated as “quan li,” “guo li,” “l(fā)i liang.” its first appearance in the mass media can be traced back to 1992, in an article stating that mainland china was in fear of western countries soft power and “peaceful evolu

15、tion” (liu fang-chi 1992). the academia formally introduced this concept when chinas rhetoric about “comprehensive national power” caught taiwans attention in the mid-1990s (sung kuo-cheng 1996). nyes conception of soft power has been contingent, in part, on the hot issues faced by american foreign

16、policies, such as the end of cold war, the kosovo crisis, the 911 incidents and war on iraq, and the eve of east asia summit (see nye 1990, 1999, 2003, 2005). similar to nyes practical concerns, taiwan also focuses on the policy implications of this concept in which how to change others preference t

17、hrough persuasion is the key (poong hwei-luan 2000; lu hsiu-lien 2000; lin bi-jaw 2004). this policy-oriented understanding of soft power is obvious in taiwans publications. while there are few articles appeared in academic journals, there are many op-ed articles with this term in titles; and most o

18、f them are written by the scholars who once served in the government (i.e. lin bi-jaw 2004, su chi 2006).taiwanese scholars define soft power in a loose and abstract way. most taiwanese commentators employ nyes definition and regard soft power as “co-optive power”, namely the ability to shape others

19、 preferences with attractiveness and persuasion (lin bi-jaw 2004). they suggest that any power other than military strength and punitive sanctions should be considered “soft power”, implying that economic power constitutes one of the components of soft power. this is different to nyes original formu

20、lation in which soft power is distinct from military and economic power.regarding the question of where soft power comes from, most taiwanese scholars agree that political attractiveness, culture, and diplomacy are its major sources. the most important elements of soft power in the taiwan discourse

21、seem to be domestic political values and culture. academics, politicians, and policy practitioners all agree that democracy is the most valuable asset taiwan holds internationally. explicitly citing nye, president chen shui-bian refers to democracy and civil society as taiwans soft power (a-bian zon

22、gtong dianzi bao 6/24/2004). not only the democratic progressive party (dpp) that stresses this “value” dimension of soft power; the kuomintang (kmt) does so as well. on his trip to europe in february 2006, kmt chairman ma ying-jeo claims that what matters for taiwan in the future in terms of its do

23、mestic politics and cross-strait relations is “ideas,” and that democracy, peace, and prosperity are the three basic elements of taiwans soft power (zhongguo shibao 2/12/2006). there seems to be a bipartisan consensus in taiwan that democracy constitutes the elements of its soft power. academics and

24、 practitioners in taiwan and abroad also echo the idea that democracy is one of taiwans soft power assets. for instance, lin bi-jaw (2004) maintains that democracy, among other things, is the major source of taiwans soft power. several interviews with taiwan representatives in the us also confirm th

25、at “democracy” is the best selling point while promoting taiwan image to the american public. “democracy is a shared value between us and taiwan,” says a senior taiwanese official stationed in washington dc, “and democratization indeed makes it easier to sell taiwans image in the states.” interview

26、with a senior official at tecro, washington dc, nov. 23, 2005. the peaceful party-turnover in the 2000 election in taiwan made an especially strong impression on the us and has attracted more support for taiwans democracy and stability. interview with dr. chen wen-yen, executive director, fapa, nov.

27、 22, 2005. in line with this democratic value, many politicians as well as scholars proposed that taiwans democratization could be a great example to other non-democratic countries as its economic achievements did in the 1980s (samuel ku 1998, lu hsiu-lien 2000, lin bi-jaw 2004, shane lee 2005).in a

28、ddition to this value dimension, taiwan also contends that culture is of importance to formulating soft power. however, compared to china, proponents of soft power in taiwan are relatively unwilling to incorporate traditional chinese culture in their arguments. instead, they use contemporary art per

29、formance like the success of the cloud gate dance theater (yunmen wuji) and glove puppetry to explicate the diffusion of taiwans positive image worldwide (hong fong-yi 2003, charles kao 2006, pat gao 2006). this is partly due to the political quarrels between both sides of the taiwan strait and iden

30、tity changes in taiwan society: the taiwan government intentionally employs taiwanese and even aboriginal culture on the island to formulate its unique identity distinct from china. for instance, an article refers to taiwans glove puppetry on an official publication, taiwan review, praised that thes

31、e glove puppet heroes staged an unwitting grassroots rebellion against the kmts top-down, sinocentric cultural view (pat gao 2006). and current taiwanese ruling elites believe that a unique taiwanese identity rooted in society could deter chinas attempt of annexation (huang chiau-tong 2004, shane le

32、e 2005, et today 2/4/2006). yet some others hold a different view and suggest that taiwan should promote traditional form of chinese characters to compete with china over cultural attractiveness (liu fang-chi 1992, lienhe bao 1/20/1997, tsai wei 2004, shiang jun 2005). third, many maintain that dipl

33、omacy is of significance to taiwan. for instance, many scholars in the institute of international relations (iir), a prestigious think tank in taiwan, propose that the government should incorporate public diplomacy, agenda-setting, and international regime formation into its foreign policy (et today

34、 5/22/2004). according to them, taiwan with its limited material resources should focus on tangible goals such as participating in regional cooperation rather than politically difficult issues, and should use other initiatives such as human security to exert its power through agenda-setting (lin bi-

35、jaw 2004). in this sense, multilateralism as a policy style constitutes one of taiwans soft power assets, and taiwan should actively participate in international aid and cooperation (wu lin-jun 2004). besides, some proposed that taiwans unofficial alliance relations based on economic and strategic t

36、ies with the us and with japan also constitute taiwans attractiveness (neilan 1997, shane lee 2005).in addition to government-level diplomacy, some scholars suggest that taiwans bourgeoning civil society in recent years and its role in international cooperation could help taiwan to build up a positi

37、ve image abroad (chen jie 1999, lin ji-lang 2003, ho yi-ching 2007). many of these scholars provide not the official tones, but the practical points of view. for instance, chen jie points out that taiwans participation in global ngo networks is conducive to escaping from the economic-diplomatic dile

38、mma, in which taiwan has to economically reward a country that made a diplomatic gesture in favor of taiwan, but the same country could get away with an act hostile to taiwan. liu chi-chun, founder of taiwan root medical peace corps, contends that “sometimes, ngos can even build more substantive ext

39、ernal relations than diplomatic channels can.” (ho yi-ching 2007) these scholars and practitioners alike believe that a genuine, apolitical, and value-oriented engagement with the global civil society could contribute to taiwans popularity in the long run.aside from the three sources of soft power n

40、ye suggests, many maintain that soft power should include several forms of non-military capabilities. for instance, taiwans president chen shui-bian expands soft power to include national pride, such as taiwans successful bid for the 2009 world games and the “red leaf legend” a junior baseball team

41、from a very poor countryside of taiwan, the red leaf junior baseball team, defeated then-world championship, a well-equipped japanese team, in 1968. this victory inspired most people on taiwan at that time. in the past (a-bian zongtong dianzi bao 6/24/2004, huang guo-en and yang ying-chao 2004). oth

42、ers contend human resource such as higher level of education is another source of soft power (tan hao-ping 2001, charles kao 2006). diplomats professionalism resulting from taiwans open political system is a form of soft power contributing to the enhancement of us-taiwan relations (interview 11/23/2

43、005). still others suggest that taiwans it advancement nowadays is another source of soft power because it could facilitate taiwans communication with its friends in this era of globalization and set a model for other countries in terms of economic development (lu hsiu-lien 2000, wong ming-hsien 200

44、2, yearbook 2003, a-bian zongtong dianzi bao 6/24/2004, paul hsu 2006).nyes formulation of soft power thus has different meanings in taiwans context. for one, unlike nyes assertion focusing on us foreign policy, this concept is more outward looking in taiwans official discourse, while the academics

45、have focused on linking domestic foundation with foreign policy. the politicians argue that democracy is the asset for taiwans soft power vis-vis china and to persuade the us public; however, they often ignore the domestic foundation that helps to ensure soft power. scholars, on the other hand, emph

46、asize that political reforms within the island and peoples identifying with taiwan are the contributing factors to soft power. in this reasoning, good governance, continuing economic development, and social stability, constitute the domestic foundation to formulating soft power (lin bi-jaw 2004, chu

47、 shin-min and cheng ming-shian 2004; su chi 2006; paul hsu 2006). in addition, these concepts of soft power seem to fit in with taiwans ongoing state-building project, and this is different from other cases in nyes study. in nyes cases (2004a), the us and japan do not encounter issues regarding nati

48、onal cohesion or national identity, wherein both governments need to do is to justify their policies in other countries eyes. however, the taiwanese government needs to legitimize its policies domestically and externally in a simultaneous way. there is a faction of the ruling elites in taiwan emphas

49、izing the political and cultural differences between taiwan and china. they highlight the sources, such as democracy and human rights, that taiwan is better perceived than china internationally, in the hope that these concepts could legitimize their pursuit of a new nation brand, and in turn help to

50、 solve the identity issue in taiwan. some others advocate a new name brand in terms of cultural products to pursue a clear cut with traditional chinese culture (pat gao 2006). this new brand, they argue, could contribute to taiwans national cohesion and to enhancing peoples “will and confidence to d

51、efend taiwan” (shane lee 2005). to these ruling elites, the concepts of soft power help taiwan to export an image worldwide taiwans democracy and peace-loving image make it distinct and separate from china, and to consolidate national cohesion taiwan needs to be defended under the banner of a unique

52、 taiwanese identity.table 1. taiwans conception of soft powerdimensionssourcescontentsforeign policy(outward-looking)political valuedemocracy, human rightsculturetraditional chinese and/or contemporary taiwanese culturediplomacyinternational aid & cooperation, multilateralism;ngos, transnational civ

53、il societyothersnational pride, level of education, diplomats professionalism, entrepreneurship, economic development and it advancementdomestic foundation(inward-looking)domestic reformgood governance, continuing economic development, social stabilitynational cohesionunified national identitywhy so

54、 attractive?given taiwans limited material power, proponents in general maintain that soft power is the “weapons of the weak” in pursuit of national interests (lu hsiu-lien 2000, yan jiann-fa 2004, ziyuo shibao 10/20/2004). first, the rise of china in the 1990s has fundamentally shaped the perceptio

55、ns of chinese power in the policy circles as well as academia in taiwan. the 1995-96 missile crises in the taiwan strait have changed peoples attitudes toward china, from a somewhat idealistic to a pragmatic view. for instance, as polling data showed, peoples identity has dramatically changed during

56、 the 1995 missile crisis: the percentage of “taiwanese identity” for the first time surpassed that of “chinese identity” and the latter has continued to decline ever since. the data is collected by the election study center (esc) in nccu, taipei. the question been asked to the respondents is: “do yo

57、u identify yourself as taiwanese, chinese, or both?” some argue that the declining of the percentage of “chinese identity” is in fact increasing the difficulties for beijings version of peaceful unification. the interactions between taiwan, china, and the us revealed the truth that it is difficult f

58、or taiwan to stand alone while facing chinas tangible military threat. given the lack of self-sufficient defensive capabilities and chinas strong obstruction towards taiwans allying with other countries, taiwanese policy circles propose the importance of non-traditional security issues, including so

59、ft power, as taiwans niche in dealing with foreign affairs (shane lee 2005). many have become advocates of the concepts of soft power (lin bi-jaw 2004, su chi 2006). second, the popularity of soft power in taiwan is in part a response to chinas research on this concept. since china constituted a major and tangible threat to taiwa