開放式創(chuàng)新演講報(bào)告ppt課件

1、Marcela MiozzoResearch interestsService firms: capabilities, strategy and structure, outsourcing, internationalisation, operation in DCs and LDCs ProjectsAnglo-German Foundation High-tech business services in Germany and the UK 2003British Academy Larger Research grant The developmental role of know

2、ledge intensive business services in Argentina and Brazil 2004-2005ESRC Service multinational enterprise acquisitions and linkages in emerging economies, 2005-2021ESRC, Using intellectual property protection to capture value from innovation in knowledge-intensive service firms, 2021- 2021. Selected

3、publications services firmsMiozzo, M. and Yamin, M. (2021) Institutional and sectoral determinants of headquarters-subsidiary relations: a study of UK service multinationals in China, Korea, Brazil and Argentina, Long Range Planning, 45, 16-40. Massini, S. and Miozzo, M. (2021) Outsourcing and offsh

4、oring of business services: challenges to theory, management and geography of innovation, Regional Studies, 46 (9), 1219-1242. Miozzo, M. and Grimshaw, D. (2021) Capabilities of large services outsourcing firms: the outsourcing plus staff transfer model in EDS and IBM, Industrial and Corporate Chang

5、e, 20, 3, 909-940.Grimshaw, D. and Miozzo, M. (2006) Institutional effects on the market for IT outsourcing: analysing clients, suppliers and staff transfer in Germany and the UK, Organisation Studies, 27, 9, 1229-1259. Miozzo, M. and Grimshaw, D. (2005) Modularity and innovation in knowledge-intens

6、ive business services: IT outsourcing in Germany and the UK, Research Policy, 34, 9, 1419-1439. Miozzo, M. and Soete, L. (2001) Internationalisation of services: a technological perspective, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 67, 2, 159-185.Research interests2. Science based firms: mergers

7、 and acquisitions, institutional effects on early firm formation, open innovation and governanceProjects Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship / ESRC Research and Knowledge Exchange RAKE grant, Do cross border acquisitions affect local and regional knowledge creation, exchange and spillo

8、vers?: an analysis of knowledge-intensive firms in the UK, 2021ESRC Follow on Funding, Funding gap or trap? Effect of foreign acquisitions of science-based firms on local knowledge transfer and spillovers, 2021 ORA (ESRC, NSF, DFG), Comparative entrepreneurship: development of early technological an

9、d organizational capabilities of new high tech firms (UK, USA and Germany), 2021-2021?Open innovation and governance: Innovation partnerships between industry and university in science-based sectorsMarcela MiozzoManchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK(joint research with Steve Caspe

10、rKeck Graduate Institute, USA )Closed innovation modelSource: Chesbrough (2003:36)Open innovation modelSource: Chesbrough (2003:37)Outside-in processInside-out processCoupled processClosed InnovationExclusively internal talentAll R&D performed internally, commercialisationFirst to market by original

11、 R&DFirst to market monopolisesCompany performs all functions and succeedsIP to prevent competitionOpen InnovationInternal & external talentFlexible to increase valueNo need for original R&DBetter business model first to marketBest mix of internal & external functionsIP exchanged knowledgeFrom close

12、d to open innovation?Motivation and aims of researchOver the past 25 years pharmaceutical companies have spent $billions on long-term partnerships with leading universitiesMany partnerships failed to produce important patentable innovations for pharmaceutical firmsAims of the research:understand rel

13、ation between open innovation and governance (incomplete contracting challenges)show how different types of industry-university partnerships need the creation of varying governance arrangements, in terms of formal and informal contractual mechanisms used to manage partnershipsTheoretical background

14、1Open innovation and governance:Open innovation helps explain when collaboration or contracting for technology and R&D can improve the innovative performance of firms (Chesbrough 2003; West and Bogers, 2021). Literature tends to focus on how to acquire an existing innovation from an external source,

15、 contractual issues are often of a short-term, transactional nature(Hagedoorn and Ridder, 2021). We focus on the governance of the creation of innovation in an open innovation context. Most of the literature on open innovation is concerned with the search for external sources of innovation (that is,

16、 the identification of external partners which have already developed an innovation and access to this innovation).We focus on open innovation in science-based sectors. Science-based sectors face prolonged periods of risky investment in research and uncertain outcomes. Theoretical background 2Contra

17、cts and innovation, approaches to incomplete contracting:Importance of legally enforceable contracts: creation of more sophisticated legal arrangements e.g. price escalator devices in long-term supplier contracts (Schwartz, 1992; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). Importance of relational governance: s

18、ocial norms created within the context of long-term relations (MacNeil, 1978; Lamoreaux et al., 2003; Ellickson, 1991), learning by monitoring (Sabel, 1993), parties may structure processes of technical collaboration in ways that generate the relational contracting norms needed to collaborate succes

19、sfully. Contracting for innovation: braiding of legally enforceable contracts and informal or relational practices to support collaboration. Particular contracts for innovation create a process for the regular and mutual exchange of information about each partys competences and willingness to collab

20、orate, binding them to imprecisely defined common projects through increased switching costs (Gilson et al., 2021; 2021).MethodsInterviews with alliance managers, both from industry and university, and senior managers of pharmaceutical firmsSecondary: press articles, program reviews (UC Berkeley-Nov

21、artis)Patent and bibliometric data (USPTO and Web of Science)MethodsKey role of four dimensions of governance:whether there is co-location or notthe type of funding provided by pharmaceutical firmsthe type of agreement on intellectual propertythe types of contractingInnovation partnerships of pharma

22、ceutical firms with universitiesRights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsTapping-in partnerships with a light legal frameworkContracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance 1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsMulti-year (unrestricted) fund

23、ing in exchange for reach-through rights on IP developed in university (plus restricted funds for particular collaborative research)Examples:10-year $140m in 1982 J&J and Scripps, renewed in 1992 5 years and $70m; 15-year $120m in 1985 PPG and Scripps; 10-year $200m in 1997 Sandoz and Scripps; 5-yea

24、r $25m in 1997 Novartis and UC Berkeley; and 5-year, $100m in 2007 Pfizer and Scripps. 1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsGoals:Company:Collaborate with faculty from leading universities/research institutes (window on science especially for conglomerate chemical firms) Acces

25、s to IP from leading university departments/research institutesUniversity: General funds to hire new faculty or offer superior benefits to existing faculty and build infrastructure (PPG-Scripps led to 40,000 square-foot addition to molecular biology building and additional 100 scientists)Working wit

26、h partners helps ensure that discoveries will benefit society1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsAgency problems:Universities and faculty both have incentives to preserve freedom of action over IPUniversities: Receive money “upfront (usually yearly payments), have an incentiv

27、e to do minimum necessary to “service partnership but otherwise maintain ownership of promising IP (i.e. to license elsewhere)Faculty: If an invention disclosure is picked-up by the industry partner, the faculty member loses freedom of action over that discovery, stronger financial incentives are av

28、ailable for faculty member to continue to develop the technology and license it at a later stage of development1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsChallenges to implement agreements:Difficult for pharmaceutical company to vet all information disclosures appropriately within t

29、ime frame (60-90 days)Getting it to the “right person“Not invented here syndrome, especially during 1980s and 1990s when pharmaceutical firms ran large internally focused R&D departmentsDifficult to judge the scientific and commercial potential of very early stage disclosures, especially in biology1

30、. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsStrategies to preserve IP ownership by university despite rights deal:Faculty can disclose inventions at a very early stage (e.g. initial grant proposal) in which the commercial potential is not at all clear, which increases the “odds that t

31、he pharmaceutical partner will “pass on a dealFaculty can “take the invention out the back door (study by Gideon Markham found that about 10% of patents invented by university faculty may be “back door candidates)Alliance managers can use social capital/relational norms to ask for a “quick review in

32、 order to preserve freedom of action for faculty1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsProblem of adverse selection:From the perspective of faculty NIH type funding preserves freedom of action over IP; “star scientists can presumably find federal funding for most researchSponsor

33、ed research is likely to be more appealing to junior faculty, or faculty without strong federal funding records1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsProblem of time inconsistency:The UCB Plant Genetics and Microbial Biology Department received a large portion of the $25 million

34、 in funding for sponsored research in service of the partnershipsA research committee was formed to decide how to spend the money, but only UCB faculty had voting rightsIn the end, all 25 faculty members received research funds from the partnership, with little control/direction by NovartisComment b

35、y a postdoc in the lab of Michael Freeling: there were “few strings in accepting the money, as “they never told us what to do (Lau, 2004).Novartis decided not to renew the partnership1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsEvidence that collaborations were not successful in leadi

36、ng to co-publications or technologiesBibliometric evidenceNovartis - UCB: 1 co-authored papersPPG-Scripps: 5 co-authored papersJ&J - Scripps: 19 co-authored papers Technologies emerging from partnerships for the companies:At least 50 start-up companies were started by Scripps faculty during the time

37、 of the PPG, J&J and Sandoz/Novartis deals (1985-2021) (San Diego Business Journal, 2021)Program Review found that Novartis did not license any technology over the course of the five year agreement with UC Berkeley Exception: J&J-Scripps partnership resulted in 4 technologies being in-licensed (J&J

38、created a purpose-built organization to evaluate and commercialize technology derived from Scripps)1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsRelational norms weak within formal contracts:A major problem with long-term rights-oriented partnerships is that industry partners had guara

39、nteed large sums of money upfront through fixed yearly payments, limiting their ability to use financial incentives to steer researchEarly deals allowed industry participants to sit in on university research committees, but only as observers without voting rights.University alliance managers spent c

40、onsiderable time “arranging research collaborations to help meet terms of partnerships1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contractsSummary: Goals of industry and university are not fully alignedThe upfront, formal contracts plus reach through rights used by these partnerships do not c

41、reate strong enough incentives or decision-making mechanisms to align universities, and especially “star faculty, with the goals of the partnershipProblems of adverse selection and time inconsistencyIn such cases, governance agreements need to help parties achieve cooperationThe lack of co-location

42、is an additional issue with many partnerships - next topic2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal frameworkOver the last 10-15 years pharmaceutical companies have opened new research facilities near by leading universities, with the goal of “tapping in to university researchGoal of industry is

43、 to promote collaboration with university scientists, tap in to external sources of knowledge creation while also creating capabilities to internalize it Novartis an early proponent, opened large R&D centers near MIT and UCSD/Scripps in late 1990s2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framewo

44、rkExample: Genomics Institute of the Novartis Research Foundation (GNF) in 1999 in close proximity to Scripps and UCSDStrong academic orientation, director prominent chemist Peter Schultz, full professor at ScrippsSigned “master agreements with USCD and Scripps, no monetary contribution but in kind

45、contribution instead, joint proposals reviewed by decision board, standard rules of inventorship2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal frameworkCo-publications between Novartis and regional academicscientists, 1997-2021: Note, Novartis Boston is much largerthan GNF2. Tapping-in partnerships w

46、ith a light legal frameworkEvidence of publication but few technologies:158 articles co-authored by GNF and UCSD 2007-2021Do not generate technologies for commercialization:Only 3 patents co-assigned to Scripps and Novartis scientists during 1997-2007 time period (i.e. patents resulting from collabo

47、rations)Preliminary evidence from Boston similar (many publications, few patents)2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal frameworkProblem of conflict of interests:Academic scientists powerful bargaining position, have low incentives to orient collaborations towards commercial aims.Junior indus

48、try scientists have a strong incentive to publish in order to create career flexibility, private incentives to co-publish on important basic research without consideration of importance to his or her employer2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal frameworkSummary:Tapping in partnership aligns

49、 the incentives of both academic and industry scientist to collaborate in research Projects often used to generate early stage or preliminary data that could be used by junior faculty as the basis of federal grant proposals Due to the basic research emphasis, the partnership is unlikely to produce s

50、cientific findings with direct commercial applicability, such as small molecule drug candidates Partnership does not attract “entrepreneurial professors to engage in collaborations 3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governancePharmaceutical companies see universities as imp

51、ortant partners within increasingly distributed innovation networks to develop drugsExample5-year, $85m in 2021 Pfizer-UC San Francisco, part of a program to develop a series of drug discovery partnerships with leading universities (similar partnerships have been launched by Pfizer with UCSD and a c

52、onsortium of New York City universities); 7-year $90m in 2021 Merck-Scripps to create the California Institute of Biomedical Research (Calibr), led by Scripps professor Peter Schulz3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governanceComplex governance arrangements that include upf

53、ront funding plus downstream payments to universities/participating faculty depending on milestones being achieved modeled on biotech Co-location of an industry lab near university collaborators dedicated to the partnershipGovernance structures designed to create strong relational contracting norms

54、(braiding of legally enforceable contracts and informal or relational practices to support collaboration)3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governanceExample: Pfizer-UCSF partnership described by Pfizer as motivated by “open innovation (in addition to $85m, open research ce

55、ntre near UCSF)Funding used to hire postdocs who can freely work in both academic and industry labs“The Pfizer and UCSF researchers can visit each others labs, conduct experiments together and participate in joint team-meetings (quote from UCSF alliance manager, OBrien 2021)Master agreement defines

56、clear IP rights, milestone payments, IP jointly owned, with Pfizer having an exclusive (time limited) option, terms of licence negotiatedMore focused, based on research at a more advanced stage than previous partnerships and focused on protein biologics, no conflict between the objective of drug development and academic mission to publish3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with bio