畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯股票期權(quán)當(dāng)前的公司業(yè)績(jī)和遞延收益

1、畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯：股票期權(quán)、當(dāng)前的公司業(yè)績(jī)和遞延收益 譯文 股票期權(quán)、當(dāng)前的公司業(yè)績(jī)和遞延收益 我們研究ceo股票期權(quán)的潛在不利影響。我們所抽取的上市公司樣本的時(shí)間是1992-2001年。我們根據(jù)股票期權(quán)占ceo報(bào)酬總額的比例將觀察值分為三組。我們根據(jù)實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)認(rèn)為股票期權(quán)的比例和公司當(dāng)前經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)相關(guān)。我們有證據(jù)顯示,股權(quán)比例較高組,有明顯異常的負(fù)相關(guān)的應(yīng)計(jì)收入,而且表現(xiàn)為收益遞延。 1.研究設(shè)計(jì)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ?1.1研究設(shè)計(jì) 我們研究1992-2001年期間上市公司ceo的股票期權(quán)。盡管其他管理者也有股權(quán)激勵(lì),但是本文主要研究ceo的股權(quán)激勵(lì)。在我們的樣本中,股票期權(quán)占了ceo報(bào)酬總額的大部分。

2、我們以布萊克斯科爾斯模型測(cè)算出來(lái)的股票期權(quán)價(jià)值來(lái)測(cè)算股票期權(quán)占ceo總收入的份額。和klassen、ittner 、mawani 2000、larcker 2003一樣,每家公司的期權(quán)比例,統(tǒng)一定義如下: soprop tt vt/ tct_ 1這里的sopropt指股票期權(quán)占總報(bào)酬的比例,v指授予ceo的股票期權(quán)以布萊爾斯克斯模型測(cè)算的價(jià)值。tc指ceo每年的報(bào)酬總額。為了研究授予ceo期權(quán)是否和公司當(dāng)前的業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān),我們根據(jù)股票期權(quán)的比例將觀測(cè)值分為三組,我們首先根據(jù)soprop 按行業(yè)和年份對(duì)公司進(jìn)行排序。第一組包括soprop值最低的三分之一的公司(低),第二組包括soprop值居中間的

3、三分之一的公司(中等),第三組包括sopropt值最高的三分之一公司(高)。1.2實(shí)證模型 為了研究股票期權(quán)和公司當(dāng)前業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系,我們對(duì)股票期權(quán)的比例和公司特定的業(yè)績(jī)進(jìn)行回歸分析的同時(shí)控制變量。就如霍爾索森和拉克爾(1999年),我們使用資產(chǎn)收益率來(lái)衡量企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī),具體地說(shuō),我們研究下面的關(guān)系:sopropit 0 + 1 roait + 2 financial_costit + 3 variabilityit-1 +4 chg_saleit-1 + 5 sizeit-1 + 6 growthit-1 + 7 leverageit-1 +8 return_1it + 9 return_3i

4、t + eit 2soprop it 由方程定義的第t年的股票期權(quán)占公司i的ceo報(bào)酬總額的比例roait 公司i第t年的資產(chǎn)報(bào)酬率financial_costit 如果在經(jīng)營(yíng)中前時(shí)期t公司i折舊收入的變化是積極的,指標(biāo)變量等于1,否則為0variabilityit-1 公司i在期間t前60個(gè)月內(nèi)的波動(dòng)性chg_saleit-1 公司i在t-2年和t-1年年銷(xiāo)售額的差額sizeit-1 股東權(quán)益市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的自然對(duì)數(shù)growthit-1 公司i所有者權(quán)益的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值和賬面價(jià)值的差額與市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的比例leverageit-1 公司i在期間t的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿return_1it 公司i在t時(shí)期期初的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿(負(fù)

5、債對(duì)股本)return_3it 公司i前三年的累積收益率2.實(shí)證分析2.1樣本選擇和描述統(tǒng)計(jì)我們獲取從1992-2001年ceo的報(bào)酬的數(shù)據(jù)(我們從2002年的execucomp數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中獲取1999-2001年報(bào)酬的數(shù)據(jù))。該數(shù)據(jù)包含了最高五位ceo的報(bào)酬。我們收集了所有公司的ceo的報(bào)酬的數(shù)據(jù)。除了報(bào)酬總額,該數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)提供了ceo收入的詳細(xì)組成部分,包括以布萊爾斯科爾斯模型估值的股票期權(quán)、工資和獎(jiǎng)金(除了報(bào)酬總額,該數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)還提供布萊爾斯克斯模型確定的股票期權(quán)、工資總額、獎(jiǎng)金的詳細(xì)組成)。原始的樣本包括2502家公司一共有14013個(gè)符合的觀測(cè)值。我們從原始數(shù)據(jù)中剔除了金融機(jī)構(gòu)(1852個(gè)觀測(cè)值

6、)和沒(méi)有給ceo股權(quán)激勵(lì)的(3442個(gè)觀察值)以及ceo的報(bào)酬低于1百萬(wàn)(1757個(gè)觀察值)的公司。因?yàn)樾枰?jì)算股票收益率的波動(dòng)性,我們同樣剔除了crsp數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中最近60個(gè)月沒(méi)有股票收益率的1013個(gè)觀察值。最后,我們還剔除了額外的缺少數(shù)據(jù)的857個(gè)觀察值。這樣我們得到一個(gè)有5092個(gè)觀測(cè)值和1353個(gè)公司的樣本。為了研究股票期權(quán)和當(dāng)前非正常的應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目,我們需要估算隨意的應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目。因此我們使用道瓊斯模型進(jìn)行這些測(cè)試,需要的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)取自compustat數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。我們的樣本中所包含的公司是盈利的(平均資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率為5.01%)。ceo的平均報(bào)酬高于500萬(wàn),其中47%為股票期權(quán),40%為現(xiàn)金。對(duì)于股

7、票期權(quán)所占比例較低的組,股票期權(quán)的平均比例是22%,現(xiàn)金的比例是53%。相反的,股票期權(quán)比例較高的組,股票期權(quán)的比例幾乎占了報(bào)酬總額的四分之三,而現(xiàn)金只占了報(bào)酬總額的23%。對(duì)于每一組來(lái)說(shuō),資產(chǎn)的報(bào)酬率都是正數(shù),但是股票期權(quán)比例高的那組的報(bào)酬率最低。三組的平均數(shù)來(lái)說(shuō)是正增長(zhǎng),但是杠桿比例似乎與股票期權(quán)的比例負(fù)相關(guān)。平均來(lái)說(shuō),有較高期權(quán)比例的公司與上年和過(guò)去的三年比有更高的回報(bào)率,其證券市場(chǎng)的波動(dòng)率也更大。 3.公司業(yè)績(jī)和股票期權(quán)的比例 用模型2來(lái)測(cè)試股票期權(quán)的比例是否和公司的業(yè)績(jī)呈正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。我們根據(jù)股票期權(quán)的比例將數(shù)據(jù)劃分為三組。我們首先根據(jù)soprop按行業(yè)按年進(jìn)行排序。一組包括sopr

8、opt值最低的三分之一的公司(低),第二組包括sopropt值居中間三分之一的公司(中等),第三組包括sopropt值最高的三分之一公司(高)。用托賓q測(cè)試表明sopropt值最高的那組和sopropt值最低的那組呈在顯著的差異(在1%的水平),從而拒絕了分布均勻的假設(shè)。因此它是在適當(dāng)平局模型2的基礎(chǔ)上單獨(dú)的回歸。正如表1列a所示,股票期權(quán)的比例較低的公司,即在10%水平時(shí),它對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)公司的業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生積極顯著的影響。股票期權(quán)的比例排在中間的公司,如列b所示,它對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)公司的業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生負(fù)的但不顯著的影響。然而在股票期權(quán)的比例高的公司,即1%水平,如列c所示,它對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)公司的業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生顯著的負(fù)面的影響。4.總

9、結(jié)在本文中,我們選取了1992-2001年的上市公司作為樣本,然后根據(jù)股票期權(quán)的比例對(duì)公司進(jìn)行分類(lèi)。股票期權(quán)比例高的企業(yè),股票期權(quán)比例高的企業(yè),即使控制了與股票期權(quán)相關(guān)的其他已知變量,我們得出股票期權(quán)比例與公司同期業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)相關(guān)。股票期權(quán)比例低的企業(yè),我們觀察到同期的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)與股票期權(quán)的比例呈正相關(guān)。當(dāng)股票期權(quán)占經(jīng)營(yíng)者報(bào)酬總額的比例較高時(shí),經(jīng)營(yíng)者的報(bào)酬在未來(lái)業(yè)績(jī)中急劇增加。這種公司中的經(jīng)營(yíng)者意識(shí)到潛在的巨大收益,有動(dòng)機(jī)將當(dāng)前的收入和收益推遲到未來(lái)期間確認(rèn)。我們的結(jié)論和猜測(cè)相一致。總得來(lái)說(shuō),本研究認(rèn)為對(duì)ceo授予過(guò)度的股權(quán)激勵(lì)具有負(fù)面影響。這種行為會(huì)對(duì)現(xiàn)任股東的財(cái)富產(chǎn)生不利影響。作者:k.柯克達(dá)瑞/

10、m.羅伯特國(guó)籍:加拿大出處:國(guó)際管理期刊,第26卷第1期,2009年4月,第26-31頁(yè) 原文stock option grants, current operating performance and deferral of earnings we examine a potential negative consequence of stock option grants to the chiefexecutive officer ceo. using a large sample of public firms spanning the period1992-2001, we class

11、ify firm-year observations into three groups based on the stockoption proportion of total compensation to the ceo. we empirically document a negativerelation between stock option proportion and contemporaneous operating performance.we provide evidence of earnings deferral manifested by significantly

12、 negative abnormalaccruals for the group with high proportion of stock options.2. research design and empirical model2.1 research design we examine ceo stock options grants of public corporations during 1992-2001. while stock options grants are used to compensate other employees as well as ceos, thi

13、s study focuses only on ceos. in our sample, stock options constitute a larger proportion of ceos total compensation compared to other employees. we measure the stock option proportion as the ratio of black-scholes value of the total options granted to the ceo in a particular year to the total compe

14、nsation granted to the ceo that year. consistent with klassen and mawani 2000 and ittner, lambert and larcker 2003, stock option proportion for each firm-year is defined as follows: v soprop t t vt/ tct_ 1where soprop is the proportion of total compensation that consists of stock options; v is the b

15、lack-scholes value of options granted to the ceo; and tc is the total compensation paid to the ceo in the year. in order to examine whether the granting of ceo stock options is associated with a firmscurrent operating performance, we classify firm-year observations into three groupsbased on the prop

16、ortion of stock options. we first rank firms based on their sopropby year and by industry. the first group comprises the bottom one third of firms low,the second group the middle one third medium and the third group includes firms withtop one third high proportion of stock options3.2 empirical model

17、to examine the association between current performance and stock options, we regressthe proportion of stock options on firm-specific performance as well as control variablesidentified in prior studies as determinants of stock option grants. as in core, holthausen and larcker 1999, we use the account

18、ing return on assets roa as the proxy for firm performance. specifically, we examine the following relation:sopropit 0 + 1 roait + 2 financial_costit + 3 variabilityit-1 +4 chg_saleit-1 + 5 sizeit-1 + 6 growthit-1 + 7 leverageit-1 +8 return_1it + 9 return_3it + eit 2soprop it the proportion of the c

19、eos total compensation of firm i that is composed on stock options in year t as defined by equation 1. the stock options are valued using the black & scholes option pricing formula;roait the return on assets of firm i on year t;financial_costit an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change i

20、n operatingincome before depreciation for firm i in period t is positive andis 0 otherwise;variabilityit-1 variability of firm is stock return for the period of 60 months prior to year t;chg_saleit-1 change in the annual sales of firm i between period t-2 and t-1;sizeit-1 natural log of the beginnin

21、g market value of equity;growthit-1 ratio of the beginning book value of equity of firm i over the beginning market value of equity;leverageit-1 financial leverage liabilities over equity of firm i at the beginning of period t;return_1it stock returns of firm i over prior one year; andreturn_3it cum

22、ulative stock returns of firm i over prior three years.3. empirical analyses3.1 sample3. empirical analyses3.1 sample selection and descriptive statistics we obtain compensation data from 2002 execucomp database for the period 1992 to 2001. the database contains the information regarding the compens

23、ation of the top five executives. we collect compensation data for all firms for which ceo is identified. in addition to the total compensation, the database provides a detailed composition including the black & scholes value stock options, the amount of salary and the bonuses.the initial sample

24、 consists of 2,502 companies and a corresponding total of 14,013 firm-year observations.we exclude financial institutions 1,852 observations, ceos that are not awarded stock options 3,442 observations and firms providing compensation lower than 1 million dollars 1,757 observations from the initial s

25、ample. we also eliminate 1,013 observations that do not have 60 months of stock return in crsp, required to compute the stock return volatility. finally, we eliminate an additional 857 observations due to missing data. this gives us a sample of 5,092 firm-year observations for 1,353 companies. to in

26、vestigate our question relating to the association between stock option compensation and current abnormal accruals, we need to estimate the discretionary accruals. we employ the modified jones model for this purpose. accounting data necessary to conduct these tests are obtained from compustat. firms

27、 included in our sample are profitable average return on asset of 5.01%. the average value of ceo compensation is over 5 million dollars and stock options represent 47% of the value of total compensation for our sample firms, compare to 40% for the cash component. for the group of firms with low pro

28、portions of stock options, stock options, account on average, for 22% of the total compensation, while the cash component represents 53%. conversely, stock options represent almost three quarter of total compensation of the group of firms with a high proportions of stock options, while the cash comp

29、onent is 23% of total compensation. for each group of firms, the average return on assets is positive but it is lower for the group of firms with a high proportion of stock options. all three groups experience positive growth, on average, and the leverage ratio seems to be negatively correlated to t

30、he proportion of stock options. on average, firms with a high proportion of stock options have experienced a higher return on their stock over the last year and the last three years. the volatility of stock return is also higher for firms with a high proportionof stock options.4. conclusionin this paper, we employ a sample of public firms spanning the period 1992-2001, and classify firm-year observations based on the proportion of stock options. for firms with a high proportion of stock options, we document a negative association between