財政學英文版課件：Chap022 PUBLIC FINANCE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

1、PUBLIC FINANCE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM Chapter 22Background Federal system Fiscal federalism Centralization Centralization ratio = Central government expendituresTotal government expenditures22-2Distribution of All U.S. Expenditures by Government Level22-3Source: Figures for 1900 through 1980 are from P

2、ommerehne 1977. Figures after 1980 are computed from various editions of the US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States , and from US Bureau of the Census 2012b.Community Formation Club voluntary association of people who band together to finance and share some benefit Optim

3、al Club (or community) 22-4The Tiebout Model Voting with your feet Tiebouts assumptions Government activities generate no externalities Individuals are completely mobile People have perfect information with respect to each communitys public services and taxes There are enough different communities s

4、o that each individual can find one with public services meeting her demands The cost per unit of public services is constant so that if the quantity of public services doubles, the total cost also doubles Public services are financed by a proportional property tax Communities can enact exclusionary

5、 zoning lawsstatutes that prohibit certain uses of land22-5Tiebout and the Real World Critique of Tiebout Empirical tests22-6Optimal FederalismWhat is the optimal allocation of economic responsibilities among levels of government? Macroeconomic functions Microeconomic functions22-7Disadvantages of a

6、 Decentralized System Efficiency issues Externalities Local public good Scale economies in provision of public goods Inefficient tax systems Scale economies in tax collection Equity issues22-8Advantages of a Decentralized System Tailoring outputs to local taxes Fostering intergovernmental competitio

7、n Experimentation and information in locally provided goods and services22-9Implications Purely decentralized systems cannot maximize social welfare Dealing with community activities that create spillover effects that are not national in scope Combine communities under a single regional government P

8、igouvian taxes and subsidies Division of responsibility in public good provision Distributional goals and mobility22-10Public Education in a Federal System Local control of schools Financing education through property taxation Federal role in education22-11Property Tax How the property tax works Ass

9、essed value Assessment ratioResidential Property Tax Rates (selected cities)CityEffective Tax Rate (%)Indianapolis2.75Detroit2.11Jackson1.70New Orleans1.40Oklahoma City1.25Boston1.06Seattle0.79New York0.6222-12Incidence and Efficiency Effects The Traditional View Tax on LandAcres of landRent per acr

10、e of landSLDLP0LDLPnLPsL = P0LPrice received by landowners falls by amount of the tax22-13Incidence and Efficiency Effects The Traditional View Tax on Land Tax capitalized into price of land Land not fixed in supply22-14Incidence and Efficiency Effects The Traditional View Tax on StructuresNumber of

11、 structuresper yearPrice per structureSBDBP0BDBPnLPnB = P0BB0B1PgBPrice paid by tenants increases by full amount of the tax22-15Summary and Implications of the Traditional View Progressivity Land tax Structures tax Empirical evidence Measuring income22-16The New View: Property Tax as a Capital Tax P

12、artial equilibrium versus general equilibrium General Tax effect Excise Tax effects Long-run effects22-17Property Tax as a User Fee The notion of the incidence of the property tax is meaningless The property tax creates no excess burden Federal income tax subsidizes consumption of local public servi

13、ces for individuals who itemize22-18Reconciling the Three Views New view: Eliminating all property taxes and replacing them with a national sales tax Traditional view: Lowering property tax rate and making up revenue from local sales tax User fee view: Taxes and benefits jointly changed and people a

14、re sufficiently mobile22-19Why Do People Hate the Property Tax So Much? Property tax levied on estimated value Property tax highly visible Property tax perceived as being regressive Circuit breakers Property tax easier to attack22-20Ideas for Improving the Property Tax Improve assessment procedures

15、Personal net worth tax22-21Intergovernmental GrantsSource: Computed from Economic Report of the President, 2012 pp. 320, 415.22-22Total GrantsGrants as %Grants as %Billions of Of Total Federalof State & LocalYear2010 $OutlaysSpending1970889.617.1198016812.321.919901718.815.2200030913.219.3201053

16、214.425.4 Possible explanation for growth: Mismatch TheoryConditional (Categorical) Grants G1c1E1Units of public good (G) per yearConsumption (c) per yearABMatching GrantsRG2c2E222-23Conditional (Categorical) Grants G1c1E1Units of public good (G) per yearConsumption (c) per yearABMatching Closed-End

17、ed GrantsRG3c3E3D22-24Conditional (Categorical) Grants G1c1E1Units of public good (G) per yearConsumption (c) per yearABNon-matching GrantsRG2c4E4HJ22-25Unconditional Grants Revenue sharing Flypaper Effect Whose indifference curves? Median voter theorem Flypaper effect22-26Chapter 22 SummaryIn a fed

18、eral system of government, different governments provide difference services, although advantages and disadvantages of centralized government existThe club model of community formation indicates that community size and quantity of public goods depend on tastesAccording to the Tiebout model, a Pareto efficient allocation of pu