GlobalDistributionSystems(GDS)（英文版）(共60頁(yè)).ppt

1、Global Distribution Systems (GDS)An overviewFrom Lazy Susan to Login Susan!World Travel MarketRegional booking differencesHow it was. Travelers went automatically to a travel agent for a ticket Travel agents then phoned the airline about a specific flight on a specific date Fares were the same on ea

2、ch flight with each airline Reservations staff retrieved index-card for that flight/date from a Lazy Susan (revolving tray with index cards) Sometimes they had to view a reservations board with binoculars! Then the travel agents request could be answered!Then. On a certain day on a certain flight tw

3、o persons met by chance: Mr. Smith from American Airlines (AA) Mr. Smith from IBM Result: Plan to automate the AA reservation process with the help of IBM hard- and software Result: SABRE (Semi Automatic Business Reservations Environment) Timeline GDS 50s: Airline Reservation Centers get first termi

4、nals 60s: First CRS Terminals in Travel Agencies 70s: Dumb Terminals become CRS 80s: CRS become GDS 90s: Ownership Change: Airlines divest their GDS 90s: Rise of direct sales through Internet 00s: GDS facing new entrants, Airlines reclaim the ownership of the channell, Low Cost Carriers, New busines

5、s models, So lets start with some historyGlobal Distribution Systems Formerly known as CRS: Computer Reservation System Now GDS: Global Distribution Systems Name change because of function change: Airline Reservations All Travel ServicesMain Functions Reservations: PNR (Passenger Name Record = booki

6、ng file containing all relevant reservation data) Back-office integration Management Info: Yield Management Market Information Data Transfer (MITD)Features of a GDS Start with the request for a flight Look into database for flight availablility Check fare Making of a PNR (Passenger Name Record):Itin

7、erary Name Contact (Phone) Ticketing Received from Fare - SSR/OSI SeatRed = Mandatory Issue of Tickets (Traditional or E-Ticket)Development User Interface Start: Dumb Terminals (Workstation) Now: Intelligent Terminals (= PC) Expert Mode (Like Focalpoint Galileo) GUI (Like Viewpoint Galileo, Amadeus

8、Vista)GDS Display: Galileo Expert modeGDS Display: Galileo GUI-ModeConnectivitySeveral levels of connectivity (low to high):Request from agency is relayed via GDS to airlines, which sends a message backRequest is chanelled through GDS direct into airlines own system and seat is allocated at end of t

9、ransaction1.Request is chanelled through GDS direct into airlines system and seat is allocated immediatelyThe higher the level, the more the vendor has to pay the GDSGDS: History (1) Originally: Lazy Susans Request and Report and/or Sell and Report 1950s: Internal airline systems Host: airline owner

10、 of a CRS Co-hosting: Selling space on own system to other airlines 1960s: Entrance to travel agencies: CRSLazy SusansGDS History (2) End Eighties: Including other services: ferries, cars, hotels, theatres, tours; Name change into GDS Four main systems:Amadeus Galileo Sabre Worldspan Regional System

11、s: Abacus Infini Gemini - . 1990s: Dehosting: Airlines sell their share in GDSGDS History (3): Founding AirlinesGDS History (4) Ownership now: Amadeus: LH, AF and IB (together 45,76%), Management 2,08%, Venture Capital 52,16% Galileo: Travelport (Hotels, Car Rental, Hotels, Real Estate, ICT) Sabre:

12、Publicly Owned Worldspan: Travelport (Hotels, Car Rental, Hotels, Real Estate, ICT)Market shares (4 main systems) 2006GDSAgenciesTerminalsAmadeus 26%93.147Galileo24%115.454Sabre23%119.546Worldspan11%45.104 Halo and Horn-effect Halo and Horn Effect Halo Effect:The extra business an agency gives the a

13、irline that owns the GDS system it uses, above what that airline might expect to get based on its share of the overall market. Horn Effect:When something is wrong with a (small) part of the system, a lot of agencies then think the whole system is wrongGDS and Internet Internet gave rise to alternati

14、ve booking channels 1983: 88% of all PNRs through GDS 2002: Only 53% Some reasons: Costs (Internet instead of dedicated lines) Ease of usec (Graphical interface)Sources of GDS-Revenue: Booking fees from airlines: Per segment USD 4.48 (Sabre, 2003) Per ticket average USD 12.-! Also fees for cancellat

15、ions (50% of bookings!) Traffic Fees (each inquiry costs the airline money) Subscriptions from agencies However: “productivity bonusses” back to agancies Sale of Management Data (MIDT) Hosting inventory other airlines Advertising and other additional services Booking Fees most important!Position Ven

16、dors (Airlines): Vendors pay for both looking and booking Huge commissions to pay to GDS Looking for ways to bypass GDS: USA: Orbitz EUR: Opodo Internet based systems, owned by airlines, that consumers can use from their own PC without having to use the GDS and/or agency Agencies receive large kick-

17、backs from GDSs: Airlines claim why not lower the booking fees instead?Relation GDS and Airlines GDS charge airlines for looking and booking Airlines pay huge commissions to GDS Agencies receive large kick-backs from GDSs: Airlines claim why not lower the booking fees instead? Airlines are (since se

18、lling their shares in GDS) looking for cheaper alternatives, made possible by new technologies (internet based): ORBITZ and OPODOPrices charged by GDS to AirlinesMore Traffic, Lesser YieldSituation Airline Industry State of the Industry (Chapter 11 = Broke)AlternativesAirline want to get that share!

19、Airline StrategiesTraditional Travel Distribution ChainVENDORSTOUROPERATORSTRAVEL AGENCIESTRAVELLERS (Leisure Corporate)New Travel Chain ( = E Commerce)VENDORSTOUROPERATORSTRAVEL AGENCIESTRAVELLERS (Leisure Corporate)New Business Models Thanks to ICT there new business models are possible Reverse au

20、ctions: Hotwire Customer names his price: Priceline Virtual Agencies: Expedia Multi channeling: Clicks, Bricks & Mortar and Calls: Clicks (E-commerce) Bricks and Mortar (Traditional agency) Calls (Call-centers)Hotwire: Inventory RegulationFounded by:AmericanAmerica WestContinentalHawaiianNorthwestUn

21、ited US AirwaysMost Popular Travel Sites GDS Regulation (1) Before 1984: Systems not allowed to discriminate against each other, other airlines and agencies However: Biased display Own airline was favoured (1st lines on 1st screen) Reason: Agencies book almost always the first flight from the first

22、screenGDS Regulation (2) 1992: New set of rules (both in US and EU): Neutral Display based on departure time and connection (direct flights first) No favours for hosts Participation in systems open to all airlines Free choice for travel agenciesGDS Deregulation 2003/2004: Airlines and GDS can now de

23、al with each other seperately Result: Airline X only in system B Discrimination with Opodo/ Orbitz: Only the best fares in those systems Danger of bypassing GDS by both agencies and consumers In favour of dominant carriersEffects on GDSs New revenue models: Supplier of IT-services, e-commerce techno

24、logy De-list smaller vendors (because they do not generate enough revenue) Third party agreements for additional servicesEffects on Airlines To buy preferred position in systems Downward price pressure on GDSs by large airlines Smaller and regional carriers possibly switch to internet MIDT value wil

25、l become less Effects on Agencies Fragmented info will be an opportunity to become data aggregators Need for tools for multiple GDS capability Some GDSs may leverage their unique ownership position: Traveport owns Galileo, Worldspan and other industry players like hotels, agencies, car-rentals etc.

26、Higher costs will be levied upon final customer GDS booking rewards will likely disappear: loss of revenue Reaction of GDSs Own Internet Booking Sites: Travelocity, The Trip, Hotwire, . As Booking Engine behind other sites like Expedia Additional Services: Corporate Travel Booking Tools Agency Booki

27、ng tools, Web-presenceGDS New Entrants: GNEsNew companies claim they can replace GDS: Farelogix G2 Switchworks ITA SoftwareGNEs are sometimes also called: Alternative Content Access Platforms (ACAP)G2 SwitchworksCosts GDS vs. GNEsBarriers for GNEs Agencies rely heavy on GDS kick-backs since airlines

28、 capped/cut commissions Switching costs for agencies (equipment, training, back-office integration) can remain a barrier for GNEs However: United Airlines (member Star Alliance) considers paying agencies a USD 5.- bonus for each booking made through a GNE! No car and hotel at the moment No worldwide

29、 coverage yetChances for GNEs Possibility to make distribution more competitive (breaking oligopoly of GDSs) Direct link to airline inventory Need for airlines to cut costs (Distribution costs 20% of total costs and are the only costs that can be most easily controlled) Star Alliance is investigatin

30、g GNEs/ACAPs (they spend each year USD 2 Bln. on GDS fees) Agencies get access to all fares (public and web-fares!) Desktop not longer controlled by GDSsReaction GDSPreferred Booking Channels Airlines have now the right to decide if they want to be present in a GDS and also have the option to decide

31、 the participation level (meaning supplying all available fares, schedules and inventory) This is called Preferred- or Competitive Booking Channels Through such a channel the airline pays less to a GDS July 2006: Major US Airlines will start charging users (agencies and corporates) a booking fee of

32、USD 3.50 per segment, which are booked through non preferred booking channels Reason for Preferred Channels Airlines maintain control of the distribution model Reduction of GDS fees Shift of cost of GDS-distribution from supplier to subscriberReaction GDS Alle major GDS are now offering their clients (agencies and corporate clients) special O