關(guān)于打擊財務(wù)報告舞弊的研究

1、本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）外 文 翻 譯外文題目 Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud 外文出處 Internal Auditor 外文作者 Green, Scott 原文：Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal

2、controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sa

3、rbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessme

4、nt of the internal control structure. A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related cont

5、rol structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical facto

6、rs that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise and audit prioriti

7、es based on solid risk analysis. There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers. * Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial

8、reporting trouble. * Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free fr

9、om inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENING One of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron,

10、 and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs re

11、portedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all el

12、se even the total destruction of the enterprise. The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conf

13、lict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud migh

14、t have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees. The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly to where constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terr

15、ific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGS Although the num

16、ber of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE

17、 REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIES A typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity a

18、nd future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A

19、 $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss. Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream. Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the p

20、roduct or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can: * Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements. * Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligation

21、s, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies. * Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence

22、 and due diligence. The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee. EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGES Companies are continually making provisions exp

23、enses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor

24、's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000. There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an a

25、uditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such ac

26、tivity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as: * Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income? * How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it? * What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used? * What will b

27、e disclosed about the charge in the financial statements? Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regard

28、ing this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION, OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method u

29、sed to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency

30、of the reserve calculation. Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in m

31、ethodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONS Related panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, th

32、ere are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as: * Maintaining open communications with out

33、side auditors. * Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses. * Scheduling regular management interviews. At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and ri

34、sk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with

35、the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE does not be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are

36、of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without th

37、e SPE. Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported

38、earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking t

39、he external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet mo

40、vements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with

41、 the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee. COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, o

42、r use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that,

43、 in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, to auditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal cont

44、rols should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability. An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this b

45、ecause he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud J. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).譯文： 關(guān)于打擊財務(wù)報告舞弊的研究美國于2002年通過了薩班斯-奧克斯利法案，旨在重建投資者的信心和保護資本市場的有效運行。法案

46、認為強烈的內(nèi)部控制防范財務(wù)報告舞弊的重要組成部分，對于樹立投資者信心有重要的作用。薩班斯-奧克斯利法案404條款是管理層對內(nèi)部控制的評估，要求內(nèi)部控制報告應(yīng)表明公司管理層有建立和維持財務(wù)報告內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)及相關(guān)控制程序充分有效的職責(zé)，包含財政年度年底對財務(wù)報告內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)及有效性進行評估的結(jié)果。此外薩班斯-奧克斯利法案需要一個公司的外部審計人員來完成一個單獨的報告,以確保對內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)和財務(wù)報告程序進行有效性評估。簡而言之,外部審計人員必須執(zhí)行測試,以確認管理評估的內(nèi)部控制結(jié)構(gòu)。一個強大的內(nèi)部審計部門可以為管理層和會計師提供舒適感，記載和評價一個公司的控制程序并且定期測試其控制結(jié)構(gòu)是傳統(tǒng)內(nèi)部審計

47、任務(wù)，可以保證公司內(nèi)部控制的有效運行以保護企業(yè)。然而，從某種程度上的內(nèi)部審計人員關(guān)注財務(wù)報告演示和披露的精確性，對于經(jīng)營審計是一個很重要的判斷。關(guān)于在財務(wù)報告程序中，確定內(nèi)部審計的關(guān)鍵因素的范圍和對外部審計的實力和經(jīng)驗的積累都有助于內(nèi)部控制功能的透明性和企業(yè)的精神文化的弘揚。企業(yè)和審計重點建立在堅實的風(fēng)險分析上。不管審計師們的水平如何，有三個步驟每個審計師都應(yīng)該采取，來幫助維護財務(wù)報告的真實性，使財務(wù)報告免受舞弊因素的影響：*廣泛聽取各方意見 *集中關(guān)注那些導(dǎo)致典型財務(wù)報表舞弊的問題*通過對比相關(guān)性能，關(guān)注金融異常情況。投資者主要是依靠中期財務(wù)報告獲取信息，審計師的需要確保這些報告是公平的和準

48、確的。內(nèi)部審計通過幫助確保溝通自由和查找出不恰當(dāng)?shù)慕鹑诠こ烫峁┝藢氋F監(jiān)督。傾聽的藝術(shù)財務(wù)報告舞弊的問題之一是，一個不負責(zé)的財務(wù)總監(jiān)(CFO)和他或她的小組成員們不太愿意公布他們公司的真正情況。事實上，像世通、安然等其他這樣很有影響力的金融巨頭的強大的、受人尊敬的首席財務(wù)官，慫恿他們的員工參與財務(wù)舞弊，進行集體造假，利用他們對企業(yè)的忠誠，吩咐他們執(zhí)行一些違背職業(yè)道德的行為來為他們的舞弊行為服務(wù)。難以置信的是這類丑聞層出不窮，不見衰退。據(jù)相關(guān)報道，有些首席財務(wù)官獎勵那些支持參與舞弊和造假的員工，脅迫、排斥、懲處那些不服從者，使得越來越多的公司員工成為幫兇。沒有哪個審計師會奢望選取的審計志愿者小組會

49、出賣自己的老板，透露真實的公司財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)，背叛自己的老板。若首席財務(wù)官夫婦與法院有些交情，而法院對他們的行為不予治理的代價將會是徹底毀滅企業(yè)的一切。好消息是，在最近的情況下，有局外人愿意站出來維護公道。安然為例，Sherron Watkins，一家公司副總裁，明確地告訴安達信和高層管理人員，以她的角度考慮到安然和SPEs的利益沖突，感知到首席財務(wù)官的管理以及會計處理的許多不當(dāng)之處。她對此問題的提出將可能瓦解那些公司，而那些公司的崩潰將可能對金融界造成劇烈的動蕩。他們聽取了Sherron Watkins意見，證實了安然公司的欺詐行為，因此也能盡早的制止其員工的集體造假行為，遏制對公司的破壞性。這個

50、教訓(xùn)使審計人員更清楚地認識到：廣泛聽取“叛徒”的抱怨的重要性。特別是在建設(shè)性的批評意見上，也許在其他人開來這被看作是一種行為不忠，但那些沒有被看作是團隊的一份子的人們，可以是很棒的搜索資料的來源。通常情況下很容易把那些抱怨看作是外來者為順利終止其代理權(quán)而做出的行為。內(nèi)部審計人員應(yīng)該頂住壓力，關(guān)注這些被動的行為，廣泛的聽取意見來做出評估和，如果需要的話，則應(yīng)勇于調(diào)查他們聽見的東西。識別典型問題雖然一些披露可能出現(xiàn)遺漏，金融報告錯誤也會很多，內(nèi)部審計人員可以尋找當(dāng)中的關(guān)鍵模式來幫助他們關(guān)注自己應(yīng)在哪些方面進行活動，這些是最有效的。發(fā)現(xiàn)這些典型問題可能需要下一番功夫，可能需要審計師治理棘手的問題。積

51、極政策收入確認一個典型的問題往往與收入或費用的未來表現(xiàn)相匹配的。美國奎斯特通信公司已經(jīng)指出，在1999年到2001年之間，它錯誤的虛構(gòu)了超過11億美金的交易。這些資金用來購買光纖和預(yù)付未來的服務(wù)，但他們訂購與收入相當(dāng)，并沒有顯示獲利。統(tǒng)一公司是一家主要開發(fā)軟件產(chǎn)品的公司，據(jù)說還通過向他們產(chǎn)品的消費者提供借貸來獲取收入。那些顧客通過購買他們的產(chǎn)品獲得循環(huán)貸款然后再買統(tǒng)一的產(chǎn)品，使得這些借貸額度超過了理性預(yù)期而無法償還貸款。1,500萬美元利潤最終成為重達5700萬的損失。可以理解，質(zhì)量是獲取源源不斷的收入的第一步。收入的最高質(zhì)量形式是那些用戶已經(jīng)收到，接受并支付了產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)價款，且這些產(chǎn)品無任何

52、的性能要求上的缺失或者會發(fā)生意外事故的可能。在識別咄咄逼人的會計事項和不可預(yù)見的會計事項如或有收費時，審核人員可以：*對于管理貸款給客戶或是資產(chǎn)就是交換協(xié)議作一個直接詢問調(diào)查。*對于未披露過的意外事故進行詳細的分析或者揭示其債務(wù)情況。*通過對收入確認評估的兩種方法的分析，告知給公司首席財務(wù)官和外部審計人員為什么這些情況拒絕支持當(dāng)前的慣例。查詢并不意味著無知，而是展示了會計謹慎性職業(yè)原則和對工作盡職盡責(zé)。稅收政策的應(yīng)用必須有一個正確的商業(yè)的理論基礎(chǔ)，使之易于被高級管理人員和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者理解，如果它不能被有效理解，這個問題應(yīng)該提交到審計委員會。經(jīng)常存在的偶生費用公司不斷地劃歸費用，即使他們不確定這些費用

53、確切數(shù)額。這像是具有傳染性的。產(chǎn)品返還、訴訟、過時的庫存、壞賬費用，經(jīng)常觸碰到偶生費用的雷區(qū)，遭到指控。以報告業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新中心的數(shù)量指標和標準普爾指數(shù)為衡量標準，廠商宣布他們的特別損失從1982年到2000年飛速增長。換句話說，在2000年以標準普爾指數(shù)500衡量有高達47%的用于偶生費用。也有許多合理的偶生費用，像是由于天然形成的、合并和資產(chǎn)銷售等產(chǎn)生的費用。如何使一個審計師識別濫用這種會計核算方法來隱藏潛在的弱點經(jīng)營業(yè)績行為呢？如果一個公司顛倒定期保留順序，如進行常規(guī)收費、重組顛倒儲備費用、收回營業(yè)收入等式審計師識別這種行為的一條線索。這種類型的活動，滋生了通貨膨脹。關(guān)于確定這樣的活動，審計師應(yīng)該問一些