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CertificationofRotorcraftandFHAProcessAEAJanuary31,2012CertificationofRotorcraftanOUTLINECertificationProcessInstallationofComplexSystemsinNormalCategoryRotorcraftXX.1301&XX.1309ComparisonGuidanceMaterialCompliancewith27/29.1309SystemSafetyAssessmentItemstobeawareof…FHA/SSAQuestions2OUTLINECertificationProcess2CertificationProcessApplication(e.g.TC,ATC,STC,ASTC)CertificationBasisdefined.CertificationPlans:Detailhowcompliancewillbeshownforeachrule(27.1309analysis,groundtest,flighttest,etc.).DefinelevelofFAAinvolvement(delegation).Testplanning&execution.Data/TestReview:FAAreviews/witnessestestsasnecessary.TC/STCissued.3CertificationProcessApplicatiComplexSystemsinSmallRotorcraftSubjectequipmentAttitudeDirectionIndicatorSyntheticVisionAHRSi.e.MEMStechnologyAirDataNavigationHTAWSTrafficWeatherRADALTAutopilots/stabilityaugmentationSystemintegrationCertificationBasesthatrangefromCAR6topart27amndt.46IntendedFunctionWillitonlybeusedforDay/NightVFR?Single/DualPilotCATA/CATBFHA/SSAProperhazardsclassificationProperdesignlevels,includingsoftwareRequiresinputfromvariousengineeringdisciplinesandPilots4ComplexSystemsinSmallRotor14CFR2X.1301Comparison2X.1301:Eachitemofinstalledequipmentmust-Beofakindanddesignappropriatetoitsintendedfunction;BelabeledastoitsfunctionandoperationallimitationsBeinstalledaccordingtoitslimitationsFunctionproperlywheninstalled.Althoughtherule&itsapplicationarethesame,theyresultindifferentrequirementsduetotheplatform’sdesign&operationaldifferences.514CFR2X.1301Comparison2X.132X.1309Comparison2X.1309:Whiletherearesomedifferencesinthe14CFRParts23,25,27,29,ingeneral,theyallsaythateachitemshouldbesafeandreliableandnotadverselyaffectanyothersystem.Basically,thisistheregulationthatrequiresthathazardsposedbythesystemsinstalledonaircraftmustbeaddressedaspartofthecertificationprocess.RESOURCESAC27/29.1309SAEARP4754“GuidelinesforDevelopmentofCivilAircraftandSystems”.SAE

ARP4761"GuidelinesandMethodsforConductingtheSafetyAssessmentProcessonCivilAirborneSystemsandEquipment".OtherpublishedACGuidance(e.g.,21-40,27-1B,29-2B),FAAOrders,RTCADocuments.62X.1309Comparison2X.1309:Wh27.1309&29.1309ComparisonItisassumedthatthebasicPart27aircraftwillbecertifiedVFR.

27.1309onaVFRHelicopterdoesnotaddresssystemswhosefailureconditionsareassessedtobehigherthanmajor(i.e.hazardousorcatastrophic).Mayrequirespecialconditions

IftherotorcraftistobecertifiedforIFRflight,thenyoumustuse27appendix“B”whichinvokessomePart29rulesincludingportionsof29.1309.727.1309&29.1309ComparisonItGuidanceMaterialAC27.1B,27.1309providesguidanceforcompliancetoFAR27.1309AC29-2C,29.1309providesguidanceforcompliancetoFAR29.1309BothACsrecognizeSAE-ARP4761/4754SystemSafetyAssessment(SSA)processAC20-174forcompliancetothenewARP4754A.8GuidanceMaterialAC27.1B,27.Complianceto27/29.1309XX.1309ComplianceData:Qualitative&QuantitativeanalysisrequiredforCatastrophic,Hazardous,andforcomplexsystemsthathaveMajorfailureclassifications.FHA,PSSA,FTA,FMEA&CCArequired.MustSubstantiateprobabilityoffailurereqmts.OnlyQualitativeassessmentrequiredfornon-complexMajorandMinorsystems.Noprobabilityoffailuresubstantiationrequired.9Complianceto27/29.1309XX.130SafetyAssessmentProcessFunctionalHazardAssessment(FHA)AircraftLevel&SystemsLevelFHAsUsedtoIdentifyEffects(i.e.FailureConditionCategories)ofSystemFailuresonAircraft5FailureConditionCategoriesCatastrophicHazardous/Severe-MajorMajorMinorNo-Effect10SafetyAssessmentProcessFunctSystemSafetyAssessmenthardwarerequirementsCatastrophic-

<1x10-9probabilityofOccurrenceHazardous/Severe-Major-

<1x10-7Major-

<1x10-5Minor-

<1x10-3No-Effect-noprobabilityofoccurrencereqmts.AsdefinedinAC27/29.1309&SAE

ARP4761"GuidelinesandMethodsforConductingtheSafetyAssessmentProcessonCivilAirborneSystemsandEquipment".11SystemSafetyAssessmenthardwSystemSafetyAssessmentSoftware&AEHRequirementsRTCA/DO-178BSoftwareLevelandRTCA/DO-254AEHLevelCommensuratewithFailureConditionCategoryLevelA(Catastrophic)LevelB(Hazardous/Severe-Major)LevelC(Major)LevelD(Minor)LevelE(NoSafetyEffect)12SystemSafetyAssessmentSoftw

AssessingtheEffectsofFailuresIntegrationofCockpitDisplaySystemsandPilotInterfaceInadditiontothesystemsengineeringspecialists,bothflighttestandHFevaluationofpilot-systeminterfaceisusedtoevaluateandclassifythehazardlevelofaparticularfailurecondition.Especiallyifitinvolvesthepilot–systeminterface(controlormisrepresentationtothepilotofinformation)13

AssessingtheEffectsofFailIssuestobeawareof:FHAshouldnotbeaccomplishedaftersystemdesignandinstallation.

PrimarypurposeofFHAistosetdesignstandards;nottoappeaseFAA

Donotusetheequipmentreliabilitytodefinefailureclassification.

ThehighesthazardclassificationforequipmentthatisnotrequiredbycertificationoroperationalrulesNOTis“minor”.14Issuestobeawareof:FHAshouFHA/SSAquestionsforthegroupShouldthehazardclassification/threattotheaircraftandoroccupantschangeformisleadinginformationasafunctionof…ItsRequiredvs.non-requiredinCAR6/part27?Whatifitcanbeclassifiedas“safetyenhancing”equipment?ItsbeinginstalledtosatisfyandOperationalequipmentrequirementsi.e.(135)?15FHA/SSAquestionsforthegrDiscussionTime:BacktoKim…16DiscussionTime:BacktoKim…1QuestionstoindustryandtheFAA:

Dowe,theFAAandindustry,understandtherisktradeoffsifweallowtheinstallationofequipmentwithalowerlevelofcertitudethanourguidanceallows?GiventheuniquecharacteristicsofrotorcraftWhataretherisktradeoffsandwhatdotheybuyus?Dowegetanetgaininsafety(asreflectedbyloweraccidentnumbers)?Howarewediscouragingapplicantsandoperatorsfrominstallingsafetyenhancingequipmentthatisnotrequiredbyanyregulations?

Arewegoingtoexacerbatepoorpilotdecisionmakingbyprovidingasystemthatmayprovideafalsesenseofsecurity(i.e.“snowtiresyndrome”)17QuestionstoindustryandtheCertificationofRotorcraftandFHAProcessAEAJanuary31,2012CertificationofRotorcraftanOUTLINECertificationProcessInstallationofComplexSystemsinNormalCategoryRotorcraftXX.1301&XX.1309ComparisonGuidanceMaterialCompliancewith27/29.1309SystemSafetyAssessmentItemstobeawareof…FHA/SSAQuestions19OUTLINECertificationProcess2CertificationProcessApplication(e.g.TC,ATC,STC,ASTC)CertificationBasisdefined.CertificationPlans:Detailhowcompliancewillbeshownforeachrule(27.1309analysis,groundtest,flighttest,etc.).DefinelevelofFAAinvolvement(delegation).Testplanning&execution.Data/TestReview:FAAreviews/witnessestestsasnecessary.TC/STCissued.20CertificationProcessApplicatiComplexSystemsinSmallRotorcraftSubjectequipmentAttitudeDirectionIndicatorSyntheticVisionAHRSi.e.MEMStechnologyAirDataNavigationHTAWSTrafficWeatherRADALTAutopilots/stabilityaugmentationSystemintegrationCertificationBasesthatrangefromCAR6topart27amndt.46IntendedFunctionWillitonlybeusedforDay/NightVFR?Single/DualPilotCATA/CATBFHA/SSAProperhazardsclassificationProperdesignlevels,includingsoftwareRequiresinputfromvariousengineeringdisciplinesandPilots21ComplexSystemsinSmallRotor14CFR2X.1301Comparison2X.1301:Eachitemofinstalledequipmentmust-Beofakindanddesignappropriatetoitsintendedfunction;BelabeledastoitsfunctionandoperationallimitationsBeinstalledaccordingtoitslimitationsFunctionproperlywheninstalled.Althoughtherule&itsapplicationarethesame,theyresultindifferentrequirementsduetotheplatform’sdesign&operationaldifferences.2214CFR2X.1301Comparison2X.132X.1309Comparison2X.1309:Whiletherearesomedifferencesinthe14CFRParts23,25,27,29,ingeneral,theyallsaythateachitemshouldbesafeandreliableandnotadverselyaffectanyothersystem.Basically,thisistheregulationthatrequiresthathazardsposedbythesystemsinstalledonaircraftmustbeaddressedaspartofthecertificationprocess.RESOURCESAC27/29.1309SAEARP4754“GuidelinesforDevelopmentofCivilAircraftandSystems”.SAE

ARP4761"GuidelinesandMethodsforConductingtheSafetyAssessmentProcessonCivilAirborneSystemsandEquipment".OtherpublishedACGuidance(e.g.,21-40,27-1B,29-2B),FAAOrders,RTCADocuments.232X.1309Comparison2X.1309:Wh27.1309&29.1309ComparisonItisassumedthatthebasicPart27aircraftwillbecertifiedVFR.

27.1309onaVFRHelicopterdoesnotaddresssystemswhosefailureconditionsareassessedtobehigherthanmajor(i.e.hazardousorcatastrophic).Mayrequirespecialconditions

IftherotorcraftistobecertifiedforIFRflight,thenyoumustuse27appendix“B”whichinvokessomePart29rulesincludingportionsof29.1309.2427.1309&29.1309ComparisonItGuidanceMaterialAC27.1B,27.1309providesguidanceforcompliancetoFAR27.1309AC29-2C,29.1309providesguidanceforcompliancetoFAR29.1309BothACsrecognizeSAE-ARP4761/4754SystemSafetyAssessment(SSA)processAC20-174forcompliancetothenewARP4754A.25GuidanceMaterialAC27.1B,27.Complianceto27/29.1309XX.1309ComplianceData:Qualitative&QuantitativeanalysisrequiredforCatastrophic,Hazardous,andforcomplexsystemsthathaveMajorfailureclassifications.FHA,PSSA,FTA,FMEA&CCArequired.MustSubstantiateprobabilityoffailurereqmts.OnlyQualitativeassessmentrequiredfornon-complexMajorandMinorsystems.Noprobabilityoffailuresubstantiationrequired.26Complianceto27/29.1309XX.130SafetyAssessmentProcessFunctionalHazardAssessment(FHA)AircraftLevel&SystemsLevelFHAsUsedtoIdentifyEffects(i.e.FailureConditionCategories)ofSystemFailuresonAircraft5FailureConditionCategoriesCatastrophicHazardous/Severe-MajorMajorMinorNo-Effect27SafetyAssessmentProcessFunctSystemSafetyAssessmenthardwarerequirementsCatastrophic-

<1x10-9probabilityofOccurrenceHazardous/Severe-Major-

<1x10-7Major-

<1x10-5Minor-

<1x10-3No-Effect-noprobabilityofoccurrencereqmts.AsdefinedinAC27/29.1309&SAE

ARP4761"GuidelinesandMethodsforConductingtheSafetyAssessmentProcessonCivilAirborneSystemsandEquipment".28SystemSafetyAssessmenthardwSystemSafetyAssessmentSoftware&AEHRequirementsRTCA/DO-178BSoftwareLevelandRTCA/DO-254AEHLevelCommensuratewithFailureConditionCategoryLevelA(Catastrophic)LevelB(Hazardous/Severe-Major)LevelC(Major)LevelD(Minor)LevelE(NoSafetyEffect)29SystemSafetyAssessmentSoftw

AssessingtheEffectsofFailuresIntegrationofCockpitDisplaySystemsandPilotInterfaceInadditiontothesystemsengineeringspecialists,bothflighttestandHFevaluationofpilot-systeminterfaceisusedtoevaluateandclassifythehazardlevelofaparticularfailurecondition.Especiallyifitinvolvesthepilot–systeminterface(controlormisrepresentationtothepilotofinformation)30

AssessingtheEffectsofFailIssuestobeawareof:FHAshouldnotbeaccomplishedaftersystemdesignandinstallation.

PrimarypurposeofFHAistosetdesignstandards;nottoappeaseFAA

Donotusetheequipmentreli

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