企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)舞弊問(wèn)題探析,財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)論文

企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)舞弊問(wèn)題探析,財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)論文本篇論文目錄導(dǎo)航：【題目】企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)舞弊問(wèn)題探析【第一章】【第二章】【第三章】【第四章】【以下為參考文獻(xiàn)】摘要會(huì)計(jì)舞弊已經(jīng)存在于資本市場(chǎng)多年，成為我們每年老生常談的話題，但卻有著常談常新的特征，會(huì)計(jì)舞弊作為資本市場(chǎng)的頑疾影響我們國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。會(huì)計(jì)舞弊往往直接導(dǎo)致公司股票價(jià)格異常波動(dòng)，造成投資者的巨額損失，同時(shí)阻礙公司的可持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)與發(fā)展，使公司面臨退市的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，甚至還阻礙證券市場(chǎng)健康發(fā)展、影響資源有效配置、降低證券市場(chǎng)公信力等等，業(yè)內(nèi)人士不斷對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)舞弊問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生深入反思，分析會(huì)計(jì)舞弊產(chǎn)生的動(dòng)因、主要的手段和帶來(lái)的危害，怎樣有效地防備會(huì)計(jì)舞弊是資本市場(chǎng)亟需解決的現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題。本文首先介紹了研究背景及意義；其次介紹了會(huì)計(jì)舞弊相關(guān)理論，除舞弊三角理論外，更是運(yùn)用了西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的有限理性理論和委托代理理論，以人為本，分析了企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)相分離的前提下產(chǎn)生會(huì)計(jì)舞弊的原因。內(nèi)部控制理論則從企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制入手，闡述了薄弱的控制環(huán)境不利于產(chǎn)生高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)信息；第三章對(duì)SY公司現(xiàn)在狀況進(jìn)行描繪敘述，包括企業(yè)的簡(jiǎn)介、經(jīng)營(yíng)成果和公司內(nèi)部控制情況與治理機(jī)構(gòu)，對(duì)SY公司的會(huì)計(jì)舞弊手段進(jìn)行分析，揭示SY公司通過(guò)虛減存貨的方式虛增利潤(rùn)、利用虛構(gòu)購(gòu)銷合同的方式方法虛構(gòu)應(yīng)收票據(jù)進(jìn)行貼現(xiàn)、通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)方交易進(jìn)行應(yīng)付票據(jù)的銀行承兌、一次性將應(yīng)該遞延確認(rèn)的補(bǔ)助計(jì)入當(dāng)期營(yíng)業(yè)外收入、不合理的研發(fā)支出費(fèi)用進(jìn)行資本化計(jì)入當(dāng)期在建工程以獲取國(guó)家對(duì)高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)稅收上的優(yōu)惠與支持、在沒(méi)有專門借款合同的情況下將一般借款根據(jù)專門借款核算，其借款費(fèi)用全部予以資本化，主觀上存心故意延后資本化終止確認(rèn)時(shí)點(diǎn)，延長(zhǎng)資本化區(qū)間等舞弊行為。在這里基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)SY公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊的動(dòng)因從持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)壓力、管理層業(yè)績(jī)考核壓力、內(nèi)部控制形同虛設(shè)、會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所缺乏獨(dú)立性等四個(gè)方面進(jìn)行分析，并后續(xù)跟蹤了會(huì)計(jì)舞弊案件對(duì)企業(yè)造成的危害，用事實(shí)證明舞弊行為嚴(yán)重?fù)p害企業(yè)公信力；最后，針對(duì)該公司存在的詳細(xì)會(huì)計(jì)舞弊問(wèn)題，結(jié)合對(duì)2020年證監(jiān)會(huì)統(tǒng)計(jì)出的我們國(guó)家上市公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊情況的分析，提出從加強(qiáng)企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制、完善公司治理構(gòu)造、建立完善的管理層鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制、加大對(duì)舞弊行為的處理懲罰力度、定期更換會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所和加強(qiáng)員工研發(fā)能力等六個(gè)方面建議，有效地防備和治理睬計(jì)舞弊。本文關(guān)鍵詞語(yǔ)：會(huì)計(jì)信息失真；關(guān)聯(lián)交易；風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因子AbstractAccountingFraudalreadyexistsinthecapitalmarketformanyyears,hasbecomeourannualcommontheme,butithasoftentalkaboutnewfeaturesoften,fraudseriouslyhamperChinaseconomicdevelopment.Accountingfraudisoftenadirectresultofabnormalfluctuationsinstockprices,resultinginhugelossesforinvestors,whilepreventingthecompanyssustainablemanagement.Theindustrycontinuestohaveaprofoundreflectionofaccountingfraudproblem,analyzemotivesaccountingfraudoccurredmainlymeansandharm,howtoeffectivelypreventaccountingfraudisarealprobleminthecapitalmarketsshouldbesolved.Thisarticleintroducesthetheoryofaccountingfraud,fraudtriangletheorypressurefromaccountingfraud,motivationandexcusethreeaspectsofthefraudmotivation.Boundedrationalitytheoryandprincipal-agenttheoryisbasedonpeople-oriented,itanalyzesthecausesunderthepremiseofenterpriseownershipandmanagementseparationofaccountingfraud.Internalcontrolofaccountinginformationfromthetheoryofinternalcontrol,elaboratesaweakcontrolenvironmentisnotconducivetoproducinghighquality.ThethirdchapterdescribesthecurrentsituationSYcompanies,includingcorporateprofiles,resultsofoperationsandofinternalcontrolandgovernanceinstitutions,andthentoSYsaccountingfraudmeans,revealingSYcompanystockthroughfalsebywayofinflatedprofits,useoffictitiouspurchaseandsalecontractmethodoffictitiousdiscountednotesreceivable,notespayablewererelatedpartytransactionsbybankacceptance,itwillbeaone-timerecognitionofdeferredgovernmentgrantrecognizedincurrentoperatingincome,unreasonableRDexpensescapitalized,includedinthecurrentconstructioninordertoobtainstatebenefitsandsupportforhigh-techindustrytaxontheloancontractintheabsenceofspecialcircumstancesinaccordancewiththegeneralborrowingspecialloanaccounting,borrowingcostsarecapitalizedonthesubjectiveintentdelayCapitalisedderecognitionpointintime,toextendtherangeofcapitalandother.hentheSMcompanysaccountingfraudfromcontinuingoperationsMotivationpressure,pressuremanagementperformanceevaluation,internalcontroluselessandanalyzedfouraccountingfirmtoact,etc.,andfolloweduponthecasesofcorporateaccountingfraudharmcausedbyitsseriousItunderminesthecredibilityoftheenterprise;andfinally,forthecompanysspecificaccountingfraudproblemexists,combinedwithanalysisofthe2020statisticsoftheCommissionofChinaslistedcompaniesfinancialfraudcase,madefromstrengtheninginternalcontrols,improvethecorporategovernancestructure,establishasoundmanagementincentivemechanismandincreasethepenaltiesforfraudandperiodicreplacementofaccountingfirmsandothersixrecommendationstoeffectivelypreventanddealwithaccountingfraud.Keywords:Accountinginformationdistortion;Relatedpartytransactions;Riskfactor目錄內(nèi)容摘要ABSTRACT第1章緒論1.1研究背景及意義1.1.1研究背景1.1.2研究意義1.2研究?jī)?nèi)容及方式方法1.2.1研究?jī)?nèi)容1.2.2研究方式方法1.3國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)在狀況1.3.1國(guó)外研究現(xiàn)在狀況1.3.2國(guó)內(nèi)研究現(xiàn)在狀況第2章會(huì)計(jì)舞弊的相關(guān)理論2.1會(huì)計(jì)舞弊的界定2.2舞弊三角理論2.3有限理性理論2.4委托代理理論2.5內(nèi)部控制理論第3章SY公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊案例的描繪敘述3.1SY公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊回首3.1.1SY公司簡(jiǎn)介3.1.2SY公司經(jīng)營(yíng)成果3.1.3SY公司內(nèi)部控制大概情況3.1.4SY公司舞弊情況3.2SY公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊手段分析3.2.1虛減原材料成本3.2.2未披露關(guān)聯(lián)方應(yīng)付票據(jù)3.2.3通過(guò)補(bǔ)助操縱利潤(rùn)3.2.4研發(fā)支出項(xiàng)目造假3.2.5應(yīng)收票據(jù)貼現(xiàn)舞弊3.2.6借款費(fèi)用資本化舞弊3.3SY公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊動(dòng)因分析3.3.1企業(yè)持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)壓力3.3.2.管理層職位晉升及業(yè)績(jī)考核壓力3.3.3內(nèi)部控制形同虛設(shè)3.3.4會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所缺乏獨(dú)立性3.4會(huì)計(jì)舞弊事件對(duì)SY公司的影響3.4.1.股票價(jià)格波動(dòng)3.4.2企業(yè)融資信譽(yù)危機(jī)3.4.3企業(yè)公信力喪失第4章