服裝品牌的分銷渠道外文文獻(xiàn)

文獻(xiàn)出處：DicksonMA.Supplier-retailerrelationshipsinChina'sdistributionchannelforforeignbrandapparel[J].JournalofFashionMarketingandManagement:AnInternationalJournal,2014,8(2):201-220.Supplier-retailerrelationshipsinChina'sdistributionchannel

forforeignbrandapparelDickson,MarshaAAbstract:ThisstudyinvestigatedhowChineseretailersperceivetheirforeignbrandapparelsuppliersandexploredtheuseofpowertheoryforexplainingtheserelationships.Asurveyof150apparelretailersoperatinginBeijing,Chinaprovideddataforthestudy.Referentpowerpositivelyinfluencedretailers'attitudestowardandnon-economicsatisfactionwiththeirsuppliers.Greaterreferentpoweralsoreducedchannelconflictandenhancedeconomicsatisfactionwithbusinessperformance.TheimportanceofthissourceofpowerseemstobelinkedwiththeconceptofguanxiinChina,whererespectfulrelationshipsarevalued.Coercivethreatstowithholdnecessarymerchandise,service,orcontractsincreasedchannelconflict.Surprisingly,greaterchannelconflictwasassociatedwithincreasedeconomicsatisfactionwithbusinessperformance.ThisrelationshipiscontemplatedfromaculturalperspectiveandrecommendationsaremadetoforeignbrandapparelmanufacturerswishingtoaccessChina'sretailmarket.KeywordsChina,Distributionchannels,Retailers,SuppliersChina'sapparelmarkethasbecomeincreasinglyattractivetoforeignmanufacturersduetothegrowingnumberofconsumersofhighqualityforeignbrandapparel(LinandChen,1998;Peng,2002;Zhao,2003).ThepotentialofthismarketisevengreaterconsideringthatthePeople'sRepublicofChina(China)hasjoinedtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO);thisshouldassurethatforeignaccesstotheseconsumerswillincrease(HainanNewsNet,2003).Initially,mostforeignapparelmanufacturerswillneedtoutilizeChina'sexistingdistributionchannelstoaccessthismarket.ThestructureofdistributionchannelsinChina,particularlythechannelsforforeignbrandapparelproducts,isdifferentfromthoseinfreemarketsliketheUSAandotherdevelopedcountries(McClainandCheng,1995;SternquistandZhou,1995;Zhangetal.,2002).Scholarsarguethatresearchonretaildistributionchannelsinlessdevelopedcountries(LDCs),suchasChina,isimperativeifwesternscholarsandmarketersaretounderstandthepromisingLDCmarketsandpromoteexportstothemarkets(Goldman,1981;Samiee,1993).Thus,thepurposeofthisstudywastoexaminetheretaildistributionchannelsforforeignbrandapparelinChina.Specifically,weinvestigatedhowChineseretailersperceivetheirforeignbrandapparelsuppliersandexploredtheuseofpowertheoryforexplainingtheserelationships.Powertheoryarguesthatsomechannelparticipantshavepoweroverothers(El-AnsaryandStern,1972;HuntandNevin,1974).Knowledgeaboutthesourcesfromwhichpowerarises,howpowerisperceived,anditsimpactonbusinessrelationshipshaveimplicationsforforeignbusinessesthatwishtotaptheretailmarketinChina.PoliticalandculturalinfluencesondistributionchannelsinChinaChineseretailersoperateinanenvironmentdefinedbyanumberofmacrofactors,includingpoliticalandculturalfactors,affectingtheretailersandtheirchannelmembers(Kwanetal.,2003).AnexampleoftheinfluenceofpoliticalfactorsistherestrictivegovernmentregulationsrelatedtoimportingconsumergoodsintoChina.TheChinesegovernmentassignsforeigntradelicensestoalimitednumberoforganizationsandenterprises;onlythoseentitiesthathavebeenassignedlicensescanengageinforeigntrade(MinistryofForeignTradeandEconomicCooperation,PRC,2003;USDeptofCommerce,1999).BeforeApril1999,averylimitednumberofstate-ownedandtownshipenterprisesweregrantedtherightstoconductdirectexportandimportbusiness(HongKongTradeDevelopmentCouncil,1999).AfterApril1999,moreenterpriseshavebeenauthorizedforexportingandimportingbutstillonlyasmallnumberofprivateindustrialenterprises,massmerchandiseretailenterprises,andscientificandresearchinstitutionshavebeengrantedforeigntradeautonomy(ChinaCentralTelevision,1999;HongKongTradeDevelopmentCouncil,1999).ArecentinterviewbythesecondauthorwithagovernmentalofficialworkingattheBeijingBureauofIndustryandCommerceAdministrationrevealedthataconsiderablenumberofBeijingretailerswhowanttosellimportedapparelproductscannotdirectlyengageinforeigntrade.ConsequentlymostChineseapparelretailersmustrelyonforeigntradeoperatorstoactastheirexport/importagentstoobtainimportedapparel(Peng,2002;Zhangetal.,2002).ChineseretailerscanobtainforeignbrandnameproductsthroughasecondchannelthatdistributesproductsthatweremanufacturedinChina(LinandChen,1998;Zhangetal.,2002).Forforeignapparelmanufacturersproducingtheirproductsinjoint-ventureenterprisesinChina(definedascollaborativeapparel),ChineselawallowsaportionoftheirproductstobesoldwithinChina.However,collaborativeapparelproductsmustgothroughthelocaldistributionchannelinordertoreachtheretailfloor.Similartothesituationwithimports,withonlyafewexceptions,thislocaldistributionchannelhasbeenclosedtoforeigninvestors.Therefore,forChineseretailerswishingtooffereitherimportedorcollaborativeapparelwithforeignbrandnames,theytypicallymustaccesstheseproductsindirectlythroughforeigntradeoperators(suppliers)(Zhangetal.,2002).Aswellasmaintainingcontroloverimportingandexporting,theChinesegovernmentalsocontrolsthedistributionchannelsforconsumergoodsPeptofCommerce,1999;HongKongTradeDevelopmentCouncil,1999).MostChinese-Foreignjoint-ventureenterprisesareprohibitedfromengagingindistributionactivitiessuchaswholesaling(TheWorldJournal,1999a)[1].Whollyforeign-investeddistributionandwholesalingbusinessesareallowedonlyinthefourcitiesofBeijing,Shanghai,Tianjin,andChongqing,whicharedirectlyadministeredbythecentralgovernment(TheWorldJournal,1999a,b).Thus,formostforeignapparelmanufacturers,criticalaccesstoChina'sretailmarketwillbecontrolledbyaChineseagentwhoactsasthesupplierforChineseretailers.Foratleasttworeasons,itwouldbevaluabletounderstandtherelationshipsthesesuppliershavewithChineseretailers.First,mostforeignapparelmanufacturersarelikelytorelinquishsomecontrolovertheirbusinesstotheseagents.Itwouldbehelpfultoconsiderhowretailersperceivetheseagents.Second,astheChinesegovernmentfurtherrelaxesrestrictionsonforeigninvolvementinimportinganddistribution,foreignapparelmanufacturerswilleventuallybeallowedtoengagedirectlywithChineseretailers.Thesebusinesseswouldbenefitfromknowinghowretailersperceivedistribution-relatedactivitiesandbusinessstrategies,andhowpowerismaintainedwithintheserelationships.BecausepowertheorywasdevelopedprimarilyintheUSA,theinfluenceofChina'suniqueculturalfactorsmustbeconsideredwhenexaminingrelationshipsamongforeignbrandapparelsuppliersandChineseretailers.Thestructureofadistributionchannelisinfluencedbyitssocialandculturalcontext(OlsenandGranzin,1990).TwofactorsinfluencingChinesebehaviorareguanxiand"face"(KimandNam,1998).GuanxireferstotheinformalnetworksandrelationshipsgoverningbusinessactivitythroughoutChina.Guanxirelationshipscontrastwiththemorelegal,contract-basedrelationshipsfoundinthewesternworld(Lovettetal.,1999).Withguanxi,relationshipsarestrengthened"throughexchangesofrespectandaffection,aswellasmaterialobjectsorspecificfavors"(Lovettetal.,1999,p.232).Lovettetal.(1999)provideexamplessupportingthecentralityofrelationshipsandtrusttobuyer-supplierrelationshipsinaguanxi-type.businesssystem.Guanxiprovidesassurancetobuyersthattheyarehighprioritytosuppliers,thatthesuppliershavetheneededabilitytosatisfythebuyers'needs,andthatsupplierswillnotcheatthem.Kwanetal.(2003)suggestthatforeignerswishingtobeinvolvedintheretailbusinessinChinashouldcultivategoodguanxiwithChinesebureaucratsbecauseitmayinfluencewhetherregulationsareinterpretedinamannerthatfavorstheforeignbusiness.AsecondculturalfactorpotentiallyimpactingrelationshipswithinChina'sdistributionchannelsisthatofface.AmongAsians,facerefersto:...therespectabilityand/ordeferencewhichapersoncanclaimforhimselffromothers,byvirtueoftherelativepositionheoccupiesinhissocialnetworkandthedegreetowhichheisjudgedtohavefunctionedadequatelyinthatpositionaswellasacceptablyinhisgeneralconduct(Ho,1976,p.883).KimandNam(1998)believethatconcernwithfacestemsfromAsia'scollectivistculture,whereharmoniousandinterdependentrelationshipsamonggroupsaredesired.Generally,Asianswishtoextendapositiveimageofthemselvestoothers.FaceislinkedwithsocialstatusandlosingfaceisthoughttobegreatlyconcerningtoChinesebecauseitbringsquestiontowhetheraperson'ssocialstatusislegitimate.KimandNam(1998)linkfacewithpowerinbusinesssettingsbyproposingthatmanagementishighlysensitivetoface-savingandhasresponsibilityformaintainingandcultivatingthesocialnetworksneededtocreatesuccessfulworkingrelationshipsamongpersons/groupswithdifferingsocialstatusandpower.Oneisexpectedtosavethefaceofanyonewithwhomonehasguanxirelationships,oranticipateretaliationfromthosewhosefacehasnotbeensaved(Luketal.,1999).Althoughwedidnot????a?measureguanxiorface,itisimportanttocontemplatetheirimpactswheninterpretingrelationshipswithinthedistributionchannel.Theoreticalbase:distributionchannelpowerPowerisaconceptcentraltounderstandinginter-organizationalrelationshipsinamarketingchannel(Stern,1988).Powerhasgenerallybeendefinedasonechannelparticipant'sabilitytocontrolthedecisionvariablesinthemarketingstrategyofanotheratadifferentlevelinthechannel(El-AnsaryandStern,1972).Thefoundationofchannelpoweristheinterdependenceofchannelparticipantsuponeachotherfordesirableresources(FrenchandRaven,1959),suchasscarcerawmaterials,heavilydemandedproducts,andinformation(Dahl,1957;SternandEl-Ansary,1982;SternandReve,1980).Desirableresourcesalsoinvolveperformingspecializedmarketingfunctionssuchastheabilitytoprovideassistanceandreward,thelegitimaterighttoinfluenceothers(suchasanautomanufacturer'srighttoinfluenceitsdealers'businessoperationsunderalegalcontract),andtheabilitytoimposepunishment(El-AnsaryandStern,1972;HuntandNevin,1974;SternandReve,1980).Thesourcesfromwhichchannelpowerisgeneratedfallintosixcategories:reward,coercion,referent,legitimate,expert,andinformation(RavenandKruglanski,1970;SternandEl-Ansary,1982).Thesepowersourcesaredefinedrespectivelyasachannelparticipant'sabilitytoproviderewards,capabilityofexertingpunishment,relevancetodesiredoutcomes,legitimaterighttoinfluenceotherparticipants,perceivedexpertise,andabilitytoprovideusefulinformation(RavenandKruglanski,1970;SternandEl-Ansary,1982).Thesixpowersourceshavebeendichotomizedtosimplifyresearch.HuntandNevin(1974)dividedthepowersourcesintocoerciveandnoncoercive,withcoercivesourcesincludingabilitytoapplypunishment(anegativeaspectofreward)andnoncoercivepowersourcesencompassingthepositiveaspectsofreward,andlegitimate,expert,referent,andinformationsources.Alatermeta-analysisoftheresultsof93studiesfocusedonsatisfactioninmarketingchannelrelationshipsindicatedthatrewardsactinamorecoercivethannoncoerciveway,similartothreats(Geyskensetal.,1999).Besidespowersources,thereareseveralothervariablesexaminedinpowertheoryresearchincludingattributedpower,channelparticipants'attitudestowardeachother,conflictbetweenchannelparticipants,participants'satisfactionwiththeirpartners,andparticipants'businessperformanceandeconomicsatisfaction.Inthefollowingsections,therelationshipsbetweenthesevariablesarereviewed.InfluenceofpowersourcesSeveralstudieshaveexaminedtherelationshipsbetweenvariouspowersourcesandattributedpower,channelconflict,attitudestowardchannelparticipants,andsatisfactionwithchannelparticipants.Attributedpoweristhepowerwieldedbyapowerholderandattributedbythepowerreceivertotheholder(El-AnsaryandStern,1972).Attributedpowerhasbeenfoundtobepositively(Etgar,1978;LuschandBrown,1982;Wilkinson,1981),non-significantly(Gaski,1986;Howell,1987),orevennegatively(GaskiandNevin,1985)relatedtocoercivepowersources.Likewise,fornoncoercivepowersources,positive(GaskiandNevin,1985;HuntandNevin,1974),negative(LuschandBrown,1982),andnon-significantrelationships(Howell,1987)withattributedpowerhaveallbeenidentified.Comparedtotheconflictingfindingsbetweenpowersourcesandattributedpower,findingslinkingthepowersourceswithchannelconflictaremuchclearer.Channelconflictisastateoftensionbetweentwochannelparticipants(RavenandKruglanski,1970).Intheirmeta-analysisGeyskensetal.(1999)foundthattheuseofbothcoercivethreatsandpromises(rewards)ledtogreaterchannelconflict.Useofthreatshadagreaterimpactonchannelconflictthandiduseofrewards.Useofnoncoercivepowersourceslessenedchannelconflict.RavenandKruglanski(1970)proposedthatuseofcoerciveandrewardpowersourceswouldleadtonegativeattitudestowardchannelparticipantsandthispropositionwassupported(FrazierandSummers,1986;John,1984).Similartotheirrelationshipswithchannelconflict,coercivepower(threats)hadagreaternegativeeffectonattitudesthandidrewardpower(John,1984).Ontheotherhand,channelparticipants'useofnoncoercivepowerresultedinpositiveattitudes(FrazierandSummers,1986).Powermayalsoinfluencechannelparticipantsatisfaction.Satisfactionisthedegreetowhichaparticipantissatisfiedwiththechannelarrangementandtheexchangerelationship(FrazierandSummers,1986;Gaski,1986).Therationaleisthatpowerintheformofassistance(noncoercive)enhancesthesatisfactionoftheweakchannelparticipant;whereas,threatsgenerateanxiety,resistance,andeventuallyabandonmentofthechannelrelationship(Baldwin,1971;FrenchandRaven,1959;KasulisandSpekman,1980).Empirically,researchersfoundthatcoercivepowernegativelyinfluencessatisfaction(FrazierandSummers,1986;HuntandNevin,1974),whilenoncoercivepowerhasapositiveimpactonsatisfaction(Gaski,andNevin,1985;HuntandNevin,1974).However,contraryfindingsalsoexist.Wilkinson(1981)reportedaninsignificantrelationshipbetweencoercivepowerandsatisfaction.Themixedresultsmaybeattributedtodifferingdimensionsofsatisfaction.Intheirmeta-analysisof93studies,Geyskensetal.(1999)foundsupportfortwodimensionsofsatisfaction,economicandnon-economic.Non-economicsatisfactiondealtwiththenegativeandpositiveaspectsofthesocial-psychologicalrelationship;itwasreducedwiththeuseofthreatsorrewards.Ontheotherhand,economicsatisfactiondescribednegativeorpositiveresponsetofinancialoutcomesofarelationship;itwasnegativelyinfluencedbyuseofcoercivethreatsbutpositivelyinfluencedbytheuseofrewards.RelationshipsamongothervariablesChannelparticipants'attitudestowardandsatisfactionwithpowerholders,channelconflict,andeconomicsatisfactionarealsorelated,althoughthereareconflictingfindingsonthespecificsoftherelationships(e.g.Frazieretal.,1989;Gaski,1986;Wilkinson,1981).Itseemsthatchannelconflictformsthebasisforpositiveornegativeattitudestowardsuppliers.Negativeattitudestowardsupplierscanleadtoreducedsatisfaction,possibledissolutionofthebusinessrelationship,anddiminishedbusinessperformanceorreducedeconomicsatisfaction(FrazierandSummers,1986;GaskiandNevin,1985;Geyskensetal.,1999;Lusch,1976,1977).Geyskensetal.(1999)foundthatchannelconflictwasnegativelyrelatedtoeconomicsatisfaction.LimitationsofthepreviousstudiesAtleasttwolimitationsexistwiththestudiesondistributionchannelsfromapowerperspective.First,moststudieshavefocusedonchannelswithinwesternculturesanddevelopedcountries,withafewexceptionssuchasinIndia(Frazieretal.,1989;Kale,1986).Therefore,aquestionarisesastotheapplicabilityofsuchfindingstoothercountries,especiallyLDCswheresocial/culturalfactors,channelstructure,proliferationofmiddlemen,andbusinessphilosophyprovidedissimilarsituationsforchannelparticipants(CunninghamandGreen,1984;Frazieretal.,1989;Johnsonetal.,1990;1993).ByinvestigatingpowerrelationshipsinappareldistributionandretailinginChina,thisstudybeginstofillthisgapintheknowledgebaseonforeigndistributionchannels.Asecondlimitationisthatmostofthestudiesondistributionchannelrelationshipshavefocusedonproducttypesotherthanapparel(ZuHoneandMorganosky,1995).Forexample,studieshaveexaminedchannelsforautomobiles(Frazier,1983;FrazierandSummers,1986),fastfood(HuntandNevin,1974),generalconsumergoods(Johnsonetal.,1990,1993;SpehandBonfield,1978),andpaint,wallcoveringsandotherhardware,andhomeappliances(Brownetal.,1995a).Kwanetal.(2003)suggestthatChineseretailersarecreatingsourcingstrategiesaimedatincreasingtheirpoweroversuppliers;however,theydidnotcollectempiricaldatatosupportthisclaim.ThepresentstudyusesapowertheoryframeworktogaininsightintotherelationshipsbetweenforeignbrandapparelsuppliersandChineseretailers.ResearchhypothesesFindingsfrompreviousstudiesusingpowertheoryhaveoftenconflictedwitheachother;thusmakingitdifficulttohypothesizerelationshipsforthisstudy.Themeta-analysisconductedbyGeyskensetal.(1999)helpstoclarifysomeoftheconflictingrelationships.Webasedourhypotheses,whicharevisuallydepictedinFigure1,onacombinationoffindingsfrompreviousstudiesandconsiderationoftheirapplicationtoChineseculture[2]:H1.ThesourcesofpowerheldbyforeignapparelsuppliersarepositivelyrelatedtothepowerattributedtothesuppliersbyChineseretailers:(a)referentpowerispositivelyrelatedtoattributedpower;(b)informationpowerispositivelyrelatedtoattributedpower;(c)rewardpowerispositivelyrelatedtoattributedpower;(d)legitimatepowerispositivelyrelatedtoattributedpower;(e)coercivepowerispositivelyrelatedtoattributedpower.H2.Thesourcesofpowerheldbyforeignapparelsuppliersaresignificantlyrelatedtochannelconflict:(a)referentpowerisnegativelyrelatedtochannelconflict;(b)informationpowerisnegativelyrelatedtochannelconflict;(c)rewardpowerispositivelyrelatedtochannelconflict;(d)legitimatepowerisnegativelyrelatedtochannelconflict;(e)coercivepowerispositivelyrelatedtochannelconflict.H3.ThesourcesofpowerheldbyforeignapparelsuppliersaresignificantlyrelatedtoChineseretailers'attitudestowardandnon-economicsatisfactionwithsuppliers:(a)referentpowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'attitudesandnon-economicsatisfaction;(b)informationpowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'attitudesandnon-economicsatisfaction;(c)rewardpowerisnegativelyrelatedtoretailers'attitudesandnon-economicsatisfaction;(d)legitimatepowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'attitudesandnon-economicsatisfaction;(e)coercivepowerisnegativelyrelatedtoretailers'attitudesandnon-economicsatisfaction.(完整文獻(xiàn)請到百度文庫)H4.ThesourcesofpowerheldbyforeignapparelsuppliersaresignificantlyrelatedtoChineseretailers'economicsatisfaction:(a)referentpowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'economicsatisfaction;(b)informationpowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'economicsatisfaction;(c)rewardpowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'economicsatisfaction;(d)legitimatepowerispositivelyrelatedtoretailers'economicsatisfaction;(e)coercivepowerisnegativelyrelatedtoretailers'economicsatisfaction.H5.Attributedpowerispositivelyrelatedtochannelconflict.H6.ChannelconflictisnegativelyrelatedtoChineseretailers'attitudetowardandnon-economicsatisfactionwithsuppliers.H7.Chineseretailers'attitudestowardandsatisfactionwithsuppliersispositivelyrelatedtoretailereconomicsatisfaction.H8.Channelconflictisnegativelyrelatedtoretailereconomicsatisfaction.MethodSampleThesamplewasdrawnfromalistofallretailstoresinBeijing,includingdepartmentstoresandapparelspecialtystores,providedbytheBeijingStatisticsBureau(BSB),agovernmentresearchorganizationthatwecontractedtoassistwithdatacollection.The536retailstoreslistedwerecontactedbytheBSB,and198ofthemconfirmedthattheycarriedforeignbrandapparel,eitherimportedfromoverseasormanufacturedwithinChina.AllretailersparticipatinginthesurveywererecruitedfromBeijing,Chinafortworeasons.First,assistancewithdatacollectionwasavailableinBeijing.Second,thesaleofforeignbrandapparelisconcentratedinChina'smajorcities,includingBeijing(Kwanetal.,2003;LinandChen,1998).QuestionnairesweredistributedbytheBSBtothe198storeswithacoverletterdescribingthestudy.Theretailersreturnedcompletedquestionnairesviamailorfacsimile.Aftertwoweeks,remindercallsweremadetothosewhohadnotresponded.Uponreceipt,eachquestionnairewascheckedandacallwasmadeencouragingtheretailertoprovideinformationonincompleteitems.QuestionnaireThequestionnaireincludedfoursectionsandwasdesignedtomeasurethesixsourcesofchannelpower,attributedpower,channelconflict,retailers'attitudestowardT? ? ? ? ?T T? ? ? ? ?Tsuppliers,non-economicsatisfactionwithsuppliers,economicsatisfactionwithsuppliers,andretailerdemographics.SectionIcontaineditemsaddressingretailerdemographiccharacteristics.InSectionII,16itemsexaminedretailers'attributionsofchannelpowertotheirsuppliers(1=ourstorehasalmostcompleteresponsibilityforthis,6=oursuppliershavealmostcompleteresponsibility).Consistentwithpreviousresearch,theitemsfocusedonavarietyofmarketingstrategies(SpehandBonfield,1978)andweredevelopedfromareviewofrelatedstudies(Brownetal.,1983;Croninetal.,1994;El-AnsaryandStern,1972;HuntandNevin,1974;LuschandBrown,1982).SectionIIIincluded40itemsassessingtheretailers'perceptionsofpowersources,attitudestowardsuppliers,channelconflict,andsatisfactionwithsuppliers(1=stronglydisagree,6=stronglyagree).Theitemswerebasedonrelatedstudies(Brownetal.,1995b;FrazierandRody,1991;FrazierandSummers,1986;Gaski,1986;HuntandNevin,1974;Johnsonetal.,1993;RavenandKruglanski,1970).SectionIVincludedthreeitemsmeasuringtheretailers'economicsatisfactionwithbusinessperformance.Twoitems,adaptedfrompreviousresearch(GaskiandNevin,1985),measuredhowwelltheretailersmettheirsalestargetandhowtheirstoresperformedincomparisonwithsimilarstores(1=verypoor,6=verywell).Athirditem,developedforthisresearch,examinedhowretailersratetheirperformanceonsalesofforeignbrandapparelincomparisonwithsalesofdomesticbrandapparel.Throughoutthequestionnairewedecidedtousesix-pointratherthanseven-pointscalesforallitemsbecausetheChinesetendtoexpressneutralopinions(Shenkar,1994;Xing,1995).Asix-pointscalewasselectedtoeliminatethepossibilityofaneutral(4)responseonaseven-pointscale.Pre-testingThequestionnairewasfirstdevelopedinEnglish.TwobilingualChinesedoctoralstudentstranslatedtheEnglishversionintoMandarin.Afterapre-testwithnineBeijingretailers,thequestionnairewasmodified.TypesofchangesincludedrephrasingsomewordssothattheitemsmorevalidlydescribedtheChinesebusinesscontext.Next,abacktranslationwasperformedinBeijingbyathirdChinesegraduatestudent.ThequestionnairewasfurtherrefineduntiltherewereminimaldifferencesbetweentheMandarinandEnglishversions.DataanalysisDemographicdataontherespondingretailerswereanalyzedwithdescriptivestatistics.BecauseofthewidedifferencesbetweenChinese/EasterncultureandUS/Westernculture,weviewedthestudyasexploratoryratherthanoneaimedatconfirmingexistingtheory.Assuchweutilizedprincipalcomponentsanalysiswithvarimaxrotationtoexplorelatentvariablesindicatedwiththeitemsmeasuringpowersources.WeexaminedtheconceptualclarityoffactorswithEigenvaluesgreaterthan1anddeletedcross-loadeditemsanditemsloadinglessthan0.6onanyfactor.Usingthesamecriteria,aprincipalcomponentsanalysiswasalsoconductedwiththe16itemsmeasuringattributedpower.Finally,athirdprincipalcomponentsanalysisincluded12itemsmeasuringchannelconflict,retailers'attitudestowardsuppliers,satisfactionwithsuppliers,andretailereconomicsatisfactionwithbusinessperformance.Toassessinternalconsistencyofthefactors,wecalculatedCronbach'salphaforeachfactor.Theitemsretainedfortheresultingvariablesweresummedanddividedbythenumberofitemsinthevariabletoreturnthemtotheoriginalscale.Afteridentifyingandcomputingthevariablestobeusedforfurtheranalysis,weusedaseriesofmultipleandsimpleregressionanalysestotestthehypotheses.Ap-valueof0.05wasusedasacriterionforalltestsofsignificance.ResultsSampledemographicsUseablequestionnaireswerereceivedfrom150retailersfora75.8percentresponserate.TheratherhighresponserateistypicalforsurveysconductedinChina(RosenandChu,1987),andwaslikelyenhancedbecauseoftheinvolvementoftheBSBindatacollection.BusinessesinChinaareaccustomedtoreportingtothegovernmentandtheBSBisagovernmentagency.Respondingretailerswe