危險海峽：未來臺灣沖突的戰(zhàn)爭模擬（英）-新美國安全中心

JUNE2022

DangerousStraits

WargamingaFutureConflictoverTaiwan

StaciePettyjohn,BeccaWasser,andChrisDougherty

AbouttheAuthors

StaciePettyjohnisaSeniorFellowandDirectoroftheDefenseProgramatCNAS.

Herareasofexpertiseincludedefensestrategy,posture,forceplanning,thedefensebudget,andwargaming.PriortojoiningCNAS,Pettyjohnspentover10yearsattheRANDCorporationasa

politicalscientist.Between2019–2021,shewasthedirectorofthestrategyanddoctrineprograminProjectAirForce.From2014–2020,sheservedastheco-directoroftheCenterforGaming.In2020,shewasavolunteerontheBidenadministration’sdefensetransitionteam.Shehasdesignedandledstrategicandoperationalgamesthathaveassessednewoperationalconcepts,testedtheimpactsofnewtechnology,examinednuclearescalationandwarfighting,andexploredunclearphenomena,suchasgrayzonetacticsandinformationwarfare.Previously,shewasaresearchfellowattheBrookingsInstitution,apeacescholarattheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,andaTAPIRfellowattheRANDCorporation.Pettyjohnholds

aPhDandanMAinforeignaffairsfromtheUniversityofVirginiaandaBAinhistoryandpoliticalsciencefromtheOhioStateUniversity.

BeccaWasserisaFellowintheDefenseProgramandco-leadoftheGamingLabatCNAS.Herresearchareasincludedefensestrategy,forcedesign,strategicandoperationalplanning,forcepostureandemployment,andwargaming.PriortojoiningCNAS,Wasserwasaseniorpolicy

analystattheRANDCorporation,wheresheledresearchprojectsandwargamesfortheDepartmentofDefenseandotherU.S.governmententities.SheholdsaBAfromBrandeisUniversityandanMSinforeignservicefromtheEdmundA.WalshSchoolofForeignServiceatGeorgetownUniversity.

ChrisDoughertyisaSeniorFellowintheDefenseProgramandco-leadoftheGamingLabatCNAS.Hisprimaryresearchareasincludedefensestrategy,operationalconcepts,andforceplanning.PriortojoiningCNAS,Doughertyservedassenioradvisortothedeputyassistant

secretaryofdefenseforstrategyandforcedevelopmentattheDepartmentofDefense.Duringthistime,heledahandfulofmajorinitiatives,includingthedevelopmentandwritingofmajorsectionsofthe2018NationalDefenseStrategy.

AbouttheDefenseProgram

Duringthepast15years,CNAShasdefinedthefutureofU.S.defensestrategy.Buildingonthislegacy,theCNASDefenseProgramteamcontinuestodevelophigh-levelconceptsandconcreterecommendationstoensureU.S.militarypreeminenceintothefuture,andtoreversetheerosionofU.S.militaryadvantagesvis-à-visChinaand,toalesserextent,Russia.Specificareasofstudyincludeconcentratingongreat-powercompetition,developinga

forcestructureandinnovativeoperationalconceptsadaptedforthismorechallengingera,andmakinghardchoicestoeffectnecessarychange.ThispaperisapartoftheGamingLabatCNAS,alargerinitiativeledbytheDefenseProgramthatdevelopshighlytailoredunclassifiedgamesandexercisestohelppolicymakersandotherstakeholdersgaincriticalinsightsintokeynationalsecurityproblems.

Acknowledgments

Theauthorswouldliketothanktheparticipantsofthewargame:BryceBarros,RyanEvans,MichèleFlournoy,RichardFontaine,Rep.MikeGallagher,CristinaGarafola,MikeHolmes,BonnyLin,Rep.MikieSherrill,andJoelWuthnow.TheywouldalsoliketothankChuckToddandtheMee??VePressproductionteamatNBCNews.AtCNAS,theythankEDMcGradyandHannahDennisfortheircontributiontowargamedesign,adjudication,andmanagement;MauraMcCarthy,MelodyCook,EmmaSwislow,andRinRothbackfortheirpublicationanddesignsupport;andLilySchleimanandJohnO’Malleyfortheirnotetakingassistance.ThisreportwasmadepossiblewithgeneralsupporttoCNAS’DefenseProgram.

Asaresearchandpolicyinstitutioncommittedtothehigheststandardsoforganizational,intellectual,andpersonalintegrity,CNASmaintainsstrictintellectualindependenceandsoleeditorialdirectionandcontroloveritsideas,projects,publications,events,andotherresearchactivities.CNASdoesnottakeinstitutionalpositionsonpolicyissues,andthecontentofCNASpublicationsreflectstheviewsoftheirauthorsalone.Inkeepingwithitsmissionandvalues,CNASdoesnotengageinlobbyingactivityandcompliesfullywithallapplicablefederal,state,andlocallaws.CNASwillnotengageinanyrepresentationalactivitiesoradvocacyonbehalfofanyentitiesorinterestsand,totheextentthattheCenteracceptsfundingfromnon-U.S.sources,itsactivitieswillbelimitedtobonafidescholastic,academic,andresearch-relatedactivities,consistentwithapplicablefederallaw.TheCenterpubliclyacknowledgesonitswebsiteannuallyalldonorswhocontribute.

(WilliamPlowman/NBCNews)

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DEFENSE|JUNE2022

DangerousStraits:WargamingaFutureConflictoverTaiwan

ExecutiveSummary

Untilrecently,U.S.policymakersandsubjectmatterexpertshaveviewedthePeople’sRepublicofChina’s(PRC’s)forcibleunificationwithTaiwanasadistantthreat.ButthemixofrapidChinesemilitarymodern-ization,anarrowwindowforlocalizednear-paritywiththeU.S.military,andgrowingpessimismabouttheprospectsforpeacefulunificationmayleadthePRCtoperceivethatithastheabilitytopursueasuccessfuloperationagainstTaiwan.Beijing’slessonslearnedfromRussia’sinvasionofUkrainecouldpromptthePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)toadjustitswarplansforTaiwantobecomemoreeffectiveanddeadly.Coupledtogether,thesedevelopmentsmaysuggestanacceleratedtimelineforseizingTaiwan.ItisthereforeurgentthattheUnitedStates,inconjunc-tionwithitsregionalalliesandpartners,identifywaystodeterthePRCfrominvadingTaiwanandpreventafutureconflict.

Todoso,theGamingLabatCNAS,inpartnershipwithNBC’sMeetthePress,conductedahigh-levelstrategic-operationalwargameexploringafictionalwaroverTaiwan,setin2027.ThewargamesoughttoilluminatethedilemmasthatU.S.andChinesepoli-cymakersmightfaceinsuchaconflict,alongwiththestrategiestheymightadopttoachievetheiroverar-chingobjectives.ThegamewasintendedtoproduceinsightsastohowtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartnerscoulddeterthePRCfrominvadingTaiwanandcouldbetterpositionthemselvestodefendTaiwananddefeatsuchaggressionshoulddeterrencefail.

ThewargameindicatedthereisnoquickvictoryforeithersideifChinadecidestoinvadeTaiwan.NeithersidefeltasthoughithadlostthefightoverTaiwan,andeventhoughChinahopedtoachieveaswiftanddecisivevictory,itwaspreparedforalongfight.Beijingwasfacedwithadilemma:whethertokeepthewarlimitedandhopetheUnitedStatesdidnotbecomeinvolved,ortopreemptivelystrikeU.S.targetstoimproveChineseprobabilityofsuccess,butatthehighcostofprolongingtheconflict.Insuchascenario,neitherBeijingnorWashingtonislikelytohavetheupperhandafterthefirstweekoftheconflict,whichsuggestsaprotractedconflict.

Moreover,aconflictoverTaiwanmayquicklyleadtoconsequencesfarbeyondwhatBeijingandWashingtonintend.Thewargamedemonstratedhowquicklyaconflictcouldescalate,withbothChinaandtheUnitedStatescrossingredlines.Thereisahighriskthatdeterrentsignalsmaybemisreadina

potentialfuturefightduetodifferencesinmilitarystrengthsandweaknesses,andtheseshapethetypesofescalationBeijingandWashingtonarelikelytoselect.Asthewargameillustrated,despiteitsdeclaredpolicyofnofirstuse,ChinamaybewillingtobrandishnuclearweaponsorconductalimiteddemonstrationofitsnuclearcapabilityinanefforttopreventorendU.S.involvementinaconflictwithTaiwan.

Thewargamehighlightedanadditionalasymmetryinthistension:therolethatcapableU.S.alliesandpartnerscouldplayinafutureconflict.NotonlydoesChinalacksuchrelationships,butcapablemilitarypartnersontheU.S.sideaddsignificantcombatpower,depth,andstrategicsignificancetoeffortstodefendTaiwan.ThisfurthercomplicatesPRCdeci-sion-makingabouthowittomaychoosetoinvadeTaiwan,andabouthowitmayseektodeterU.S.andalliedinvolvement.

Ultimately,thewargameindicatesthattheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartnershaveanopportunitytotakestepstosignificantlystrengthendeterrenceandensurethatthePRCneverseesaninvasionofTaiwanasaprofitableoption.But,inordertochangetheIndo-Pacificmilitarybalanceintheirfavoranddeveloptheadvancementsincapability,posture,andplanningthatcanholdPRCaggressionatbay,theUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartnersmusttakeimmediatestepsinseveralkeyareas.

First,theU.S.DepartmentofDefenseshouldmakesustainedinvestmentsinlong-rangeprecision-guidedweaponsandunderseacapabilities,whilealsodevel-opingadditionalbasingaccessintheIndo-Pacificregiontofacilitateoperationsandenhancesurviv-ability.TheDoDshoulddeepenitsstrategicandoperationalplanningwithhighlycapablealliessuchasJapanandAustraliatoimprovetheircollectiveabilitytorespondtoChineseaggressionagainstTaiwan.Additionally,DoDplanningshouldmovebeyonddefeatingarapidinvasiontoconsiderhowtofightaprotractedwarandmakechangestofacilitatelong-termoperationsandfavorablewartermination.Finally,thedepartmentoughttoexploretherisksofescalationinthecontextofawarwithChina,sothatthesecanbeanticipated,prevented,andmanaged.

Second,theU.S.CongressshouldenablekeyimprovementsthroughthePacificDeterrenceInitiativeandshouldhelpshapeTaiwan’smilitaryposture.Third,Taiwanmustimproveitsdefensivecapabilitiesbyinvestinginasymmetric,resilient,andattritablecapa-bilitiesbyincreasingtrainingforitsactiveandreserveforces;andbystockpilingkeyweaponsandsupplies.

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Introduction

Russia’sinvasionofUkrainein2022shockedtheworld,upendingtheassumptionthatalarge-scaleconventionalwarinEuropewasinconceivable.RussianPresidentVladimirPutin’sovertuseofviolenceshat-teredassumptionsthatrevisioniststatessuchasRussiawouldpursuetheiraimsthroughcovertsubversionandcoercivestatecraft,belowthethresholdofwar.1Russia’sinvasionhasraisedfearsthattheworldfacesanauthor-itarianassaultonfreedomanddemocracy.RippleeffectsoftheUkrainewarareglobal,andthelessonsofthisconflictextendfarbeyondEurope’sborders.

Fordecades,defenseanalystshavewarnedthatChinesemilitarymodernizationwasshiftingthebalanceofpowerinEastAsia,potentiallyenablingChinatoseizeTaiwan.2Taiwanhasgoverneditselfsince1949,whenChiangKai-Shek’sKuomintangforcesfledthereaftertheirdefeatintheChineseCivilWar,butthePeople’sRepublicofChinahasinsistedthatTaipeiisabreakawayprovincethatmustunitewithBeijing.Whilecross-straittensionshavewaxedandwanedoverthepast73years,thepotentialuseofovertmilitaryforceagainstTaiwanisofutmostconcerntoU.S.policymakers—

EventsinEuropehavemadetheseconcerns

moreurgent.WhiletheinvasionofUkrainedoes

notnecessarilyportendaninvasionofTaiwan,

ChinaislearningfromRussia’smisstepsand

thinkingabouthowtoaddressdeficienciesinits

ownforces,plans,andstrategy.9Beijingislikely

alsoassessingU.S.andinternationalresponsesto

aggressionagainstTaiwan.Foritspart,Taiwanis

drawinglessonsaboutUkraine’sstaunchresis-

tanceandconsideringthecapabilities,training,

andoperationalconceptsthatwouldbeneeded

todefenditselfagainstaChineseinvasion.10More

recently,U.S.PresidentJoeBidenstatedthatthe

UnitedStateswouldcommitmilitaryresourcesto

TaiwanshouldChinaattack.AlthoughtheWhite

HousedeniedanychangeinofficialU.S.policy,the

president’sstatementveersfromtheU.S.approach

of“strategicambiguity,”inwhichitisunclear

whethertheUnitedStateswouldcometoTaiwan’s

aidincaseofaninvasion,andmaybeviewedas

WashingtonissuingadeterrentthreattoBeijing.11

Consideringthesedevelopments,theGaming

LabatCNAS,inpartnershipwithNBCNews’s

MeetthePress,conductedawargametoexplore

afictionalwar

evenmoresoafter

Russia’sattack

onUkraine.3

Untilrecently,

U.S.officialsand

expertshaveseen

forcibleunifica-

tionasadistant

threatbecause

WhiletheinvasionofUkrainedoesnotnecessarilyportendaninvasionofTaiwan,ChinaislearningfromRussia’smisstepsandthinkingabouthowtoaddressdeficienciesinitsownforces,plans,andstrategy.

overTaiwan,setin

2027.12Thegame

soughttoillumi-

natetheoptions

thatU.S.and

Chinesepolicy-

makersmighthave

insuchaconflict,

thedilemmasthey

oftheimmensechallengeandriskoflaunchinganamphibiousassaultonTaiwan.ButChina’srapidmodernizationandprofessionalizationofthePeople’sLiberationArmycallthisassumptionintoquestion4WhencoupledwiththelackofprogressbytheU.S.militaryonacquiringadvancedtechnologies,devel-opinganewAmericanwayofwar,andimprovingpostureintheIndo-Pacificregiontostrengthendeter-rence,thismayleadChinatoperceiveithastheabilitytopursueasuccessfuloperationagainstTaiwan.5SomeworrythatChineseexpertsareincreasinglypessimisticabouttheprospectsforpeacefulunificationand,asaresult,mayresorttomilitaryforce.6Forinstance,theheadofU.S.Indo-PacificCommand,AdmiralJohnAquilino,announcedthat“thisproblemismuchclosertousthanmostthink,”7whilehispredecessormain-tainedthatChinacouldinvadeTaiwanby2027.8

mightface,andthestrengthsandweaknessesof

variousstrategies.Ultimately,thiswargameaimed

toidentifystepsthattheUnitedStatesanditsallies

andpartnerscouldtaketodeterthePRCfrom

invadingTaiwan,andtobetterpositionthemselves

todefeatsuchaggressionshoulddeterrencefail.

Thewargameproducedseveralcriticalinsights

aboutapotentialnear-termconflictoverTaiwan

betweenthePRCandtheUnitedStates.13This

reporthighlightsthekeytakeawaysfromthe

game.Itconcludeswithconcreterecommen-

dationsforhowtheUnitedStatesanditsallies

andpartnerscanimprovedefenseplanningand

strengthendeterrenceintheIndo-Pacific,with

theintentofpreventingafuturewaroverTaiwan

and,ifthatfails,improvingU.S.abilitytodefend

Taiwan.

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DEFENSE|JUNE2022

DangerousStraits:WargamingaFutureConflictoverTaiwan

CNAS’DangerousStraitsstrategic-operationalgame.(WilliamPlowman/NBCNews)

DangerousStraits:TheWargame

TheCNASGamingLabconductedatwo-sidedwargameinApril2022toexamineapotentialconflictsparkedbyaChineseinvasionofTaiwanin2027.ThisgamefocusedonAmericanandChinesedecision-makingatthehighoperationalandstrategiclevels.Theintentofthewargamewastwofold.First,byfilmingitforMeetthePress,CNASsoughttoeducatethegeneralpublicabouthowaconflictcouldunfoldbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesoverTaiwan.Second,thewargameaimedtoprovideinsightintohowChinamaychoosetofight,andhowtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartnerscoulddefeatChineseaggression.

Thewargamefeatured10participants,currentandformerU.S.governmentofficialsandsubjectmatterexpertsonU.S.andPRCdefensestrategy.ParticipantswereassignedtoeitherthePRC(Red)ortheU.S.(Blue)team,representingseniordefenseofficialsadvisingtheirrespectivepresidents.TheRedteamsoughttounifyTaiwanwiththePRCwhilepreventingtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesfromdefendingTaiwan.TheBlueteamaimedtodefendTaiwanfromChineseaggressionandkeepthePRCfromforciblysubjugatingTaiwan.The

militaryforcesofTaiwan,Japan,andAustraliawererep-resentedbytheWhiteCell,consistingoftheCNASteam,whichalsoadjudicatedinteractionsbetweentheRedandBlueteams’plans.14

Thewargameexaminedascenarioinwhichdiscus-sionsoverindependenceinTaiwan’slegislatureeruptedintoapoliticalcrisisduringwhichthePRCdemandedimmediateunificationtalks.AfterTaipeirefusedtojointalkswhilerefutingmovestowardindependence,ChinamobilizedPLAforcesandundertookasignificantmilitarybuildupinitsEasternTheaterCommand.AsitmovedkeyforcesandcapabilitiestoforwardstagingareasclosertoTaiwan,U.S.intelligenceofficialscon-firmedthatanattackonTaiwanwasimminent.Thus,thewargamebeganwithbothteamspreparingforapoten-tialattack,posturingtheirforcestobestachievetheirobjectives.TheBlueteam’sfirsttaskwastoidentifywaystobolsterdeterrence,whilecraftingastrategytodefendTaiwanifdeterrencefailed.TheRedteam’sfirsttaskwastodeveloptheirinitialinvasionstrategy,havingreceivedordersfromPresidentXiJinpingtoinvade.

ThescenariopositedafutureinwhichthePRC,Taiwan,andtheUnitedStateshadshoreduptheirmilitarystrengthandaddressedcriticaldeficiencies.

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Asaresult,thewargamemadeoptimisticassumptionsthateachwasabletomakeimprovementsthathavepreviouslyprovedelusive.ThescenarioalsopositedthattherewasamplewarningofChina’smilitarybuildup.Moreover,theWhiteCellassumedthatallthreeforceswerecompetentatexecutingmilitaryoperations—albeitwithdifferentlevelsofproficiency.AsdemonstratedbytheRussianmilitaryperformanceinUkraine,thisisacriticalassumptionthatcouldimpactfindingsandrecommendations.15

Itisworthnotingthatthiswargamewasrunonlyonce,andthustheinsightsderivedfromthegameshouldbetestedfurther.Moreover,wargamesareindicativeratherthanpredictive.Thedecisionsandoutcomesofthisgameareplausible,butthatdoesnotmakethemhighlyprobable.Nonetheless,observationsfromthiswargameyieldlessonsthatshouldinformU.S.andalliedandpartnerplanningfordefendingTaiwan.

KeyInsights

Severalcriticalinsightsemergedfromgameplayandplayerdiscussion.Theseinsightshavesignificantimplica-tionsforafutureconflictoverTaiwanintheIndo-Pacific,andtheyrepresentlessonslearnedfromthewargame.

IllusionsofaShortWar

TheRedteamdevelopedaplanfocusedon

employingalargeinvasionforcetoachieveaquick

victory.Theteamfacedadilemma:whetherto

concentrateonTaiwanandavoidstrikingU.S.

forcesinthehopethattheywouldstayonthe

sideline,ortoattackBlueforcestogainamilitary

advantageandhopethatBluewouldbewilling

tonegotiateafterTaiwanfell.Theformercourse

ofactioncouldkeepthewarlimitedandimprove

thechancesthatRedcouldcontrolTaipeibefore

othercountriesintervened.Thelattersignificantly

increasedtheprospectsofwinning,ifBluedid

becomeinvolved,butalsoriskedalarger,more

difficult,andpossiblylongerconflict.Thesecond

courseofactionultimatelywonoutbecauseRed

wasworriedthatBluewouldinterveneregard-

less,anditwouldbeeasiertostrikeatBlueearlier

thanlater.TheRedteamsimultaneouslylaunched

airandmissilestrikesagainstTaiwan’sforces

whilealsopreemptivelyattackingkeyBluebases,

particularlythoseonGuam.Red’sattackswere

notsufficienttoknockoutU.S.forcesandinstead

promptedastrongBlueandalliedresponseto

Red’saggression.

ParticipantsintheDangerousStraitswargamediscusscoursesofaction.(WilliamPlowman/NBCNews)

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DEFENSE|JUNE2022

DangerousStraits:WargamingaFutureConflictoverTaiwan

RED’SINVASIONPLAN

N

TheRedteam’splanssoughttosoftenupTaiwanwithairandmissilestrikesandthentolaunchalarge-scaleamphibiousandairborneassaultonnorthernTaiwanwiththeaimofrapidlyseizingthecapital.

terraintoreachthecapital.Moreover,Redalsohadtofindawaytoprovidefuel,food,andammunitiontoitsforcesashorewhileBlueforcesattackeditsvulnerablelinesofcommunication.18

Ultimately,neithersidewasabletodecisivelywinintheinitialweekoffighting.BothRedandBluehadexpendedlargeportionsoftheirinventoriesofpre-cisionlong-rangemissiles,lostmanyfighteraircraft,andneededtoresupplyandrearmforcesunderattack.However,Redstillhadcivilianassetsitcouldusetocontinueitscross-straitinvasion,aidedbyitsgeographicproximitytoTaiwan.

Wedonotknowwhatthelong-termoutcomemighthavebeen,butaprotractedconflictappearedtobeplau-sible.Red’srapidassaultfailedinthisfictionalscenario,duetoBlueandTaiwan’ssmartinvestmentsincapabil-ities,training,andmunitions.Blue’splanshadfocusedonhaltingRed’scross-straitattack,particularlyitsnavy.WhenBlue’ssubmarineshadfiredalltheirtorpedoesanditsaircrafthadlaunchedmostoftheirlong-rangepreci-sionmunitions,ithadlimitedoptionsforimmediatelygeneratingoffensivecombatpower.NeithersidefeltasthoughithadlostthefightoverTaiwan.EventhoughChinahopedtodeterU.S.andalliedandpartnered

TheRedteamsoughttoforceTaipeitocapitulate

beforeBlue’sforcescouldrecoverfromRed’sopening

blow.RedaimedtodecapitateTaiwan’sleadership,

launchpunitivestrikestoerodeTaiwan’swilltoresist,

andcutoffcommunicationstotheislandtoreduce

Taipei’sstrategicmessagingaimedatrallyinginterna-

tionalsupport.Alongsidethesestrategicattacks,Red

soughttorapidlyferrygroundforcestobeachesand

portsinnorthernTaiwan,inadditiontoairdropping

forcesinthesameregion,tocaptureTaipeiasquickly

aspossible.Redbelievedthiswouldgenerateenough

momentumtoconquerthenorthernhalfoftheisland

andcompeltherestofthecountrytosurrender.The

UnitedStatesanditsallieswouldthenfacetheunpal-

atableprospectofrollingbackRed’sterritorialgains,

whichwouldbeincrediblydifficult—ifnotimpossible—

andultimatelyconcludethatitwasnotworththecost.16

Red’squickvictoryprovedelusive.Enabledbyits

controloftheskiesoverTaiwan,Redamphibious,

airborne,andairassaultinvasionforcesmadeitashore,

butencounteredfierceresistance.17Redforcesoccupied

abeachandairfieldnorthofTaipeibutsufferedheavy

losses.Whenthegameended,Red’sinvasionforcestill

hadtotraversemountainousandheavilydefended

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TheRedteamdevelopsitsinitialstrategytoinvadeTaiwan.(WilliamPlowman/NBCNews)

involvementtosupportBeijing’sdesiredquick

victory,itwaspreparedforalongfight.

ThissuggeststhatshouldaChineseinvasionofTaiwanoccuritwouldbeessentialforTaiwanandtheUnitedStatesnottolosethewarintheopeningdays.ButpreventingChinafromitspreferredquicktriumphoverTaipeiwouldnotequatetoanAmericanandTaiwanesevictory.Therefore,U.S.andalliedandpartnereddefenseplannersneedtothinkbeyondtheopeningweektoconsiderhowtowinaprotractedwar.

FallingOffEscalationLadders

AfterRedattackedBlueforcesonbasesinJapanandGuam,theconflictspiraledinaseriesoftit-for-tatescalations,aseachteamattackedtheother’sterritorymoreaggressivelyinresponsetopriorattacks.Theseoffensiveswerenotpurelypunitive.Oftentimes,theywerealsodrivenbymilitarynecessities.TheRedteambelieveditcouldnotriskallowingU.S.forcestothwarttheinitialwaveofitsamphibiousassaultandthusdecidedtopreemptivelyhitAmericanforcesandbasesinJapanandGuam.ItalsowouldhaveattackedaU.S.aircraftcarrierifonehadbeenwithinmissilerange.Inresponse,theBlueteamusedbomberstolaunchcruisemissilestrikesatRedshipsinport,whichwereeasiertargetsthanshipssailingtowardTaiwan.

Theescalationsincreasedwitheachpassingturn.

Eachsidevieweditsownattacksasproportionaland

constitutingamessagetotheopponentthathemust

desistfromcertainactionsorfacemoreseverecon-

sequences.Butthesituationquicklyincreasedthe

scopeandintensityofthehostilities.BecauseRedhad

alreadyattackedAmericanterritory,itfeltithadlittle

U.S.andalliedandpartnered

defenseplannersneedto

thinkbeyondtheopening

weektoconsiderhowtowin

aprotractedwar.

tolosebylaunchingacruisemissilestrikeatU.S.bases

inHawaiiinretaliationforBlueattacksonitsports.

TheRedteamalsolaunchedmissilesalvosatU.S.

alliesincludingJapan,Australia,andthePhilippines.

TodegradeRed’scommandandcontrolandtar-

geting,BlueattackeditsEasternTheaterCommand

headquartersinNanjingandearlywarningradarson

Chineseterritory.Inresponsetothecontinuedstrikes

onitsterritory,includingathwartedstrikeonanH-20

bomberbase,Redwantedtotargetmilitaryinstalla-

tionsinthecontinentalUnitedStates,butdidnothave

theforcestodoso.

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Moreover,RedandBluehaddifferentstrengths

andweaknessesthatshapedthetypeofescalationtheychose.Redhadastrongerhandinitially,butitlackedcredibleconventionalresponsestoattacksonitsterritory,leadingittoturntoitsnucleararsenal.Bluehadmoreconventionalandnuclearoptionsbutwasmoreconcernedaboutescalationincyberspace.Beforetheyknewit,bothBlueandRedhadcrossedkeyredlines,butneit