英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視

Chapter4PricediscriminationECNUOrientalRealEstateCollege英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第1頁(yè)!4.1DefinitionAprevalentmarketingskillandeconomicphenomena.preferentialpriceorquantitydiscount.eg.Sometimespeoplewillthinkthatiffirmschargedifferentpriceondifferentconsumersforthesamegoods,itmeanspricediscrimination.Butthisunderstandingisinplete.Inmuchcase,discretepricemaybeonlyreflecttrafficcostandsalescostfee.Andincertaincase,universalpricemeansdiscriminationonthecontrary(fixedfeeinbuseg.).

英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第2頁(yè)!Pricediscriminationmeansonefirmsalestheidenticalgoodstodifferentconsumerswithdifferentnetprice.(Philips,1983)Netprice,subtractproductdifferencefromgoodsprice.Ifpricedifferentiationjustreflectsthecostdifferenceofsupplyingtodifferentconsumers,wedeempricediscriminationdoesn’texist.Ratiotest

《Harrypotter》inpainlypackededitionvs.deluxeedition,eg.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第3頁(yè)!Conditionsofpricediscrimination1、firmsmusthasmarketpower.Weoftenconfineitinmonopolyoroligopolymarket,onlywhenfirmscanpricehigherthanmarginalcost,cantheychargedifferentpriceondifferentconsumers.LocayandRodriguez,1992：petitivefirmsispossibletopracticepricediscrimination,ifconsumerspurchaseingroupunit.2、theabilityofeffectivemarketsegmentation.3、ensureofnoarbitrage.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第4頁(yè)!KindsofarbitragesPossibilityofpricediscriminationisrelatedwithpossibilityofarbitrage.Onekindofarbitrageisrelatedwithtransferabilityofgoods.Iftransactioncostislow,pricediscriminationwillencounterarbitrage,namelylow-priceconsumerswillbuyforresellingtohigh-priceconsumers.Transactioncostprovidesonecluetofeasibilityofpricediscrimination.Absolutearbitrageornoarbitrageisonlytwoextremecase.Generally,somelimitedarbitragewilloccurs,itdependsonrelativecostandine.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第5頁(yè)!InfluenceofarbitrageInfluenceoftwokindsofarbitrageisdifferent.Transferabilityofgoodsisinclinedtopreventdiscrimination.Transferabilityofdemandmaycausefirmsincreasediscrimination.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第6頁(yè)!4.2Perfectpricediscriminationsimplestcase：singleconsumer(orsomeidenticalconsumers)hasoneunitofdemand.Monopolymakepriceequaltoreserveprice,gettingallconsumersurplus.Aclassicalexample：adoctorisalittlevillagesimilarwitheverybodyinthereandtheireconomicinformation.Heestimateshowmucheveryoneiswillingtopayforandthenchargeforthatamount.Anothercase：airlinepanypayforeachaircraftindifferentprice.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第7頁(yè)!ProfitmaximizationInlinearpricing,monopolyprice：p=Twoparttariff：setasnetconsumersurplusinpetitivepricep=,set“l(fā)icensefee”A=,sopricingprojectasbelowT(q)=Profitpare：Monopolypricing：=Twoparttariff：0Ifq>0Ifq=0英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第8頁(yè)!(3)UniversalcaseAssumption：consumersholddifferentdemandcurves,andmonopolyknowaboutthem.Optimalproject：setp=,andaskeachconsumerpayitsnetsurplusas“l(fā)icensefee”,namelyProblemofinformationrevealwhenconsumerhasunitdemandandsupplieronlyknowdistributionofestimationamongthembutnoabouteveryone’sestimation,itwillsetsingleprice——meansnopricediscrimination.

英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第9頁(yè)!優(yōu)惠券的使用

(JournalofMarketingResearch,1978)就業(yè)狀態(tài)產(chǎn)品種類鋁箔蠟紙頭痛藥清潔液面巾紙就業(yè)29.0%(62)17.7%(62)25.0%(76)32.6%(92)22.4%(116)失業(yè)38.3%(128)23.5%(153)28.6%(161)37.4%(214)29.2%(226)表中條目是有使用優(yōu)惠券傾向的全職主婦購(gòu)買商品的比例括號(hào)中的數(shù)字表示所表示比例的抽取樣本中人數(shù)英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第10頁(yè)!Howtopreventarbitrage持卡、憑證擔(dān)保（轉(zhuǎn)售限制，尤其是對(duì)于中間商）摻雜交易費(fèi)用合約垂直一體化專欄：航空公司如何防止套利？英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第11頁(yè)!MR1D1MR2D2MCp1p2Q1Q2英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第12頁(yè)!ProfitandsurplusIncaseofpricediscrimination,priceinmarketiispi,profitasbelowGeneralconsumersurplusisIncaseofuniformpricing,priceis,salesamountinmarketIis,profitasbelowGeneralconsumersurplusis英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第13頁(yè)!ConclusionGenerally,thewelfareeffectofthethird-degreepricediscriminationisuncertain.Itdependsontheparebetweenlossoflow-elasticityparisonandgainofhigh-elasticityconsumersandsuppliers.Oneofthecentralquestioninpolicyisitsinfluencetoinedistribution.Pricediscriminationtransfersbenefitoflow-elasticityconsumerspartlytohigh-elasticityconsumersandsuppliers.Itmaybenotappropriate,butasweknow,low-elasticityconsumersaregenerally(notalways)richergroup.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第14頁(yè)!三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視實(shí)例2：迪斯尼世界門票價(jià)格，2006成人門票的類型非佛羅里達(dá)居民佛羅里達(dá)居民所有主題公園、水上樂(lè)園和歡樂(lè)島優(yōu)惠年票5394294個(gè)主題公園的年票415325淡季佛羅里達(dá)居民四個(gè)主題公園季票不提供2154天，4個(gè)主題公園季票1951711天，1個(gè)主題公園季票6356.7英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第15頁(yè)!4.4.1indirectpricediscriminationbasedontime航空公司基于訂票時(shí)間的價(jià)格歧視p起飛時(shí)間預(yù)售時(shí)間票價(jià)與提前訂票時(shí)間的關(guān)系提前訂票時(shí)間2-3天英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第16頁(yè)!質(zhì)量歧視的三個(gè)決策：廠商應(yīng)該確定幾種不同的等級(jí)？

實(shí)踐表明，三個(gè)而不是兩個(gè)等級(jí)是最優(yōu)的。各個(gè)等級(jí)水平如何選擇？如何為每個(gè)等級(jí)的產(chǎn)品制定相應(yīng)的價(jià)格？參與約束&激勵(lì)相容約束英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第17頁(yè)!4.4.3Indirectpricediscriminationbasedonquantityquantitydiscount.taxifeeelectricpowerusePackagestrategy（quantity—priceportfolio）英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第18頁(yè)!4.5ComparisionamongseveralmethodsinnonlinearpricingTwo-parttariff(T(q)=A+pq)providesamenuofconsumebundlesinaline.Generallythelinedoesnotpassorigin.Simplicityisitsprimaryattraction,andsometimesitdependsonpossibilityoflimitedarbitrage.Fullarbitrageisprevented,namelyonlyonebuyerpaysforfixedfeeA,andthenresalegoodstootherconsumers.Notice：actuallytwo-parttariffcorrespondstoquantitydiscount,averagepricedecreasewithincreaseofconsumequantity.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第19頁(yè)!AsimplemodelTwokindsofconsumers,proportionoftasteparameterbeingθ1isλ,

proportionoftasteparameterbeingθ2is1-λ.Assumethatθ2>θ1,monopolyproduceinfixedcostc,andc<θ1<θ2.forsimplicity,assumesoV’(q)=1-q英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第20頁(yè)!GeneraldemandfunctionInthiscase,consumersurplusisNoticethat,andθ2typeconsumersalwaysholdhighersurplus.Makeθasharmonicmeanofθ1andθ2

Thengeneraldemandinpricepis

英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第21頁(yè)!Case1：perfectpricediscriminationAssumethatmonopolycanobserveθidirectly.Thenitcansetmarginalpriceasp1=c,andsetpersonalfixedfeeManufacturer’smonopolisticprofitisLeavedistributionquestionoutofaccount,welfarehereisoptimal.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第22頁(yè)!Case3：Two-parttariffAssumealsothatmonopolyprovidesgoodstotwokindsofconsumers.Setmarginalpricep.Maximalfixedfeethatcanmakeθ1typeconsumersbuygoodsisA=S1(p).Thenθ2typeconsumerswillpurchase,becauseSoprofitfunctionofmonopolyisPriceofprofitmaximizationisSimply,wecanseethatprofitoftwo-parttariffisasgoodasinlinearpricingatleast(thelatecanbeseenasthespecialcaseoftheformer).

英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第23頁(yè)!ConclusionWecanmakeamoreplexprojecttogetmoreprofitthroughpletenonlinearpricing.(processomitted)Conclusion1：low-demandconsumersdonotgetnetsurplus,whilehigh-demandconsumerscangetpositivenetsurplus.Conclusion2：effectiverestrictiontopersonalarbitragewillpreventhigh-demandconsumersbuylow-demandbundles.Conclusion3：high-demandconsumersbuysociallyoptimalquantity;andlow-demandconsumersbuyquantitylowerthanoptimalquantity.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第24頁(yè)!ComparabilityinstylizedmodelandconclusionSetsignoveragain,wecantransferqualitymodelinquantitymodel,sothesetwoarethesameinstylizedmeaning.Conclusion4：consumerspreferqualitymore(θ2type)purchaseoptimalquality;andconsumersprefernotsomuch(θ1type)purchasequalitylowerthanoptimallevel.Infact,monopolybroadenqualitylevel,andprovidinglow-qualitygoodsasmeansofsegmentingmarkets.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第25頁(yè)!Atthesametime,wecan’tsayprovidingdifferentqualitygoodstodifferentconsumersmeansnodiscrimination.Reasonofprovidingserviceindifferentquality(suchasclassedcabininaircraftsandtrains)partlyistogetconsumerssurplusbysegmentingconsumersintodifferentgroupsTheconceptof“identical”goods：BMWinUSAisthesametoinGerman?Generalequilibriumtheoristmaypointoutwithsomeexcuse，goodsdeliveredindifferenttime,differentlocationanddifferentstateordifferentqualityisdifferentgoods,soscopeofpurepricediscriminationisverylimited.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第26頁(yè)!MarketsegmentationCanwefindarightwaytoconductmarketsegmentation（theresultmustberelatedtopriceelasticityandWTP(willingtopay)statusgenderageLocationtimeusePurchasingamount英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第27頁(yè)!Theotherkindofarbitrageisrelatedwithtransferabilityofdifferentconsumepackagesorbundlesprovidedtoconsumers.Thatnotmeansphysicaltransferofgoodsamongconsumers.Thatmeansfirmstrytomakeeverybuyerreallyselectconsumepackagedesignedforhim,notforothers.Incentivepatibilityandself-selection.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第28頁(yè)!ThreekindsofpricediscriminationPerfectpricediscrimination——suppliersgetallconsumersurplusinconditionofholdingperfectinformationofwillingpayment.Second-degreepricediscrimination——suppliersextractconsumersurplusinpletelyusingself-selectionwheninformationofindividualpreferenceisinplete.Third-degreepricediscrimination——Marketsegmentationusingdirectinformationaboutdemandsuchasage,professionandlocationetc.andsetdifferentpriceforeachgroup.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第29頁(yè)!(2)Complexcaseassumption：nconsumersholdthesamedemandcurve,andmonopolyknowaboutit.q=D(p)/n,soD(p)=nqTgrossofconsumers’paymentTwopricingprojects：linearpricingandtwoparttariffLinearpricing：T=pqTwoparttariff：T=A+pq英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第30頁(yè)!ProfitpareDMCABC=△ABCObviously,alltheconsumersurplusisgrabbedintwoparttariff.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第31頁(yè)!HowtomakePerfectpricediscriminationInfactit’saquestionofinformationemergingCompretivelyusecouponoraccumulatedconsumingvolumesAuctionorbidPricinginbindBargainingdirectly英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第32頁(yè)!4.3Third-degreepricediscrimination（Multi-market）assumption：Monopolycansegmentconsumersinsomegroupsaccordingtosomeexogenousinformation,andknowabouteachoftheirdemandcurves.Noarbitrageamonggroups,andmonopolycan’tpractisepricediscriminationinonegroup.Aspecialexampleofmultipleproductsmonopolypricing：independentdemandandinterdependentcost英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第33頁(yè)!ProfitmaximizationGeneraldemandProfitfunctionAccordingtoInverseelasticityrule(Lernerindex),ineverymarketshouldexistsOptimalpricingmeanssettingparativelyhighpriceinmarketwithlowerelasticity.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第34頁(yè)!WelfarepareCompareitwiththeresultofuniformpricingAssumethatscalerewardfixed：Cisconstant

英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第35頁(yè)!DifferenceonwelfareGeneraldifferenceequalstochangeofsurplusplusprofitTosetuplimitanddownlimit,makeFunctionofNSWisconvexfunctionofmarketprice,andS’(p)=-D(p),accordingtoLagrangemediantheory,wecangetSo,ifpricediscriminationcannotincreasesalesvolume,welfarewillbereduced.Thatisthenecessaryconditionofexistenceofpricediscriminationinthesocialangle.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第36頁(yè)!三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視實(shí)例1Office2000在新加坡的定價(jià)常規(guī)價(jià)格學(xué)術(shù)機(jī)構(gòu)價(jià)格Excel579199PowerPoint579199Word579199三件產(chǎn)品的組合759219中國(guó)大使館在新加坡的簽證費(fèi)簽證提前時(shí)間1天3天7天單次入境756025雙次入境857035英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第37頁(yè)!4.4Second-degreepricediscriminationAssumption：consumerdemandisheterogeneous.Ifmonopolyknowabouttastesofallconsumers,itcanmakeperfectpricediscriminationthroughprovidingpersonalconsumepackagesorbundles.Butmonopolygenerallycannotclassifyconsumersaccordingtosomeexplicitinformation,anditcanprovideamenuforselection.Thenpossibilityofarbitragemustbeconsidered,namelyconsumersbelongingtoonegroupmaychooseconsumepackagedesignedforothergroups.Therestrictionofself-selectionorincentive-patible.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第38頁(yè)!4.4.2IndirectpricediscriminationbasedonqualityProductlineswithdifferentqualitystatusDifferentkindsofconsumers：highvaluetype,lowvaluetypeCommonstrategy：“harmed”goods，IBM,Sony,IntelpProductstatus400350300600486SX486英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第39頁(yè)!例：參考價(jià)格對(duì)高價(jià)位產(chǎn)品的影響微波爐型號(hào)選擇率（%）組（60人）第二組（60人）松下Ⅱ型13松下Ⅰ型4360愛(ài)默生5727英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第40頁(yè)!（P、F）組合類型One2one銅服務(wù)價(jià)格One2one金服務(wù)價(jià)格月租費(fèi)17.50英鎊36.00英鎊工作日白天通話費(fèi)29便士18便士英國(guó)移動(dòng)通信公司的二部定價(jià)套餐此外還有，移動(dòng)的動(dòng)感地帶短信套餐等。英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第41頁(yè)!ProfitandwelfareAssumption：consumersreferenceasbelowU=V(0)=0,V’(q)>0,V’’(q)<0.θisaconstantoftaste,differentinperson.V(*)isuniformtoeveryone.Alsothesecanbeexplainedinthesamepreferenceofconsumersbutwithdifferentinelevel.Compareamongcaseofperfectdiscrimination,monopolypricingandtwo-parttariff.θV(q)–T

iftheypayTandconsumeq0

iftheydonotbuy英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第42頁(yè)!UtilityfunctionNotice：fixedcostonlyinfluencethedecisionofbuyingornot.Onceconsumersdecidetobuy,itisoutofconsider.Consumerutilitymaximization：U=θiV(q)-pqFirst-ordercondition：θiV’(q)=pAccordingtoassumptionbefore,θi(1-q)=pSo,demandfunctioniseducedas

q=Di(p)=1-p/θiNetconsumersurplusis英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第43頁(yè)!θ2

θ1pP1=cD1D2S2(p)S1(p)英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第44頁(yè)!Case2：MonopolypricingAssumethatconsumershavepletearbitrage,sothatmonopolycanonlysetuniformprice：T(q)=pqProfitis(p-c)D(p),andD(p)=1-p/θ

MonopolypriceisMonopolisticprofitisHereweassumethatmonopolydecidestoprovidegoodstotwokindsofconsumers.Itneed(c+θ2)/2≤θ1,orλislargeenough.英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視共48頁(yè)，您現(xiàn)在瀏覽的是第45頁(yè)!ComparisoninwelfareeffectIt’ssimpletojudgethat

Andalso,inthecaseofsupplyingtwokindsofconsumersatthesametime,marginaloftwo-parttariffisbetweenpetitivepriceandmonopolyprice,namelyNotice：welfareundert