大二上財務(wù)管理課件

TypesofPreferredPreferredBankGuaranteedEuroPreferredWarrantConvertibleBondPreferred融資融資(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryMMpropositionIwithout（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論PerfectcapitalTherearenotaxes,transaction costsassociatedwithsecuritytrading.Investorsandfirmscantradethesamesetsecuritiesatcompetitivemarket presentvalueoftheirfuturecashflows.

otheyrevealnewinformationtheyrevealnewinformationaboutMMpropositionIwithoutodiglianiandMertonMillerPropositionequalt hmrk fh hflVLInotherwords,financialmanagerscannotincreasevaluebychangingthemixsecuritiesusedtoVL((一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutMMandtheLawofOneIntheabsenceoftaxesorothertransactioncosts,thetotalcashflowpaidouttoallofafirm’ssecurityholdersisequaltothetotalcashflowgeneratedbythefirm’sassets.Therefore,bytheLawofOnePrice,thefirm’ssecuritiesanditsassetsmusthavethesametotalmarketvalue.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquityNumberof PriceperMarketValueof

$1 Stateofthe perReturnonsharesM&MI Doesn’t50%debt

NumberofPriceperMarketvalueof

$500,000Marketvalueof $ Stateofthee$75,000125,000175,00050,00050,000Equity $25,00075,000125,000per Returnonshares (一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutHoldingfixedthecashflowsgeneratedbythefirm’sassets,however,thechoiceofcapitalstructuredoesnotchangethevalueofthefirm.Itmerelydividesthevalueofthefirmintodifferentsecurities.LetEandDdenotethemarketvalueofequityanddebtifthfirmislevered.LetUbethemarketvalueofequityifthefirmisunlevered.AndletAbethemarketvalueoffirm’sassets.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutHomemadeLeverage:Investorsuseleverageintheirownportfoliostoadjusttheleverage madebythefirm.Aslongasinvestorscanborroworlendatthesameinterestrateasthefirm,homemadeleverageisaperfectsubstitutefortheuseofleveragebythefirm.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquity-Debtreplicatedby(marginloanandbuytwoassumedthattheinvestor'scostofborrowingmoneyisthesameasthatofthefirm StateoftheEarningsontwoLESS:Interest@Netearningson me i.e.,issueDebt+UnleveredFirm=LeveredeStateoftheM&MeStateoftheExample-RiverCruises–Firmdebtat-Investorcanunwrapdebt(oneshareandlendmoney)PLUS:Interest@ PLUS:Interest@ Netearningson Returnon$10 i.e.Leveredfirm+investDebt=UnleveredArbitrage， 理性投資者將杠桿，投資于無杠桿公(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutAverageCostofCapital(NoForleveredfirm,weightedaveragecostofcapital(WACC)calculatesthecostofcapitalofthefirm’sassetsbycomputingtheweightedaverageofthefirm’sequityanddebtcostofcapital.Forunleveredfirminperfect(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutWithperfectcapitalmarkets,afirm’sWACCisindependentofitscapitalstructureandisequaltoitsequitycostofcapitalifitisunlevered,whichmatchesthecostofcapitalofitsassets.Therefore,iftheriskofaprojectmatchestheriskoftheassetsofafirm,wecanusethefirm’sWACCtoestimatetheappropriatecostofcapitalforthe Inaperfectcapitalmarket,theLawofOnePriceimpliesthatallfinancialtransactionshaveanNPVofzeroandneithercreatenordestroyvalue. Consequently,thechoiceofdebtversusequityfinancingdoesnotaffectthevalueofThefundsraisedfromissuin equalthepresentvalueofthefutureinterestandprincipalpaymentsthefirmwillmake.Thatis,inaperfectcapitalmarket,afirm’schoiceofcapitalstructureisunimportantHowever,thisstatementisatoddswiththeobservationthatfirmsinvestsignificantresources,bothintermsofmanagerialtimeandeffortandinvestmentbankingfees,inmanagingtheircapitalstructures.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutInmanyinstance,thechoiceofleverageisofcriticalimportancetoafirm’svalueandfuturesuccess.Therearelargeandsystematicvariationsinthetypicalcapitalstructuresfordifferentindustries.Atyear-end-2004,Amgen,abiotechnologyanddrugfirm,hasdebtof$5bil.andamarketcap.ofmorethan$81bil.,givingthefirmadebt-equityratioof0.06.Incontrast,NavistarInternational,anautoandtruckmanufacturer,hadadebt-equityratioof0.95.Truckmanufacturersingeneralhavehigherdebtratiosthanbiotechnologyanddrugcompanies.forSelectedIndustriesDebtlevelsaredeterminedbybookvalues,andequitybymarketvalues.TheaveragedebtfinancingforallU.S.stockswasabout36%,butnotethelargedifferencesby(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutIfcapitaltructureis whydoweseesuchconsistentdifferencesincapitalstructuresacrossfirmsandindustries?whydomanagersdedicatesomuchtime,effort,andexpensetothecapitalstructureMMpropositionIwithout實證結(jié)果不支持無關(guān)LysandSivaramakrishnan(1988務(wù)杠桿與DhrymesandKurz(1967資決策與融資決(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(二(二 roositionII:withoutThereturnofaportfolioisequaltotheweightedaverageofthereturnsofthesecuritiesinit,theequalityimpliesthefollowingrelationshipbetweenthereturnsofleveredequity,debt,andunleveredequityForlevered inperfect(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutMMPropositionThecostofcapitalofleveredequityisequaltothecostofcapitalofunleveredequityplusapremiumthatisproportionaltothemarketvaluedebt-equityCostofCapitalofLeveredGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebtNextFigureillustratestheeffectofincreasingtheamountofleverage,whichismeasuredintermsofdebt-to-valueratio,D/(E+D),inafirm’scapital capital,itsdebtcostofcapital,anditswhererU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbMM’sPropositionII(w/riskyrIncludesBankruptcyIncludesBankruptcyAsthefirmborrows

Risky

moreofriskistransferredfromstockholderstoFig.WACCandLeveragewithPerfectCapitalMarketsAsthefractionofthefirmfinancedwithdebtincreases,boththeequityandthedebteriskierandtheircostofcapitalweightisputonthelower-costdebt,theweightedaveragecostofcapitalremainsFinancialDistress， 成本Legalandadministrativecosts(tendtobeasmallpercentageoffirmIndirectCosts（間接成本：在企業(yè) 往受到重大影響，企業(yè)價值大幅下降。）Impairedabilitytoconductbusiness(e.g.,lost無形資產(chǎn)的損AgencyCosts（公司管理者和股東會采取減少 MMpropositionII：without 企業(yè)不存在最優(yōu)CapitalStructureCapitalStructureFallacies(Doesdebtratioincreaseinshareprice?FigureEarningsperSharewithandwithoutThesensitivityofEPStoEBITishigherforaleveredfirmthanforanunleveredfirm.Thus,givenassetswiththesamerisk,theEPSofaleveredfirmismorevolatile.TheincreaseinexpectedEPSwillnotincreaseinshareprice.CapitalCapitalStructureFallacies(Willshareholdersgainfromnewequityissue?Ingeneral,aslongasthefirmsellsthenewsharesofequit atafairprice,therewillbeno ainorlosstoshareholdersassociatedwiththeequityissueitself.Themoneytakeninbythefirmasaresultoftheshareissueexactlyoffsetsthedilutionoftheshares.AnygainorlossassociatedwiththetransactionwillresultfromtheNPVoftheinvestmentsthefirmmakeswiththefundsraised.((二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutLeveredandUnleveredBetas:Theeffectofleverageontheriskofafirm’ssecuritiescanalsobeexpressedintermsofbeta.Letbethebetaoftheleveredequity,bethebetaofequitywithoutleverage,bethebetaofdebt.Wehavefollowingrelationship:sincetheyhavesameWerefertoasafirm’sunleveredbeta.Itmeasuresthemarketriskofthefirmwithoutleverage,whichisequivalenttothebetaofthefirm’sassets.(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutIfwearetryingtoestimatetheunleveredbetaforaninvestmentproject,weshouldbaseourestimateontheunleveredbetasoffirmswi leveredLet’ssolveleveredIfthefirm’sdebtisrisk ,thenitsbetaiszero(βD=0)es(Hamada’sHowtocalculatedebt-adjustedbeta(bottom-up(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory（三）Modigliani‐MillerpropositionIwith?公稅與負(fù)債比率會呈正向變動。Assume:keepthedollaramountofAssume:keepthedollaramountofdebtcTaxbenefit=Taxbenefit=$10,000x(.06)x(.35)=

DxrDx =DxPVof210perpetuity=$210/.06= Shield c=$10,000x.35=*Tocomputetheincreaseinthefirm’stotalvalueassociatedwiththeinteresttaxshield,weneedtoforecasthowafirm’sdebt—andthereforeitsinterestpayments—willvaryovertime.((三MMpropositionI：withInterestTaxTheInterestTaxShieldandFirmLetVLandVUrepresentthevalueofthefirmwiandwithoutleverage,respectively.WehavethefollowingchangetotheMMPropositioninthepresenceoftaxes:Thetotalvalueoftheleveredfirmexceedsthevalueofthefirmwithoutleverageduetothepresentvalueofthetaxsavingsformdebt:=VU+D*

Thehigherdebt,themoreOptimalcapitalstructure:asmuchdebtasC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.The hasnodebt.The’sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%.Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyour’equitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueShouldyoudothisandC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.’hasnodebt.The sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterest andtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.’ShouldyoudothisandAllE E InterestPmt Taxes@35%NetCash

0

C.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.hasnodebt.The ’sannualcashflowis$10,00 ,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.Shouldyoudothisand00InterestAll EquityAllEquity=TaxesTaxes@e*Equity+Debt=(4,550+NetCashNetCash*thevalueofafirmisthetotalamountitcanraisefromallinvestors,notjustequityholders.Fig.TheCashFlowsoftheUnleveredandLeveredFirmByincreasingthecashflowspaidtodebtholdersthroughinterestpayments,afirmreducestheamountpaidintaxes.Theincreaseintotalcashflowspaidtoinvestorsistheinteresttaxshield.(Assumea40%marginalcorporatetaxrateand$500mildebt.)(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory roositionII:withThecostofe r)D(1T whererUisthecostofcapitalthefirmwouldhaveifithadnodebtGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebt在賦稅條件下，當(dāng)負(fù)債比率增加時，股東財務(wù)風(fēng)險所要求增加的風(fēng)險的程度小于無稅條件下風(fēng)險的增加程度，即在ValuingtheInterestTaxShield Infact,itThus,thereductionintheWACCincreaseswiththeamountofdebtfinancing.Thehigherthefirm’sleverage,themorethefirmexploitsthetaxadvantageofdebt,andtheloweritsWACC.(See.NextFigure)whereU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbTheWACCwithandwithoutCorporateTaxesWecomputetheWACCasafunctionofleverage.WithouttaxestheWACCisconstant.Withtaxes,theWACCdeclinesasthefirmincreasesitsrelianceondebtfinancingandtheinteresttaxshieldgrows.Thefigureassumesamarginal etaxrateofc=35%.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryCostsofFinancialCostsofFinancialDistress-Costsarisingbankruptcyordistortedbusinessdecisionsbeforebankruptcy.(Baxter,1967) ValueifallEquity-PVCosts-PVCostsofFinancialThepresentvalueofthecostsoffinancialdistressincreaseswithincreasesthedebtratiobecausetheprobabilityofdefaultand/orbankruptcyisFinancialumvalueof

CostsfinancialMarketValueofTheMarketValueofThe

Valueoflevered

Fig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxesandFinancialAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thetaxbenefitsofdebtincreaseby*Duntilinterestexpenseexceedsthefirm’s ofdefault,andhencethe resentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,alsoincreasewithD.Theoptimallevelofdebt,D*,occurswhentheseeffectsbalanceoutandVLis ized.D*willbelowerforfirmswithhighercostsoffinancialdistress.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory?al alTaxesintheInterestTaxTheamountofmoneyaninvestorwillpayforasecurity ydependsonthebenefitstheinvestorwillreceive—namely,thecashflowstheinvestorwillreceive,afteralltaxeshavebeenpaid.Thus, altaxesreducethecashflowstoinvestorsanddiminishfirmvalue. Asaresult,theactualinteresttaxshielddependsonthereductioninthetotaltaxes(bothcorporateand thatarepaid.Todeterminethetruetaxbenefitofleverage,weneedtoevaluatethecombinedeffectofbothtaxes.TopFederalTaxRatesintheUnitedStates,1971-2005alAfter-TaxInvestorCashFlowsResultingfrom$1inEBIT eistaxedatrateifortheinvestor.Dividendorcapitalgain istaxedatratecforthecorporation,andagainatrateefortheinvestor.alTaxes ageofalTaxes ValuingtheInterestTaxShield alAslongas*0,thendespiteanytaxdisadvantageofat allevel,anettaxadvantageforleverageIncaseofpermanentdebt,thevalueofthefirmwithleverageBecausetheimlies

altaxdisadvantageofdebtgenerallyweseethatthebenefitofleveraeis (referp.關(guān)于Miller模型的討 只要Tei 如果的利息抵稅效應(yīng)不能完全被抵消，則Miller模型預(yù)示企業(yè)價值隨著/權(quán)益比Miller

(1Tc)(1Te)

1 VL= VL<VU+TCDwhenTe< VL VL< DebtwherepBr0interestrateforattracting

1

)interestrateforattractinginvestorswithtaxrate(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(七 理JensenandMeckling(1976):公司會發(fā)生兩 (a)管理者經(jīng)營的利得需與股東 消費perk）。 股東會考慮這樣的可能性，而產(chǎn)生權(quán) 成本者間的利 Keiretsuin v

Next2.supermajority(1/2,2/3,

(七 理 ， 債融資,以賺取超額 (七 理B.債權(quán)人與股東間的負(fù) 問公 負(fù)債會發(fā)生負(fù) 成本,公司 會發(fā)生權(quán) 成本, 成(負(fù) 成

成本)極小化時,AT(R)=AD(R)+RR Myers(1977):當(dāng)公司 Jensen(1986)舒緩管理者與股東間的利益，也因此成為負(fù)。A costsandFig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxes,FinancialandAgencyAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thevalueofthefirmincreasesfromtheinteresttaxshieldaswellasimprovementsinmanagerialincentives.Ifleverageistoohigh,however,thepresentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,aswellastheagencycostsfromdebtholder–equity ucesfirmvalue. optimallevelofdebt,D*,balancesthesebenefitsandcostsofleverage.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgency(八) MyersandMajluf(1984):當(dāng)管理者的私有信息為新投資方案 時,因信息不對稱問題,公司的權(quán)益可能被錯誤的評價。即使公司新的投資計劃NPV為正，若股價被低權(quán)益的價值被高估時,管理者才會 股為壞消息,債券融資優(yōu)于權(quán)益融資。由于內(nèi)部 因此內(nèi)部權(quán)益是最受喜愛的來源，其次為一般債券及Myers(1984):依據(jù)MyersandMajluf 見融資優(yōu)序Fig.StockReturnsBeforeandAfteranEquityStockstendtorise(relativetothemarket)beforeanequityissueisannounced.Uponannouncement,stockpricesfallonaverage.ThisfigureshowstheaveragereturnrelativetothemarketbeforeandafterannouncementsusingdatafromDeborahLucasandRobertMcDonald,“EquityIssuesandStockPriceDynamics,”JournalofFinance45(1990):1019–1043.融資融資融資決策之因素(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(Trade-off(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTiming(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-off假設(shè):投資人與管理者對未來成長機會有相同的由于市場不完善與成本極小化的持一目標(biāo)的比率,以追求公司價值極大化.KrausandLitzenberger1973Scott1976),與Kim1978):負(fù)債帶來的租稅利益與成本間的決定了公Miller1977DeAngeloandMasulis1980人所得稅與非負(fù)債稅盾(non-debttaxshields)也該.(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-offRoss(1977):公司與投資人間有信息不對稱,投資人不知道公司的質(zhì)量,高質(zhì)量的公司由于 較低,因而會 較多的債券,以使自己與低質(zhì)量,JensenandMeckling(1976):（參 SmithandWarner(1979):為使 (一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-offAghionandBolton(1986): 控制權(quán)的喪失,卻也可能因財務(wù)杠桿而獲致較高的報酬.有效的融資形式乃是使 在某些經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下,同時以負(fù)債及權(quán)益融資是最適決AghionandBoltn1988):增發(fā)會有股權(quán)稀釋的邊際成本,新發(fā)負(fù)債會有負(fù)債的邊際成本,權(quán)衡兩邊際成本后,即可適當(dāng)分配控制權(quán),決定公司的最適資本結(jié)構(gòu). Debt-to-ValueRatio[D/(E+D)]ofU.S.Firms,1975–2005Althoughfirmshaveprimarilyissueddebtratherthanequity,theaverageproportionofdebtintheircapitalstructureshasnotincreased(variedinarangefrom30%-45%fortheaveragefirm)duetothegrowthinvalueofexistingequity.Source:CompustatandFederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,PatternsofCorporate(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(二)融資優(yōu)(PeckingOrderTheory:啄食順MarketTiming(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrderThispeckingordermayupsetthetrade-off ofcaitalstructurebecausefirmsmabereluctanttoadddebttocapitalstructureevenifthereisadditionalvaluefromtheinteresttaxshield.Thus,firmsmayoperatewithlessthanthe"otimal"amountofdebtintheircaitalstructureaslongastheycanfundprojectswithretainedearnings.(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權(quán)益券部權(quán) 而言,債券有固定的收益,因此價值較易被估計,也較為穩(wěn)定,較不會被低估. MyersandMajluf(1984)（參見發(fā)布訊號理論的介NetExternalFinancingandExenditures U.S.CororationsInaggregate,firmshaveraisedexternalcapitalprimarilybyissuingdebt.Thesefundshavebeenusedtoretireequityandfundinvestment,butthevastmajorityofcapitalexpendituresareinternallyfunded.Source:FederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,Fig.AggregateSourcesofFundingforExpenditures,U.S.Inaggregate,firmstendtorepurchaseequityandissuedebt.Butmorethan70%capitalexpendituresarefu Source:FederalReserveFlowof(PeckingOrderC.CornellandShapiro(1987):一企業(yè)與其客戶,經(jīng)銷商、契約關(guān)系外，尚有隱藏的請求權(quán)(implicitclaim、(organizationalcapital)， 保證、工作安定本扣除組織負(fù)債后即為該企業(yè)的凈組織資本(net.

(PeckingOrder 加其內(nèi)部;成功的企業(yè)由于擁有較多的組織資本,故其負(fù)債比(PeckingOrderD.Baskin(1989):由留存收益提供的內(nèi)部不必承 成本,也避免了因放股利的個人所得稅,因此內(nèi)部權(quán)益優(yōu)融資可因利息而減少公司稅的課征,且 成本較低,更不會造成控制權(quán)的稀釋.因此公司的融資決策會依循融(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外 Narayanan(1988):舉債增加需要支付的利息就更 (PeckingOrderDonaldson(1985):由于 在及不可預(yù)測的因素,而動用留存收益融資 較小,因此除非是緊急防御或是采取攻勢,否則不應(yīng)依賴 管理者為了增加自主權(quán),常謀求減輕外在利益團(tuán)體對公司運作的潛在干預(yù),而運用內(nèi)部正可避免投資大眾的注目,故內(nèi)優(yōu)于外 (PeckingOrder (PeckingOrderDBartonandGordon(1987持決策的控制權(quán)及彈性,將會較喜歡內(nèi),(PeckingOrderEMillerandRock(1985于任何的壞消息,因此內(nèi)部 采用何種外部融資方式均無差異。(亦即,，序理(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder Scott(1977):公司有抵押擔(dān)保的新負(fù)債,會剝 擔(dān)保的債權(quán)人之,而提高公司權(quán)益的價值.因此如果管理者追求的是股東 GrossmanandHart(1982):舉債會增加 潤,而非要享受 (PeckingOrderLeland&Pyle(1977）：當(dāng)企業(yè)投資可以使其價值提高時，將不會新股而降低原HotromandTirole(1989果管理以融。(亦即，不支融序理論的順(PeckingOrder. (PeckingOrderNarayanan(1988)：負(fù)債具有優(yōu)先求償因此舉債造成股價下跌的幅度較新股為(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder故公司價值應(yīng)會隨銀行借款增加而上 經(jīng)濟(jì)效果，故多選擇發(fā)債籌Yosha1995來成長機會愈高的公司，為避免信(二HoustonandJames(1996):未來成長機會較高的公 Cole(1998):企業(yè)若與銀行已有財務(wù)往來,則銀行會 予該企業(yè),主因是銀行能藉由財務(wù)往來4 Krishnaswamietal1999利的信息但卻高度信息不對稱時，為避免公BootandThakor(2000),HoustonandJames(2001):(PeckingOrder4Hoshietal.(1991),Billettetal.(1995):實證發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行具有正面價值,支持銀行 。 SebouhandGordon(2000):銀行融資 ,而私募負(fù),(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)Myers(1977):短期負(fù)債到期期間短,每次舉成本.JensenandMeckling(1976人或股東的,因此可轉(zhuǎn)債可降低成本.(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTimingCapitalStructureThestaticfirmsweighthetaxbenefitsofdebtagainstcostswithfinancialdistressandThedynamictrade-off:(HennessyandWhited(2005,JF)Thepeckingassourcesoffinancing,firmspreferinternalfunds,thenande asalast#informationasymmetry.(MyersandMajluf(1984,Themarkettimingfirmspreferequitywhentheyperceivetherelativecostequityislow,andpreferdebt#managerstimesecurityofferingstoexploitmarketinefficiency.(BakerandWurgler(2002,JF))EvidenceEvidencefavorstheMarketTimingFirmstendtoissuewhenFirmstendtoissuewheninvestorsarerathertooenthusiasticaboutearningsPost-issuestockreturnstendtobe“theamountbywhichourstockisundervaluedorovervaluedwasanimportantconsideration”inissuingeuit. GrahamandHarve 2001)Seasonedequityofferings,markettiming,andthecorporatelifecyclebyDeAngelo,DeAngeloandStulz(2010,Asimplelife-cycleyoungwithhighmrkt-to-book(M/B)ratiosandlowoperatingcashsellstocktofundwhereasma