連鎖店的競爭企業(yè)差別定價(jià)和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)外文翻譯

連鎖店的競爭企業(yè)差別定價(jià)和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)外文翻譯標(biāo)題:Chain-StoreCompetition:Customizedvs.UniformPricing原文:1.IntroductionDifferentretaillocationshavedifferentcostsand,whatisourconcernhere,differentdegreesofcompetition.Forexample,wagelevelsmayvarybylocationandaparticularmarketplayermayfacefewercompetitorsinsomelocationsthanothers.Hence,wemightexpectpricestobecustomizedacrosslocations.Asanillustration,takethemilestoneantitrustinvestigationbytheUSFederalTradeCommissionoftheproposedStaples/OfficeDepotmergerHere,akeyelementtheFTCuncoveredwastheadoptionofmarkedlydifferingpricingpracticesacrosslocationsofdifferingcompetitiveintensity,withaclearlinkbetweenthenumberofcompetingstoresofsimilartypeandthelevelofpriceThisisthirddegreepricediscrimination,butinanoligopolycontext。Acommonlyheldviewisthatfirmsarebetteroffpracticingthisformofpricediscriminationbetweenlocationsofdifferingcompetitiveintensity.Againstthisview,Cortes1998andothersubsequentauthorshaveshownthatinsituationsof“bestresponseasymmetry”,whereoneplayer’sstrongmarketistheother’sweakmarket,firmscanbeworseoffpracticingpricediscrimination.AsCortesputsit,“…iffirmsdifferinwhichmarketstheytargetforthisaggressivepricingandcompetitivereactionsarestrong,pricesinallmarketsmayfall.”。Butinmostretailingsituations,suchasofficeequipmentsupplies,rivalfirmswillholdthesameopinionaboutwhichmarketisstrongandwhichisweakasaresultofdifferingdegreesofcompetition?asituationofbestresponsesymmetryratherthanasymmetryUnderthesecircumstances,aclearpuzzleiswhyinsomeprominentcasesofbestresponsesymmetry,indistinctiontoStaples/OfficeDepot,firmspracticeuniformpricingratherthanvaryingpricebylocation.Itisthispuzzlethatisthefocusofourpaper.Aswedocumentindetailbelow,thekeyplayersintheUnitedKingdom“UK”supermarketindustry,whichhasaturnoveroverfivetimesaslargeastheUSofficeequipmentmarket,havemaintainedorenhancedtheirpoliciesonuniformityofpricingacrosslocationwithinmainlandBritain.Noteitiscrucialtothesuccessofauniformpricingpolicythatthereispriorcommitmenttosuchapolicy,ratherthansimultaneouschoiceofpricingpolicyandpricesthemselves.WeshowthatUKsupermarketshavemadesuchcommitmentsGiventhisunderlyingcommitment,wedemonstrateataverygenerallevelthataprofitincentiveexistsinfavorofuniformpricing,insomebutnotallsituationsofbestresponsesymmetry.Theargumentisessentiallyasfollows:ItiswellknownthatinadifferentiatedproductmarketsettingwithBertrandpricecompetition,bothplayersinaduopolycanbenefitifonecancommittoahigherprice.AcommitmenttouniformpricingwillprovideacommitmenttoahigherpriceifdemandfacingthefirminamonopolymarketislesselasticthanintheduopolymarketThenifthegaininprofitsfromtheduopolymarketexceedsthelossfromthemonopolymarket,thestrategyisprofitable.Wegoontofurthercharacterizeanalyticallythetypeofmarketforwhichthisincentivewillexist.Akeyfeatureisthatlargermarketshaveconsumerswithawiderrangeoftastesthandosmallmarkets.Followingthisgeneralanalysis,wedemonstrateusingaparameterizedexamplethataverywiderangeofdegreesofcompetitiveintensityisconsistentwithprofitseitherbeingenhancedoratleastreducedonlyslightlybyapolicyofuniformpricing.Thus,smallpositivebenefitsarisingfromotherAspectsofuniformpricingincludingreductionsinpromotionalcostsandlesseningofantitrustattentionmaywellbesufficienttoensurethatuniformpricingdevelopsasaresilientpracticeacrosstheindustry.Weproceedasfollows.ThenextsectionsetsoutthenatureofpricingandpricingcommitmentintheUKsupermarketindustryasanillustrativecase.Followingthis,section3developsthegeneralAnalyticalframeworkjustoutlinedandcharacterizesthecircumstanceswheretherecanbeaunilateralprofitincentiveforuniformpricing.Section4utilizesaparameterizedexampletoillustratetherangeofmarketcircumstancesconducivetouniformpricingbeingmoreprofitablelocalpricing.Section5extendsthedomaintoincorporatejointincentivestoadoptuniformpricinginthepresenceofcompetingchain-storeretailers,alsopracticalconsiderationswherelocalpricingmaybemoreexpensivetooperatethannationalpricing.Section6containsourconcludingremarks.2.UniformPricinginUKGroceryRetailingInthissectionwechartsufficientmaterialrelatedtoUKgroceryretailingtoshowtheveryconsiderableextenttowhichthemajorchainspriceuniformlyacrossareasdespitefacingverydifferentcompetitiveenvironmentsandcostsacrossthoseareas.Wealsodocumentthecommitmentsfirmsuseinmaintainingtheiruniformpricingpolicies.GroceryretailingrepresentsthelargestretailsectorintheUK,wortharound$160bnin2005.Fourretailers?Tesco,Sainsbury,AdsaWal-MartsubsidiaryandMorrison/Safeway?dominatethenationalmarket,accountingfor75%ofsalesofgroceryitemsi.e.,foodanddrink,cleaningproducts,toiletriesandhouseholdgoods,andindeed30%ofallretailsalesintheUK.Thesefoursupermarketretailershaveprimarilypositionedthemselvesas“onestopshops”,operatingwithverywideproductrangesinlargeformatstores.Assuch,theyjointlyaccountfor95%ofgrocerysalesforstoresexceeding1,400sqmeterswhichhasbeenviewedbytheUKcompetitionauthoritiesasthecriticalsizedistinguishingone-stopgroceryshops,servingprimaryshoppingneeds,fromsmallerstorescateringfor“top-up”and“convenience”groceryshopping.WhilemostoftheretailgrocerychainsoperateonanationallevelintheUK,thereisconsiderablevariationinregionalandlocalmarketsharesandconcentrationlevels.Table1providessomesummaryevidence,basedonaverydetailedreportintothesectorundertakenbytheUK’sCompetitionCommission“CC”hereafterin2000.Inparticular,highlevelsoflocalconcentrationwerefoundinmoreruralareasnotablyinScotlandandWalesandcertainurbanareaswhereaproliferationofstoresfromthesamechainexisted.Inadditiontomarketstructuredifferences,consumerincomelevelsalsodifferfromregiontoregiontendingtobehigherinthesouthernpartoftheUKandfromdistricttodistricttendingtobehigherinurbanareasasopposedtoruralareas,suggestingthepresenceofvariationinlocalconsumerdemand,incomesandpossiblywillingnesstopay.Withdifferencesinbothlocalcompetitionandlocaldemandconditions,itmightbethoughtthatretailerswouldseektotakeadvantageofopportunitiestosetpricesdifferentlyfromstoretostore.Inparticular,retailersmightsethigherpricesinareaswherelocalcompetitionwaslimitedand/oraverageincomelevelswerehigh,whilesettinglowerpricesinareasofmoreintenselocalcompetitionand/orlowaverageincomes.However,forthesectorasawhole,theCC2000foundanalmostevensplitbetweenthosefirmsthatadjustedpricesonalocalbasisandthosethatadopteduniformpricesacrossalltheirstores.OfthefifteenmaingrocerychainsoperatingintheUK,sevenwerefoundtovarypricesfromstoretostorebasedonlocalcompetitionanddemandconditionswhileeightusednationalpricing,withnolocalvariationinprices.Table2showstheextentandcharacteroflocalpriceflexingidentifiedbytheCCamongstthebig5firmsin1999.TothiswehaveaddeddatafromalaterCCreportin2003.In1999,individualproductpriceswerefoundinsomeretailerstovaryconsiderablybyasmuchas100%,butaveragepricesdifferedacrosseachchainbylessthan3%.TheCCinvestigatedthebasisonwhichlocalpricingoperated,identifyingthecriticalfactorsinfluencingstore-levelpricing.Fortheretailgroupsthatdidvaryprices,bothdifferencesinlocaldemandinrespectofincomeorregionaleffectsandlocalcompetitioninrespectoflocalmarketpowerorfacingparticularprice-focusedcompetitorswerefoundtobeimportantindeterminingthepricebandappliedtoindividualstoresandthevariationinpricesacrossthestorechain.Costelementslikedifferencesinstoresizewerealsofoundtoplayarole,butnotsosignificantlyastoexplainthefullextentofstore-to-storepricevariationHowever,thepatternofpricingpracticesinthesectorchangedmarkedlyoverthefollowingfouryears.Whilepriceflexingcontinuedtobeusedbysomeofthesmallerchains,by2003,bothSainsburyandTescohadvoluntarilymovedawayfromstorepricingbasedonlocation.Furthermore,inMarch2004,MorrisonacquiredSafewayandsetaboutconvertingallthelatter’sstoresintotheMorrisonformat,intheprocessabandoningSafeway’sstore-by-storepromotionalpricingpolicyinfavorofitsnationalpricingpolicy.Remarkably,uniformpricinghasbecomethedominantformofpricinginthissector,andthemajorretailers,includingTesco,reportedlytheworld’sthirdlargestretailer,haveeschewedtheopportunitytocustomizepricesonastore-by-storebasisinfavorofnationalpricing.Ifnationalpricingistohaveanypossiblestrategicroleininfluencingthepricingdecisionsofrivalretailersi.e.beseenasbeyondmere“cheaptalk”,thenthechain-storeretailerwouldneedvisiblytopre-committouniformpricinginsuchafashionthattheotherretailerscouldbecertainthatthechainstore’shandsaretiedwhenitcomestoactualdeterminationofprices.BeyondUKsupermarkets,uniformpricingisalsowitnessedinotherretailsectorsaswell.AsDobsonandWatterson2005observe,thesefurtherexamplesillustratetherangeofpossiblecommitmentdevicesandpoliciesthatmaybeemployedtosupportthecredibilityofauniformpricingstrategy.Forinstance,aretailchainmayrelyonsomeexpensivecommitmentmechanismthatwouldrenderitspositionworsewereitnottoadoptuniformpricingthanifitdidso.Inthecaseofsomeretailersthiscomesaboutbypublishingallpricesinacataloguewhichthenappliesacrossthewholecountry,e.g.IKEAinfurnitureandfurnishingsorArgosintheUKforgeneralmerchandise,withnoscopeforlocalpricedeviations.Analternativecommitmentcanarisethroughnationaladvertisingtoinformconsumersaboutpricesorthroughuseofintegralpricetagsstandardacrossacountry,oreventhewholeEurozonee.g.topclothingretailerssuchasSweden’smultinationalH&MandUK’sMarks&Spencer.Afurtherpossibilityisforthechain-storeretailertoremovelocalmarketboundariestocreateessentiallyanationalmarketforitsowngoods.Forexample,thismightbepossibleifconsumerswereallowedfullaccesstothestorenetworkregardlessoftheirlocation,withorderstakenfromanypartofthecountrythenbackedwitheitherhomedeliveryordeliverytothenearestavailablestoreasofferedforexamplebyanumberofUKclothingretailersincludingMarks&SpencerandNext.AsimilareffectcouldarisethrougharetailerdevelopinganInternetoperationtorunalongsideitsstoreoperations,i.e.becomea“clicksandbricks”retailer,makingacommitmenttoofferingonlinepricesequaltotheloweststore-levelprices.Indeed,thisisamovethatTesco,AdsandSainsburyhaveadoptedindevelopingonlinegrocerysalesintheUKandisalsobeingrolledoutbyH&Mforclothing5.FurtherConsiderationsTheresultsintheprevioustwosections,anddiagrammaticallyillustratedinFigure1,pointtothescopeforuniformpricingofferingstrictlyhigherprofitsthanunderlocalpricingbeingquiterestricted.However,theremaybeotherpracticalconsiderations,aswealludedtointheIntroduction,whichmayextendthescopeforadoptinguniformpricing.Inthissectionwebuildonthelineardemandanalysisintheprevioussectiontoillustratetwopossibleconsiderations:first,whereother,rivalchain-storeretailersexistandtheycancoordinatetheirpricingpolicychoices;secondwherelocalpricingmayinvolvesomeadditionalcoststhatreducenetprofitsunderthispricingpolicychoice.6.ConclusionLargenationorregionalchain-storegroupsnowdominatemostsectorsofretailing.Theyhavethecostsavingsandmarketingcloutofalargepurchasercoupledwiththepotentialflexibilitytotailoroffersacrossthelocalmarketstheyserve.Thispotentialflexibilityhasbeenrealizedthroughdevelopmentsininformationgatheringandprocessing,allowingmarketerstocustomizemarketingmixvariablestothestore-levelMontgomery,1997Incontrast,ourfocushascenteredoncompetitiveaspects.Specifically,hicpricediscriminationmayimpactoncompetitionacrossthenetworkoflocalmarketsserved.Inthiscontextwehaveshownquitegenerallythatmarketconditionsexistwhereitwillbebothindividuallyandjointlyprofitableforretailerstoeschewcustomizingpricesandinsteadsetuniformpricesacrosstheirstores.Thismeanstheretailerforgoeshighpricesandhighprofitsinthelocalmarketswhereithasmonopolypowerandinsteadleveragesthismarketpoweracrossallitsmarketstoraisepricesinthosemarketswheretheintensityofcompetitionotherwisemakesthemlow.Itentailssacrificingsomelocalprofits,butwiththebenefitofsofteningcompetitionmorebroadlyandsufficientlytoraisefirmprofitsoverall.出處:PaulDobsonandMichaelWatterson.Chain-storecompetition:customizedvs.uniformpricing[J].MarketingSci.2008.4911,pp.29-40標(biāo)題:連鎖店的競爭:企業(yè)差別定價(jià)和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)譯文:摘要:不同零售處有我們?cè)谶@里所關(guān)注的不同的費(fèi)用和不同程度的競爭。例如,工資水平可能會(huì)隨著地理位置的不同而不同,某一特定市場的人員在同一位置可能會(huì)面臨相對(duì)其他一些地方更少的競爭對(duì)手。因此,我們可以期望價(jià)格根據(jù)位置來定制。以具有里程碑意義的美國聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)提出的斯臺(tái)普斯辦公車廠合并反壟斷調(diào)查作為例子。在這里,一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的因素是,聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)根據(jù)不同的地點(diǎn)和競爭強(qiáng)度定價(jià),跟有相似類型和價(jià)格水平的競爭商店的數(shù)量有明顯的聯(lián)系。這是三度差別定價(jià),但是在寡頭壟斷的背景下產(chǎn)生的。一個(gè)普遍持有的看法是公司最好掌握這種針對(duì)不同的位置之間的競爭強(qiáng)度形式的歧視價(jià)格。對(duì)這種觀點(diǎn),卡特1998和其他后來著作者的情況表明,在“最佳反應(yīng)不對(duì)稱”的情況下,如果那里是玩家的強(qiáng)大的市場也是其他人的疲軟市場,公司運(yùn)用價(jià)格歧視將會(huì)使情況更糟。作為個(gè)體所指出的那樣,“…如果公司有不同的目標(biāo)市場,積極的定價(jià)和競爭力反應(yīng)較強(qiáng),在所有市場價(jià)格可能下降。”但在多數(shù)零售的場合,例如辦公設(shè)備用品,競爭公司關(guān)于哪個(gè)市場力量強(qiáng)大,哪個(gè)力量弱作為不同程度競爭的結(jié)果會(huì)有同樣的看法-這是對(duì)稱最好的反應(yīng)局面而不是不對(duì)稱。在這些情況下,一個(gè)清晰的困惑是為什么在一些突出的案例有明顯對(duì)稱性,最好的臺(tái)普斯辦公車廠是公司統(tǒng)一定價(jià),而不是根據(jù)不同的位置定價(jià)。這個(gè)迷將是本文的重點(diǎn)。我們的文章詳細(xì)介紹在英國超市行業(yè)的關(guān)鍵參與者,營業(yè)額超過5倍美國辦公設(shè)備市場,他們?cè)谟箨憙?nèi)保持或增強(qiáng)他們的不均勻性政策。注意這是成功的關(guān)鍵,統(tǒng)一價(jià)格政策應(yīng)致力于這一政策,而不是同時(shí)選擇的定價(jià)政策和自己定價(jià)。我們展示的英國超市做了這樣的承諾?？紤]到這個(gè)潛在的承諾,我們證明了在一個(gè)很普遍的水平,利潤激勵(lì)存在贊成統(tǒng)一定價(jià),只有部分好的反應(yīng)的情況下最好是對(duì)稱。其中的論點(diǎn)本質(zhì)上如下:眾所周知,在分化的產(chǎn)品市場設(shè)置下,波特蘭德的價(jià)格競爭,在雙寡頭壟斷中如果一個(gè)人能確認(rèn)了一種更高的價(jià)格它就將受益。承諾統(tǒng)一定價(jià)將提供一個(gè)承諾,以一種更高的價(jià)格如果需求面向公司壟斷市場比寡頭壟斷的市場缺少彈性。如果在寡頭壟斷的市場中獲得的利潤超過損失,他們的策略是有利可圖。我們繼續(xù)進(jìn)一步描述的這個(gè)刺激會(huì)存在的類型的市場分析。一個(gè)主要特點(diǎn)是大的市場比小市場讓消費(fèi)者到更廣泛的體會(huì)。綜合分析之后,我們證明了有非常廣泛的有競爭強(qiáng)度的參數(shù)化的例子利潤是一致的,采用統(tǒng)一定價(jià)利潤被增強(qiáng),或至少輕微減少。于是,從其他統(tǒng)一定價(jià)方面產(chǎn)生的正面效益小包括減少促銷成本和減輕的反托拉斯的注意力可能會(huì)足夠保證統(tǒng)一定價(jià)發(fā)展為實(shí)踐整個(gè)行業(yè)的彈性實(shí)踐。我們按如下步驟。接下來的部分羅列出定價(jià)的性質(zhì)和價(jià)格承諾在英國超市的幾個(gè)行業(yè)情況作為例證。此后,第三節(jié)一般發(fā)展的解析框架,它只是概述了在利益單方面激勵(lì)統(tǒng)一定價(jià)的情況.第四部分采用參數(shù)化范圍的例子來說明市場狀況用統(tǒng)一的價(jià)格比地方定價(jià)更為有利可圖.第5部分延伸領(lǐng)域?qū)⒙?lián)合鼓勵(lì)采用統(tǒng)一的價(jià)格競爭的存在,實(shí)用的連鎖店的兩種零售商,也考慮當(dāng)?shù)氐亩▋r(jià)可能會(huì)比國家定價(jià)變得更加的昂貴。第6部分包含我們的結(jié)束語。在這個(gè)部分中我們對(duì)英國食品零售業(yè)羅列足夠的材料,在非常大的范圍內(nèi)統(tǒng)一各個(gè)領(lǐng)域大型連鎖店價(jià)格,不畏懼在各個(gè)地方不同的競爭環(huán)境和成本。我們也證明公司使用并維護(hù)其均勻的定價(jià)政策。在英國,食品零售業(yè)代表最大的零售市場,2005年總價(jià)值約為1600億美元。四大零售商-特時(shí)刻、山柏力,愛仕達(dá)一沃爾瑪公司的子公司),莫里森-主宰國際市場,占75%的食品項(xiàng)目例如,食物和飲料、清潔用品、化妝品、家用物品的銷售額,事實(shí)上,30%的零售在英國。這四個(gè)超市零售商定位自己是“一站店”,在很大的格式化的商店范圍,操作廣泛的產(chǎn)品.這樣,95%的雜貨銷售額都在面積超過1400平方米的商店完成在英國競爭部門被視為一站式雜貨店,服務(wù)主要購物的需求,從那些小商店為“附加”和“便利”購物。雖然大部分的零售食品雜貨連鎖店在英國操作用一個(gè)國家標(biāo)準(zhǔn),但市場占有率和地方的濃度有較大的不同。表1提供一些簡單的證據(jù),它是基于一個(gè)詳細(xì)的報(bào)告由進(jìn)入這一行業(yè)英國競爭委員會(huì)以下簡稱“CC2000年提供。特別是,發(fā)現(xiàn)更多的在農(nóng)村地區(qū)特別是在蘇格蘭和威爾斯和一些城市的地區(qū)從商店擴(kuò)散存在同一連鎖店高水平的局部濃度。除了市場結(jié)構(gòu)差異,消費(fèi)者收入水平之間的差距也與地區(qū)與地區(qū)之間傾向較高位于該國南部的英國和區(qū)域與區(qū)域高傾向于在城市