第11版《國際勞工組織勞動(dòng)世界監(jiān)測(cè)報(bào)告》

XILOMonitorontheworldofwork.EleventheditionAglobalemploymentdivide:low-incomecountrieswillbeleftfurtherbehindwithoutactiononjobsandsocialprotection

31May2023

Keymessages

XVariousglobalshocksandrisksareholdingbacklabourmarketrecovery,especiallyinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.Indevelopingcountries,respondingtothecurrentmultiplecrises(or“polycrisis”)isconstrainedbyacombinationofhighinflationandhighinterestrates,alongwithagrowingriskofdebtdistress.

XTheILOprojectsthatlow-incomecountries,AfricaandtheArabStatesareunlikelytorecovertopre-pandemiclevelsofunemploymentthisyear.Whiletheglobalunemploymentrateisexpectedtofallbelowthepandemiclevelin2023,thisreflectsstronger-than-expectedresilienceinhigh-incomecountriesratherthanageneralizedrecovery.

XIn2023,theglobaljobsgapisprojectedtostandat453millionpeople(or11.7percent1),morethandoublethelevelofunemployment.TherealscaleofemploymentchallengesisencapsulatedbytheILO’sjobsgapindicatorwhichincludesallpersonswhowouldliketoworkbutdonothaveajob.Thejobsgapismuchhigheramongwomen(14.5percent)thanmen(9.8percent).

XDifferencesinthejobsgapreflectaglobalemploymentdivide.Low-incomecountriesfacethelargestjobsgaprateat21.5percent,whiletherateinmiddle-incomecountriesstandsslightlyabove11percent.High-incomecountriesregisterthelowestrates,at8.2percent.Low-incomecountriesaretheonlycountryincomegroupthathasseenalong-termriseinthejobsgaprate,from19.1percentin2005to21.5percentin2023.

XLow-incomecountriesindebtdistressfaceajobsgapof25.7percentin2023.Inlow-incomecountriesthatareindebtdistress,thejobsgapissignificantlyhigherthanindevelopingcountriesatlowriskofdebtdistress,at25.7percentcomparedwith11percent.Thisreflectsthefactthatfinancialandfiscalconstraintsarehamperingtheirpolicy

responses,furtherworseninglabourmarket

conditions.

XSomecountriesarefacingparticularlycomplexandcascadingcrises,whichinteractwithbroaderglobalchallengesandexacerbatelabourmarketimpacts.Theyrangefromnaturaldisasters(e.g.theearthquakesinTürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublic)tomultipleeconomicshocks(e.g.inSriLanka),whichhavecomeontopofthelingeringeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandtheglobalcost-of-livingcrisis.

XSignificantsocialprotectionpolicygapsremainindevelopingcountries,especiallyinlow-incomecountries,includinginregardtoold-agepensions.

Only38.6percentofolderpersonsinlower-middle-incomeand23.2percentinlow-incomecountriesreceiveanold-agepension.Investinginnationalsocialprotectionsystemsbasedonequitableandsustainablefinancingfromtaxesandsocialcontributionsandcomplementedbyinternationalsupportwhereneeded,isnecessaryandwillbringeconomic,socialandemploymentbenefits.

XTheILO’snewestimatesconfirmthatbuildinganationalsocialprotectionfloor,forexample,throughexpandingbasicold-agepensionsindevelopingcountrieswouldincreaseGDPpercapitainlow-andlower-middle-incomecountriesby14.8percentwithin10years.Suchbasicold-agepensionsindevelopingcountrieswouldalsoreducetheshareofthepopulationlivingbelowtheUS$2.15PPPpovertylineby6percentagepointsandincreasetheincomeshareofthebottom40percentoftheincomedistributionby2.5percentagepoints.Furthermore,theinducedeffectsofbasicpensionswouldreducethegendergapinlabourincomeby3.6percentagepoints,equivalenttotheglobalprogressregisteredinthelast15years.

1Thenumeratorofthisratecomprisesallthosewithoutajobandwantingone,whilethedenominatorconsistsofthatfigureinadditiontototalemployment.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition2

XTherequiredfinancialresourcesforexpandingbasicold-agepensionsarelargebutnotinsurmountable.Fordevelopingcountries,theannualcostofprovidingbasicold-agepensionsatthelevelofnationalpovertylinesisequivalentto1.6percentofGDP(2.3percentand1.5percentofGDPforlow-incomeandlower-middle-incomecountries,respectively).Forsub-SaharanAfrica,thecostwouldbeUS$23.3billion,or1.4percentofGDP

andapproximately12.5percentofglobalannualofficialdevelopmentassistance.

XTheUNGlobalAcceleratoronJobsandSocialProtection,andtheGlobalCoalitionforSocialJustice,canbuildglobalresourcestoachievebasicold-agepensions,asonepartofareformoftheinternationalfinancialarchitecturetobetteraddresstheneedsoflower-incomecountries.

XPart1.Latesttrendsinanuncertainlabourmarketrecovery

1.Thecontext:uneven

impactofthepolycrisis

PrecipitatedbythewarinUkraineandthelingeringeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemic,theongoingcost-of-livingcrisishashurtincomesandlivelihoodsaroundtheworld,especiallyindevelopingcountries.GlobalGDPgrowthisexpectedtodecelerateto2.8percentthisyear,downfrom3.4percentin2022.2Thisslowdownmasksasignificantdivergencebetweenadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.Inhigh-incomecountries,labourmarketsremaintightdespitetheseriesofinterestraterises(thoughsomeemploymentdeficitspersistevenintheseeconomies).Whilesomelargeemergingeconomies,suchasIndia,havereturnedtostrongeconomicgrowth,low-incomecountriesarefacinghighlevelsofdebtandrisingcostsofborrowing,whichfurtherconstraintheireffortstopromotedecentandproductiveemployment.

Highinflationandinterestratescontinuetoweighonmanylabourmarkets,whileforsomecountriesthesituationisexpectedtoease(box1).Atthesametime,fiscalspaceinthepooresteconomiesisseverelyconstrained,whichlimitstheirpolicyresponsestoapolycrisisworlddefinedbyarangeofcomplexandcascadingchallenges,includingconflict,naturaldisastersandeconomiccrisesthatamplifytheeffectsofglobalshocksstemmingfromtheCOVID-19pandemicandthecost-of-livingcrisis.Thissituationhascontributedtoaworseningglobalemployment

dividewiththemostsignificantlabourmarketdeficitsevidentinlow-incomecountries.

Persistentinflationhasledtoaggressivemonetarypolicytightening.Inflationratesaroundtheworldstartedtorisein2021,andjumpedsignificantlyin2022,inallcountryincomegroups,leadingtosignificantmonetarypolicytightening.Atthebeginningof2023,37outof162countries,almostalllow-andmiddle-income,hadcentralbankinterestratesinexcessof10percent(seefigureA1andtableA1inthestatisticalannex).Continuedhighinflationexpectationsareexpectedtocausefurthermonetarytighteninginaroundhalfofthecountries:whilealmostallhigh-incomecountriesarelikelytoexperiencefurthertightening,onlyaminorityoflow-andmiddle-incomecountriesisexpectedtodoso.

Countriesfaceatrade-offinmanagingexpectedinflation,exchangeratemovements,debtsustainabilityandeconomicactivity.Highinterestratescauseproblemsfordebtsustainabilityandnewdebtfinancing,especiallysincemanycountrieshaveseentheirdebt-to-GDPratiosrisesignificantlyduringtheCOVID-19crisis.Exchangeratedepreciationinmanydevelopingcountrieshascontributedtohigherinflationandinterestrates,whileworseningtheexternaldebtburden.3Indeed,theproportionofcountriesindebtdistressorathighriskofdebtdistresshasdoubledto60percentcomparedwith2015levels(

IMF2023

).Enterprisesandworkersaredeeplyimpactedduringadebtcrisis.Realinterestrates,whicharedecisiveforeconomicactivity,haveremainedrelativelylowinadvancedeconomies.

2IMF,

WorldEconomicOutlook:ARockyRecovery

,April2023.

3UNCTAD,

GlobalTrendsandProspects

,TradeandDevelopmentReportUpdate,April2023.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition3

Butcontinuedtighteningofmonetarypolicy,alongwithrecedinginflation,couldraiseexpectedandrealizedrealinterestratestohigherlevels,whichwilleventuallytakeatollonlabourmarkets.4

2.Unemploymentandthejobsgap

Globalunemploymentislikelytoreturntothepre-pandemiclevelin2023

TheILO’slatestestimatesprojectthattheglobalunemploymentratewillfallby0.1percentagepointsin2023(figure1).Thisimpliesadeclineinthetotalnumberofgloballyunemployedpeopleof1million,5whichisduetogreater-than-anticipatedlabourmarketresilienceinhigh-incomecountriesinthefaceoftheeconomicslowdown.6Therearesignsthatfurtherinterestratehikesinhigh-incomecountrieswillbelimitedascentralbankersstarttoprioritizeconcernsaboutthehealthoftheeconomy.Interestratesinmanylow-andmiddle-incomecountriesareexpectedtoremainstableordecline.Nevertheless,theriskoftheglobaleconomyentering

arecessionremainssizeable,creatingamajordownsideriskforgloballabourmarkets(

IMF2023

).

Globalestimatesofunemploymentfortheyears2020through2022havebeenrevisedsubstantiallyinlightofnewdata.7Consequently,globalunemploymentin2022isnowestimatedat192million,comparedto205millionreportedinILO'sWESOTrends2023.In2023,globalunemploymentisprojectedtofallto191million,correspondingtoanunemploymentrateof5.3percent.TheglobalrecoveryinunemploymentratesfollowingtheCOVID-19crisishasbeenremarkablyfastcomparedtopreviouscrisessuchastheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008–09(figure1).

Yet,unemploymentinlow-incomecountriesandintheregionsofAfricaandtheArabStatesisnotexpectedtorecovertopre-pandemiclevelsin2023.

TheglobalpicturemaskssignificantheterogeneityattheregionallevelregardingthespeedofrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19crisis.UnemploymentratesinAfricaandtheArabStatesin2023areprojectedtoremainelevatedcomparedto2019,whileother

Figure1.Unemploymentrate,2007–23,world(percentage)

7.0

6.0

5.0

20082010201220142016201820202022

Source:ILOestimates.

4Monetarypolicytighteningalsoraisestheriskoffinancialinstability,whichcouldhaveamajorimpactonthelabourmarket.

5ThisisanimprovementcomparedtopreviousprojectionsfromJanuary,whenestimatesindicatedanincreaseof3million(see

WESOTrends2023

).

6ForadjustmentsofILOestimatesincomparisonwiththosepublishedin

WESOTrends2023

,seefiguresA1andA2inthestatisticalannex.

7ThedownwardrevisionisdueprimarilytonewlyincorporatedunemploymentdatafromIndianlabourforcesurveys,showingthattheIndianunemploymentratedeclinedsharplyin2021and2022,fallingto4.8percent,whichisalmost2percentagepointsbelowitslevelof2019

(6.5percent).Yet,evenwhenexcludingIndia,theglobalunemploymentrateisprojectedtofallbacktoitspre-pandemiclevelin2023.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition4

Figure2.Unemploymentrates,worldandby(sub)regionandcountryincomegroup,2019,2022and2023(percentage)

2022

World

WorldexcludingIndia

Low-incomecountries

Lower-middle-incomecountries

Upper-middle-incomecountries

High-incomecountries

NorthernAfrica

Sub-SaharanAfrica

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

NorthernAmerica

ArabStates

EasternAsia

South-EasternAsiaandthePacific

SouthernAsia

Northern,SouthernandWesternEurope

EasternEurope

CentralandWesternAsia

Source:ILOestimates.

2023

2019

10.9

11.2

11.2

4.0

4.6

4.8

4.6

4.6

4.3

4.7

4.7

4.4

7.0

7.0

7.8

7.8

3.8

3.9

8.0

2.5

2.6

2.4

8.7

9.3

9.3

9.2

6.0

6.0

6.3

6.3

6.7

6.4

6.3

6.3

5.0

5.3

5.2

5.4

5.4

5.4

5.4

5.7

5.5

5.1

5.1

5.7

5.7

5.5

5.5

5.5

5.7

regionssuchasLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,Northern,SouthernandWesternEurope,andCentralandWesternAsiahavemanagedtoreducethoseratessubstantiallybelowpre-crisislevels.Low-incomecountriessofarhavefailedtorecovertotherateofunemploymentwitnessedin2019(figure2).

Jobsgapindicatorpointstolarge

employmentdeficits,particularly

indevelopingcountries

Whileunemploymentnumbersprovideimportantinformationontheextentoflabourunderutilization,especiallyindevelopingcountries,anovelindicatordevelopedbytheILO,thejobsgap,offersamorecomprehensivemeasureoftheunmetdemandforemploymentaroundtheworld.Itcapturesallpersonswhowouldliketoworkbutdonothaveajob.Thejobsgapusesthesamedatasourcesasunemploymentstatisticsbutinadditionutilizeslabourforcesurveydatatoincorporatealljobseekersorotherswhowouldworkiftheycould.Assuch,the

indicatorisausefulcomplementtotheunemploymentrateandhelpsprovideamorecomprehensiveviewoflabourunderutilization.8

In2023,theglobaljobsgapisprojectedtostandat453millionpeopleor11.7percent,9morethandoubletheunemploymentcount.Theglobaljobsgapof453millionincludesboththe191millionunemployedpeopleandanadditional262millionwhowantemploymentbutdonotqualifyasunemployed.Thosewithoutajobbutnotclassifiedasunemployedinclude,forinstance,peoplewhoarediscouragedfromsearchingandthosecurrentlyunabletotakeupemploymentatshortnotice,suchaspersonswithcareresponsibilities.

Thereisanunequaljobsgapglobally.In2023,low-incomecountriesarefacingthelargestjobsgaprateat21.5percent,whiletherateinmiddle-incomecountriesstandsslightlyabove11percent.High-incomecountriesregisterthelowestrates,at8.2percent.Overall,whileonlyafewcountries,mostlyhigh-income,experiencerelativelylowjobsgaprates,therestoftheworldcontinuestofacepersistentemploymentdeficits.

8TheILO’sjobsgapindicatorcomplementstheexistingsetofindicatorsintheILOmodelledestimatesbyprovidingcombinedestimatesofthe

unemployed,potentiallabourforce,andwillingnon-jobseekers(eachofthemdefinedin

resolutionIofthe19thICLS

).LiketheLU3indicator,thejobsgapincludesinadditiontotheunemployedthosewhoareunavailablejobseekersandavailablenon-jobseekers,butincontrasttotheLU3indicator,italsoincludesthosewhofallintoneitherofthepreviouscategoriesbutdowantemployment(willingnon-jobseekers).See

WESOTrends

2023

formoredetailsontheindicatoranditsdifferenceswithrespecttounemployment.

9Thenumeratorofthisratecomprisesallthosewithoutajobandwantingone,whilethedenominatorconsistsofallthosewithoutajobandwantingoneplustotalemployment.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition5

Figure3.Jobsgaprate,2023,bygenderandcountryincomegroup(percentage)

Female

Male

LowLower-middleUpper-middleHigh

incomeincomeincomeincome

Source:ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates.

21.5

14.5

11.511.2

9.8

8.2

25

20

10

15

0

5

Figure4.Jobsgaprate,bycountryincomegroup,2005–23(percentage)

25

20

15

10

5

02005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023

LowincomeLower-middleincomeUpper-middleincomeHighincome

Source:ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates.

Theseareparticularlyacuteforwomen,whofaceWhiletheglobaljobsgaprateisprojectedto

declinein2023by0.2percentagepointsto11.7percent,thereareconsiderablevariationsbetweencountryincomegroups(figure4).Low-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseelittlechangein2023;thisisalsotheonlyincomegroupthathasseenalong-termriseinthejobsgapratefrom19.1percentin2005to21.5percentin2023.Thepersistenceof

ajobsgaprateof14.5percent,comparedto9.8per

centformen.Low-incomecountriesexhibitthe

greatestgenderdisparityinemploymentdeficits,with

womenfacingajobsgapratethatis9percentage

pointshigherthanthatofmen.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition6

Figure5.Jobsgaprateindevelopingcountries,2023,bycountryriskofdebtdistress(percentage)

35

LowModerateHighIndebtdistress

TotalFemale

Note:Thelistofdeveloping(mostlylow-income)countriescoveredinthissample(asof28February2023)canbefoundat:

https://www

.

org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist

imf..pdf,excludingDominica,FederatedStatesofMicronesia,Grenada,Kiribati,MarshallIslandsandTuvalu,whicharenotavailableinILOmodelledestimatesofthejobsgaprate.

Sources:Jobsgaprate(percentage)–ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates;countryriskofdebtdistress–

IMFDebtSustainability

Analysis–Low-IncomeCountries

.

30

25

20

10

15

0

5

thejobsgapinthesepoorestcountriesreflectsthefactthat,forvariousreasons,therearenotenoughnewemploymentopportunitiesforrapidlygrowing,youthfulpopulations.Lower-middle-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseealmostnochangein2023buthaveexperiencedasizeablelong-termdecline.Upper-middle-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseethelargestdecrease(0.5percentagepoints)in2023.High-incomecountrieshaveseenthelargestlong-termimprovementinthejobsgapratewitha4percentagepointdeclinesincetheaftermathofthe2008–09globalfinancialcrisisandadropof0.3percentagepointsin2023alone.

Debt-distressedcountriesfacethebiggestlabourmarketchallengesandhavemuchmore

constrainedpolicyspace,whichwillhinderfurtherpolicyresponsesinthefaceofongoingcrisesandnewshocks.Inthelow-incomecountriesthatareclassifiedasindebtdistress,10thejobsgapissignificantlyhigher,estimatedtoreach25.7percentin2023,comparedwith11.0percentindevelopingcountriesatlowriskofdebtdistress(figure5).Thejobsgaprateforwomeninthesedebt-distressedcountriesisexpectedtoreachalmost31percentin2023,reflectingagenderdisparitythatisevidentinallcountriesasnotedabove.Thecorrelationbetweendebtdistressandthejobsgapratepointstothecriticalimportanceofinternationalfinancialsupportfordebt-distressedcountriesinpromotingbothaneconomicandajobrecovery.

10Forclassification,seetheIMF’s“

DebtSustainabilityAnalysis–Low-IncomeCountries

”.

ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition7

Box1.Exacerbatedfacesofthepolycrisis

Whiletheriskofpolycrisisisglobalinnatureandscope,developingcountriesfaceevenmorecomplexandcascadingcrises,whichinteractwithbroaderglobalchallengestofurtherexacerbatelabourmarketimpacts.Theserangefromnaturaldisastersandconflictstodomesticpoliticalandeconomicshocks,whichhavecomeontopoftheeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandthecost-of-livingcrisis,alongwiththeeffectsofclimatechange.Thereisconsiderablediversityintheaccumulatedimpactsofmultiplecrises,includingtheeffectsofeconomicshocks(SriLanka)andnaturaldisasters(TürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublic).Inadditiontoprecipitatingthesurgeininflationanddisruptiontosupplychainsstartingin2022,thewarinUkrainecontinuestoimpactitsownlabourmarket(andneighbouringcountriesthroughflowsofrefugees).

SriLankainaneconomiccrisis.Ontopoflong-runningmacroeconomicimbalancesandstructuralweaknesses,SriLankahasbeenhitbyaseriesofcrises,startingwiththeEasterbombingsin2019andfollowedbytheCOVID-19pandemic,whichhittheeconomyandlabourmarkethard,especiallythetourismsector.Aswitnessedinotherdevelopingcountries,women,youthandMSMEs,particularlythoseoperatingintheinformaleconomy,werebadlyaffectedbylockdownmeasures.11Outputcontractedslightlyalreadyin2019beforedecliningby4.6percentin2020duringtheCOVID-19lockdowns,followedbyapartialrecoveryin2021(growthof3.5percent).12ThespillovereffectsoftheUkraineconflictthwartedthenascentrecoveryandpushedtheSriLankaneconomyintoafull-blownbalanceofpaymentscrisisandsubsequentdebtdefaultinApril2022.Outputdeclinedby7.8percentin2022(–12.4percentin2022Q4),asthecountryfacedseverefuelandothershortages.Inflationreachedmorethan46percentlastyear,whichhasdamagedrealincomesandlivelihoods.

FollowingthesigningofanIMFsupportprogrammeinMarch2023,somestabilizationhasbeenachievedthoughtheeconomyisexpectedtocontractby3.0percentthisyear.13ArecentILOsurveyindicatesthatasignificantnumberofMSMEshavebeenforcedtocloseoperations,withthesurvivingbusinesseshavingimplementedlargereductionsinemployment,

workinghours,andinsomecases,wages.14AnotherkeyconcernistheeffectsonwomenintheSriLankanlabourmarket.Alreadystartingfromalowlevel,women’slabourforceparticipationfellfrom34.5percentin2019to32.1percentin2022.Duetotheslowprocessofdebtrestructuring,macroeconomicstabilizationandeffectsofreforms,therecoverywillbeslow,implyingthatthenegativeeffectsontheSriLankanlabourmarketwillcontinuewithalagasevidentintheaftermathofpreviouseconomicandfinancialcrises.

LabourmarketimpactsinTürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublicafteradevastatingnaturaldisaster.On6February2023,thesouth-easternprovincesofTürkiyewerehitbymorethanonemajorearthquake,whichkilledaround50,000peopleandinjuredapproximately107,000.15Almost4millionworkerswerelivingintheaffectedregion,largelyemployedinagriculture,manufacturing,tradeandother,mostlylowvalue-added,services.Throughtheimpactonbuildingsandinfrastructure,suchanaturaldisasterhadanimmediateeffectontheeconomyandlabourmarket.Duetothelossofaround220,000workplaces,theILOestimatesthattheearthquakeresultedinadeclineof16percentinhoursworked,equivalenttomorethan657,000full-timejobs.TheILOestimatesthat,overall,theearthquakehasreducedtake-homelabourincomeinTürkiyebymorethan2,859millionTurkishlira(aroundUS$150million)permonth.

InSyrianArabRepublic,where12yearsofcivilwarhadalreadytakenahugetollontheeconomyandlabourmarket,arecentILOassessmentfindsthataround170,000workershavelosttheirjobsasaresultoftheFebruaryearthquakes.16Theearthquakeshavedirectlyaffectedaround154,000householdsandmorethan725,000people.Around35,000MSMEshavealsobeenimpacted.Thistemporary“disemployment”hasledtototallabourincomelossesequivalenttoatleastUS$5.7millionamonth.Thefiveworst-affecteddistrictswerehometoanestimated42.4percentofthecountry’stotalpopulation,includingaround7.1millionpeopleofworkingage,ofwhom2.7millionwereinemployment(formalandinformal).Ofthese,22.8percentwerewomen.

11R.GunatilakaandS.Chandrasiri,“

TheLabourMarketImplicationsoftheSriLanka’sMultipleCrises

”,I