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XILOMonitorontheworldofwork.EleventheditionAglobalemploymentdivide:low-incomecountrieswillbeleftfurtherbehindwithoutactiononjobsandsocialprotection
31May2023
Keymessages
XVariousglobalshocksandrisksareholdingbacklabourmarketrecovery,especiallyinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.Indevelopingcountries,respondingtothecurrentmultiplecrises(or“polycrisis”)isconstrainedbyacombinationofhighinflationandhighinterestrates,alongwithagrowingriskofdebtdistress.
XTheILOprojectsthatlow-incomecountries,AfricaandtheArabStatesareunlikelytorecovertopre-pandemiclevelsofunemploymentthisyear.Whiletheglobalunemploymentrateisexpectedtofallbelowthepandemiclevelin2023,thisreflectsstronger-than-expectedresilienceinhigh-incomecountriesratherthanageneralizedrecovery.
XIn2023,theglobaljobsgapisprojectedtostandat453millionpeople(or11.7percent1),morethandoublethelevelofunemployment.TherealscaleofemploymentchallengesisencapsulatedbytheILO’sjobsgapindicatorwhichincludesallpersonswhowouldliketoworkbutdonothaveajob.Thejobsgapismuchhigheramongwomen(14.5percent)thanmen(9.8percent).
XDifferencesinthejobsgapreflectaglobalemploymentdivide.Low-incomecountriesfacethelargestjobsgaprateat21.5percent,whiletherateinmiddle-incomecountriesstandsslightlyabove11percent.High-incomecountriesregisterthelowestrates,at8.2percent.Low-incomecountriesaretheonlycountryincomegroupthathasseenalong-termriseinthejobsgaprate,from19.1percentin2005to21.5percentin2023.
XLow-incomecountriesindebtdistressfaceajobsgapof25.7percentin2023.Inlow-incomecountriesthatareindebtdistress,thejobsgapissignificantlyhigherthanindevelopingcountriesatlowriskofdebtdistress,at25.7percentcomparedwith11percent.Thisreflectsthefactthatfinancialandfiscalconstraintsarehamperingtheirpolicy
responses,furtherworseninglabourmarket
conditions.
XSomecountriesarefacingparticularlycomplexandcascadingcrises,whichinteractwithbroaderglobalchallengesandexacerbatelabourmarketimpacts.Theyrangefromnaturaldisasters(e.g.theearthquakesinTürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublic)tomultipleeconomicshocks(e.g.inSriLanka),whichhavecomeontopofthelingeringeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandtheglobalcost-of-livingcrisis.
XSignificantsocialprotectionpolicygapsremainindevelopingcountries,especiallyinlow-incomecountries,includinginregardtoold-agepensions.
Only38.6percentofolderpersonsinlower-middle-incomeand23.2percentinlow-incomecountriesreceiveanold-agepension.Investinginnationalsocialprotectionsystemsbasedonequitableandsustainablefinancingfromtaxesandsocialcontributionsandcomplementedbyinternationalsupportwhereneeded,isnecessaryandwillbringeconomic,socialandemploymentbenefits.
XTheILO’snewestimatesconfirmthatbuildinganationalsocialprotectionfloor,forexample,throughexpandingbasicold-agepensionsindevelopingcountrieswouldincreaseGDPpercapitainlow-andlower-middle-incomecountriesby14.8percentwithin10years.Suchbasicold-agepensionsindevelopingcountrieswouldalsoreducetheshareofthepopulationlivingbelowtheUS$2.15PPPpovertylineby6percentagepointsandincreasetheincomeshareofthebottom40percentoftheincomedistributionby2.5percentagepoints.Furthermore,theinducedeffectsofbasicpensionswouldreducethegendergapinlabourincomeby3.6percentagepoints,equivalenttotheglobalprogressregisteredinthelast15years.
1Thenumeratorofthisratecomprisesallthosewithoutajobandwantingone,whilethedenominatorconsistsofthatfigureinadditiontototalemployment.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition2
XTherequiredfinancialresourcesforexpandingbasicold-agepensionsarelargebutnotinsurmountable.Fordevelopingcountries,theannualcostofprovidingbasicold-agepensionsatthelevelofnationalpovertylinesisequivalentto1.6percentofGDP(2.3percentand1.5percentofGDPforlow-incomeandlower-middle-incomecountries,respectively).Forsub-SaharanAfrica,thecostwouldbeUS$23.3billion,or1.4percentofGDP
andapproximately12.5percentofglobalannualofficialdevelopmentassistance.
XTheUNGlobalAcceleratoronJobsandSocialProtection,andtheGlobalCoalitionforSocialJustice,canbuildglobalresourcestoachievebasicold-agepensions,asonepartofareformoftheinternationalfinancialarchitecturetobetteraddresstheneedsoflower-incomecountries.
XPart1.Latesttrendsinanuncertainlabourmarketrecovery
1.Thecontext:uneven
impactofthepolycrisis
PrecipitatedbythewarinUkraineandthelingeringeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemic,theongoingcost-of-livingcrisishashurtincomesandlivelihoodsaroundtheworld,especiallyindevelopingcountries.GlobalGDPgrowthisexpectedtodecelerateto2.8percentthisyear,downfrom3.4percentin2022.2Thisslowdownmasksasignificantdivergencebetweenadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.Inhigh-incomecountries,labourmarketsremaintightdespitetheseriesofinterestraterises(thoughsomeemploymentdeficitspersistevenintheseeconomies).Whilesomelargeemergingeconomies,suchasIndia,havereturnedtostrongeconomicgrowth,low-incomecountriesarefacinghighlevelsofdebtandrisingcostsofborrowing,whichfurtherconstraintheireffortstopromotedecentandproductiveemployment.
Highinflationandinterestratescontinuetoweighonmanylabourmarkets,whileforsomecountriesthesituationisexpectedtoease(box1).Atthesametime,fiscalspaceinthepooresteconomiesisseverelyconstrained,whichlimitstheirpolicyresponsestoapolycrisisworlddefinedbyarangeofcomplexandcascadingchallenges,includingconflict,naturaldisastersandeconomiccrisesthatamplifytheeffectsofglobalshocksstemmingfromtheCOVID-19pandemicandthecost-of-livingcrisis.Thissituationhascontributedtoaworseningglobalemployment
dividewiththemostsignificantlabourmarketdeficitsevidentinlow-incomecountries.
Persistentinflationhasledtoaggressivemonetarypolicytightening.Inflationratesaroundtheworldstartedtorisein2021,andjumpedsignificantlyin2022,inallcountryincomegroups,leadingtosignificantmonetarypolicytightening.Atthebeginningof2023,37outof162countries,almostalllow-andmiddle-income,hadcentralbankinterestratesinexcessof10percent(seefigureA1andtableA1inthestatisticalannex).Continuedhighinflationexpectationsareexpectedtocausefurthermonetarytighteninginaroundhalfofthecountries:whilealmostallhigh-incomecountriesarelikelytoexperiencefurthertightening,onlyaminorityoflow-andmiddle-incomecountriesisexpectedtodoso.
Countriesfaceatrade-offinmanagingexpectedinflation,exchangeratemovements,debtsustainabilityandeconomicactivity.Highinterestratescauseproblemsfordebtsustainabilityandnewdebtfinancing,especiallysincemanycountrieshaveseentheirdebt-to-GDPratiosrisesignificantlyduringtheCOVID-19crisis.Exchangeratedepreciationinmanydevelopingcountrieshascontributedtohigherinflationandinterestrates,whileworseningtheexternaldebtburden.3Indeed,theproportionofcountriesindebtdistressorathighriskofdebtdistresshasdoubledto60percentcomparedwith2015levels(
IMF2023
).Enterprisesandworkersaredeeplyimpactedduringadebtcrisis.Realinterestrates,whicharedecisiveforeconomicactivity,haveremainedrelativelylowinadvancedeconomies.
2IMF,
WorldEconomicOutlook:ARockyRecovery
,April2023.
3UNCTAD,
GlobalTrendsandProspects
,TradeandDevelopmentReportUpdate,April2023.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition3
Butcontinuedtighteningofmonetarypolicy,alongwithrecedinginflation,couldraiseexpectedandrealizedrealinterestratestohigherlevels,whichwilleventuallytakeatollonlabourmarkets.4
2.Unemploymentandthejobsgap
Globalunemploymentislikelytoreturntothepre-pandemiclevelin2023
TheILO’slatestestimatesprojectthattheglobalunemploymentratewillfallby0.1percentagepointsin2023(figure1).Thisimpliesadeclineinthetotalnumberofgloballyunemployedpeopleof1million,5whichisduetogreater-than-anticipatedlabourmarketresilienceinhigh-incomecountriesinthefaceoftheeconomicslowdown.6Therearesignsthatfurtherinterestratehikesinhigh-incomecountrieswillbelimitedascentralbankersstarttoprioritizeconcernsaboutthehealthoftheeconomy.Interestratesinmanylow-andmiddle-incomecountriesareexpectedtoremainstableordecline.Nevertheless,theriskoftheglobaleconomyentering
arecessionremainssizeable,creatingamajordownsideriskforgloballabourmarkets(
IMF2023
).
Globalestimatesofunemploymentfortheyears2020through2022havebeenrevisedsubstantiallyinlightofnewdata.7Consequently,globalunemploymentin2022isnowestimatedat192million,comparedto205millionreportedinILO'sWESOTrends2023.In2023,globalunemploymentisprojectedtofallto191million,correspondingtoanunemploymentrateof5.3percent.TheglobalrecoveryinunemploymentratesfollowingtheCOVID-19crisishasbeenremarkablyfastcomparedtopreviouscrisessuchastheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008–09(figure1).
Yet,unemploymentinlow-incomecountriesandintheregionsofAfricaandtheArabStatesisnotexpectedtorecovertopre-pandemiclevelsin2023.
TheglobalpicturemaskssignificantheterogeneityattheregionallevelregardingthespeedofrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19crisis.UnemploymentratesinAfricaandtheArabStatesin2023areprojectedtoremainelevatedcomparedto2019,whileother
Figure1.Unemploymentrate,2007–23,world(percentage)
7.0
6.0
5.0
20082010201220142016201820202022
Source:ILOestimates.
4Monetarypolicytighteningalsoraisestheriskoffinancialinstability,whichcouldhaveamajorimpactonthelabourmarket.
5ThisisanimprovementcomparedtopreviousprojectionsfromJanuary,whenestimatesindicatedanincreaseof3million(see
WESOTrends2023
).
6ForadjustmentsofILOestimatesincomparisonwiththosepublishedin
WESOTrends2023
,seefiguresA1andA2inthestatisticalannex.
7ThedownwardrevisionisdueprimarilytonewlyincorporatedunemploymentdatafromIndianlabourforcesurveys,showingthattheIndianunemploymentratedeclinedsharplyin2021and2022,fallingto4.8percent,whichisalmost2percentagepointsbelowitslevelof2019
(6.5percent).Yet,evenwhenexcludingIndia,theglobalunemploymentrateisprojectedtofallbacktoitspre-pandemiclevelin2023.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition4
Figure2.Unemploymentrates,worldandby(sub)regionandcountryincomegroup,2019,2022and2023(percentage)
2022
World
WorldexcludingIndia
Low-incomecountries
Lower-middle-incomecountries
Upper-middle-incomecountries
High-incomecountries
NorthernAfrica
Sub-SaharanAfrica
LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
NorthernAmerica
ArabStates
EasternAsia
South-EasternAsiaandthePacific
SouthernAsia
Northern,SouthernandWesternEurope
EasternEurope
CentralandWesternAsia
Source:ILOestimates.
2023
2019
10.9
11.2
11.2
4.0
4.6
4.8
4.6
4.6
4.3
4.7
4.7
4.4
7.0
7.0
7.8
7.8
3.8
3.9
8.0
2.5
2.6
2.4
8.7
9.3
9.3
9.2
6.0
6.0
6.3
6.3
6.7
6.4
6.3
6.3
5.0
5.3
5.2
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.5
5.1
5.1
5.7
5.7
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.7
regionssuchasLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,Northern,SouthernandWesternEurope,andCentralandWesternAsiahavemanagedtoreducethoseratessubstantiallybelowpre-crisislevels.Low-incomecountriessofarhavefailedtorecovertotherateofunemploymentwitnessedin2019(figure2).
Jobsgapindicatorpointstolarge
employmentdeficits,particularly
indevelopingcountries
Whileunemploymentnumbersprovideimportantinformationontheextentoflabourunderutilization,especiallyindevelopingcountries,anovelindicatordevelopedbytheILO,thejobsgap,offersamorecomprehensivemeasureoftheunmetdemandforemploymentaroundtheworld.Itcapturesallpersonswhowouldliketoworkbutdonothaveajob.Thejobsgapusesthesamedatasourcesasunemploymentstatisticsbutinadditionutilizeslabourforcesurveydatatoincorporatealljobseekersorotherswhowouldworkiftheycould.Assuch,the
indicatorisausefulcomplementtotheunemploymentrateandhelpsprovideamorecomprehensiveviewoflabourunderutilization.8
In2023,theglobaljobsgapisprojectedtostandat453millionpeopleor11.7percent,9morethandoubletheunemploymentcount.Theglobaljobsgapof453millionincludesboththe191millionunemployedpeopleandanadditional262millionwhowantemploymentbutdonotqualifyasunemployed.Thosewithoutajobbutnotclassifiedasunemployedinclude,forinstance,peoplewhoarediscouragedfromsearchingandthosecurrentlyunabletotakeupemploymentatshortnotice,suchaspersonswithcareresponsibilities.
Thereisanunequaljobsgapglobally.In2023,low-incomecountriesarefacingthelargestjobsgaprateat21.5percent,whiletherateinmiddle-incomecountriesstandsslightlyabove11percent.High-incomecountriesregisterthelowestrates,at8.2percent.Overall,whileonlyafewcountries,mostlyhigh-income,experiencerelativelylowjobsgaprates,therestoftheworldcontinuestofacepersistentemploymentdeficits.
8TheILO’sjobsgapindicatorcomplementstheexistingsetofindicatorsintheILOmodelledestimatesbyprovidingcombinedestimatesofthe
unemployed,potentiallabourforce,andwillingnon-jobseekers(eachofthemdefinedin
resolutionIofthe19thICLS
).LiketheLU3indicator,thejobsgapincludesinadditiontotheunemployedthosewhoareunavailablejobseekersandavailablenon-jobseekers,butincontrasttotheLU3indicator,italsoincludesthosewhofallintoneitherofthepreviouscategoriesbutdowantemployment(willingnon-jobseekers).See
WESOTrends
2023
formoredetailsontheindicatoranditsdifferenceswithrespecttounemployment.
9Thenumeratorofthisratecomprisesallthosewithoutajobandwantingone,whilethedenominatorconsistsofallthosewithoutajobandwantingoneplustotalemployment.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition5
Figure3.Jobsgaprate,2023,bygenderandcountryincomegroup(percentage)
Female
Male
LowLower-middleUpper-middleHigh
incomeincomeincomeincome
Source:ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates.
21.5
14.5
11.511.2
9.8
8.2
25
20
10
15
0
5
Figure4.Jobsgaprate,bycountryincomegroup,2005–23(percentage)
25
20
15
10
5
02005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023
LowincomeLower-middleincomeUpper-middleincomeHighincome
Source:ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates.
Theseareparticularlyacuteforwomen,whofaceWhiletheglobaljobsgaprateisprojectedto
declinein2023by0.2percentagepointsto11.7percent,thereareconsiderablevariationsbetweencountryincomegroups(figure4).Low-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseelittlechangein2023;thisisalsotheonlyincomegroupthathasseenalong-termriseinthejobsgapratefrom19.1percentin2005to21.5percentin2023.Thepersistenceof
ajobsgaprateof14.5percent,comparedto9.8per
centformen.Low-incomecountriesexhibitthe
greatestgenderdisparityinemploymentdeficits,with
womenfacingajobsgapratethatis9percentage
pointshigherthanthatofmen.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition6
Figure5.Jobsgaprateindevelopingcountries,2023,bycountryriskofdebtdistress(percentage)
35
LowModerateHighIndebtdistress
TotalFemale
Note:Thelistofdeveloping(mostlylow-income)countriescoveredinthissample(asof28February2023)canbefoundat:
https://www
.
org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist
imf..pdf,excludingDominica,FederatedStatesofMicronesia,Grenada,Kiribati,MarshallIslandsandTuvalu,whicharenotavailableinILOmodelledestimatesofthejobsgaprate.
Sources:Jobsgaprate(percentage)–ILOSTATdatabase,ILOmodelledestimates;countryriskofdebtdistress–
IMFDebtSustainability
Analysis–Low-IncomeCountries
.
30
25
20
10
15
0
5
thejobsgapinthesepoorestcountriesreflectsthefactthat,forvariousreasons,therearenotenoughnewemploymentopportunitiesforrapidlygrowing,youthfulpopulations.Lower-middle-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseealmostnochangein2023buthaveexperiencedasizeablelong-termdecline.Upper-middle-incomecountriesareprojectedtoseethelargestdecrease(0.5percentagepoints)in2023.High-incomecountrieshaveseenthelargestlong-termimprovementinthejobsgapratewitha4percentagepointdeclinesincetheaftermathofthe2008–09globalfinancialcrisisandadropof0.3percentagepointsin2023alone.
Debt-distressedcountriesfacethebiggestlabourmarketchallengesandhavemuchmore
constrainedpolicyspace,whichwillhinderfurtherpolicyresponsesinthefaceofongoingcrisesandnewshocks.Inthelow-incomecountriesthatareclassifiedasindebtdistress,10thejobsgapissignificantlyhigher,estimatedtoreach25.7percentin2023,comparedwith11.0percentindevelopingcountriesatlowriskofdebtdistress(figure5).Thejobsgaprateforwomeninthesedebt-distressedcountriesisexpectedtoreachalmost31percentin2023,reflectingagenderdisparitythatisevidentinallcountriesasnotedabove.Thecorrelationbetweendebtdistressandthejobsgapratepointstothecriticalimportanceofinternationalfinancialsupportfordebt-distressedcountriesinpromotingbothaneconomicandajobrecovery.
10Forclassification,seetheIMF’s“
DebtSustainabilityAnalysis–Low-IncomeCountries
”.
ILOMonitorontheworldofwork.Eleventhedition7
Box1.Exacerbatedfacesofthepolycrisis
Whiletheriskofpolycrisisisglobalinnatureandscope,developingcountriesfaceevenmorecomplexandcascadingcrises,whichinteractwithbroaderglobalchallengestofurtherexacerbatelabourmarketimpacts.Theserangefromnaturaldisastersandconflictstodomesticpoliticalandeconomicshocks,whichhavecomeontopoftheeffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandthecost-of-livingcrisis,alongwiththeeffectsofclimatechange.Thereisconsiderablediversityintheaccumulatedimpactsofmultiplecrises,includingtheeffectsofeconomicshocks(SriLanka)andnaturaldisasters(TürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublic).Inadditiontoprecipitatingthesurgeininflationanddisruptiontosupplychainsstartingin2022,thewarinUkrainecontinuestoimpactitsownlabourmarket(andneighbouringcountriesthroughflowsofrefugees).
SriLankainaneconomiccrisis.Ontopoflong-runningmacroeconomicimbalancesandstructuralweaknesses,SriLankahasbeenhitbyaseriesofcrises,startingwiththeEasterbombingsin2019andfollowedbytheCOVID-19pandemic,whichhittheeconomyandlabourmarkethard,especiallythetourismsector.Aswitnessedinotherdevelopingcountries,women,youthandMSMEs,particularlythoseoperatingintheinformaleconomy,werebadlyaffectedbylockdownmeasures.11Outputcontractedslightlyalreadyin2019beforedecliningby4.6percentin2020duringtheCOVID-19lockdowns,followedbyapartialrecoveryin2021(growthof3.5percent).12ThespillovereffectsoftheUkraineconflictthwartedthenascentrecoveryandpushedtheSriLankaneconomyintoafull-blownbalanceofpaymentscrisisandsubsequentdebtdefaultinApril2022.Outputdeclinedby7.8percentin2022(–12.4percentin2022Q4),asthecountryfacedseverefuelandothershortages.Inflationreachedmorethan46percentlastyear,whichhasdamagedrealincomesandlivelihoods.
FollowingthesigningofanIMFsupportprogrammeinMarch2023,somestabilizationhasbeenachievedthoughtheeconomyisexpectedtocontractby3.0percentthisyear.13ArecentILOsurveyindicatesthatasignificantnumberofMSMEshavebeenforcedtocloseoperations,withthesurvivingbusinesseshavingimplementedlargereductionsinemployment,
workinghours,andinsomecases,wages.14AnotherkeyconcernistheeffectsonwomenintheSriLankanlabourmarket.Alreadystartingfromalowlevel,women’slabourforceparticipationfellfrom34.5percentin2019to32.1percentin2022.Duetotheslowprocessofdebtrestructuring,macroeconomicstabilizationandeffectsofreforms,therecoverywillbeslow,implyingthatthenegativeeffectsontheSriLankanlabourmarketwillcontinuewithalagasevidentintheaftermathofpreviouseconomicandfinancialcrises.
LabourmarketimpactsinTürkiyeandSyrianArabRepublicafteradevastatingnaturaldisaster.On6February2023,thesouth-easternprovincesofTürkiyewerehitbymorethanonemajorearthquake,whichkilledaround50,000peopleandinjuredapproximately107,000.15Almost4millionworkerswerelivingintheaffectedregion,largelyemployedinagriculture,manufacturing,tradeandother,mostlylowvalue-added,services.Throughtheimpactonbuildingsandinfrastructure,suchanaturaldisasterhadanimmediateeffectontheeconomyandlabourmarket.Duetothelossofaround220,000workplaces,theILOestimatesthattheearthquakeresultedinadeclineof16percentinhoursworked,equivalenttomorethan657,000full-timejobs.TheILOestimatesthat,overall,theearthquakehasreducedtake-homelabourincomeinTürkiyebymorethan2,859millionTurkishlira(aroundUS$150million)permonth.
InSyrianArabRepublic,where12yearsofcivilwarhadalreadytakenahugetollontheeconomyandlabourmarket,arecentILOassessmentfindsthataround170,000workershavelosttheirjobsasaresultoftheFebruaryearthquakes.16Theearthquakeshavedirectlyaffectedaround154,000householdsandmorethan725,000people.Around35,000MSMEshavealsobeenimpacted.Thistemporary“disemployment”hasledtototallabourincomelossesequivalenttoatleastUS$5.7millionamonth.Thefiveworst-affecteddistrictswerehometoanestimated42.4percentofthecountry’stotalpopulation,includingaround7.1millionpeopleofworkingage,ofwhom2.7millionwereinemployment(formalandinformal).Ofthese,22.8percentwerewomen.
11R.GunatilakaandS.Chandrasiri,“
TheLabourMarketImplicationsoftheSriLanka’sMultipleCrises
”,I
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