巴塞羅那國際事務(wù)研究中心-歐盟與東地中海：如何應(yīng)對土耳其（英文）-2021.5-8正式版

CIDOBnotes

internacionals

ISSN:2013-4428

251

MAY

2021

THEEUANDTHEEASTERNMEDITERRANEAN:howtodealwithTurkey

EduardSoleriLecha,SeniorResearchFellow,CIDOB

@solerlecha

Thispiecebenefittedfromthediscussionsoftheexpertmeeting“

EasternMediterranean:who(andhow)cancreatefavourable

conditionsforcooperation?

”heldonMarch1st2021aspartofCIDOB’sForeignPolicyDialogues,sponsoredbytheSpanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,EuropeanUnionandCooperation.Theauthoralsothanksseveralparticipantsfortheircommentsandsuggestionsondraftversionsofthisdocument

EUleadersandinstitutionshavealwaysseenAnkaraasadifficultpartnerandatroubleso-meally,butTurkeyisincreasinglydepictedasageopoliticalrival.

Intersectingconflicts,theassertivepoliciesofkeyplayersandthecrisisoftrustbetweenTurkeyanditsEuropeanandWesternpartnerscontributedtoraisingthetensionintheEas-ternMediterraneanin2019and2020.

TheimpossibilityoftheEUagreeingsanc-tions,Turkey’sperceptionthatconfrontationcouldbetoocostly,andtheexpectationscrea-tedbyBiden’selectionintheUScontributedtopostponingamajorcrisis.

Thebasesforthisappeasementarefragileandsoonerorlatertensionswillresurface.TheEasternMediterraneanisthespacewhereanEU–Turkeyrivalrymaysolidifyorwhereapo-licyofproductiveengagementcouldbegivenanewchance.

Amorecohesive,frankandunderstandingEUcouldmakeadifference–onewhichavoidsthetemptationofagrandbargain,optsforthesegmentationofcontentiousportfolios,andplacesasharedgreenrecoveryatthecentreofacooperativeagenda.

Thestakesofanadversarialrelationship

CanaNATOallyandcandidateforaccessionalsobeanadversary?EUleadersandinstitutionshaveal-waysseenAnkaraasadifficultpartner.In2019,themembersofthe

FEUTURE

researchprojectarguedthattheEU–Turkeyrelationshipseemedtobeadvanc-ingtowardsastateofconflictualcooperation.Yet,anincreasingnumberofcountriesandindividualleadersintheEUarestartingtotreatTurkeynolongerasadif-ficultpartnerbutratherasahostileactororevenasageopoliticalrival.ThesameishappeninginAnkara’sdecision-makingcircles.Thisadversarialrelationshipmayeithersolidifyorbereplacedbyapolicyoftena-ciousengagementwhich,despiteallthegrievances,rediscoversthebenefitsofcooperation.

Nowadays,EUleadersandinstitutionsmaydisagreeonthebestwaytodealwithTurkey,buttheysharethefeelingthattheEUissurroundedbyaringofinstabil-ity,thattheEasternMediterraneanispartofthatringandthatTurkey’sleadershiphascontributedtoignit-ingit.Turkey,meanwhile,alsofeelsencircled.Agoodexamplearethestatementsbytheforeignaffairsmin-ister,

Mevlüt?avu?o?lu

,describingthePhilia(Friend-ship)ForumorganisedbyGreeceinFebruary2021asan“attempttoformanalliancebuiltuponhostilitytowardsTurkey”.TheforumgatheredEgypt,France,SaudiArabia,theUAE,Bahrain,CyprusandGreece–countriesthatsharebilateraldisputeswithTurkeyorwithitspresident.

NosinglefactorexplainswhyEU–Turkeyrelationshavedeterioratedtothispoint,andthereismorethanonepointoffriction.Yet,theEasternMediterranean

CIDOBnotesinternacionals251.MAY2021 1

Bytheendof2020EU–Turkeyrelationsenteredaphaseofappeasement,althoughitwasanextremelyfragileone.Theproponentsofadversarialpoliciesmomentarilyconcurredthatitwasnottherighttimetoenterfull-fledgedconfrontation.

isamongthemostvisibleandislikelytobethespacewherethedeteriorationorimprovementofrelationsbetweenTurkeyandtheEUcanhavegreatestimpact.AgreeingtoasolutiononCyprusandthemaritimedis-putesbetweenGreeceandTurkey–oratleastgettingclosertoone–wouldremovefundamentalobstaclesinEU–Turkeyrelations.Bycontrast,iftensionsescalateandunilateralandaggressiveactionscontinue,itcouldultimatelytriggerathornypoliticalormilitarycrisiswiththepotentialtowipeoutanyhopeforcoopera-tion.Theriskofanaccidentisrealandshouldnotbeignored.

Theoptimiststellusthatwecouldbeinamuchmoredifficultsituation.Indeed,in2019andmostof2020thesituationdeterioratedrapidly.AnalystswerewarningthatthepossibilityofamilitaryconfrontationbetweenTurkeyandsomeofitsNATOallieswas

nolongera

remotepossibility

.Yetthattrainwreckwasavoided.Turkeydecidedtobacktrackandmakesomegoodwillgesturestode-escalatethetensionintheEasternMedi-

terranean,andtheEUgaveitselftimetodecidewheth-ertoapplysanctionsorimplementapositiveagendawithTurkey.

Bytheendof2020EU–Turkeyrelationshadenteredaphasethatisoftenreferredasappeasementbutthatcouldalsobedepictedasanextremelyfragiletruce.Thepropo-nentsofadversarialpoliciesmomentarilyconcurredthatitwasnottherighttimetoenterfull-fledgedconfronta-tion,butthatdoesnotmeantheirmutualperceptionshavesignificantlyimproved.Ifthefactorsthathavepreventedtheconflictfromspirallingwaneorareneutralisedbyoth-erforces,confrontationwillagainbecomeapossibleanddangerousscenario.TheEasternMediterraneanislikelytobethespacewherethistensionwillfirstresurface.

ThestakesarehighforboththeEUandTurkey.Relationsarebasedonacomplexnetworkofinterestsandrelationsthatwillbeseverelydamagedifconflictualattitudespre-vail.ItisnotonlythattheEUwouldnolongerbeabletorelyonTurkey’scooperationbutthatitwouldhavetore-directsignificantresourcestocontainTurkey’shostileac-tions.NeighbouringGreeceandCyprus(andeventuallyBulgaria)wouldsufferthemost.Turkey’salreadyfragileeconomywouldalsofaceadditionalshocksifitwereonacollisioncoursewiththeEU.

Toavoidthisriskmaterialisingandtocreateconditionsforcooperativeengagement,weshouldtrytounderstandhowrelationsreachedanewlowandidentifytheele-mentsthatthencontributedtodiffusingamajorcrisisaswellasthosethatcouldunderminerelationsagain.OnlythenwillwebeabletoimaginehowtheEUcanmodifyitsattitudesandimproveitstoolkittodealandworkwithTurkeyintheEasternMediterraneanandbeyond.

Oldandnewdisputes,adangerousmix

DisputesintheEasternMediterranean(thedivisionofCyprus,delimitationofairspace,territorialwatersandcontinentalshelfintheAegeanandtheMediterranean,aswellasthedemilitarisationofsomeislandsanddis-putedsovereigntyoverrocksandisletsclaimedbybothGreeceandTurkey)havealwaysdamagedbilateralrela-tionsandbecameanintegralpartofEU–TurkeyrelationswhenGreecejoinedtheEUin1981andCyprusin2004.Still,bothTurkeyandtheEUwereabletohandlethese

disputesandpreserveaminimumlevelofcooperation.TheclearestsignofthisisthatneitherGreecenorCyprusvetoedthestartofaccessionnegotiationswithTurkeyin2005.Fifteenyearslaterthesit-uationhasbecomeevenmorecomplex.Thepointsoffriction–andconsequent-lytheriskofconflict–haveincreased.As

MichaelTanchum

hassaid,theEast-ernMediterraneanhasbecome“theeyeofagatheringgeopoliticalstorm”.

Firstly,becauseconflictsintheregionhaveproliferatedandareincreasinglyconnected.IntheEasternMediterra-neantwonewconflicts(SyriaandLibya)coexistwithsev-eralthataredecadesold(theArab–Israeliconflict,CyprusandthebilateraldisputesbetweenTurkeyandGreece).Intheabsenceoffunctionalstructuresforregionalsecuritycooperationtomanagethem,adhocalliancesandcount-er-allianceshavebeenformed,whichhascontributedtoentanglingthedifferentconflicts.Israel,forinstance,hasaimedatcultivatingrelationswithGreeceandCyprustocounteracombativeTurkeyonthePalestinianissue.GreecealsonegotiatedwiththeeasternLibyanauthor-itiestocounterAnkara–Tripolicooperation.AssomeofthesealliancesincludeEUmemberstates,thewholeoftheEUhasbecomepartlyembeddedinthedangerousgameofshort-lived,topic-by-topic

liquidalliances

intheMiddleEast.

ThediscoveryofenergysourcesintheEasternMediter-raneanhasaddedalayerofcomplexitytothismatrixofconflictsandalliances.Althoughenergycouldhavebeenanincentiveforcooperation,ithasmainlyfuelledcom-petitionbetweenfluidregionalblocspreciselybecauseoftheprevalenceofthenegative-summentality.Asaresult,TurkeyfounditselfexcludedfromregionalplatformssuchastheEastMedGasForum,aninternationalor-

2 CIDOBnotesinternacionals251.MAY2021

ganisationestablishedin2019,formedofCyprus,Egypt,France,Greece,Israel,Italy,JordanandPalestine.Thesedevelopmentshaveraisedthestakesaroundthedelimi-tationofterritorialwatersandexclusiveeconomiczones(EEZs)andtheconstructionofinfrastructuretoexploitthem,liketheEastMedgaspipeline.

ThereisaconsiderabledistancebetweenTurkey’sclaimsandthoseofGreeceandCyprus.Turkey,whichisnotasignatoryofUNCLOS(theUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea),considersthatislandshavealessereffectintermsofmaritimedelimitationthanconti-nentalcoastlines.AccordingtoAnkarathisappliestoCy-prusbutalsotoCreteandtheDodecanese,includingthesmallislandofKastellorizo.InthecaseofCyprus,TurkeyalsomaintainsthattheRepublicofCyprusmustnotex-ploitthenaturalresourceseveninthepartsthatwouldfallwithinitsEEZuntilasolutionisreachedthatallowsTurkishCypriotstobenefit.TurkeynotonlydeniesGreek

andCypriotclaimsbutpromotesadifferent–maximalist

–delimitationthatispopularlyknownastheMaviVatandoctrine,whoseoriginsaretobefoundinthethinkingofnationalistsegmentsoftheTurkisharmedforces.Theseincompatibleviews–showninthemapbelow–reduceinternationalinvestors’appetiteforexploitingthenaturalresourcesinthearea,conditionthewaythethreecoun-triesrelatetootherlittoralstatesandincreasetheriskofconflict.

TheErdo?angovernment’sembraceoftheMaviVatandoctrinemaybeseenasanegotiationtactic,butitisalsotheresultoftheevolutionofTurkey’sforeignpolicy.Since2016,Ankarahasdeployedamoreassertiveandnation-alistforeignpolicyandproveditswillingnesstodrivechange.Turkeymaynolongerbeastatusquopower,butthetimesofthedoctrineofzeroproblemswithneigh-boursarealsolonggone.Infact,thenewturninTurkey’sforeignpolicyisoftendescribedas

revisionist

,

revanchist,

MaritimedisputesintheEasternMediterranean

TURKEY

TURKEY

Kas

Kastellorizo

AegeanSea

Turkishcontinental

shelf,according

toTurkey

GREECE

GREECE

(Kastellorizo

Claimedby

EMGF

forKasGreece)

bothCyprus

Rhodes

andTurkey

Kastellorizo

(Greece)

Greece’s

Crete

claimedEEZ

boundary

CYPRUS

EMGF

EEZagreed

MediterraneanSea

betweenTurkey

andLibya

EEZagreed

betweenGreece

andEgypt

LIBYA

EGYPTEMGF

EMGF MemberoftheEastMedGasForum(FranceandItalyand

arealsofullmembers;theEUandUSarepermanent

observers;theUAEisacandidatemember)

Gasfield ExclusiveEconomicZones(EEZ)

CreatedbyCIDOB.Source:TheEconomist,PretroleumEconomist.

Claimedbyboth

Cyprusandthe

Turkish SYRIA

Republicof

NorthCyprus

LEBANON

ISRAEL

EMGF

Palestine

EMGF

Gaza

JORDAN

Strip

EMGF

CIDOBnotesinternacionals251.MAY2021 3

TheevolutionofcooperationandconflictdynamicsintheEasternMediterraneancannotsolelybeexplainedbyAnkara’sactionsandstrategies.

interventionist

andeven

irredentist

.ThisevolutionistheresultofseveralfactorsincludingchangesinTurkey’sdomesticpoliticsanddecision-makingprocesses,butalsoregionalandglobaldevelopments(thevacuumleftbyArabregionalpowers,theArabuprisingsandtheirshockwaves,acompetitiveandmultipolarworldorder,perceivedUSunreliabilityandstalemateintheEUacces-sionprocess,amongothers).Moreover,Turkeyhasdiver-sifieditsinternationalpartnershipsbyturningtowardsRussia(includingthepurchaseoftheS-400missilesys-temandco-sponsoringdiplomaticinitiativesthatexcludetheWest,suchastheAstanaProcess)and,amidthepan-demic,China–albeittoalesserextent.

However,theevolutionofcooperationandconflictdy-namicsintheEasternMediterraneancannotsolelybeexplainedbyAnkara’sactionsandstrategies.GreecehasalsodeployedamorerobustandproactivepolicyintheMiddleEast,partlyasanattempttocontainTur-key’sownnationalistpoliciesandpartlytoattractfor-eigninvestmentforamuch-neededeconomicrecovery.

Gulfcountries,particularlyaveryassertiveandself-confidentUAE,havealsoupgradedtheirdiplo-maticandmilitarycooperationintheEasternMed-iterranean,establishingbilateralandmultilateralco-operationwithGreeceandCyprus,offeringdecisivesupporttoSisi’sEgypt,meddlingintheLibyaconflictinsupportofKhalifaHaftarand,morerecently,nor-malisingrelationswithIsrael.AbuDhabihasbecomeAnkara’snemesis,asitholdsopposingviewpointsonalmostalltheregionalanddomesticconflictsinthewiderMiddleEast.Areportbythe

ECFR

arguedthatthisconfrontation“isnotonlyfeedinginstabilityinareasthathaveanimmediateimpactonEuropeaninterests,suchasLibyaandtheHornofAfrica,butisalsoseepingintoEuropeitself,intheEasternMediter-ranean.TherivalryisdeepeningEurope’sdivisions,makingitmoredifficultfortheEuropeanUnionanditsmemberstatestodevelopacohesivepolicyontheMediterranean”.

Finally,Franceisalsooutspokenonregionalaffairs,isakeyplayeronseveralissues(Lebanon,Syria,Libya)andisoftenatoddswithAnkara.FrancehasopenlycriticisedTurkey’sforeignpolicynotonlyintheEasternMediterra-neanbutalsoinAfricaandtheCaucasusandhasinten-sifieditsdiplomaticandmilitarypresenceintheEasternMediterranean.FrenchcooperationeffortswithGreece,EgyptandtheUAEareseeninAnkaraashostilediplo-maticmoves.

Dissectingescalation

Allthefactorsnotedintheprevioussection(intersectingconflicts,theassertivepoliciesofkeyplayersandthecri-sisoftrustbetweenTurkeyanditsEuropeanandWesternpartners)havecontributedtoraisingthetensionintheEasternMediterranean.ThealarmsrangwhenTurkeysentaresearchvessel,theOru?Reis,toexplorecontest-edwatersclosetoKastellorizoinsummer2019.CyprusandGreeceprotestedandtheEuropeanCouncilagreedtofurther

downgrade

relationswithTurkey,endorsingtheCommission’sproposaltoreducethepre-accessionas-sistancetoTurkeyandinvitingtheEuropeanInvestmentBanktoreviewitslendingactivitiesinTurkey.InOctobertheCouncilagreedtoestablisha

frameworkregimeof

restrictivemeasures

targetingnaturalandlegalpersonsresponsiblefororinvolvedinillegaldrillingforhydrocar-bonsintheEasternMediterraneanandinvitedtheHighRepresentativeandtheCommissiontopresentproposalstothiseffect.Theframeworkwasfinally

adopted

bytheEuropeanCouncilinNovember2019.

ThisdidnotsoftenTurkey’spositions.Instead,TurkeyannouncedabilateraldealwiththeLibyangovernmentonexclusiveeconomiczonesthatignoredGreekclaims.TheEuropeanCouncilinDecember2019lamentedthisdeci-sionandonceagainreaffirmeditssoli-daritywithCyprusandGreece.Egypt

andFrancealsobackedGreekandCypriotclaims.TheforeignministersofthefourcountriesmetinCairoanddeclaredthedealsignedbyAnkaraandTripoli“

null

andvoid

”.

InJanuary2020theTurkishparliamentwentastepfur-therandapprovedthe

deploymentoftroopsinLibya

,amovethatwaslargelyseenashostilebyFranceandEgypt.ThatwasfollowedinFebruarybyasecondmi-grationcrisisontheGreekborders.ThenCOVID-19forcedallactorstofocusondealingwiththepandem-icandtemporarilydistractedfromthoseothersourcesoftension.However,thehealthemergencywasnotapowerfulenoughincentivetotrytoresolvethiscrisis.Insummer2020,tensionbetweenFranceandTurkeyintheMediterraneanescalatedevenfurther.FranceaccusedTurkeyofbreakingthearmsembargoinLib-yaandoftargetinga

Frenchfrigate

thatwastryingtoinspectaTanzanian-flaggedcargoship.FrancethendecidedtosuspenditsparticipationinNATO’sMed-iterraneanmission.ThisincidentrangalarmbellsandcountriessuchasGermanyandSpainintensifiedtheirdiplomaticeffortstode-escalatetension.TurkeyseemedreceptivetothesemessagesandinSeptember2020theOru?Reis

withdrew

totheportofAntalya.Thiswaslargelyseenagestureofgoodwill.

Yet,anewroundofunilateralactionsdefiedthehopesofappeasement.GreeceandEgyptannounced

4 CIDOBnotesinternacionals251.MAY2021

Therun-uptotheEuropeanCouncilofDecember2020wasmarkedbyaheateddiscussiononwhethertheEUshouldhaveimposednewsanctionsonTurkey.

a

bilateralagreement

delimitatingtheirexclusiveeconomiczoneswithouttakingTurkey’sclaimsintoconsideration.InOctober,

Macron

alsodenouncedtheallegeddeploymentofjihadifightersinNa-gorno-KarabakhandsaidthatTurkeyhadcrossedaredline.InNovember,Erdo?anvisitedthefenced-offdistrictofVaroshaduringthecommemorationofthecelebrationsforthe37thanniversaryoftheproclamationoftheTurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprus,anentityonlyTurkeyrecognises.Erdo?anthencalledfora“two-state”solutiontotheCyprusconflict.ThisvisitandthestatementsbytheTurkishpresidentwerecondemnedbyHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy

JosepBorrell

,whosaidthatthey“causegreaterdistrustandten-sionintheregionandshouldbeurgentlyreversed”.

Howwastheclashavoided?

Therun-uptotheEuropeanCouncilofDecember2020

wasmarkedbyaheateddis-cussiononwhethertheEUshouldhaveimposednewsanctionsonTurkey.Ulti-mately,Europeanleadersagreedtopostponethede-cisionandreiteratedtheirwillingnesstoexplorethepossibilityofimplementing

a“positiveagenda”withTurkey,butalsotheoptionofimposingrestrictivesanctions,andgaveHighRepre-sentativeJosepBorrelltheresponsibilityforcomingupwithideasonhowtoproceed.TheEuropeanCouncilalsoendorsedtheideaofconveningamultilateralcon-ferencefortheEasternMediterranean.

AlthoughFrance,GreeceandCyprusaskedtheEUtosendaclearermessagetoAnkara,othercountrieswerenotconvincedabouttheusefulnessofanewroundofsanctions.Germany’smainconcernwasthattensionsintheEasternMediterraneancouldspi-ralintoabroaderTurkey–EUcrisisthatwouldhaveimmediatedomesticconsequencesduetoitslargeTurkishdiasporapopulation.

Bulgaria

alsoopposedsanctions,fearingtherepercussionsofadeteriora-tionofrelationswithitspowerfulsouthernneigh-bourandtheconsistentlygoodconnectionbetweenBulgarianprimeministerBoykoBorissovandpresi-dentErdo?an.OtherEUcountries,particularlythosefromcentralandeasternEurope,wereafraidoftheimpactthiscouldhaveonthecohesionofNATO.SpainandItalywerealsoinfavourofappeasement,addingeconomicintereststothelistofconcerns,butaboveallfearedaconfrontationwithTurkeyandtheshockwavesthiscouldhaveintheMediterranean.ThesouthernEuropeancountrieswhichhadmetin

Ajaccio

inSeptember2020werevisiblydividedonthestrategytofollowtowardsTurkey.

JoeBiden’svictoryintheUSelectionsinNovember2020alsocontributedtobeginningthisphaseofap-peasement.AlthoughtheTurkishleadershiptriedtoframethenewpresidencyasanopportunityforyetanotherreset,JoeBidenandsecretaryofstateAntonyBlinken’sfirststatementsandgesturesdidnotcom-fortTurkey.Infact,Ankarafeltincreasinglycornered,whichmaybethereasonittriedtotonedowntherhet-oricandreachedouttomostoftheactorswithwhomithashadstrainedrelationsinrecentyears.Thisre-en-gagementstrategyhasbornefruit.GreeceandTurkeyheldtwonewroundsofexploratorytalks,whichcon-tributedtore-freezingtheriskofconflictintheEasternMediterranean.TheattemptstoimproverelationswithSaudiArabia,EgyptandIsraelarealsovisibleandmaysoonproduceresultsintheformofthenormalisationofrelationsandofficialvisits.InJanuary2021,MacronandErdo?analsoexchanged

letters

vowingtoresumecommunicationandmendties.EveninaninterviewinwhichMacrondenouncedTurkey’sinterferenceinFrenchdomesticpolitics,theFrenchpresidentnoteda

changeinErdo?an’sdesiretore-engageintherelation-shipand

argued

that“WeneedadialoguewithTurkey.WemustdoeverythingsothatitdoesnotturnitsbackonEuropeandgotowardsmorereligiousextremismornegativegeopoliticalchoicesforus”.

TheUSelectionsalsomodifiedtheEU’sposition.Euro-peansexpectthenewadministrationtoplayaconstruc-tiveroleinsecuringthecurrentphaseofde-escalationintheEasternMediterraneanor,atworst,tocoordinatewiththeEUtofaceapotentiallydefiantTurkey.ThiswasapowerfulargumentfortheEUnottorushitsde-cisions,andamongotherthingsthe

DecemberEurope-

anCouncil

agreedthat“theEUwillseektocoordinateonmattersrelatingtoTurkeyandthesituationintheEasternMediterraneanwiththeUnitedStates”.

TheneedtostabiliseTurkey’seconomywasalsoapow-erfulargumentforappeasement.Thepandemichashitstrategicsectorssuchasthetourismandtravelindus-triesandhasaggravatedpreviouseconomicchallenges(inflation,depreciationofthelira,lackofinternationaltrustinthoseresponsibleforTurkey’seconomicandmonetarypolicies).Hence,Turkey’seconomyneededtheshiftfromthreatstodiplomacy.Butthesudden

dis-

missal

ofthecentralbankchief,amovethatwaspoorlyreceivedbyinvestors,sentawarningsignal.Theecon-omymaynotbeastrongenoughbuffertopreventacrisisifshort-termpoliticalbenefitsareatstake.

CIDOBnotesinternacionals251.MAY2021 5

Finally,itisworthmentioningthesuccessfulUN-spon-

relations.Historysuggeststhatthisfactoralonewillnot

soredtalksthatallowedtheformationofaninterim

beenoughtotriggeracrisiswithTurkey.Nevertheless,

governmentinLibya.Thisdidnottriggerthephaseof

thelackofpoliticalprogresswillhampertheapplication

EU–Turkeyde-escalationanditwasnotaproductof

ofthepositiveagenda,particularlyifavotebytheEu-

it,butiteasedamajorsourceoffrictionbetweenTur-

ropeanParliamentisneededtoimplementit.Sounless

keyandFrance.Althoughtheeffectsarelessvisible,

Turkey’sauthoritiesradicallychangethewaytheydeal

theongoingreconciliationbetweenQatar–Turkey’s

withinternaldissent,thepositiveagendawillremain

mostsolidregionalally–andSaudiArabiaandthe

limitedandwillhavelessercapacitiestopreventorbuf-

UAEfollowingtheAl-UlasummitinJanuary2021may

feracrisis.

alsohelp;certainlyithascontributedto