國(guó)際事務(wù)研究院-國(guó)際數(shù)字人民幣：野心危言聳聽和期望（英）-2021.10-8正式版

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AnInternationalDigitalYuan:(Vane)

Ambitions,(Excessive)Alarmismand

(Pragmatic)Expectations

ISSN2532-6570

IAICOMMENTARIES21|44-OCTOBER2021

byNicolaBilotta

DaysaftertheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)publiclydiscloseditsroadmapforadigitaleuroprojecton24July,thePeople’sBankofChina(PBoC)publishedawhitepaperdescribingtheadvancementsofitsplanforadigitalyuan(e-CNY).

WhiletheEUroadmapoutlinesaninvestigationphasewhichwillendinfiveyears,Chinahasalreadyintroducedseveralpilotexperimentsforitse-CNY.InJune2021,thee-CNYwasemployedinmorethan70.7milliontransactionsforavalueof34.5billionyuanby20.8millionretailusersand3.5millioncorporateusers.1

Inthebattlegroundofglobaldigitalcompetition,countriesseekfirst-moveradvantagetosetstandardsandfosteramodelofdevelopment.As

1People’sBankofChina,ProgressofResearch

DevelopmentofE-CNYinChina,July2021,

/en/3688110/3688172/41

57443/4293696/2021071614584691871.pdf.

suggestedbyECBeconomists,2thisassumptioncouldalsoberelevantintheeventthatanationalcentralbankdigitalcurrency(CBDC)islaunched,helpingtoexplainwhycountriesseemtoberacingoverthelaunchofpublicdigitalcurrencies.Unsurprisingly,thegeostrategicdimensionbehindaCBDCishighlyemphasisedinthepoliticalnarrativeofallmajorpowers.Withthegrowingdigitalisationoftheeconomy,aCBDCisseenasatooltomitigaterisksrelatedtotheemergenceofnewprivately-owneddigitalcurrenciesandofforeignCBDCs.3

Stronglyincentivisedbydomesticandexternalfactors,ChinaisleadingtheraceforanationalCBDC.Itspayment

2MassimoMinessoFerrari,ArnaudMehlandLivioStracca,“TheInternationalDimensionofaCentralBankDigitalCurrencies”,inVoxEU,12October2020,

/node/66335.

3Seeforexample:FabioPanetta,ADigitalEurofortheDigitalEra,IntroductorystatementattheECONCommitteeoftheEuropeanParliament,FrankfurtamMain,12October2020,

https://

/review/r201013a.pdf.

NicolaBilottaisResearcherattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)whereheworksoninternationalpoliticaleconomy,digitaleconomyandgeofinance.

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AnInternationalDigitalYuan:

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Figure1|Cashusagebycountry(%totaltransactionsbyvolume)

Source:Author’selaborationfromMcKinsey,The2020McKinseyGlobalPaymentReport,October2020,

/~/media/mckinsey/industries/financial%20services/our%20insights/

accelerating%20winds%20of%20change%20in%20global%20payments/2020-mckinsey-global-payments-

report-vf.pdf.

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marketisalreadyextremelydigitalised.Thenumberandvalueofmobilepaymenttransactionsaccountedfor66percentand59percentoftotalpaymenttransactionsin2019whilecash-basedtransactionswereonly23percentand16percentrespectively.4Nevertheless,around92percentofmobilepaymentsweremadethroughonlytwoprivateproviders–WeChatPay(39percent)andAlipay(53percent)5–whichareintegratedinmuch

4People’sBankofChina,ProgressofResearch&DevelopmentofE-CNYinChina,cit.,p.2.

5CecilyLiuandWangMingjie,“NewWaystoPayMakeLifeEasierontheRoad”,inChinaDaily,19October2018,

.

cn/a/201810/19/WS5bc93a59a310eff303283525.

html.

largeranddiversifiedecosystemsassociatedtotheChineseBigTechsTencentandAlibaba.

Theirdominantpositioninthepaymentindustryposesseveralconcernsonsystemicrelevance,marketpowerandanticompetitiveuseofdata.6TheissuingofaCBDCisseenbyBeijingasameanstomakethePBoCregaincentralityinadigitalisedeconomy.Furthermore,thee-CNYcouldundermineanyfutureprivatedigitalcurrencyprojectissued

6BankforInternationalSettlements(BIS),“BigTechinFinance:OpportunitiesandRisks”,inBISAnnualEconomicReport2019,June2019,p.70,

/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.

htm.

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Figure2|Distributionofcurrenciesin2020

Source:Author’selaborationfromStatista,DistributionofCurrenciesWorldwidein2020,BasedonTheirTransactionValue,

/statistics/1189498.

IAICOMMENTARIES21|44-OCTOBER2021

byforeigncorporations–suchasFacebook’sDiem,formerlyknownasLibra–whichisperceivedasathreatbytheChinesegovernment.

ThedomesticuseofaCBDCishoweverjustonepieceofabroaderpuzzle.

FortheChinesegovernment,thee-CNYhasthepotentialtopursueBeijing’sambitiontofurtherinternationaliseitscurrency.ComparedtoChina’seconomicpower,theyuansignificantlyunderperformsasaninternationalcurrency,makingBeijinghighlydependedontheUSdollarforglobaltradeandinvestment.

Forexample,inJanuary2021,only2.42percentofthetotalvalueofglobalpaymentsweremadeinyuan.7As

7SeeRMBTracker,MonthlyReportingandStatisticsonYuan(RMB)Progresstowards

notedinarecentreportfromtheBankofChina,BeijingshouldstrategicallyreduceitsexposuretotheUSdollarinviewofascenarioinwhichtheUScouldcutoffaccesstodollarsettlementsforcertainChinesebanksasretaliationforthedeteriorationofUS–Chinarelations.8

Afterhavingfailedtoestablishanalternativetothewestern-centricSocietyforWorldwideInterbank

FinancialTelecommunication(SWIFT)withtheCross-BorderInter-BankPaymentsSystem(CIPS),multi-CBDCarrangementscouldallowChinatocircumventthecurrentsystem.Thiscouldallow

BecominganInternationalCurrency,February2021,p.3,

/swift-

resource/250281/download.

8“ChineseBanksUrgedtoSwitchAwayfromSWIFTasU.S.SanctionsLoom”,inReuters,29July2020,

https://reut.rs/309S59u.

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tobypasstheSWIFTintermediarynode–ifenoughcountriesacceptinternationalpaymentsindigitalyuan

–and,ultimately,defusethereachandeffectivenessofUSprimaryandsecondarysanctions.9

ThisscenariohasalarmedmanyintheUSwhonotethatadigitalyuancouldbeanationalsecurityissue,10whileothershavehighlighteditschallengetoanyfurtherinternationalisationoftheeuro.11Thee-CNYcouldindeedpotentiallyprovideasimplifiedmethodforcross-borderyuan-denominatedsettlements,reducingcostsandpoliticalrisksassociatedwithUSdollarintermediation.

Digitalnetworksandmulti-CBDCarrangementscouldindeedeasetheinternationalisationofacurrencyasameanofpaymenttroughtradelinks.Economictheorysuggestthatfrictionscauseagentstouseaspecificnationalcurrencyasinternationalmediums

9See Jan Knoerich, “China’s New

DigitalCurrency:ImplicationsforYuanInternationalizationandtheUSDollar”,inNicolaBilottaandFabrizioBotti(eds),The(Near)FutureofCentralBankDigitalCurrencies.RisksandOpportunitiesfortheGlobalEconomyandSociety,Bern,PeterLang,2021,p.160,

https://

/document/1068992.

10YayaJ.FanusieandEmilyJin,China’sDigitalCurrency.AddingFinancialDatatoDigitalAuthoritarianism,CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,January2021,p.16,

https://www.

/publications/reports/chinas-digital-

currency;

FrederickKempe,“WhytheUSCan’tAffordtoFallBehindintheGlobalDigitalCurrencyRace”,inAtlanticCouncilInflectionPoints,28February2021,

https://www.

/?p=358914.

11CarolynnLook,“China’sDigitalYuanIsKeyRiskforEuro,ECB’sVilleroySays”,inBloomberg,29June2021,

/

news/articles/2021-06-29/china-s-digital-

yuan-is-key-risk-for-euro-ecb-s-villeroy-says.

andtheeconomyofscaleleadstoconcentrateononlyafewnationalcurrenciesforthispurpose.12

ACBDCsystemcouldreducefrictions

–transactioncostsandcostsofcalculation–inprinciple,allowingretailandcorporateuserstohavedirectclaimsoncentralbankmoney.13AsacknowledgedbyarecentreportproducedbytheBankforInternationalSettlement,theCommitteeonPaymentsandMarketInfrastructures,theWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund,multi-CBDCsarrangementshavethepotentialtoenhanceefficiencywhileloweringcostsofcross-bordertransactions.14

ImprovingtheglobalreservestatusofacurrencythroughaCBDCcouldinsteadbemorechallenging.15Recentresearchstressesthatacurrency’sroleasaninvoicingorpaymentunitactsasacomplementtoitsroleasastoreofvalue,resultinginpositivefeedbackloops.16Forexample,ithasbeen

12PaulKrugman,“TheInternationalRoleoftheDollar:TheoryandProspect”,inJohnF.O.BilsonandRichardC.Marston(eds),ExchangeRateTheoryandPractice,Chicago/London,UniversityofChicagoPress,1984,p.261-278,

/chapters/c6838.

13BankforInternationalSettlements(BIS),“CBDCs:AnOpportunityfortheMonetarySystem”,inBISAnnualEconomicReport2021,June2021,p.65-95,

/publ/

arpdf/ar2021e3.htm.

14BISetal.,CentralBankDigitalCurrenciesforCross-BorderPayments:ReporttotheG20,July2021,

/publ/othp38.htm.

15MarkusK.Brunnermeier,HaroldJamesandJean-PierreLandau,“TheDigitalizationofMoney”,inNBERWorkingPapers,No.26300(September2019),

/papers/

w26300.

16MassimoFerrariandArnaudMehl,“CentralBankDigitalCurrencyandGlobalCurrencies”,in

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Figure3|CBDCsvstoday’sarrangementsincross-bordertransactions

Source:Author’selaborationfromBIS,“CBDCs:AnOpportunityfortheMonetarySystem”,cit.

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suggestedthataCBDCcouldfacilitatethedigitalisationofinformationexchangesinpaymentsthroughe-invoices,e-receipts,e-identityande-signature,potentiallyconnectingaCBDCsystemwithhighervalueservicesprovidedatalowercost.

Nevertheless,theappealofaninternationalcurrencydependsoneconomicandinstitutionalfactors

–suchasoverallmacroeconomicconditions,theopennessandtransparencyoftheissuingfinancialmarketsorthecredibilityoftheissuingcountry’ssocialinstitutions.Thesedeterminantsarecurrentlyconstrainingtheyuan’spotentialinternationalstatus.Assuggestedbyonestudy,policyandinstitutionalfactors(likecapitalaccountcontrol,

EuropeanCentralBank(ECB),TheInternationalRoleoftheEuro,FrankfurtamdMain,ECB,June2021,p.55-60,

https://www.ecb.europa.

eu/pub/ire/html/ecb.ire202106~a058f84c61.

en.html#toc18.

limitedconvertibilityoreconomicfreedom)aredraggingdownthepotentialshareoftheyuaninglobalreservesfrom10percentofthetotalto2percent.17

AChineseCBDCisunlikelytoalterthesefundamentalfactors.

Withoutbeingaccompaniedbystructuraldomesticreforms,thee-CNYwillnotbeabletochallengetheUSdollarsinternationalstatusneitherasameansofpaymentnorasastoreofvalueoraunitofaccount.

Nevertheless,thereisabiggerpicture.

Assuggestedbyabourgeoningliterature,theinternationalstatusofacurrencyisalsodrivenbyessential

17YipingHuang,DailiWangandGangFan,“PathstoaReserveCurrency:InternationalizationoftheRenminbiandItsImplications”,inADBIWorkingPapers,No.482(May2014),

/11540/1244.

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andunderpinninggeopoliticalfactorswhichcouldinfluencetheadoptionofthee-CNY.18First,adigitalyuancouldstrengthentheadoptionoftheyuanintocross-borderpayments,linkingthee-CNYwithvariousformsofeconomicactivitiesthroughbilateral,regionalandmultilateraltradeagreements,especiallyforthosecountriesalreadyinvolvedinChina’strade-backedprogrammes(suchastheBeltandRoadInitiative).

Furthermore,thee-CNYprojectispushingothermajoreconomiestoacceleratetheirownnationalCBDCprojects,asdemonstratedbytheECBdecision.CompetitorcountriesaimtopreventtheissuanceofforeignCBDCs,asthiscouldimprovethestatusofotherinternationalcurrenciesattheexpenseoftheirs.IfseveralnationalCBDCsaredeveloped,bilateralandmultilateralCBDC-arrangementscanpromotetheestablishmentofanewpaymentsystemnetworkbasedonmulti-CBDCsarrangementsinwhichexchangerisksaredrasticallyreducedandnodesaremoreindependentfromtheUSdollar.

However,toenablethispotential,thereistheneedofsomedegreeofcooperationtodesigninteroperabilitybetweenCBDCsystems.MuchoftheinternationaladoptionofanationalCBDCabroadwilldependonagreedandsharedstandardsandsolutions.19

18SeeBarryEichengreen,ArnaudMehlandLiviaChi?u,“MarsorMercury?TheGeopoliticsofInternationalCurrencyChoice”,inVoxEU,2January2018,

/node/62433.

19Suchas:(i)theabilitytocarrydataaboutthepaymentinastandardisedform;(ii)identityrequirementsandchecks;(iii)applicationoffraudprevention,KnowYourCustomer(KYC),Anti-MoneyLaundering(AML),security,

Whileabilateralsolutionbetweentwocountriescouldwork,itisunlikelytobescalable,andtobeappliedglobally.Whatisinsteadneededisamultilateralorregionalarrangementthatenablespaymentstobemadeinafrictionlessform.

Beingawareofthis,BeijingisactiveintryingtobuildinternationalcooperationarounditsCBDCproject,seekingtoexploititsfirst-moveradvantage.ThePBoChasalreadyproposedasetofglobalrulestoempowerbasicinteroperabilitybetweenCBDCsissuedbydifferentjurisdictions.20Moreover,ithasjoinedthem-CBDCBridgeinitiative

–aCBDCcross-borderpaymentproject

–togetherwiththeBISInnovationLab,theBankofThailand,theHongKongMonetaryAuthorityandtheCentralBankoftheUnitedArabEmirates.21

Finally,SWIFT,concernedaboutapotentiallossofaccesstotheChineseeconomy,hassetupajointventure,calledFinanceGatewayInformationServices,withthePBoCtoimprovecross-bordertransactionservicesinChina.ThreepercentofthejointventureisownedbythePBoC’sDigitalCurrencyResearchInstitute,suggestingthereisfurtherscopetogloballypromotetheuseofthedigitalyuan.22

integrity,transparency,dataprivacy.

20TomWilsonandMarcJones,“ChinaProposesGlobalRulesforCentralBankDigitalCurrencies”,inReuters,25March2021,

https://

reut.rs/3si5OH4.

21BIS,CentralBanksofChinaandUnitedArabEmiratesJoinDigitalCurrencyProjectforCross-BorderPayments,23February2021,

https://

/press/p210223.htm.

22“SWIFTSetsUpJVWithChina’sCentralBank”,inReuters,4February2021,

https://reut.

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Transformationsintheinternational

monetarysystemarehistoricallyslow.

ACBDCisunlikelytoqualitatively

changetheeconomicandinstitutional

factorsthataffecttheinternational

useofcurrencies.23e-CNY’spolicy

goal, however, does not seek to

supplanttheUSdollarasthedominant

globalcurrency,instead,itaimsto

reducedollardependencewiththe

establishmentofanewandalternative

paymentsystem.Topushthis(more

feasible)agenda,Chinacansuccessfully

leverageitsglobaleconomicpowerto

shapeandfostertheinternational,orat

leastmultilateral,CBDCspace.

Thee-CNYwillnotultimatelybecome

asilverbulletfortheambitionofan

internationalyuan.However,withthe

digitaleuroandthedigitalUSdollar

initiativeslaggingfarbehind,China

appearstohavelittlecompetitionin

theCBDCspace.Whilefortheeuro

andtheUSdollaritismoreimportant

togettheirCBDCprojectsrightthanto

rushtheseintofruition,theEUandthe

USrisklosingmomentumandleaving

Chinawithgreatinfluenceoverthe

developmentofglobalCDBCstandards.

5October2021

rs/3cDqynA.

23DongHeetal.,“DigitalMoneyAcrossBorders:

MacrofinancialImplications”,inIMFPolicy

Papers,No.2020/50(October2020),

https://

/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/

Issues/2020/10/17/Digital-Money-Across-

Borders-Macro-Financial-Implications-49823.

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IstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)

TheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)isaprivate,independentnon-profitthinktank,foundedin1965ontheinitiativeofAltieroSp