競爭法(雙語)課程07-antimonopoly-law3-ADP課件

1Part2AntimonopolyLaw:

ChinesePerspective1Part2LearningObjectives(1)DefineDominantMarketPosition(2)DefineTyingandBundling(3)ExplainPredatoryPricing(4)ExplainRPM(5)PriceDiscriminationLearningObjectives(1)Define3Content1.DominantMarketPosition2.AbuseofaMarketDominantPosition3.TyingandBundling4.PredatoryPricing5.PriceDiscrimination3Content1.DominantMarketPos4Chapter6AbuseofaMarketDominantPosition4Chapter61.DominantMarketPosition(1)Definitiona)Itreferstotheundertaking(s)havingtheabilitytocontroltheprice,quantityorothertradingconditionsofproductsinrelevantmarket,ortohinderoraffectotherundertakingstoentertherelevantmarket.1.DominantMarketPosition(1)b)TheOriginalPowerofDominantPositionEconomicPowerIntellectualPropertyRightsAdministrativePowerb)TheOriginalPowerofDomin(2)

Factorstofindingdominantmarketposition(i)marketshareinrelevantmarket,andthecompetitionsituationoftherelevantmarket;(ii)abilitytocontrolthesalesmarketsortherawmaterialpurchasingmarkets;(iii)financialstatusandtechnicalconditionsoftheundertaking;(iv)thedegreeofdependenceofotherundertakings;(v)entrytorelevantmarketbyotherundertakings;(vi)otherfactorsrelatedtofindadominantmarketposition.7(2)Factorstofindingdominan(3)Howtoassumeadominantmarketposition?a)Undertakingsthathaveanyofthefollowingsituationscanbeassumedtobehaveadominantmarketposition:(i)therelevantmarketshareofoneundertakingaccountsfor1/2orabove;(ii)thejointrelevantmarketshareoftwoundertakingsaccountsfor2/3orabove;(iii)thejointrelevantmarketshareofthreeundertakingsaccountsfor3/4orabove.8(3)Howtoassumeadominantm(b)DefensesUndertakingswithamarketshareoflessthan1/10willnotbedeemedasoccupyingadominantmarketpositioneveniftheyfallwithinthescopeofsecondorthirditem.WhentheUndertakingsassumedtohaveadominantmarketpositioncanprovethattheydonothaveadominantmarket,shallnotbeassumedtohaveadominantmarketposition.9(b)DefensesUndertakingswithone≥1/2two≥2/3three≥3/410one≥1/2102.AbuseofaMarketDominantPositionTheRequirementsofAbusing1)Undertakingsofadominantmarketposition2)Abusingbehaviors(i)sellcommoditiesatunfairlyhighpricesorbuycommoditiesatunfairlylowprices;(ii)sellcommoditiesatpricesbelowcostwithoutlegitimatereasons;(iii)refusetotradewithcounterpartywithoutlegitimatereasons;112.AbuseofaMarketDominant(iv)requireitscounterpartytotradeexclusivelywithitortradeexclusivelywiththeappointedundertakingswithoutlegitimatereasons;(v)tieproductsorrequireasunreasonableconditionsfortradingwithoutlegitimatereasons;(vi)applydissimilarpricesorothertransactiontermstoequivalentcounterparties;(vii)otherconductsidentifiedasabuseofadominantpositionbyantimonopolyexecutionauthorities.12(iv)requireitscounterparty3.TyingandBundling3.TyingandBundling"Tyingandbundling[are]soubiquitousthatweforgettheyarethere....Tyingandbundling[are],roughlyspeaking,whatthemodernfirmdoes.It'stherationale.Itputsthingstogetherandofferstheminpackagestoconsumers."14"Tyingandbundling[are]sou15(1)DefinitionsBundlingTyingpurebundling:sellingproductsonlyasabundle,notindividuallymixedbundling:sellingproductsasabundleandindividuallymakingthesaleofonegood(thetyinggood)conditionalonthesaleofanothergood(thetiedgood)Elementscertainformsofbundlingoftwoseparateproductsthroughcoercion(?)EconomicconceptLegalconcept15(1)DefinitionsBundlingTyingChinaTyingisthepracticeofmakingthesaleofonegood(thetyinggood)tothedefactoordejurecustomerconditionalonthepurchaseofaseconddistinctivegood(thetiedgood).Itisoftenillegalwhentheproductsarenotnaturallyrelated.Ex.abookstorerequiringthecustomerbuyanunpopularbookbeforeallowingthemtopurchaseabestseller.16ChinaTyingisthepracticeof(2)Whytotie?1)toexcludecompetitors

2)toraisethecostofcompetitors

3)tofacilitatetheconspiracywiththecompetitors

17(2)Whytotie?1)toexcludec18(3)EconomicAnalysisChicagoSchoolRecognitionofefficienciesreductioninproduction/distributioncostsproductimprovementqualityassurance/compatibilitypricingLimitedmotivetoleverageamonopolyintoanothermarket singlemonopoly profittheoremTyingis(almost)alwaysbenignClassicalTyingApproachLeveragetheory:afirmextendsitsdominancethroughtyingandisabletoearnasecondmonopolyprofit“Tyingdeemedtoservenolegitimatebusinesspurpose”Tyingis(almost)alwaysharmfulPost-ChicagoChicagoSchooldidnotaddressoligopolisticmarketsAnti-competitivescenariosforeclosureofthecompetitivemarketprotectionofthemonopolymarketothers?Tyingisfrequentlybenignbutcanbeharmfulincertaincircumstances18(3)EconomicAnalysisChicagoInviewoftheirpotentialefficiencies,manyeconomistsbelievethat,ingeneral,tyingandbundlingaremorelikelytobeprocompetitivethananticompetitive.19Inviewoftheirpotentialeff20(4)ErrorCostAnalysis(1) Actual Impact

LegalStandard HarmfulNotHarmfulIllegalCasesthatarebothharmfulandillegalCasesthatarenotharmfuleventhoughtheyviolatethelegalruleLegalCasesthatareharmfuleventhoughtheydonotviolatethelegalruleCasesthatarebenignandlegalKeyFactorsfrequencyofharmfulcasesrateoffalseacquittalsandfalseconvictionserrorcosts20(4)ErrorCostAnalysis(1) 21ErrorCostAnalysis(2)PerSeLegalityRuleofReasonPerSeIllegalityCourtofAppealsinMicrosoftIIICommissiondecisioninMicrosoftModifiedPerSe-JeffersonParishPerSeapproachinHiltiandTetraPakIIStandardofproofforcompetitiveharmEClawU.S.lawEconomicAnalysisChicagoSchoolPost-ChicagoClassicalApproach21ErrorCostAnalysis(2)22(5)LegalAnalysis(1)ModifiedPerSeofJeffersonParishTestKeyIssuesMarketdominanceSeparateproductstest+CoercionEffectoncommerceJustificationanddefencesSeparateproductstestasaroughproxyfornetefficienciesBiasinEnforcement(over-enforcement)22(5)LegalAnalysis(1)Modifi23LegalAnalysis(2)Commission’sRuleofReasonapproachinMicrosoftTestKeyIssuesMarketdominanceSeparateproductstestRestrictionofcompetition+EfficiencyjustificationLowthresholdforseparateproductstestRequisitelegalstandardNeedforindispensabilityrequirement23LegalAnalysis(2)CommissionThreelegalapproachestotyingthemodifiedperseapproach(Jefferson

Parish)theperseapproach(HiltiandTetra

PakII)theCommission’s“ruleofreason”approach24Threelegalapproachestotyin25(5)Conclusions1)AnalysisoftheanticompetitiveeffectsoftyingandbundlingbyU.S.courts,bycontrast,hasevolvedovertime.Majorlegalrulestendtobemorehostiletowardstyingthanisjustifiedaccordingtoeconomicanalysis.2)Althoughcourtslonghaveexpressedconcernthattyingorbundlingmightenablefirmstousemonopolypowerinonemarketasleveragetocurbcompetition,andtherebyacquiremonopolypower,inasecondmarket,

judicialconcernhaseasedastyingandbundlinghavebecomebetterunderstood.25(5)Conclusions1)Analysiso3)Judicialprinciplehasbeenchanged:Duringthepast,itbeenthoughttobeworthyofpersecondemnationwithoutexaminationofanyactualcompetitiveeffects.Atpresent,itisdeemedperseillegalunderU.S.SupremeCourtrulingsonlyifspecificconditionsaremet,includingproofthatthedefendanthasmarketpoweroverthetyingproduct.Further,theSupremeCourthasrecentlyrecognizedthatcompetitivemarketsandtyingarrangementsarenotincompatible.Indeed,somelowercourtshaverequiredproofoflikelyoractualanticompetitiveeffectsandefficienciesintyingcases.263)Judicialprinciplehasbeen(6)InternationalBusinessMachinesCorp.v.UnitedStates1996Facts:IBMrestraineditsleaserofitstabulatingmachinestouseothermanufactures’tabulatingcards.ThegovernmentthoughtIBMhadviolatedtheClaytonAct(38Stat.730)andtriedtodeclaretheleasingcontractwasvoidundertheShermanAnti-TrustAct.27(6)InternationalBusinessMacIBMinsistsitsleasesarelawfulbecauseitspurposeandeffectareonlytothegoodwillofitspatronsbypreventingtheuseofunsuitablecardswhichwouldinterferewiththesuccessfulperformanceofitsmachines.ThecourtholdsIBMcanlistthespecificationsoftabulatingcards,whichalsocanachievethesameeffect.28IBMinsistsitsleasesarelaw4.PredatoryPricing(1)DefinitionPredatorypricingisthepracticeofsellingaproductorserviceataverylowprice,intendingtodrivecompetitorsoutofthemarket,orcreatebarrierstoentryforpotentialnewcompetitors.294.PredatoryPricing(1)Defin(2)MechanismIfcompetitorsorpotentialcompetitorscannotsustainequalorlowerpriceswithoutlosingmoney,theygooutofbusinessorchoosenottoenterthebusiness.Thepredatorymerchantthenhasfewercompetitorsorisevenadefactomonopoly,andhypotheticallycouldthenraisepricesabovewhatthemarketwouldotherwisebear.Inessence,thepredatorundergoesshort-termpainforlong-termgain.30(2)MechanismIfcompetitorsor(3)TheRisksOfThePredatorThestrategymayfailifcompetitorsarestrongerthanexpected,orcompetitorsaredrivenoutbutreplacedbyothers.Ineithercasethepredatorcannotenduretheshort-termlosses31(3)TheRisksOfThePredatorT(4)Requirementstosucceed1)Thepredatormusthavesufficientstrength(financialreserves,guaranteedbackingorothersourcesofoffsettingrevenue)toenduretheinitialleanperiod.2)Theremustbesubstantialbarrierstoentryfornewcompetitors.32(4)Requirementstosucceed1)(5)LegalEffectInmanycountriespredatorypricingisconsideredanti-competitiveandisillegalunderantitrustlaws.Itisusuallydifficulttoprovethatpricesdroppedbecauseofdeliberatepredatorypricingratherthanlegitimatepricecompetition.Inanycase,competitorsmaybedrivenoutofthemarketbeforethecaseiseverheard.33(5)LegalEffectInmanycountr(6)CriticismEconomistsclaimthattruepredatorypricingisrarebecauseitisanirrationalpracticeandthatlawsdesignedtopreventitonlyinhibitcompetition.——BrookeGroupv.Brown&WilliamsonTobaccoInthiscase,theFederalTradeCommissionhasnotsuccessfullyprosecutedanycompanyforpredatorypricingsince.34(6)CriticismEconomistsclaim(7)ExamplesOfAllegedPredatoryPricing1)FranceTelecom/Wanadoo—TheEuropeanCourtofJusticejudgedthatWanadoo(NowOrangeInternetFrance)chargedlessthancostinordertogainaleadintheFrenchbroadbandmarket.Theyhavebeenorderedtopayafineof€10.35m,althoughthiscanstillbecontested.2)Microsoftreleasedtheirweb-browserInternetExplorerforfree.Asaresultthemarketleaderandprimarycompetitor,Netscape,wasforcedtoreleaseNetscapeNavigatorforfreeinordertostayinthemarket.InternetExplorer'sfreeinclusioninWindowsledtoitquicklybecomingthewebbrowserusedbymostcomputerusers.35(7)ExamplesOfAllegedPredat(7)ExamplesOfAllegedPredatoryPricing3)TheGermangovernmentorderedWal-Marttoincreaseitsprices.4)TheFrenchgovernmentorderedtostopofferingfreeshippingtoitscustomers,becauseitwasinviolationofFrenchpredatorypricinglaws.AfterAmazonrefusedtoobeytheorder,thegovernmentproceededtofinethem€1,000perday.Amazoncontinuedtopaythefinesinsteadofendingitspolicyofofferingfreeshipping.5)IntheDarlingtonBusWar,StagecoachGroupofferedfreebusridesinordertoputtherivalDarlingtonCorporationTransportoutofbusiness.36(7)ExamplesOfAllegedPredat5.PriceDiscrimination(1)DefinitionPricediscriminationexistswhensalesofidenticalgoodsorservicesaretransactedatdifferentpricesfromthesameprovider.Ingeneral,thepracticeofchargingdifferentcustomersdifferentpricesiscalledpricediscrimination.375.PriceDiscrimination(1)Def(2)EffectTheeffectsofpricediscriminationonsocialefficiencyareunclear;typicallysuchbehaviorleadstolowerpricesforsomeconsumersandhigherpricesforothers.Outputcanbeexpandedwhenpricediscriminationisveryefficient,butoutputcanalsodeclinewhendiscriminationismoreeffectiveatextractingsurplusfromhigh-valuedusersthanexpandingsalestolowvaluedusers.Evenifoutputremainsconstant,pricediscriminationcanreduceefficiencybymisallocatingoutputamongconsumers.38(2)EffectTheeffectsofprice(3)Examplesofpricediscrimination1)RetailpricediscriminationIncertaincircumstances,itisaviolationoftheRobinson-PatmanAct,formanufacturersofgoodstoselltheirproductstosimilarlysituatedretailersatdifferentpricesbasedsolelyonthevolumeofproductspurchased.2)EmployeediscountsDiscountsthatbusinessesgivetotheirownemployeesarealsoaformofpricediscrimination.39(3)Examplesofpricediscrimi3)DiscountsformembersofcertainoccupationsManybusinesses,especiallyintheSouthernUnitedStates,offerreducedpricestoactivemilitarymembers.Inadditiontoincreasedsalestothetargetgroup,businessesbenefitfromtheresultingpositivepublicity,leadingtoincreasedsalestothegeneralpublic.Lesspublicizedarediscountstootherserviceworkerssuchaspolice;off-dutypolicecustomersinhigh-crimeareasaresaidtoconstitutefreesecurity.403)Discountsformembersofce4)Gender-basedexamplesManygender-basedpricedifferencesareheldtobeillegalincountriessuchastheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom.5)"Ladies'night"ManyNorthAmericanorEuropeannightclubsfeaturea"ladies'night"inwhichwomenareoffereddiscountorfreedrinks,orareabsolvedfrompaymentofcovercharges.Thisdiffersfromconventionalpricediscriminationinthattheprimarymotiveisnot,usually,toincreaserevenueattheexpenseofconsumersurplus.414)Gender-basedexamplesManyg6)HaircuttingWomen'shaircutsareoftenmoreexpensivethanmen'shaircutsbecausewomengenerallyhavelonger,morecomplexhairstyleswhereasmengenerallyhaveshorterhairstyles.Somesalonshavemodifiedtheirpricingtoreflect"longhair"versus"shorthair"or

styleinsteadofgender.Thissituationhasbeencommonpracticeinbarbershopsfordecades.Additionally,womentendtobemoreconcernedabouthaircarethanmen,henceanopportunitytochargeadifferentprice.426)HaircuttingWomen'shaircuts7)DrycleaningDrycleanerstypicallychargehigherpricesforthelaunderingofwomen'sclothesthanformen's.SomeUScommunitieshavereactedbyoutlawingthepractice.Drycleanersjustifythepricedifferencesbecausewomen'sclothestypicallyrequirefarmoretimetopressthanmen'sclothesduetomorepleating.8)CarinsuranceManyinsurancecompanieschargemalesmoreforcarinsurancebecauseof"perceivedrisk"(i.e.whatmighthappen,asopposedtowhatwillhappen).437)DrycleaningDrycleanersty9)AcademicpricingCompanieswilloftenofferdiscountedsoftwaretostudentsandfacultyatK-12anduniversitylevels.Thesemaybelabeledasacademicversions,butperformthesameasthefullpriceretailsoftware.Academicversionsofthemostexpensivesoftwaresuitesmaybepricedaslittleasonefift