企業(yè)管理中英文對照外文翻譯文獻

中英文對照外文翻譯譯文：公司治理與高管薪酬：一個應急框架總體概述20Bruc，BuckMain關于高管補償?shù)拇蠖鄶?shù)實證文獻主要集中在對美國和英國的公司部門，當分析高管薪理論方面的高管補償和在不同形式的激勵和公司業(yè)績方面的探索鏈接。JensenMurphyAguileaFilatotchGospelJackson指出其“情境化”的性質(zhì)，因此它無法準確地比較和解釋企業(yè)的多樣性在不同的組織和體制環(huán)境的治理安排。同樣，由此產(chǎn)生的許多政策處方體現(xiàn)在好的公司治理是依靠最好實踐的普遍觀念，這往往需要適應當?shù)氐沫h(huán)境或者轉(zhuǎn)化為多樣的國際化的制度設置。本文我們討論高管補償?shù)囊粋€組織的方法能更好的解釋不同組織環(huán)境和體制環(huán)境相Aguileraet量所介導的。規(guī)范和認知性相聯(lián)系的社會合法的。因此這些社會影響必須與組織有效性相協(xié)調(diào)。委托代理二分法對高管薪酬的組織方法委托代理理論致力于研究管理激勵，它主要關注的是從股東的觀點考慮的的高管補償結(jié)果的有效性，股東是指投資并謀求最大投資回報的人。這個方法依據(jù)股東和經(jīng)理之間的“保持距離”假設，本位主義作為他們合同的基礎。因此，除了吸收和保留高素質(zhì)的管理隊伍，設計良好的激勵機制能增加公司的生產(chǎn)能力，能更好的協(xié)調(diào)高管的利益與股東的利益保持一致。一些研究指出高管人員，特別是首席執(zhí)行官，利用自己的權(quán)利來設計薪酬，能夠使他們不受監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東對自己的約束。自利的管理者會萃取租金通過他們自己的喜好來操縱董事會，主要是被媒體應用的憤怒約束的主體。因此首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬安排跟激勵無關而加劇了首席執(zhí)行官的自我充實或是走過場。在一定程度上，股東的代理問題被解決了，阻止的方法是評估高管薪酬與公司的業(yè)績有關。公司治理的實證研究已經(jīng)開始懷疑經(jīng)理人報酬與公司效率之間的關系。許多開始質(zhì)疑是否這個協(xié)會持有代理沖突的變異；不同的組織背景像創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)、首次募股企業(yè)和成熟企業(yè)；和不同的國家設置。也許更重要的是，高管薪酬的業(yè)績影響對國家體制環(huán)境似乎有所不同。例如，高管薪酬的研究表明，在美國高管薪酬和業(yè)績之間有很強烈的關系，但在英國和德國的股權(quán)激勵政策的影響相對稍低，然而在日本高管薪酬沒有激勵效應。同時，組織理論和戰(zhàn)略管理研究表明，高管薪酬的治理作用存在大量的不同觀點。例如，管家理論放寬了在代理理論中發(fā)現(xiàn)的管理行為假設，認為管理者可以在某些情況下為了組織的利益充當管家，只有相對地的利益沖突存在。同樣，利益相關者理論認識到，公司治理因素的有效性取決于一系列的公司相關行為，和他們之間的相互作用，盡管這個研究較少關注高管薪酬。和環(huán)境的復雜性。在代理理論中，方法大多限于股東和經(jīng)理兩方，很少注意代理問題可能在不同的任務和資源環(huán)境、組織的生命周期或不同的體制環(huán)境中中是如何變化的。雖然威廉姆森認為交易成本會因不同的機構(gòu)和組織環(huán)境而有所不同，他指出公司治理研究的主流是“太專注于資源配置的效率的議題，而忽視了組織效率離散的結(jié)構(gòu)會帶來仔細的審查管家和利益相關者理論移除了代理理論的一些嚴格的假設，但沒有提供一全面的能夠與不同組織和環(huán)境相聯(lián)系的薪酬激勵研究框架。Aguileraet后，我們建議高管薪酬的研究應該采取更加開放的政策，把組織特在整體背景下的重要性而非只是某一因素的作用。代理基礎的傳統(tǒng)觀念和我們的框架的觀點背離，我們的框架植根于綜合各種理論和實證研究結(jié)果，建立一個簡潔的框架。這種方法是為了更好地了解高管薪酬和組織機構(gòu)環(huán)境的相互依存關系。這些結(jié)構(gòu)是組織環(huán)境與公司治理和體制影響的互補和替代?？傊覀冎鲝埜吖芗畹慕M織有效性與主流代理研究建議的業(yè)績之間不存在直接的線性影響。這個影響是建立在大量公司水平和宏觀因素上的而沒有考慮大量的研究。在下面的章節(jié)中，我們試圖討論這些重要的應變因素及高管補償制度的俠侶和有效性。組織環(huán)境這里我們根據(jù)以前研究激勵機制的有效性是如何被一個組織的突發(fā)事件的重要范疇所調(diào)種對所有人都適合的做法是不可取。一個在管理方面的研究被日益認知，組織資源基礎及他與外部環(huán)境的相互依存關系不是一成不變的，他是動態(tài)組織的一部分。一個公司治理的權(quán)變概念的應用已經(jīng)在一個研究公司治理的生命周期的新興機構(gòu)被制定了。這些文獻確定了公司的發(fā)展的大部分階段，和與之相聯(lián)系的需要治理不久的代理沖突的變化，包括激勵機制。公司治理可以被看做是一個動態(tài)系統(tǒng)，靠著治理可以改變不同階段的企業(yè)的實踐環(huán)境間的相互依賴關系，如新興階段、成長期、成熟期和衰退期。通過不同的階段，企業(yè)可以從一個西債的資源基地演變成一個更廣泛的的資源基地。這種轉(zhuǎn)變可能至少要臨時依賴外部資源。這些外部資源的提供者創(chuàng)造新的公司治理，以確保不僅能創(chuàng)造財富，而且能在股東和其他利益相關者之間公平的分配。這主要反映在公司管理問責制對外部資源提供者的改變。CoreGuayv也發(fā)現(xiàn)了這一機制的具體實施受到上市公司組織環(huán)境關于始終控制該公司的創(chuàng)始人的一些限制。在下個階段，內(nèi)部和外部資源被投資在公司的成長上。當企業(yè)耗盡了重點行業(yè)的增長機會，也許就會轉(zhuǎn)到相關或非相關的行業(yè)上，自利系統(tǒng)就變得不那么透明了。激勵機制錯位導致一個逐漸擴大的和多樣化的管理驅(qū)動產(chǎn)生業(yè)績惡化、股東價值損失的結(jié)果。在這一階段的管理人員，特別是首席執(zhí)行官，可以說是享有薪酬設計的權(quán)利的，首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬安排會弱化激勵機制，而更多的滿足管理層的自我充實。唯一可行的戰(zhàn)略選擇在第四個階段，可采取上市公司的私有化。當更透明的激勵和治理機制被以增加管理資產(chǎn)有私有制公司檢測和承諾償還債務的形式被引進，伴隨著收購的衰退組織的重新調(diào)整會導致生命周期的重新振作。因此，該組織可能會縮小其活動范圍，并開始一個新周期?？傊?，有效的治理機制取決于公司治理生命周期的變化，而不是符合一個普遍性的模型。組織環(huán)境強調(diào)的是組織相互依存本質(zhì)的開放性，這樣，成熟企業(yè)會與通過激勵機制降低代理成本聯(lián)系在一起，新創(chuàng)立企業(yè)面臨不同挑戰(zhàn)的發(fā)展和成長機會，因為它們嘗試著環(huán)境的不確定性。各種治理措施的潛在好處是公司治理研究的核心。但是，Aguileraet為組織環(huán)境同的環(huán)境而有所不同。高管補償方案可能有多種類型的相關費用，直接費用反映在資產(chǎn)負債表和其他會計資料上。此外，激勵體制還存在不太明顯的機會成本和聲譽成本。這些成本可能會對激勵體制有效性的多個參數(shù)產(chǎn)生不同的影響，意味著他們之間的潛在權(quán)衡。Black-Schols式，雖然資源就不能遵守，并可能因此面臨相對較高的成本。除了這些直接成本，高管補償也要減少明確的成本，需要更多的間接難以量化的機會成本。這些費用設計激勵機制如何影響管理者的風險觀念和戰(zhàn)略重點，從而影響對商業(yè)機會的利用，他們會根據(jù)不同的組織環(huán)境而改變。例如，Hall和MurphyRENWEI,因為管理者在成熟的公司受歸屬要求和內(nèi)部粉盒的限制，比所期望的從投資組合多樣化的角度持有更多公司的股權(quán)，他們被迫使其持有的股票價值打折。這種“價值成本楔”是企業(yè)必須支付的價格以便產(chǎn)生股權(quán)支付的好處。v上市交易可能產(chǎn)生成本，會阻止管理人員將他們持有的股份調(diào)整到最佳水平。因此，用先手股權(quán)作為收益或竄是的一種參考點，該作者的行為模型預測，當考慮到不同類型的獎勵計劃在首次公開發(fā)行的適當性時，管理者應規(guī)避風險。最后，管理補償機制可能影響到公司的聲譽成本。例如，HallShahrimHal做法相關，會影響到成本效益的不同方面，其顯著性在不同的組織環(huán)境中會不同。原文：CorporateGovernanceandExecutiveRemuneration:AContingencyFrameworkExecutiveOverviewByintegratingorganizationalandinstitutionaltheories,thispaperdevelopsaapproachtoexecutiveremunerationandassessesitseffectivenessindifferentoftheexecutiveremunerationresearchfocusesontheprincipal-agerameworkandassumesauniversalinkbetweenexecutivincentiveandperformanceoutcomes.Wesuggestaframeworkthatexaminesexecutivecompensationinofitorganizationontextandpotentiacomplementaritieubstitutiffectbetweendifferentcorporategovernancepracticesatboththefirmandnationallevels.Wealsoimplicationsfordifferentapproachestoexecutivecompensationpolicysuchas―softlaw‖and―hardlaw.‖Overthepasttwodecades,companiesaroundtheworldhaveincreasinglymovedfromfixedpaystructuoremuneratioschemesthaarerelatetoperformanceandincludasubstantialcomponentofequity-basedincentives.Asaresult,researchontheofexecutivecompensationhasbecomeoneofthehotlydebatedtopicswithincorporategovernanceresearcsBruce,Buck,andMain(2005p.1493)indicate,Irecenyears,literatureonexecutiveremunerationhasgrownatapacerivaledonlybythegrowthofpayitself.MostoftheempiricalliteratureonexecutivecompensationhasfocusedtheU.S./U.K.corporatesectorswhenanalyzingorganizationaoutcomesofdifferentcomponentsofexecutivepay,suchascashpay(salaryandbonus),long-termincentivesexecutivstockoptions)andperquisite.g.pensioncontributiondcompanycars)Intermsofitstheoreticalunderpinnings,previousresearchhasattemptedtounderstandcompensationintermsofagencytheoryandexploredlinksbetweendifferentformsofexincentivesandfirmperformance.Thisliteratusmotivatebytheassumptionthatbymanagingtheprincipal-agencyproblembetweenshareholdendmanagersfirmswiloperatmoreefficiendperformbetterMuchofcorporatgovernanceresearcisbasedonauniversamodeloutlinebyprincipal-ageor(Fama&Jensen1983;Jensen1986)andthecentrapremiseofthisframeworkisthatshareholdersandmanagershavedifferentaccesstofirm-specificandbroadlydivergeninteresndriskpreferencesaresultmanagersasagentsofengageinthatmaybeshareholderswealthmaximization.AsubstantiabodyofliteratusbasedonthisstraightforwaremiseandsuggestthattoconstraimanageriaopportunismshareholdersmayuseaofmanageriaincentivhaaligtheinteresfagentandprincipalsJensenandMurphy(1990,pp.2243)observe,Agencytheoredictsthatcompensaicwilltietheagent’sexpectedprincipal’sobjective.Theistomaximizewealth;thereforeagencytheorypredictsthatCEOcompensationpolicieswilldependinshareholdewealth.Thekeymetricineffectinpositivorganizationutcomesispay-performancesensitivity(Bruceetal.,2005).However,thi―closystemaproachfoundnagencybasedliteratusitauniversasetoflinkagebetweenexecutivincentiveandperformancanddevotelittttentiothedistinontextinwhichfirmareembedded.Despiteconsiderableresearcheffort,theempiricalfindingsonthesecausallinkagesmixedandtheexecutiveequity-relatedincentivesonfinancialperformancehavefailedtoidentifysignificanteffects(see,forexample,thesurveysandcommentariesofCore,Guay,&2003;Daily,Dalton,&Rajagopalan,2003;Hall,2003;andTosi,Werner,Katz,&2000)InamorerecencritiqfagencytheoryAguileraFilatotcheospelandJackson(2008)pointedoutits―undercontexaendhenceitsinabilitytoaccuratelycompaandexplainthediversityofcorporategovernancearrangementsacrossdifferentandinstitutiontextsSimilarluchoftheresultiolicprescriptionshrineincodesof―goodcorporatgovernancerelonuniversanotionofbestpractichichoftenneedtobeadaptedtothelocalcontextsoffirmsortranslatedacrossdiversenationalsettings(Aguilera&Cuervo-Cazurra,2004;Aguilera&Jackson,2003;Fiss&Zajac,2004)InthipaperwediscusanorganizationpproachtoexecutivcompensatiothawillfortheAguileraetal.(2008)wesuggestthatcorporategovernanceaspectsofexecutivecompensationoutlinedbythestakeholderperspectivesmustcapturethepatternedvariationincorporategovernancedifferencnorganizationontextandtheienvironmentAlongtheslineswebuilonrecentstudiesofcorporategovernancethathaveattemptedtoexplainthedynamicdimenscorporategovernanceoverthecompanylifecycle(Filatotchev&Wright,2005),aswelldiversifcorporatgovernancearrangementacroscountrie(Aguiler&Jackson2003;Bruceatal.,2005).Thus,animportanttaskincorporategovernanceresearchistouncdiversityofarrangementsandtounderstandhowtheeffectivenessofexecutiveremuneramediatedbyitsalignmentvariables(―context‖)contextsandinstitutionalenvironments(Aguileraetal.,2008).Wesuggestanovelcontingency-basedframeworkforunderstandingthegovernanceofexecutivecompensation,whichwetermsofcomplementaritysubstitutietweengovernancefactorsandtheimpactofinstitutionalenvironments.Organizationalcstovariationsinalandexternalstrategicresourcesandspecificstagesintheirorganizationallifecycle(OLC).Forexample,thematurephasesofhaveamoreand―professionaliagementteam.Asaresulttheymaybeingreateneedofformalincentivalignmenmechanismscomparedtoyoungerfounder-ownedfirmsintheistart-upphase,whichmayhavenarrowerresourcebasesandthushigherfocusonreputational,onlypotentialbenefitofexecutivcompensatioschemes,butalsotheicostssuchasthedireccostofequity-basedincentivesandtheirindirecteffectsonmanagerialbehaviorandriskcostswillvaryfordifferenfirmsoperatinindifferensortsofenvironmentssothatcost-benefnalysearerareluniversaomplementarity/substituertotheoverall―bundlefcorporatgovernancepractichaarealignewithoneanotheandmutuallyenhancetheabilityofthosepracticestoachieveeffectivecorporategovernance.thattheexecutivecompensationmaydependonthepresenceofothergovernancefactoruchashighshareholdeinvolvemenandboardindependenceFinally,aonandpathdependenceofexecutivecompensatioasagovernancefactoxecutivpaypackagesmustbesocialllegitimanrelationtoprevailingregulatory,normative,andcognitiveimpactsonorganizations.Athesesocietaleffectsmustbereconciledwithorganizationalefficiency(Bruceetal.,Principal-AgentDichotomyVersusOrganizationalApproachtoExecutiveRemunerationPrincipal-ageheorydominatesresearconmanageriaincentivenditisprimarilyconcernedwithefficiencyoutcomesofexecutivecompensationschemesfromtheperspectishareholders,whoinvestresourcesandseekmaximumreturnontheirinvestment.Thisapreliesontheassumptionoflhscontracweenshareholdersandmanagers,andself-interesportunismasabasioftheicontract(Bruceetal.2005).Thus,besidesattractindretaininahigh-qualianagementteam,well-designeincentivschemesshouldincreasecorporateproductivityandvaluebythoseofshareholders(Hall,2003).

s’interestswithSomestudieowever,claimthaexecutivendparticulaOs,ypowerinrelatiotothedesignofpaypackagesandareabletoinsulatthemselvefromandexecutivesmaynowextractrentbymanipulatinboardstructustheiownfavor(i.e.,bynominatingtheironiesboardmembers),subjecmainlytoan―outragonstraippliebythemedia(Bebchuk&Fried,2004).TheCEO’stherefore,havelesstodowithincentivealignmandmoretodowiththeCEenrichmentor―skimming‖(Bertrand&Mullan,Theextentowhichshareholdergencyproblemsareresolveandskimmingpreventeistypicalssessebyassociatixecutivpaywiththeperformanceofthefirm(Buck&Shahrim,2005).beguntocastdoubtonwhetheradirectanduniversallinkbetweenexecutivecompensationandfirmefficiency.ManytoquestionwhetherthisassociationholdsacrossthemultiplevariantsofagencydenBerghe,Levrau,Carchon,&VanderElst,2002);differentorganizationalcontextsentrepreneurialventures,initialpublicofferings(IPOs),andmaturefirms(Filatotche2005);anddifferentnationalsettings.PerhapsmoreimportantisthefactthattheimpactofthecontextsForexample,studieofexecutivpayshowstrongcorrelatioetweenpayandperformanceintheUnitedandequity-basedincentivesintheUnitedKingdomandGermany(Bruceetal.,2005),whereasexecutiveJapanhasnoincentiveeffects(Kubo,2005).Meanwhile,studiesinorganizationtheoryandstrategicmanagementsuggestaalternativeviewsonthegovernancerolesofexecutivecompensation.Forexample,theoryhasrelaxedsomeoftheassumptionsaboutmanagerialbehaviorfoundinagencyarguingthatmanagersmayactasstewardsforthegoodoftheorganizationinsituationonlyrelativeinorconflicfinteresxis(Davis2005).Likewisestakeholdetheoryonawidersetof1984),althoughthisresearchhasrelativelylessattentiontoexecutiveincentives.Despitetheirdifferences,acommontendencywithintheseresearchstreamsisonuniversalisticmodelsofefficiency,whicastimportanorganizationandenvironmentalcomplexities(Aguileraetal.,the―undercontextualized‖approachremainsrestrictomostlytwoactor(shareholdendmanagers)withlittleattentiontohowagencyproblemsmayvaryacrossdiversetaskandresourcelifecycleoforganizations,ordifferentinstitutionalenvironments.Although277)suggestedthattransactioncostsmaybedifferentindifferentinstitutionalcontexts,hepointedoutthatmainstreamcorporatesecis―toopreoccupiedissueofallocatifficiency.ttheneglecoforganizational efficiennwhichdiscretestructuralunderscrutiny.‖theoryremovesomeoftheagencyapproach,yetdonotprovideacomprehensiveresearrameworkthatlinksexecutiveincentiveswiththedifferentorganizationalenvironments.

contextFollowingAguileraetal.(2008)weproposethatexecutivecompensationresearchadoptamore―opsystem‖approach,whichtreatorganizationafeatureasbeinginterdependeiththediversitluctuationnduncertaintiftheienvironmentandrejectsuniversalsntree‖propositions.Inso-stemapproachemphasizestheimportanceofexaminingexecutivecompensationcontextratherthanassinglefactorsactinginisolation.Themaindeparturebetweenthe―traditional‖toexecutivecompensatioandourconceptuaframework,whichisgroundedinorganizatioeorandsynthesizesvariousempiricalfindingsthrougharelativelyparsimonioussetofapproachisaimedatbetterunderstandingtheinterdependencebetweenexecutivepracticeandtheorganizationndinstitutiovironmentinwhichthesepracticeareconductedThesespecificonstrucreorganizationontextcomplementaritubstitutionwithacorporatgovernance―bundlendinstitutiofectnshortweclaimthatheorganizationaleffectivenessofexecutiveincentivesdoesnothaveadirectandlinearperformanceassuggestedbymainstreamagencyresearch.Thiseffectiscontingentonaoffirm-levndmacrofactorthaareasarulenotaccounteforinthevastmajoritofstudies.InthefollowingsectionsweattempttodiscusstheseimportantcontingencytheirpotentialeffectsontheeffectivenessandefficiencyofexecutivecompensationOrganizationalContextOrganizatiotheorisaveexaminedhowtheeffecoforganiationa(―structural‖)characteristseffectivenerperformancmaybemediatedorinfluencebycontextualvariablessuchastaskuncertaintaskinterdependenceandorganizationynamics(Donaldson,2001;Filatotchev,Toms,&Wright,2006).Althoughexecutivecompensationbeconsidereasastructurovernancecharacteristhinthiframework,organizationtheoryhasnotelaboratedwithregardtotheeffectivenessofthisformofcorporateHerewebuildonpreviousresearchandexaminehowtheeffectivenessofincentivemaybemediatedbyanimportantcategoryoftheresourceandcapabilitihatshapefirmsinterdependenciithdiffererganizationalenvironments(seeAguileraetal.,2008,foramoredetaileddiscussion).Oneaspectofresource-relatedcontingenciesisgroundedintheresource-basedasabilioinnovat(Barney1991)Afurtheaspecofresourcerelatecontingenciomesfromresourcedependencytheory,whichsuggeststhatfirmswillrespondtodemandsexternalactorsororganizationsuponwhoseresourcestheyareheavilydependent,butseektominimizeSalancik,1978).Forexample,thedegreeandnatureofexternalfinanceislikelytodemandsplacedoncorporatgovernancetoensureaccountabilindincentivalignment.Organizationalcontextconsiderationsthusimplythattheroleandeffectsofincentivearelikeltodiffeinwayscontingenuponboththeexternaandinternesourcethaarecriticalwithintheconttrms’organizational,market,sectoral,nearyotherwords,theeffectinecutiveincentivesmaydependonthemosage,thephasesofgrowthordeclineicany’sdevelopment,andthecharacterofonatdifferearketsandsectorsamongmanyotherfactor(Aguileretal.2008).Whileanorganizationerspectiejectthenotiooftalsosuggeststhatpolicywillbemoreeffectiveifittakesintoaccountthepotentialorganizationalcontexts.Inshort,aone-size-fits-allapproachisundesirable.Thereisanincreasingrecognitioninmanagementresearchthattheorganizationalbaseanditinterdependenithexternaenvironmentarenotstatiutanintegraroforganizationynamics.Theapplicatioofacontingency-baseconceptofcorporategovernancehasbeendevelopedwithinanemergingbodyoftheofcorporatgovernance(Filatotchtal.2006;FilatotchvWright2005).ThisliteratureidentifiesanumberofstagesinthedevelopmentofthefirmandlinksthemwithextenandnaturofagencyconflicharequirgovernanceremediesincludinincentiveviewedhereasadynamicsystemwherebygovernancepracticesmayaddresschangingsetsofenvironmentalinterdependenciesthroughoutthestageoftheOLC,suchasstart-urowth,maturityanddeclineFigure1illustraistheoreticalframework.OvertheOLCstages,firmsmayevolvefromhavingaverynarrowresourcebasetoamoreextensiveandheterogeneousresourcebase.ThistransitionmayrequireatleastrelianconexternaresourcesProvideroftheseexternaresourcecreatnewcorporategovernancedemandstoensurethatwealthisnotonlycreatedbutalsodistributedofeachfactorprovider,whethertheseareshareholdersorotherstakeholders.Thisischangesofthefirm’smanagementetal.,2006).

providers(FilatotchevIntheearlstageoftheOLC(Quadran1ofFigure1)theentrepreneurrmhasanarrowresourcebase.Itisusuallyownedandagroupfounder-managersand/orfamilyinvestors,withthelevelofmanagerialaccountabilityshareholdersgenerallylow.Inthiscontext,asubstantialportneer-islinkedtothefirm,whichquestionstheappropriatenesosrmayevenunderminetheeffectivenessofequity-basedincentiveschemes,inlinewithargumentsdevelopedbyCoGuay(2010).Asthefirmgrows,itrequiresaccesstoexternalresourcesandexpertisethatmaysupportthisgrowth,anditopensupitsgovernancesystemtoexternalinvestors,suchangelsandventurecapitalfirms.Atthisstage,thebalancebetweenresourcesandstarttoshiftowardgreatetransparencandincreasinmonitorinbyexternaproviderofresources.AnIPO(Quadrant2ofFigure1)representsadramaticshiftfromanfirmtoa―professionrmwithafullydevelopedgovernancesystem.Theshifinaccountabilitywidensthefirmccesstothefinaciaresourceofthestockmarket.IntheianalysiofcompensationinIPOfirmsAllcockandFilatotch2009)identifinincreasinroleofanemerginggovernancemechanismaimedatmanagersandincomingpublicmarkettheynumberoflimitatiomposedonthimechanismbythespecifiorganizationontexofIPOfirmsrelatedtothecontinantroleofthefirm’sfoundersinitsanceInthenextstageinternndexternaresourceareinvesteinthefirmrowthasitmaturesandexploitstrategiopportunitisWhenthefirmhasexhausteditsgrowththefocalindustryandperhapsunrelatedindustries,thegovernancesystembecomeslesstransparent.Misalignmentofincentivesamanageriadriveforever-increasixpansionanddiversificatducinperformancedeterioratiandlossinshareholdevalueAtthistagexecutivendparticularEOs,arguablyenjoypositionsofpowerinofpaypackages,andthearrangementmayhavelestodowithincentivalignmenandmoretodowiththeCEO’sskimmingInaturnaroundsituation,turnintoatheireffectsonmanagerialrisktakingandtimehorizons(Wiseman&Bromiley,1996).TheonlyviablestrategicalternativeatthisstagemaybetotakeapublicRestructurifadeclininorganizatiollowinapublic-to-privyoutmayresulinareinvigoratiofthelifcyclasmoretransparencentivandgovernancmechanismsareintroducedintheformofincreasedmanagerialequity,monitoringbyprivateequitycommitmenttoservicedebt.Assuch,theorganizationmaynarrowthescopeofitsstartanewcycle.Insum,aneffectiveincentivemechanismdependsonpatternedvariationsovertheratherthanconformingtoauniversalistrtionalcontextunderlinesthe―open‖natureoforganizationalinterdependence,suchthat,whereasmaturefirmsmaybereducinagencycostthroughincentivalignmentnewentrepreneuriirmsfacedifferentchallengeintermsofmakingsurethatfounder-managerareabletoanticipatfuturetechnologicevelopmentsandgrowthopportunitistheytrytobufferenvironmentaluncertainties(Filatotchev&Bishop,2002).Thepotentialbenefitofvariousgovernancepracticesisatthecoreofcorporateresearcowever,Aguileretal(2008)arguedthaorganizationontexmayalsoaffectpotentialcostsrelatedtotheinputsofcorporategovernance.Theseoftenappearas―externalendconsequencesthatstemfromorman-ifestthebroaderenvironmentofthereducethecorporategovernance.Suchcostswillvaryacrossfirmstotheextentthattheyoperateindifferenvironments.Executivecompensationschemesmayhaveassociatedcostsofseveraltypes,startingthedirectcoststhatarereflectedinthefietaheraccountingdocumentation(Hall2003).Inadditioncentivsystemsmayimposelesexplicpportunitcost(e.g.,changesinmanagerialriskpreferences)andreputationalcosts(e.g.,costsoforexecutivirresponsibilisevarioucostmayhavediffereffectonthemultipleparametersncentiveschemes’effectiveness,implyintelbetweenthem.Previousresearchismainlyfocusedondirectcostsofvarioustypesofexecutivecompensation,suchastheout-of-pocketexpensesassociatedwithexecutivestock&Schaefer,2006;Ronen,2008).ThecostofexecutivestockoptionstoshareholderscanbeestimatedusingthefamiliarBlack-Scholesformula,thoughthisbeapplicabltoexecutivoptionthacannotbetradecontinuouslthankstovestinandholdingperiods(Hall&Murphy,2002).differentsectoraandnationaregulatorenvironmentsAnimportanimplicatioisthedifferentialimpactofcostsonfirmsdependingontheirresourcecapacities.Forexample,largesufficieesourcescoreeasilybufferthese,