公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

中英文資料外文翻譯外文資料Financial?rmbankruptcyandsystemicriskInFall2008whentheFederalReserveandtheTreasuryinjected$85billionintotheinsurancebehemothAmericanInternationalGroup(AIG),themoneylenttoAIGwentstraighttocounterparties,andveryfewfundsremainedwiththeinsurer.AmongthelargestrecipientswasGoldmanSachs,towhomabout$12billionwaspaidtoundoAIG’screditdefaultswaps(CDSs).ThebailoutplanfocusedonrepayingthedebtbyslowlysellingoffAIG’sassets,withnointentionofmaintainingjobsorallowingtheCDSmarkettocontinuetofunctionasbefore.Thus,thegovernment’sefforttoavoidsystemicriskwithAIGwasmainlyaboutensuringthat?rmswithwhichAIGhaddonebusinessdidnotfailasaresult.Theconcernsareobviouslygreatestvis-a-visCDSs,ofwhichAIGhadover$400billioncontractsoutstandinginJune2008.Incontrast,thegovernmentwasmuchlessenthusiasticaboutaidingGeneralMotors,presumablybecausetheybelieveditsfailurewouldnotcausemajormacroeconomicrepercussionsbyimposinglossesonrelated?rms.Thisdecisionisconsistentwiththeviewinmacroeconomicresearchthatfinancial?rmbankruptciesposeagreateramountofsystemicriskthannonfinancialfirmbankruptcies.Forexample,BordoandHaubrich(2009)concludethat“...moresevere?nancialeventsareassociatedwithmoresevererecessions...”Likewise,Bernanke(1983)arguestheGreatDepressionwassoseverebecauseofweaknessinthebankingsystemthataffectedtheamountofcreditavailableforinvestment.Bernankeetal.(1999)hypothesizeafinancialacceleratormechanism,wherebydistressinonesectoroftheeconomyleadstomoreprecariousbalancesheetsandtightercreditconditions.Thisinturnleadstoadropininvestment,whichisfollowedbylesslendingandawidespreaddownturn.Wereshockstotheeconomyalwaystocomeintheformofdistressatnon?nancial?rms,theseauthorsarguethatthebusinessdownturnswouldnotbesosevere.Weargueinsteadthatthecontagiousimpactofanonfinancialfirm’sbankruptcyisexpectedtobefarlargerthanthatofafinancial?rmlikeAIG,althoughneitherwouldbecatastrophictotheU.S.economythroughcounterpartyriskchannels.Thisisnottosaythatanepisodeofwidespreadfinancialdistressamongourlargestbankswouldnotbefollowedbyanespeciallysevererecession,onlythatsuchfailureswouldnotcausearecessionoraffectthedepthofarecession.Rathersuchbankruptciesaresymptomaticofcommonfactorsinportfoliosthatleadtowealthlossesregardlessofwhetheranyfirm?lesforbankruptcy.Pervasive?nancialfragilitymayoccurbecausethefailureofone?rmleadstothefailureofother?rmswhichcascadesthroughthesystem(e.g.,DavisandLo,1999;JarrowandYu,2001).Orsystemicriskmaywreakhavocwhenanumberof?nancial?rmsfailsimultaneously,asintheGreatDepressionwhenmorethan9000banksfailed(Benston,1986).Intheformercase,thefailureofone?rm,suchasAIG,LehmanBrothersorBearStearns,couldleadtowidespreadfailurethrough?nancialcontractssuchasCDSs.Inthelattercase,thefactthatsomany?nancialinstitutionshavefailedmeansthatboththemoneysupplyandtheamountofcreditintheeconomycouldfallsofarastocausealargedropineconomicactivity(FriedmanandSchwartz,1971).Whileaweak?nancialsystemcouldcausearecession,therecessionwouldnotarisebecauseone?rmwasallowedto?lebankruptcy.Further,shouldoneortheother?rmgobankrupt,thenon?nancial?rmwouldhavethegreaterimpactontheeconomy.Suchextremerealeffectsthatappeartobetheresultof?nancial?rmfragilityhaveledtoalargeemphasisonthepreventionofsystemicriskproblemsbyregulators.Foremostamongthesepoliciesis“toobigtofail”(TBTF),thelogicofwhichisthatthefailureofalarge?nancialinstitutionwillhaveramificationsforother?nancialinstitutionsandthereforetherisktotheeconomywouldbeenormous.TBTFwasbehindtheFed’sdecisionstoorchestratethemergerofBearStearnsandJ.P.MorganChasein2008,itsleadershipintherestructuringofbankloansowedbyLongTermCapitalManagement(LTCM),anditsdecisiontopropupAIG.TBTFmaybejusti?ediftheoutcomeispreventionofamajordownswingintheeconomy.However,ifthesystemicrisksintheseepisodeshavebeenexaggeratedorthesalutaryeffectsoftheseactionsoverestimated,thenthecosttotheef?ciencyofthecapitalallocationsystemmayfaroutweighanypotentialbene?tsfromattemptingtoavoidanotherGreatDepression.Nodoubt,noregulatorwantstotakethechanceofstandingdownwhilewatchingoveranothersystemicriskcrisis,sowedonothavetheabilitytoexamineempiricallywhathappenstotheeconomywhenregulatorsbackoff.ThereareveryfewinstancesinthemodernhistoryoftheU.S.whereregulatorsallowedthebankruptcyofamajor?nancial?rm.Mostrecently,wecanpointtothebankruptcyofLehman,whichtheFedpointedlyallowedtofail.However,withonlyoneobviouscasewhereTBTFwasabandoned,wehaveonlyaninklingofhowTBTFpolicyaffectssystemicrisk.Moreover,atthesametimethatLehmanfailed,theFedwasinterveninginthecommercialpapermarketandaidingmoneymarketmutualfundswhileAIGwasdowngradedandsubsequentlybailedout.Inaddition,theFederalReserveandtheTreasurywerescaremongeringabouttheprospectsofasecondGreatDepressiontomakethepassageofTARPmorelikely.ThuswewillneverknowifthemarketdownturnthatfollowedtheLehmanbankruptcyre?ectedfearofcontagionfromLehmantotherealeconomyorfearofthedepthsofexistingproblemsintherealeconomythatwerehighlightedsodramaticallybyregulators.Inthispaperweanalyzethemechanismsbywhichsuchriskcouldcauseaneconomy-widecol-lapse.Wefocusontwotypesofcontagionthatmightleadtosystemicriskproblems:(1)informationcontagion,wheretheinformationthatone?nancial?rmistroubledisassociatedwithnegativeshocksatother?nancialinstitutionslargelybecausethe?rmssharecommonriskfactors;or(2)counterpartycontagion,whereoneimportant?nancialinstitution’scollapseleadsdirectlytotroublesatothercred-itor?rmswhosetroublessnowballanddriveother?rmsintodistress.Theef?cacyofTBTFpoliciesdependscruciallyonwhichofthesetwotypesofsystemicriskmechanismsdominates.Counterpartycontagionmaywarrantinterventioninindividualbankfailureswhileinformationcontagiondoesnot.Ifregulatorsdonotstepintobailoutanindividual?rm,thealternativeistoletitfail.Inthecaseofabank,theprocessinvolvestheFDICasreceiverandtheinsuredliabilitiesofthe?rmareveryquicklyrepaid.Incontrast,thefailureofaninvestmentbankorhedgefunddoesnotinvolvetheFDICandmaycloselyresembleaChapter11orChapter7?lingofanon?nancial?rm.However,ifthenonbank?nancial?rminquestionhasliabilitiesthatarecoveredbytheSecuritiesIndustryProtectionCorporation(SIPC),the?rmisrequiredbylawundertheSecuritiesIndustryProtectionAct(SIPA)toliquidateunderChapter7(DonandWang,1990).ThisexplainsinlargepartwhyonlytheholdingcompanyofLehman?ledforbankruptcyin2008anditsbroker–dealersubsidiarieswerenotpartoftheChapter11?ling.Amajorfearofa?nancial?rmliquidation,whetherdonethroughtheFDICorasrequiredbySIPA,isthat?resaleswilldepressrecoveriesforthecreditorsofthefailed?nancial?rmandthatthese?resaleswillhaverami?cationsforother?rmsinrelatedbusinesses,evenifthesebusinessesdonothavedirecttiestothefailed?rm(ShleiferandVishny,1992).ThisfearwasbehindtheFed’sdecisiontoextendliquiditytoprimarydealersinMarch2008–FedChairmanBernankeexplainedinaspeechon?nancialsystemstabilitythat“theriskdevelopedthatliquiditypressuresmightforcedealerstosellassetsintoalreadyilliquidmarkets.Thismighthaveresultedin...[a]?resalescenario...,inwhichacascadeoffailuresandliquidationssharplydepressesassetprices,withadverse?nancialandeconomicimplications.”(May13,2008speechattheFederalReserveBankofAtlantaconferenceatSeaIsland,Georgia)Thefearofpotential?resalesisexpressedinfurtherdetailinthesamespeechasareasonforthemergerofBearStearnsandJPMorgan:“Bear...wouldbeforcedto?leforbankruptcy...[which]wouldhaveforcedBear’ssecuredcreditorsandcounterpartiestoliquidatetheunderlyingcollateraland,giventheilliquidityofmarkets,thosecreditorsandcounterpartiesmightwellhavesustainedlosses.Iftheyrespondedtolossesortheunexpectedilliquidityoftheirholdingsbypullingbackfromprovidingsecured?nancingtoother?rms,amuchbroaderliquiditycrisiswouldhaveensued.”Theideathatcreditorsofafailed?rmareforcedtoliquidateassets,andtodosowithhaste,iscountertothebasictenetsofU.S.bankruptcylaws,whicharesetuptoallowcreditorstheabilitytomaximizethevalueoftheassetsnowundertheircontrol.Ifthatvalueisgreatestwhencontinuingtooperate,thelawsallowsuchareorganizationofthe?rm.Ifthevalueinliquidationishigher,thelawsareinnowayprejudicedagainstsellingassetsinanorderlyprocedure.Bankruptcyactuallyreducesthelikelihoodof?resalesbecauseassetsarenotsoldquicklyonceabankruptcy?lingoccurs.Cashdoesnotleavethebankruptfirmwithouttheapprovalofajudge.Withoutpressuretopaydebts,the?rmcanremaininbankruptcyformonthsasittriestodecideonthebestcourseofaction.Indeed,amajorcomplaintabouttheU.S.codeisthatdebtorscaneasilydelayreorganizingandslowdowntheprocess.If,however,creditorsandmanagementbelievethatspeedyassetssalesareintheirbestinterest,thentheycanpressthebankruptcyjudgetoapprovequickaction.ThisoccurredinthecaseofLehman’sassetsaletoBarclays,whichinvolvedhiringworkerswhomighthavesplitupweretheirdivisionsnotsoldquickly.金融公司破產(chǎn)及系統(tǒng)性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)2008年秋，當(dāng)美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)和財(cái)政部拒絕85億美金巨資保險(xiǎn)投入到美國國際集團(tuán)時(shí)，這邊借給美國國際集團(tuán)的貨款就直接落到了競爭對手手里，而投保人只得到極少的一部分資金。在那些大的受益人當(dāng)中，高盛用12億美金來撤銷美國國際集團(tuán)的信用違約互換。這一應(yīng)急方案通過逐步售出美國國際集團(tuán)的資產(chǎn)來償還貸款，而不是保住崗位或者是確保短期貸款市場像之前那樣持續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)揮市場效能。因此，政府避免美國國際集團(tuán)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的，是為了確保美國國際集團(tuán)的商業(yè)伙伴不至于破產(chǎn)。從這一出發(fā)點(diǎn)，很明顯是信用違約互換當(dāng)中最好的一個(gè)。也是因?yàn)檫@一點(diǎn)，相比2008年美國國際集團(tuán)多贏得4000億的合同。 在條款當(dāng)中，美國政府在援助通用汽車時(shí)表現(xiàn)的并沒那么積極，可能是因?yàn)檎_信，通用的破產(chǎn)把損失強(qiáng)加到相關(guān)的合作企業(yè)，這樣不會(huì)對宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生太大的壞影響。這一決定和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)查的結(jié)果是一致的，即金融公司的破產(chǎn)比非金融公司的破產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大很多。例如Bordo和Haubrich提到“越是嚴(yán)重的金融事件越是和嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退聯(lián)系在一起?！蓖瑯拥?，Bernanke反駁道，大蕭條如此的讓經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退是因?yàn)殂y行業(yè)的缺陷影響到投資的信用度。Bernanke假設(shè)一種金融加速器機(jī)制，在這樣的機(jī)制中，經(jīng)濟(jì)的一個(gè)領(lǐng)域破產(chǎn)導(dǎo)致更多的不穩(wěn)固的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和緊張的信貸狀況。這反過來就導(dǎo)致投資的減少，隨之而來的是變少的貸款和普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。如果對非金融企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊都是以破產(chǎn)的形式呈現(xiàn)，這些作者們在辯論經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷好似不會(huì)很嚴(yán)重的。我們反而認(rèn)為非金融企業(yè)破產(chǎn)的連鎖影響遠(yuǎn)比金融企業(yè)的大，就像美國國際集團(tuán)。雖然通過競爭對手風(fēng)險(xiǎn)渠道，不會(huì)對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生毀滅性的打擊。但并不是說一段時(shí)期在大銀行間的經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷不會(huì)伴隨沖擊很大的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。只是因?yàn)檫@樣是經(jīng)濟(jì)失利不會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，也不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的深度。不管是哪一種類型的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)，這樣的破產(chǎn)在企業(yè)股份中不是常見的導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)損失的癥狀。因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)公司的倒閉導(dǎo)致其他公司的倒閉形成系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的一種聯(lián)級，這樣就會(huì)產(chǎn)生普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱的現(xiàn)象。當(dāng)許多金融公司同時(shí)倒閉，系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)減弱經(jīng)濟(jì)的破壞力度，就像在大蕭條時(shí)期，9000多家銀行倒閉。在前一種案例中，一家公司的倒閉，譬如像美國國際集團(tuán)，雷曼兄弟，或者貝爾斯登這樣的公司倒閉，會(huì)導(dǎo)致倒閉現(xiàn)象在金融界蔓延，例如信用違約互換。在后一種案例中，事實(shí)是許多金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉意味著不僅僅是貨幣的供應(yīng)，而且只要經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中的破敗，就會(huì)降低信用額度。當(dāng)脆弱的金融系統(tǒng)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)的蕭條時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條就不會(huì)產(chǎn)生，因?yàn)楣究梢陨暾埰飘a(chǎn)。而且如果只是一兩個(gè)公司的破產(chǎn)，非金融企業(yè)會(huì)對經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生更大的影響。這樣極端且真實(shí)的影響是金融企業(yè)的脆弱性導(dǎo)致調(diào)控者特別強(qiáng)調(diào)對系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的預(yù)防。這些政策當(dāng)中，最突出的是“太大以至于破產(chǎn)”(TBTF的邏輯)，這一觀點(diǎn)的思維方式是，一個(gè)大型的金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉將會(huì)影響到其分支的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，因此，對經(jīng)濟(jì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是很大的。太大而倒閉是2008年隨著美國聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)決定合并貝爾斯登公司和摩根大通銀行之后產(chǎn)生的，在重建銀行貨代時(shí)期的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)是長期資金管理，這一政策的決定是支援美國國際集團(tuán)。如果結(jié)果是阻止了經(jīng)濟(jì)的衰退，太大而倒閉的政策將會(huì)被證實(shí)。然而，如果在這一段時(shí)期系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益處被高估，資金分配以避免另外一場大蕭條的效率代價(jià)體系將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出任何潛在的利益。毫無疑問，在觀察另外一個(gè)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候，沒有管理者想乘機(jī)撤退。因此當(dāng)管理者推到一邊的時(shí)候，我們不能憑經(jīng)驗(yàn)來考核決定經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況。當(dāng)今的美國，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破產(chǎn)的。最近，我們可以看到雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)，這是美國聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)，逼不得已同意破產(chǎn)的企業(yè)。然而，雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是唯一一個(gè)顯而易見的例子表明太大而倒閉的政策是名不副實(shí)的，我們只看到中意政策對系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的微不足道的影響。此外，與此同時(shí)因雷曼兄弟的倒閉，此外,與此同時(shí),雷曼兄弟的失敗的情況下,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在干預(yù)商業(yè)市場、促進(jìn)貨幣資金,而美國國際集團(tuán)是跳傘了。而且，美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備局和財(cái)政局即將散布第二次大蕭條的謠言，以彰顯其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我們將永遠(yuǎn)不知道雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場低迷，以及從雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)致使人們對破產(chǎn)的恐懼反映到現(xiàn)實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)上來或者管理者對人們的現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)體中存在的問題的恐懼進(jìn)行無限的夸大。在本論文中，我們分析會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的經(jīng)